In the United States, mandatory maternity leave is sex discrimination, and mandatory retirement is age discrimination. By contrast, European antidiscrimination law is compatible with both types of mandatory employment policies. This article compares the jurisprudence and policy debates in the United States and Europe on mandatory maternity leave and retirement to unearth two different understandings of the state’s role in advancing equality. In the United States, employment equality is closely tied to preserving individuals’ choice to work, whereas in Europe, employment equality requires collectively imposed norms about the role of work in a person’s life cycle. The comparison highlights the tradeoffs between protecting individual autonomy and combating the social and economic forces that undermine equality.
{"title":"From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle in the United States and Europe","authors":"Julie C. Suk","doi":"10.5131/AJCL.2011.0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2011.0024","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, mandatory maternity leave is sex discrimination, and mandatory retirement is age discrimination. By contrast, European antidiscrimination law is compatible with both types of mandatory employment policies. This article compares the jurisprudence and policy debates in the United States and Europe on mandatory maternity leave and retirement to unearth two different understandings of the state’s role in advancing equality. In the United States, employment equality is closely tied to preserving individuals’ choice to work, whereas in Europe, employment equality requires collectively imposed norms about the role of work in a person’s life cycle. The comparison highlights the tradeoffs between protecting individual autonomy and combating the social and economic forces that undermine equality.","PeriodicalId":288236,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Theoretical Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"34 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114058096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
House and Senate Democrats have produced health care legislation whose mandates, subsidies, tax penalties, and health insurance regulations would penalize work and reward Americans who refuse to purchase health insurance. As a result, the legislation could trap many Americans in low-wage jobs and cause even higher health-insurance premiums, government spending, and taxes than are envisioned in the legislation.Those mandates and subsidies would impose effective marginal tax rates on low-wage workers that would average between 53 and 74 percent - and even reach as high as 82 percent - over broad ranges of earned income. By comparison, the wealthiest Americans would face tax rates no higher than 47.9 percent.Over smaller ranges of earned income, the legislation would impose effective marginal tax rates that exceed 100 percent. Families of four would see effective marginal tax rates as high as 174 percent under the Senate bill and 159 percent under the House bill. Under the Senate bill, adults starting at $14,560 who earn an additional $560 would see their total income fall by $200 due to higher taxes and reduced subsidies. Under the House bill, families of four starting at $43,670 who earn an additional $1,100 would see their total income fall by $870. In addition, middle-income workers could save as much as $8,000 per year by dropping coverage and purchasing health insurance only when sick. Indeed, the legislation effectively removes any penalty on such behavior by forcing insurers to sell health insurance to the uninsured at standard premiums when they fall ill. The legislation would thus encourage "adverse selection" - an unstable situation that would drive insurance premiums, government spending, and taxes even higher.
{"title":"Obama's Prescription for Low-Wage Workers: High Implicit Taxes, Higher Premiums","authors":"Michael F. Cannon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1543986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1543986","url":null,"abstract":"House and Senate Democrats have produced health care legislation whose mandates, subsidies, tax penalties, and health insurance regulations would penalize work and reward Americans who refuse to purchase health insurance. As a result, the legislation could trap many Americans in low-wage jobs and cause even higher health-insurance premiums, government spending, and taxes than are envisioned in the legislation.Those mandates and subsidies would impose effective marginal tax rates on low-wage workers that would average between 53 and 74 percent - and even reach as high as 82 percent - over broad ranges of earned income. By comparison, the wealthiest Americans would face tax rates no higher than 47.9 percent.Over smaller ranges of earned income, the legislation would impose effective marginal tax rates that exceed 100 percent. Families of four would see effective marginal tax rates as high as 174 percent under the Senate bill and 159 percent under the House bill. Under the Senate bill, adults starting at $14,560 who earn an additional $560 would see their total income fall by $200 due to higher taxes and reduced subsidies. Under the House bill, families of four starting at $43,670 who earn an additional $1,100 would see their total income fall by $870. In addition, middle-income workers could save as much as $8,000 per year by dropping coverage and purchasing health insurance only when sick. Indeed, the legislation effectively removes any penalty on such behavior by forcing insurers to sell health insurance to the uninsured at standard premiums when they fall ill. The legislation would thus encourage \"adverse selection\" - an unstable situation that would drive insurance premiums, government spending, and taxes even higher.","PeriodicalId":288236,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Theoretical Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129977326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we study the quantitative properties of a policy reform aimed at funding the pension system in the standard model economy with perfect substitution across workers with different experience levels and a model economy where this substitutability is imperfect. With compulsory retirement, the welfare gains for young cohorts are underestimated in the standard model economy with perfect substitution as compared to the imperfect substitution case. However these additional welfare gains displayed in the imperfect substitution case come at the cost of higher welfare losses for the generations living at the time of the policy reform, due to the fall in the experience premium that follows after the elimination of social security. When the policy reform consists of the elimination of both social security and compulsory retirement, we find that in the standard model the status quo problem disappears. However, such policy change is not able to solve the status quo problem when less and more experienced workers are imperfect substitutes because the fall in the experience premium is more pronounced, providing a rationale for the lack of political support in favour of pension reform in the Spanish economy.
{"title":"Social Security Reform with Imperfect Substitution between Less and More Experienced Workers","authors":"Juan A. Rojas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1333536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1333536","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we study the quantitative properties of a policy reform aimed at funding the pension system in the standard model economy with perfect substitution across workers with different experience levels and a model economy where this substitutability is imperfect. With compulsory retirement, the welfare gains for young cohorts are underestimated in the standard model economy with perfect substitution as compared to the imperfect substitution case. However these additional welfare gains displayed in the imperfect substitution case come at the cost of higher welfare losses for the generations living at the time of the policy reform, due to the fall in the experience premium that follows after the elimination of social security. When the policy reform consists of the elimination of both social security and compulsory retirement, we find that in the standard model the status quo problem disappears. However, such policy change is not able to solve the status quo problem when less and more experienced workers are imperfect substitutes because the fall in the experience premium is more pronounced, providing a rationale for the lack of political support in favour of pension reform in the Spanish economy.","PeriodicalId":288236,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Theoretical Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121666590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of information about the candidates. I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking than females, and its implications for rates of promotion and abilities of survivors. I define promotion hierarchies with and without memory, where memory means that promotion depends on the entire history of success. In both types of hierarchies, the surviving risk takers have lower average ability whenever they have a higher survival rate. Further, even if more risk takers than non risk takers are promoted in the beginning of the hierarchy, that will be reversed over time. The risk takers will eventually have a lower survival rate, but higher ability. As a consequence of these differences, the various requirements of employment law cannot simultaneously be satisfied. Further, if promotion standards are chosen to maximize profit, the standards will reflect gender in ways that are difficult to distinguish from discriminatory intent.
{"title":"Risk Taking and Gender in Hierarchies","authors":"Suzanne Scotchmer","doi":"10.3386/W14464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W14464","url":null,"abstract":"In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of information about the candidates. I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking than females, and its implications for rates of promotion and abilities of survivors. I define promotion hierarchies with and without memory, where memory means that promotion depends on the entire history of success. In both types of hierarchies, the surviving risk takers have lower average ability whenever they have a higher survival rate. Further, even if more risk takers than non risk takers are promoted in the beginning of the hierarchy, that will be reversed over time. The risk takers will eventually have a lower survival rate, but higher ability. As a consequence of these differences, the various requirements of employment law cannot simultaneously be satisfied. Further, if promotion standards are chosen to maximize profit, the standards will reflect gender in ways that are difficult to distinguish from discriminatory intent.","PeriodicalId":288236,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Theoretical Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123492402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-11-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01554.x
L. Kaas
This paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste-based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality. When the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak, the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely. However, with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition, equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation, and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before. Profits of discriminating firms may increase, and discrimination can persist in the long run although it would have disappeared without the policy.
{"title":"Does Equal Pay Legislation Reduce Labour Market Inequality?","authors":"L. Kaas","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01554.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01554.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste-based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality. When the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak, the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely. However, with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition, equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation, and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before. Profits of discriminating firms may increase, and discrimination can persist in the long run although it would have disappeared without the policy.","PeriodicalId":288236,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Theoretical Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127902881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) sets minimum wages and maximum hours for the nation’s workers. Nevertheless, employers steal billions of dollars each year from low-wage workers. This article argues that a faithful reading of the FLSA requires courts to bar confidential settlements of claims brought under the statute. A rule against confidentiality would make public a significant amount of information about wage theft. That information is a prerequisite to encouraging individual workers to enforce their rights and to generating broader public awareness about the epidemic of wage theft that low-wage workers face.
{"title":"Silent Workers, Disappearing Rights: Confidential Settlements and the Fair Labor Standards Act","authors":"E. Wilkins","doi":"10.15779/Z38QP9K","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38QP9K","url":null,"abstract":"The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) sets minimum wages and maximum hours for the nation’s workers. Nevertheless, employers steal billions of dollars each year from low-wage workers. This article argues that a faithful reading of the FLSA requires courts to bar confidential settlements of claims brought under the statute. A rule against confidentiality would make public a significant amount of information about wage theft. That information is a prerequisite to encouraging individual workers to enforce their rights and to generating broader public awareness about the epidemic of wage theft that low-wage workers face.","PeriodicalId":288236,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Theoretical Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121094322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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