This paper investigates the optimal design of linear compensation schemes that incentivize information acquisition and sharing in multidivisional organizations. When the information shared between divisions is highly correlated and the information acquisition costs are not too high, the optimal strategy for the headquarters manager is to implement a compensation scheme that links the remuneration of each division to the performance of the other division. However, if the information is weakly correlated or the cost of acquisition is prohibitively high, the most effective incentive is to tie each manager’s remuneration solely to the performance of their own division.
{"title":"The Design of Information Acquisition and Sharing","authors":"Dimitri Migrow, Francesco Squintani","doi":"10.1086/726580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726580","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the optimal design of linear compensation schemes that incentivize information acquisition and sharing in multidivisional organizations. When the information shared between divisions is highly correlated and the information acquisition costs are not too high, the optimal strategy for the headquarters manager is to implement a compensation scheme that links the remuneration of each division to the performance of the other division. However, if the information is weakly correlated or the cost of acquisition is prohibitively high, the most effective incentive is to tie each manager’s remuneration solely to the performance of their own division.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134287947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Gugler, Sven Heim, M. Janssen, Mario Liebensteiner
When lower prices are available only to consumers who search, firms can price discriminate based on search. We study local German electricity retail markets in which nonsearching consumers pay the incumbent’s baseline tariff. To observe other prices, consumers access an online platform. Pricing and search patterns differ substantially across local markets. Using panel data, we show that in local markets with more search, incumbents have higher baseline tariffs, while incumbents’ and entrants’ online tariffs are lower. In a theoretical model, we discuss when an incumbent has an incentive to differentiate tariffs and the welfare properties of banning such price discrimination practices.
{"title":"Incumbency Advantages: Price Dispersion, Price Discrimination, and Consumer Search at Online Platforms","authors":"K. Gugler, Sven Heim, M. Janssen, Mario Liebensteiner","doi":"10.1086/725335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725335","url":null,"abstract":"When lower prices are available only to consumers who search, firms can price discriminate based on search. We study local German electricity retail markets in which nonsearching consumers pay the incumbent’s baseline tariff. To observe other prices, consumers access an online platform. Pricing and search patterns differ substantially across local markets. Using panel data, we show that in local markets with more search, incumbents have higher baseline tariffs, while incumbents’ and entrants’ online tariffs are lower. In a theoretical model, we discuss when an incumbent has an incentive to differentiate tariffs and the welfare properties of banning such price discrimination practices.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128837330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Green, Oliver Hyman-Metzger, G. Sood, Michelle A. Zee
The pioneering work of Washington in 2008 shows that legislators with daughters cast more liberal roll call votes on women’s issues. Costa and coauthors in 2019 find that this pattern subsides in more recent congresses and speculate that increasing party polarization might diminish the “daughter effect.” We investigate patterns of change over time by looking at eight congresses prior to the four studied by Washington and eight subsequent congresses, including three not included by Costa and coauthors. Contrary to the party polarization hypothesis, we find no daughter effect prior to the period that Washington studied and no effect thereafter.
{"title":"Revisiting a Natural Experiment: Do Legislators with Daughters Vote More Liberally on Women’s Issues?","authors":"D. Green, Oliver Hyman-Metzger, G. Sood, Michelle A. Zee","doi":"10.1086/724744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724744","url":null,"abstract":"The pioneering work of Washington in 2008 shows that legislators with daughters cast more liberal roll call votes on women’s issues. Costa and coauthors in 2019 find that this pattern subsides in more recent congresses and speculate that increasing party polarization might diminish the “daughter effect.” We investigate patterns of change over time by looking at eight congresses prior to the four studied by Washington and eight subsequent congresses, including three not included by Costa and coauthors. Contrary to the party polarization hypothesis, we find no daughter effect prior to the period that Washington studied and no effect thereafter.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126989074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While most experimental papers on repeated games explore the benefits of repeated interactions, we explore the often-overlooked potential for negative implications. We demonstrate this possibility in the lab with a standard random-termination protocol applied to a new, simple, and easily interpretable stage game, capturing stylized aspects of bystander complacency.
{"title":"Bad Repetition","authors":"Geoffroy de Clippel, Kareen Rozen","doi":"10.1086/724325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724325","url":null,"abstract":"While most experimental papers on repeated games explore the benefits of repeated interactions, we explore the often-overlooked potential for negative implications. We demonstrate this possibility in the lab with a standard random-termination protocol applied to a new, simple, and easily interpretable stage game, capturing stylized aspects of bystander complacency.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126184290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study employee productivity before and during the working-from-home period of the COVID-19 pandemic, using personnel and analytics data from over 10,000 skilled professionals at an Indian technology company. Hours worked increased, output declined slightly, and productivity fell 8%–19%. We then analyze determinants of productivity changes. An important source is higher communication costs. Time spent on coordination activities and meetings increased, while uninterrupted work hours shrank considerably. Employees networked with fewer individuals and business units inside and outside the firm and had fewer one-to-one meetings with supervisors. The findings suggest key issues for firms in implementing remote work.
{"title":"Work from Home and Productivity: Evidence from Personnel and Analytics Data on Information Technology Professionals","authors":"Michael J. Gibbs, F. Mengel, Christoph Siemroth","doi":"10.1086/721803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721803","url":null,"abstract":"We study employee productivity before and during the working-from-home period of the COVID-19 pandemic, using personnel and analytics data from over 10,000 skilled professionals at an Indian technology company. Hours worked increased, output declined slightly, and productivity fell 8%–19%. We then analyze determinants of productivity changes. An important source is higher communication costs. Time spent on coordination activities and meetings increased, while uninterrupted work hours shrank considerably. Employees networked with fewer individuals and business units inside and outside the firm and had fewer one-to-one meetings with supervisors. The findings suggest key issues for firms in implementing remote work.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127626824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I am pleased to present the inaugural issue of the Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics ( JPE Micro). JPE Micro, which is published by the University of Chicago Press and is closely tied to the Journal of Political Economy ( JPE), is intended to serve as a forum for high-quality theoretical and empirical research in microeconomics. More specifically, the journal strives to publish high-quality theoretical, empirical, and econometric research papers and replication studies that address issues of relevance to microeconomics. JPE Micro interprets microeconomics in the broadest possible sense, which means including issues related to how individuals, households, firms, and governments make choices and how those choices affect prices, the allocation of resources, and the well-being of people. JPE Micro welcomes submissions in all areas of microeconomics including, but not limited to, industrial organization and labor, behavioral, experimental, environmental, international, public, health care, education, and development economics. The journal is served by a truly outstanding board of editors, which includes Eduardo Azevedo, Lint Barrage, Anna Dreber Almenberg, Matthew Grennan, Christian Hansen, and Juanna Schrøter Joensen. Each is an exceptional scholar, and as a collective, they provide the breadth and depth of economic wisdom and knowledge that a top scholarly journal demands. In addition to these editors, several exceptional associate editors also have agreed to advise in the handling of manuscripts.
我很高兴为大家介绍《政治经济微观经济学杂志》(JPE Micro)的创刊号。《微观经济学》由芝加哥大学出版社出版，与《政治经济学杂志》(JPE)密切相关，旨在为微观经济学的高质量理论和实证研究提供论坛。更具体地说，该杂志致力于发表高质量的理论、实证和计量经济学研究论文和重复性研究，解决与微观经济学相关的问题。JPE微观经济学在最广泛的意义上解释微观经济学，这意味着包括与个人、家庭、公司和政府如何做出选择以及这些选择如何影响价格、资源配置和人民福祉有关的问题。JPE Micro欢迎所有微观经济学领域的投稿，包括但不限于产业组织和劳动、行为、实验、环境、国际、公共、卫生保健、教育和发展经济学。该杂志由一个真正杰出的编辑委员会服务，其中包括Eduardo Azevedo, Lint Barrage, Anna Dreber Almenberg, Matthew Grennan, Christian Hansen和Juanna Schrøter Joensen。每个人都是杰出的学者，作为一个集体，他们提供了顶级学术期刊所需要的经济智慧和知识的广度和深度。除了这些编辑之外，几位杰出的副编辑也同意在手稿处理方面提供建议。
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction to JPE Micro","authors":"J. List","doi":"10.1086/724247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724247","url":null,"abstract":"I am pleased to present the inaugural issue of the Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics ( JPE Micro). JPE Micro, which is published by the University of Chicago Press and is closely tied to the Journal of Political Economy ( JPE), is intended to serve as a forum for high-quality theoretical and empirical research in microeconomics. More specifically, the journal strives to publish high-quality theoretical, empirical, and econometric research papers and replication studies that address issues of relevance to microeconomics. JPE Micro interprets microeconomics in the broadest possible sense, which means including issues related to how individuals, households, firms, and governments make choices and how those choices affect prices, the allocation of resources, and the well-being of people. JPE Micro welcomes submissions in all areas of microeconomics including, but not limited to, industrial organization and labor, behavioral, experimental, environmental, international, public, health care, education, and development economics. The journal is served by a truly outstanding board of editors, which includes Eduardo Azevedo, Lint Barrage, Anna Dreber Almenberg, Matthew Grennan, Christian Hansen, and Juanna Schrøter Joensen. Each is an exceptional scholar, and as a collective, they provide the breadth and depth of economic wisdom and knowledge that a top scholarly journal demands. In addition to these editors, several exceptional associate editors also have agreed to advise in the handling of manuscripts.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133338102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rational choice framework for modeling matching markets has been tremendously useful in guiding the design of school-assignment systems. Despite this success, a large body of work documents deviations from the predictions of this framework that appear influenced by behavioral economic phenomena. We review these findings and the body of behavioral theories that have been presented as possible explanations. Motivated by this literature, we lay out paths for behavioral economists to be directly useful to education market design.
{"title":"Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design: A Forward-Looking Review","authors":"A. Rees-Jones, Ran I. Shorrer","doi":"10.1086/725054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725054","url":null,"abstract":"The rational choice framework for modeling matching markets has been tremendously useful in guiding the design of school-assignment systems. Despite this success, a large body of work documents deviations from the predictions of this framework that appear influenced by behavioral economic phenomena. We review these findings and the body of behavioral theories that have been presented as possible explanations. Motivated by this literature, we lay out paths for behavioral economists to be directly useful to education market design.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133447281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
O. Bandiera, R. Burgess, Erika Deserranno, Ricardo Morel, M. Sulaiman, Imran Rasul
There has been a rise in the use of the local delivery model for development interventions, where local agents are hired as intermediaries to target benefits to potential beneficiaries. We study this model in the context of a standard agricultural extension intervention in Uganda. We document a trade-off between coverage and targeting: delivery agents treat more farmers when they have a greater number of social ties, but they are significantly more likely to target their nonpoor ties. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the design of the local delivery model for antipoverty interventions.
{"title":"Social Incentives, Delivery Agents, and the Effectiveness of Development Interventions","authors":"O. Bandiera, R. Burgess, Erika Deserranno, Ricardo Morel, M. Sulaiman, Imran Rasul","doi":"10.1086/722898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722898","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a rise in the use of the local delivery model for development interventions, where local agents are hired as intermediaries to target benefits to potential beneficiaries. We study this model in the context of a standard agricultural extension intervention in Uganda. We document a trade-off between coverage and targeting: delivery agents treat more farmers when they have a greater number of social ties, but they are significantly more likely to target their nonpoor ties. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the design of the local delivery model for antipoverty interventions.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131084836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Haushofer, Sara Lowes, A. Musau, D. Ndetei, Nathan Nunn, M. Poll, Nancy Qian
While observational evidence suggests that people behave more prosocially toward members of their own ethnic group, many laboratory studies fail to find this effect. One possible explanation is that coethnic preference only emerges during times of stress. To test this hypothesis, we pharmacologically increase levels of the stress hormone cortisol, after which participants complete laboratory experiments with coethnics and non-coethnics. We find mixed evidence that increased cortisol decreases prosocial behavior. Coethnic preferences do not vary with cortisol. However, in contrast to previous studies, we find strong and robust evidence of coethnic preference.
{"title":"Stress, Ethnicity, and Prosocial Behavior","authors":"J. Haushofer, Sara Lowes, A. Musau, D. Ndetei, Nathan Nunn, M. Poll, Nancy Qian","doi":"10.1086/722367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722367","url":null,"abstract":"While observational evidence suggests that people behave more prosocially toward members of their own ethnic group, many laboratory studies fail to find this effect. One possible explanation is that coethnic preference only emerges during times of stress. To test this hypothesis, we pharmacologically increase levels of the stress hormone cortisol, after which participants complete laboratory experiments with coethnics and non-coethnics. We find mixed evidence that increased cortisol decreases prosocial behavior. Coethnic preferences do not vary with cortisol. However, in contrast to previous studies, we find strong and robust evidence of coethnic preference.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121283934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Motivated by growing evidence of agents’ mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept—robust equilibrium—that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by applicant-proposing deferred acceptance. Although truth telling is a dominant strategy, almost all applicants may be nontruthful in robust equilibrium; however, the outcome must be arbitrarily close to the stable matching. Our results imply that one can assume truthful agents to study deferred acceptance outcomes theoretically or counterfactually. However, to estimate the preferences of mistaken agents, one should assume stable matching but not truth telling.
{"title":"Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents","authors":"Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che, YingHua He","doi":"10.1086/722978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722978","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by growing evidence of agents’ mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept—robust equilibrium—that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by applicant-proposing deferred acceptance. Although truth telling is a dominant strategy, almost all applicants may be nontruthful in robust equilibrium; however, the outcome must be arbitrarily close to the stable matching. Our results imply that one can assume truthful agents to study deferred acceptance outcomes theoretically or counterfactually. However, to estimate the preferences of mistaken agents, one should assume stable matching but not truth telling.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124795934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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