Utilizing data from surveys of mass-market consumer fraud sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission in 2005, 2011, and 2017, this paper explores whether victims of such mass-market consumer frauds complain to anyone beyond their families and friends about being victimized, and if they do complain, to whom they complain. It also explores whether victims with different demographic characteristics are more or less likely to complain.
In about 45 percent of instances, victims complained to someone beyond their family and friends. This might have been the seller or manufacturer of the fraudulent product of service; a provider of payment services such as a credit card company, a bank or another payment service; a Better Business Bureau; or a government agency. This figure is stable across the three surveys included in this analysis.
While there is little, if any, variation in complaint rates across the three surveys, there is considerable variation in the likelihood that victims of different types of frauds complained. Those who were billed for an item that they had never agreed to purchase were the most likely to report having complained – with 61 percent of those victims indicating that they had complained to at least one party. Fifty-eight percent of those who paid for a product or service that they never received reported having complained. For victims who experienced other types of frauds, no more than 40 percent complained. Of those who purchased fraudulent credit card insurance or a fraudulent computer repair, less than 20 percent complained.
Not surprisingly, complaints were most frequently directed at someone directly involved in the transaction – a seller or a manufacturer. Thirty percent of victims reported having complained either to a seller or to a manufacturer. About 12 percent complained to a credit card company, a bank, or some other payment service provider.
Less than 3 percent of victims complained to a government entity. Somewhat more than half of these – 1.5 percent of victims – complained to a local authority – the local police or a local consumer agency. Less than 1 percent complained to a state Attorney General or other state authority or to a federal agency. Just over 2 percent of victims reported having complained to a Better Business Bureau. Together, 4.8 percent of victims complained to a BBB or to a government agency.
To whom a complaint is directed varies somewhat with the type of problem being considered. While a seller or manufacturer is the most frequent recipient of complaints for most of the types of fraud considered here, the percentage of victims who complained to a seller or manufacturer ranged from 43 percent among victims who paid for an item that they never received to 6 percent for victims of fraudulent computer repair offerings. The percentage of complainants who complained to a governmental entity or the BBB likewise varied with the type of fraud – with around 20 perc
{"title":"To Whom Do Victims of Mass-Market Consumer Fraud Complain?","authors":"K. Anderson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3852323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3852323","url":null,"abstract":"Utilizing data from surveys of mass-market consumer fraud sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission in 2005, 2011, and 2017, this paper explores whether victims of such mass-market consumer frauds complain to anyone beyond their families and friends about being victimized, and if they do complain, to whom they complain. It also explores whether victims with different demographic characteristics are more or less likely to complain.<br><br> In about 45 percent of instances, victims complained to someone beyond their family and friends. This might have been the seller or manufacturer of the fraudulent product of service; a provider of payment services such as a credit card company, a bank or another payment service; a Better Business Bureau; or a government agency. This figure is stable across the three surveys included in this analysis. <br><br> While there is little, if any, variation in complaint rates across the three surveys, there is considerable variation in the likelihood that victims of different types of frauds complained. Those who were billed for an item that they had never agreed to purchase were the most likely to report having complained – with 61 percent of those victims indicating that they had complained to at least one party. Fifty-eight percent of those who paid for a product or service that they never received reported having complained. For victims who experienced other types of frauds, no more than 40 percent complained. Of those who purchased fraudulent credit card insurance or a fraudulent computer repair, less than 20 percent complained.<br><br> Not surprisingly, complaints were most frequently directed at someone directly involved in the transaction – a seller or a manufacturer. Thirty percent of victims reported having complained either to a seller or to a manufacturer. About 12 percent complained to a credit card company, a bank, or some other payment service provider. <br><br> Less than 3 percent of victims complained to a government entity. Somewhat more than half of these – 1.5 percent of victims – complained to a local authority – the local police or a local consumer agency. Less than 1 percent complained to a state Attorney General or other state authority or to a federal agency. Just over 2 percent of victims reported having complained to a Better Business Bureau. Together, 4.8 percent of victims complained to a BBB or to a government agency.<br><br> To whom a complaint is directed varies somewhat with the type of problem being considered. While a seller or manufacturer is the most frequent recipient of complaints for most of the types of fraud considered here, the percentage of victims who complained to a seller or manufacturer ranged from 43 percent among victims who paid for an item that they never received to 6 percent for victims of fraudulent computer repair offerings. The percentage of complainants who complained to a governmental entity or the BBB likewise varied with the type of fraud – with around 20 perc","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115961408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article advances a public health model of ethics and compliance. It argues that corporate leaders should draw from the successful lessons of public health to promote ethical behavior more effectively in their companies. With its attention to data-driven risk mitigation and behaviorally cognizant processes, a public health model can move compliance from the faulty assumption on which it is based, i.e., that organizational wrongdoing can be deterred solely through appeals to the rational decision-making processes of employees, to a more accurate understanding of the situational and social influences that foster noncompliance. The article supports its thesis in three parts. It begins by explaining the evolution of compliance and its transition from overly legalistic to behaviorally aware. Next it draws on behavioral ethics and network research to make the connection between public health and compliance. Third, it explores how corporate leaders can meld the insights from these two disciplines, offering a new way of approaching ethics and compliance that is focused on behavioral ethics conduct risk and the practical application of behavioral science within the firm—the best way to improve the legal, ethical, and financial health of companies.
{"title":"Leading a Healthier Company: Advancing a Public Health Model of Ethics and Compliance","authors":"Todd Haugh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3843166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3843166","url":null,"abstract":"This article advances a public health model of ethics and compliance. It argues that corporate leaders should draw from the successful lessons of public health to promote ethical behavior more effectively in their companies. With its attention to data-driven risk mitigation and behaviorally cognizant processes, a public health model can move compliance from the faulty assumption on which it is based, i.e., that organizational wrongdoing can be deterred solely through appeals to the rational decision-making processes of employees, to a more accurate understanding of the situational and social influences that foster noncompliance. The article supports its thesis in three parts. It begins by explaining the evolution of compliance and its transition from overly legalistic to behaviorally aware. Next it draws on behavioral ethics and network research to make the connection between public health and compliance. Third, it explores how corporate leaders can meld the insights from these two disciplines, offering a new way of approaching ethics and compliance that is focused on behavioral ethics conduct risk and the practical application of behavioral science within the firm—the best way to improve the legal, ethical, and financial health of companies.","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"163 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132485134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author of this article looks into some concerns pertaining to the impact of money laundering legislation on e-Money Issuers in light of some recent furore in Malaysia wherein MACC had filed applications against 41 parties to recover RM270 million of 1MDB money. Research has subsequently been done to review and analyze the current law pertaining to this matter using the internet as a point of resource. The following legal opinion is put forward premised upon the said research. The author of this article has resourced reference material on this subject from searches over the internet.
{"title":"Legal Opinion – The Impact of Money Laundering Legislation on E-Money Issuers","authors":"S. Woodhull","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3572482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3572482","url":null,"abstract":"The author of this article looks into some concerns pertaining to the impact of money laundering legislation on e-Money Issuers in light of some recent furore in Malaysia wherein MACC had filed applications against 41 parties to recover RM270 million of 1MDB money. Research has subsequently been done to review and analyze the current law pertaining to this matter using the internet as a point of resource. The following legal opinion is put forward premised upon the said research. The author of this article has resourced reference material on this subject from searches over the internet.","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114238859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) allow prosecutors to negotiate and enter into agreements with corporate actors to defer or suspend criminal proceedings, subject to adherence to certain conditions. Developed in the US, in place on a statutory basis in England and Wales since 2013, and likely to be introduced in Australia this year, DPAs are seen to allow the State to intervene and impose conditions on a corporate actor for criminal behaviour, while permitting the entity to make reparation without the collateral damage of conviction. DPAs are proposed as quicker, cheaper, and more predictable than the conventional criminal trial with its costs, risks, and delays. I consider if and how a mechanism for deferring prosecution can cohere with the existing scheme of corporate criminal liability, and with the apparent desire and drive for more robust responses to corporate crime. I argue that DPAs are both necessitated by but also misconstrued as a way of offsetting problems with corporate criminal liability. Moreover, and paradoxically, while DPAs are introduced in an effort to remedy such issues, they are deployed also so as to mitigate the inevitable consequences of conviction, that is, the ‘successful’ use of corporate criminal liability. DPAs therefore both serve to supplement as well as dilute corporate criminal liability. Beyond this, DPAs have implications for individual criminal liability and the scheme of corporate civil liability.
{"title":"Trying Corporate Actors – Why Not Prosecute?","authors":"L. Campbell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3332134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3332134","url":null,"abstract":"Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) allow prosecutors to negotiate and enter into agreements with corporate actors to defer or suspend criminal proceedings, subject to adherence to certain conditions. Developed in the US, in place on a statutory basis in England and Wales since 2013, and likely to be introduced in Australia this year, DPAs are seen to allow the State to intervene and impose conditions on a corporate actor for criminal behaviour, while permitting the entity to make reparation without the collateral damage of conviction. DPAs are proposed as quicker, cheaper, and more predictable than the conventional criminal trial with its costs, risks, and delays. \u0000 \u0000I consider if and how a mechanism for deferring prosecution can cohere with the existing scheme of corporate criminal liability, and with the apparent desire and drive for more robust responses to corporate crime. I argue that DPAs are both necessitated by but also misconstrued as a way of offsetting problems with corporate criminal liability. Moreover, and paradoxically, while DPAs are introduced in an effort to remedy such issues, they are deployed also so as to mitigate the inevitable consequences of conviction, that is, the ‘successful’ use of corporate criminal liability. DPAs therefore both serve to supplement as well as dilute corporate criminal liability. Beyond this, DPAs have implications for individual criminal liability and the scheme of corporate civil liability.","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"16 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120997899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Counterfeits cause tremendous damages to brand companies by eroding market shares and reducing customers' willingness to pay. Realizing such problem, many brand companies develop and deploy anticounterfeit technologies to prevent counterfeiters from imitating their products. In this paper, we consider an authentic company which sells its product to a market where a counterfeiter may imitate the genuine one. To combat counterfeiting, the authentic company develops its anticounterfeit technology, helping customers distinguish its genuine product from the fake. We find that in the presence of counterfeiting activities, an authentic company may choose to offer, from its spectrum of product qualities, a relatively low product quality or a very high quality, but not some quality level in-between. Our analysis further indicates that, in equilibrium, the anticounterfeit effort exerted by the authentic company does not necessarily decrease in the penalty levied by the authority, even though they serve the same purpose. In addition, we explore two possible measures that may help increase the authentic company's profit. The first is committing itself to anticounterfeit effort and the second is proactive cooperation with regulatory authority. We find committing to anticounterfeit effort can always make the authentic company better off but may increase the occurrence of counterfeiting. On the contrary, proactive cooperation with the regulatory authority can help reduce counterfeiting but may decrease the authentic company's profit as well.
{"title":"The Role of Anticounterfeit Technology in Combating Counterfeit Products","authors":"S. Yao, Kaijie Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3315767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3315767","url":null,"abstract":"Counterfeits cause tremendous damages to brand companies by eroding market shares and reducing customers' willingness to pay. Realizing such problem, many brand companies develop and deploy anticounterfeit technologies to prevent counterfeiters from imitating their products. In this paper, we consider an authentic company which sells its product to a market where a counterfeiter may imitate the genuine one. To combat counterfeiting, the authentic company develops its anticounterfeit technology, helping customers distinguish its genuine product from the fake. We find that in the presence of counterfeiting activities, an authentic company may choose to offer, from its spectrum of product qualities, a relatively low product quality or a very high quality, but not some quality level in-between. Our analysis further indicates that, in equilibrium, the anticounterfeit effort exerted by the authentic company does not necessarily decrease in the penalty levied by the authority, even though they serve the same purpose. In addition, we explore two possible measures that may help increase the authentic company's profit. The first is committing itself to anticounterfeit effort and the second is proactive cooperation with regulatory authority. We find committing to anticounterfeit effort can always make the authentic company better off but may increase the occurrence of counterfeiting. On the contrary, proactive cooperation with the regulatory authority can help reduce counterfeiting but may decrease the authentic company's profit as well.","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124014957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-29DOI: 10.1146/ANNUREV-LAWSOCSCI-101317-031212
Mihailis E. Diamantis, W. Laufer
This article offers an overview of and commentary on the US approach to corporate prosecution and punishment. Though the United States purports to have a vigorous system of corporate criminal law enforcement, one could reasonably ask whether that system actually takes corporate crime seriously. Corporate prosecutions, convictions, and punishment continue to be rare events. Sanctions leveraged against corporations range from those whose effectiveness remains unproved, to those that are provably ineffective, to those that are conceptually and practically incoherent. One could also reasonably ask to what extent the United States even has a corporate criminal law to enforce. The recent history of corporate criminal law enforcement reflects a discernable shift in discretion from judges to prosecutors. This period is marked by the importance of extralegal prosecutorial guidelines, the absence of controlling case law, large gaps in statutory law, and long-called-for law reforms. One result is a systematic shift from reliance on public enforcement to private self-regulation. Not only are the resulting costs to the private sector substantial and growing, but the problems with relying on corporations to police themselves are plain to see. Amid these challenges, the thirst for private-sector responsibility and accountability should motivate continued debate over the prosecution and punishment of corporations.
{"title":"Prosecution and Punishment of Corporate Criminality","authors":"Mihailis E. Diamantis, W. Laufer","doi":"10.1146/ANNUREV-LAWSOCSCI-101317-031212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV-LAWSOCSCI-101317-031212","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers an overview of and commentary on the US approach to corporate prosecution and punishment. Though the United States purports to have a vigorous system of corporate criminal law enforcement, one could reasonably ask whether that system actually takes corporate crime seriously. Corporate prosecutions, convictions, and punishment continue to be rare events. Sanctions leveraged against corporations range from those whose effectiveness remains unproved, to those that are provably ineffective, to those that are conceptually and practically incoherent. One could also reasonably ask to what extent the United States even has a corporate criminal law to enforce. The recent history of corporate criminal law enforcement reflects a discernable shift in discretion from judges to prosecutors. This period is marked by the importance of extralegal prosecutorial guidelines, the absence of controlling case law, large gaps in statutory law, and long-called-for law reforms. One result is a systematic shift from reliance on public enforcement to private self-regulation. Not only are the resulting costs to the private sector substantial and growing, but the problems with relying on corporations to police themselves are plain to see. Amid these challenges, the thirst for private-sector responsibility and accountability should motivate continued debate over the prosecution and punishment of corporations.","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"252 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115590126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The growing spate of corruption, fraud and financial crimes with devastating consequences on companies and national economies has compelled regulatory changes across national, regional and even international boundaries. In fact, the general perception was that such vices were largely an internal event, primarily impacting the organization's net earnings or earnings per share (EPS). They were not conceived to have a major impact in the way businesses were conducted. Unfortunately, that perception has considerably changed in recent times. Today, the world understands better with organizations knowing that the negative effect of these offences goes beyond the bottom line of any organisation. Basically, these vices serve to attenuate optimum pursuit of organizational goals; they limit organizational ability to economize on scarce resources, including information processing and decision-making capability, in transaction cost terms; they promote information hoarding, opportunism, bounded rationality and distortions. The associated negative publicity of corporate fraud breeds high reputational risks, stifles business prospects, and threatens business survival. These are the core transactional issues on which a comparative assessment of the rise of fraud examination and forensic accounting in Africa turns. Corruption is rife in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government agencies which have become a conduit by Government officials, legislators and politicians to divert funds through inflated contracts, bloated staff strength, and overpriced procurement of goods and services. The fraudulent monies would then be laundered into the financial system through concealed deposits in private pseudonym accounts, ‘non-existent corporate’ accounts, purchase of real estate, or donations to political parties, religious bodies and charities involved in the scheme. (Herbert, Tsegba, Ene and Onyilo 2017:2) Nowadays, the audacity of corruption is not just an act of the mind but a deliberate one perpetrated with total disregard for the law and its consequences. As fraudsters have become more dangerously creative with devastating consequences, so has the configuration of fraud investigation become increasingly sophisticated with encouraging results. Forensic accounting, which has evolved to combat the growing rate and economic consequences of fraud and abuse, financial crimes and corruption, encapsulates specialized knowledge and specific skills to stumble up on the evidence of economic transactions. (Joshi, 2003). Traditional accountants, however effective they may be, are not necessarily forensic accountants. The global economic consequences of recent accounting scandals juxtaposing the increasing spate of fraud and corruption have occasioned new national and international antifraud and anti-money laundering legislations. These have created a huge demand for fraud investigation and forensic accounting work. Increasingly, many professional accountancy firms are establish
腐败、欺诈和金融犯罪日益猖獗，给企业和国民经济带来毁灭性后果，迫使各国、各地区甚至是国际范围内的监管变革。事实上，普遍的看法是，这些恶习主要是内部事件，主要影响组织的净收入或每股收益(EPS)。人们并不认为它们会对企业的经营方式产生重大影响。不幸的是，这种看法在最近发生了很大的变化。如今，随着各组织认识到这些犯罪行为的负面影响超出了任何组织的底线，世界更加了解了这一点。基本上，这些不良行为削弱了对组织目标的最佳追求;它们限制了组织在交易成本方面节约稀缺资源的能力，包括信息处理和决策能力;它们助长了信息囤积、机会主义、有限理性和扭曲。与之相关的对企业欺诈行为的负面宣传会带来很高的声誉风险，扼杀商业前景，威胁到企业的生存。这些是对欺诈审查和法务会计在非洲兴起的比较评估转向的核心交易问题。国有企业和政府机构腐败现象普遍，它们已成为政府官员、立法者和政客通过虚增合同、臃肿的员工队伍和价格过高的商品和服务采购来转移资金的渠道。然后，这些欺诈性资金将通过隐藏在私人假名账户中的存款、“不存在的公司”账户、购买房地产或向参与该计划的政党、宗教团体和慈善机构捐款，被洗钱进入金融体系。(Herbert, Tsegba, Ene和Onyilo 2017:2)如今，肆无忌惮的腐败不仅是一种思想行为，而且是一种蓄意的行为，完全无视法律及其后果。随着欺诈者变得越来越危险，越来越有创造力，带来毁灭性的后果，欺诈调查的配置也越来越复杂，结果令人鼓舞。法务会计的发展是为了打击日益增长的欺诈和滥用、金融犯罪和腐败的经济后果，它包含了偶然发现经济交易证据的专业知识和特定技能。(乔希,2003)。传统的会计师，无论他们多么有效，都不一定是法务会计师。最近的会计丑闻对全球经济造成的影响，加上欺诈和腐败的激增，促使各国和国际上出台了新的反欺诈和反洗钱立法。这就产生了对欺诈调查和法务会计工作的巨大需求。越来越多的专业会计师事务所正在建立专门的欺诈审查和法务会计单位，以跟上工作量。与此同时，组织和政府机构发现很难招聘到经验丰富、技术高超的法务会计师和欺诈审查员。(Herbert et al. 2017:5)最后一点将在下一段中展开。本文论述了公共财政管理改革对法务会计师的需求。法务会计的需要和定义将得到发展。论述了公共财政管理的具体内容，并提出了有效实施公共财政管理的措施。
{"title":"Forensic Account in Public Finance Management","authors":"Professor Kelly Kingsly","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3247698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3247698","url":null,"abstract":"The growing spate of corruption, fraud and financial crimes with devastating consequences on companies and national economies has compelled regulatory changes across national, regional and even international boundaries. In fact, the general perception was that such vices were largely an internal event, primarily impacting the organization's net earnings or earnings per share (EPS). They were not conceived to have a major impact in the way businesses were conducted. Unfortunately, that perception has considerably changed in recent times. Today, the world understands better with organizations knowing that the negative effect of these offences goes beyond the bottom line of any organisation. Basically, these vices serve to attenuate optimum pursuit of organizational goals; they limit organizational ability to economize on scarce resources, including information processing and decision-making capability, in transaction cost terms; they promote information hoarding, opportunism, bounded rationality and distortions. The associated negative publicity of corporate fraud breeds high reputational risks, stifles business prospects, and threatens business survival. These are the core transactional issues on which a comparative assessment of the rise of fraud examination and forensic accounting in Africa turns. Corruption is rife in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government agencies which have become a conduit by Government officials, legislators and politicians to divert funds through inflated contracts, bloated staff strength, and overpriced procurement of goods and services. The fraudulent monies would then be laundered into the financial system through concealed deposits in private pseudonym accounts, ‘non-existent corporate’ accounts, purchase of real estate, or donations to political parties, religious bodies and charities involved in the scheme. (Herbert, Tsegba, Ene and Onyilo 2017:2) Nowadays, the audacity of corruption is not just an act of the mind but a deliberate one perpetrated with total disregard for the law and its consequences. As fraudsters have become more dangerously creative with devastating consequences, so has the configuration of fraud investigation become increasingly sophisticated with encouraging results. Forensic accounting, which has evolved to combat the growing rate and economic consequences of fraud and abuse, financial crimes and corruption, encapsulates specialized knowledge and specific skills to stumble up on the evidence of economic transactions. (Joshi, 2003). Traditional accountants, however effective they may be, are not necessarily forensic accountants. The global economic consequences of recent accounting scandals juxtaposing the increasing spate of fraud and corruption have occasioned new national and international antifraud and anti-money laundering legislations. These have created a huge demand for fraud investigation and forensic accounting work. Increasingly, many professional accountancy firms are establish","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134510803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On 30 September 2017, the United Kingdom implemented a powerful new investigative tool known as an "unexplained wealth order" in its Criminal Finances Act 2017. On 7-8 November 2017, London hosted the Fifth OECD Forum on Tax and Crime. Against this background, as well as other recent developments that have shown a spotlight on the interlinkages between tax and crime, this working paper researches the role that tax laws and tax authorities play in either helping or hindering unexplained wealth orders. In doing so, it derives some relevant considerations for United Kingdom authorities as they move forward in implementing this new law.
{"title":"Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWOs) Under the UK's Criminal Finances Act 2017: The Role of Tax Laws and Tax Authorities in Its Successful Implementation","authors":"Rita Julien","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3151969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3151969","url":null,"abstract":"On 30 September 2017, the United Kingdom implemented a powerful new investigative tool known as an \"unexplained wealth order\" in its Criminal Finances Act 2017. On 7-8 November 2017, London hosted the Fifth OECD Forum on Tax and Crime. Against this background, as well as other recent developments that have shown a spotlight on the interlinkages between tax and crime, this working paper researches the role that tax laws and tax authorities play in either helping or hindering unexplained wealth orders. In doing so, it derives some relevant considerations for United Kingdom authorities as they move forward in implementing this new law.","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130493985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Miranda A. Galvin, Thomas A. Loughran, S. Simpson, Mark A. Cohen
We use survey data from a nationally representative sample to explore public support for government-run victim compensation programs for financial fraud, consumer fraud, identity theft, and burglary. We use contingent valuation (willingness to pay) methodology to infer preferences for compensation programs, and also explore predictors of those preferences. Overall, findings suggest that the public strongly supports the implementation of victim compensation programs. However, our results also indicate that this support may be driven in part by perceptions of benefiting from this program directly in the future. Additionally, a small but notable minority of respondents exhibit preferences for programs without compensation. Our findings suggest that the general public is supportive of restitutive compensation programs, not only as paid for by offenders, but by the government. We suggest that policy makers may embrace some principles of restorative justice for white collar crimes, which may otherwise be more financially damaging than traditional crimes.
{"title":"Victim Compensation Policy and White Collar Crime: Public Preferences in a National Willingness to Pay Survey","authors":"Miranda A. Galvin, Thomas A. Loughran, S. Simpson, Mark A. Cohen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3012724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3012724","url":null,"abstract":"We use survey data from a nationally representative sample to explore public support for government-run victim compensation programs for financial fraud, consumer fraud, identity theft, and burglary. We use contingent valuation (willingness to pay) methodology to infer preferences for compensation programs, and also explore predictors of those preferences. Overall, findings suggest that the public strongly supports the implementation of victim compensation programs. However, our results also indicate that this support may be driven in part by perceptions of benefiting from this program directly in the future. Additionally, a small but notable minority of respondents exhibit preferences for programs without compensation. Our findings suggest that the general public is supportive of restitutive compensation programs, not only as paid for by offenders, but by the government. We suggest that policy makers may embrace some principles of restorative justice for white collar crimes, which may otherwise be more financially damaging than traditional crimes.","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116304277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cohen and Machalek’s (1988) evolutionary ecological theory of crime explains why obscure forms of predation can be the most lucrative. Sutherland explained that it is better to rob a bank at the point of a pen than of a gun. The US Savings and Loans scandal of the 1980s suggested ‘the best way to rob a bank is to own one’. Lure constituted by the anomie of warfare and transition to capitalism in former Yugoslavia revealed that the best way to rob a bank is to control the regulatory system: that is, to control a central bank. This makes possible theft of all the people’s money in a society. The criminological imagination must attune to anomie created by capitalism, and to the evolutionary ecology of lure.
{"title":"The Best Way to Rob a Bank","authors":"Aleksandar Maršavelski, J. Braithwaite","doi":"10.5204/IJCJSD.V7I1.466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5204/IJCJSD.V7I1.466","url":null,"abstract":"Cohen and Machalek’s (1988) evolutionary ecological theory of crime explains why obscure forms of predation can be the most lucrative. Sutherland explained that it is better to rob a bank at the point of a pen than of a gun. The US Savings and Loans scandal of the 1980s suggested ‘the best way to rob a bank is to own one’. Lure constituted by the anomie of warfare and transition to capitalism in former Yugoslavia revealed that the best way to rob a bank is to control the regulatory system: that is, to control a central bank. This makes possible theft of all the people’s money in a society. The criminological imagination must attune to anomie created by capitalism, and to the evolutionary ecology of lure.","PeriodicalId":292153,"journal":{"name":"CJRN: White-Collar","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128166394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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