Pub Date : 2021-09-09DOI: 10.4324/9780429324734-15
Susan Dieleman
{"title":"Thinking with Rorty about How to Make Philosophy more Livable","authors":"Susan Dieleman","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122802452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Should Rorty Say about Relativism?","authors":"Carol Rovane","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114574337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rorty's Reconstruction of Epistemology","authors":"R. Calcaterra","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133820083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-09DOI: 10.4324/9780429324734-14
M. Bacon, Nat Rutherford
In this chapter, we make three connected claims. First, despite Rorty’s expressed ‘bourgeois liberal’ reformism, there are philosophical resources within his political philosophy which indicate a latent programme of radical social criticism. Second, we argue against the charge that Rorty is a relativist who lacks the necessary foundations for social criticism by comparing the liberalisms of Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. Thirdly, we argue that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism would commit him, by his own lights, to engage in radical criticism of actually-existing liberalism. On this account of Rorty’s political philosophy, the idea that redescription of our social situation might take us beyond bourgeois liberalism becomes a real possibility.
{"title":"Rorty, Habermas, and Radical Social Criticism","authors":"M. Bacon, Nat Rutherford","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-14","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we make three connected claims. First, despite Rorty’s expressed ‘bourgeois liberal’ reformism, there are philosophical resources within his political philosophy which indicate a latent programme of radical social criticism. Second, we argue against the charge that Rorty is a relativist who lacks the necessary foundations for social criticism by comparing the liberalisms of Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. Thirdly, we argue that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism would commit him, by his own lights, to engage in radical criticism of actually-existing liberalism. On this account of Rorty’s political philosophy, the idea that redescription of our social situation might take us beyond bourgeois liberalism becomes a real possibility.","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"464 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133340751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Philosophy of Richard Rorty","authors":"G. Marchetti","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132105330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rorty as Liberal Ironist Peace Warrior","authors":"S. Clough","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125029374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ronald Dworkin and Richard Rorty are sometimes thought to be diametrically opposed philosophers, particularly in their approach to foundational questions in moral thought. Dworkin is a champion of truth and objectivity in morality. Rorty, by contrast, is a great pragmatist who subscribed to a defated vision of truth and unambiguously renounced objectivity, in favor of what he called “solidarity”.1 If their stated -isms and alliances were not evidence enough of discord, they also criticized one another in print, particularly on these foundational, or metaethical, questions. The point of this chapter is to show that things are not what they seem: Rorty and Dworkin largely agree on metaethics. The difference between them is largely a difference in emphasis. The layout of the chapter is as follows. In Section 1, I explain in further detail why Rorty and Dworkin are thought to disagree. I outline their commitments and summarize their direct criticisms of one another with respect to metaethics. In Section 2, I begin the rapprochement. I note that several scholars have identifed something “pragmatist” in Dworkin’s thought, particularly in his legal thought. This work, then, shows that he might be closer to Rorty than frst appearances suggest. Nevertheless, that work, taken as a whole, suffers from a few limitations. What pragmatism means for those various theorists is either too vague or too various to be helpful. Also, even when some of this work clearly explains a sense in which Dworkin is a legal pragmatist, it fails to explain how pragmatism also fgures in Dworkin’s moral philosophy. A further limitation is that this secondary literature confuses how specifcally Rortyan Dworkin’s moral thought turns out to be. That last limitation – not recognizing the specifcally Rortyan elements of Dworkin’s moral thought – this is examined and corrected in Section 3. In the fnal substantive part of the chapter, Section 4, I try to diagnose this faux fght between Rorty and Dworkin. I argue that the difference is largely a matter of emphasis. Dworkin stresses his continuity with traditional moral realism, while registering some complaints. Rorty castigates realism before admitting that he can assent to the basic structure of such a view. If this is a case of “six of one, and a half-dozen of the other”, one might be led to think any further comparison of what these thinkers say
{"title":"The Rorty-Dworkin Debate","authors":"Raff Donelson","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-4","url":null,"abstract":"Ronald Dworkin and Richard Rorty are sometimes thought to be diametrically opposed philosophers, particularly in their approach to foundational questions in moral thought. Dworkin is a champion of truth and objectivity in morality. Rorty, by contrast, is a great pragmatist who subscribed to a defated vision of truth and unambiguously renounced objectivity, in favor of what he called “solidarity”.1 If their stated -isms and alliances were not evidence enough of discord, they also criticized one another in print, particularly on these foundational, or metaethical, questions. The point of this chapter is to show that things are not what they seem: Rorty and Dworkin largely agree on metaethics. The difference between them is largely a difference in emphasis. The layout of the chapter is as follows. In Section 1, I explain in further detail why Rorty and Dworkin are thought to disagree. I outline their commitments and summarize their direct criticisms of one another with respect to metaethics. In Section 2, I begin the rapprochement. I note that several scholars have identifed something “pragmatist” in Dworkin’s thought, particularly in his legal thought. This work, then, shows that he might be closer to Rorty than frst appearances suggest. Nevertheless, that work, taken as a whole, suffers from a few limitations. What pragmatism means for those various theorists is either too vague or too various to be helpful. Also, even when some of this work clearly explains a sense in which Dworkin is a legal pragmatist, it fails to explain how pragmatism also fgures in Dworkin’s moral philosophy. A further limitation is that this secondary literature confuses how specifcally Rortyan Dworkin’s moral thought turns out to be. That last limitation – not recognizing the specifcally Rortyan elements of Dworkin’s moral thought – this is examined and corrected in Section 3. In the fnal substantive part of the chapter, Section 4, I try to diagnose this faux fght between Rorty and Dworkin. I argue that the difference is largely a matter of emphasis. Dworkin stresses his continuity with traditional moral realism, while registering some complaints. Rorty castigates realism before admitting that he can assent to the basic structure of such a view. If this is a case of “six of one, and a half-dozen of the other”, one might be led to think any further comparison of what these thinkers say","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126302596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-09DOI: 10.4324/9780429324734-18
S. Sullivan
{"title":"Achieving Whose Country? Rorty and Baldwin on the United States","authors":"S. Sullivan","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124212039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bildung, Unimportance, and Moral Progress","authors":"S. Marchetti","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116038128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-09DOI: 10.4324/9780429324734-10
Christopher J. Voparil
{"title":"Rorty and Experience","authors":"Christopher J. Voparil","doi":"10.4324/9780429324734-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429324734-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":298858,"journal":{"name":"The Ethics, Epistemology, and Politics of Richard Rorty","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122109663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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