This chapter discusses some of the contexts and contents of the European debate about political parties in the eighteenth century, before moving on to delineate some facets of its reception in the early American republic, especially among some of its formative political writers and American presidents, including John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. Whereas early American political thinkers were eager to avoid the extreme factionalism and partisanship which had been characteristic of Britain, most of them accepted that division was inevitable in politics. In addition to Madison’s familiar appropriation of “Humean” arguments about how to control factionalism in the Tenth Federalist, it is argued that Bolingbroke’s justification for partisan opposition within the party framework merits special attention.
{"title":"Party and Faction in Eighteenth-Century Political Thought from Montesquieu to Madison","authors":"Max Skjönsberg","doi":"10.2307/J.CTV1NC6RCB.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/J.CTV1NC6RCB.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses some of the contexts and contents of the European debate about political parties in the eighteenth century, before moving on to delineate some facets of its reception in the early American republic, especially among some of its formative political writers and American presidents, including John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. Whereas early American political thinkers were eager to avoid the extreme factionalism and partisanship which had been characteristic of Britain, most of them accepted that division was inevitable in politics. In addition to Madison’s familiar appropriation of “Humean” arguments about how to control factionalism in the Tenth Federalist, it is argued that Bolingbroke’s justification for partisan opposition within the party framework merits special attention.","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122422992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-08DOI: 10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0007
C. Arcenas
In Federalist 70, Alexander Hamilton (writing as Publius) argued that an energetic executive, as envisioned by Article II of the United States Constitution, was essential to good government. To clinch his argument, he relied on a contrast between theory and practice that seems puzzling at first glance. This chapter elucidates Hamilton’s argument in three parts. It first identifies three strains of eighteenth-century thought concerning the relationship between political theory and political practice. It then examines the specific strain that appears in Federalist 70, with particular attention to its origins and its significance to both Hamilton and his audience. Finally, it uses Hamilton’s defense of an energetic executive as a point of departure to discuss a new development in American political thought—namely, what Americans in the 1780s were beginning to think of as a new, and distinctively American, science of politics, which emphasized practical experience over speculative theory.
{"title":"Defending an Energetic Executive","authors":"C. Arcenas","doi":"10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"In Federalist 70, Alexander Hamilton (writing as Publius) argued that an energetic executive, as envisioned by Article II of the United States Constitution, was essential to good government. To clinch his argument, he relied on a contrast between theory and practice that seems puzzling at first glance. This chapter elucidates Hamilton’s argument in three parts. It first identifies three strains of eighteenth-century thought concerning the relationship between political theory and political practice. It then examines the specific strain that appears in Federalist 70, with particular attention to its origins and its significance to both Hamilton and his audience. Finally, it uses Hamilton’s defense of an energetic executive as a point of departure to discuss a new development in American political thought—namely, what Americans in the 1780s were beginning to think of as a new, and distinctively American, science of politics, which emphasized practical experience over speculative theory.","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129489803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter asks how the constitutional debates over the admission of new states affected the balance of power among the states in general and the election of the presidency in particular. It frames what it calls “The Problem of New States,” and explores how early texts on U.S. western policy of the 1780s framed questions of territory and statehood. It then explores in detail the debates surrounding new state admissions and the Northwest Ordinance in the Constitutional Convention, showing how contingent the final outcome of the Electoral College was, and how questions like the equal footing of states, which have often been taken as settled constitutional issues, were in fact matters of contentious debate. It concludes by tracing paths forward for future research.
{"title":"Is the Electoral College the Fundamental Problem?","authors":"F. Furstenberg","doi":"10.2307/J.CTV1NC6RCB.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/J.CTV1NC6RCB.13","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter asks how the constitutional debates over the admission of new states affected the balance of power among the states in general and the election of the presidency in particular. It frames what it calls “The Problem of New States,” and explores how early texts on U.S. western policy of the 1780s framed questions of territory and statehood. It then explores in detail the debates surrounding new state admissions and the Northwest Ordinance in the Constitutional Convention, showing how contingent the final outcome of the Electoral College was, and how questions like the equal footing of states, which have often been taken as settled constitutional issues, were in fact matters of contentious debate. It concludes by tracing paths forward for future research.","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117142547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-08DOI: 10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0006
J. Gienapp
Leading constitutional framers Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris are often justifiably seen as staunch allies: the foremost champions of expansive national and presidential power at the Founding. Yet, in underappreciated ways, their respective constitutional visions pointed in subtly distinct directions. Contemporary legal debates help bring this into focus. Participants in these disputes often claim, rather curiously, that under the Constitution national power is limited and circumscribed while presidential power is vast and expansive, often deriving essential support from Hamilton’s own Founding-era writings. Using these debates as an entry point, this chapter probes the conflicting ways Hamilton, Wilson, and Morris balanced commitment to national and presidential power. While Hamilton was ready, if only rhetorically, to expand the latter at the expense of the former, it is doubtful that Wilson or Morris were similarly willing. Delineating these neglected differences reveals that there was not one single brand of national constitutionalism at the founding but in fact several, each of which should be understood on its own terms.
{"title":"National Power and the Presidency","authors":"J. Gienapp","doi":"10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Leading constitutional framers Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris are often justifiably seen as staunch allies: the foremost champions of expansive national and presidential power at the Founding. Yet, in underappreciated ways, their respective constitutional visions pointed in subtly distinct directions. Contemporary legal debates help bring this into focus. Participants in these disputes often claim, rather curiously, that under the Constitution national power is limited and circumscribed while presidential power is vast and expansive, often deriving essential support from Hamilton’s own Founding-era writings. Using these debates as an entry point, this chapter probes the conflicting ways Hamilton, Wilson, and Morris balanced commitment to national and presidential power. While Hamilton was ready, if only rhetorically, to expand the latter at the expense of the former, it is doubtful that Wilson or Morris were similarly willing. Delineating these neglected differences reveals that there was not one single brand of national constitutionalism at the founding but in fact several, each of which should be understood on its own terms.","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127448809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-08DOI: 10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0010
Daniel J. Hulsebosch
Is the president bound by law? If so, how? These are historical as well as modern questions, and they are questions that the first president, George Washington, asked himself and his advisors throughout his eight-year administration. As he and they marked the boundaries of the executive under the spare text of the new federal Constitution’s Article II, they used the law of nations to fill the gaps and define key powers. Enlightenment-era jurists like Emer de Vattel intended their treatises to function as updated versions of the traditional “mirror for princes,” or advice books for European rulers, and that is how the president and his cabinet read them. Just as throughout his life he had turned to self-help books to make his way in the world, Washington turned to Vattel to learn how to govern—not just how to govern other people, but more importantly how to govern with other people at home and abroad. The early modern law of nations not only provided stage directions, showing an actor how to behave among others. It also contained working scripts to borrow. Vattel in particular emphasized jealous territorial sovereignty and open commercial intercourse, and striking the balance between them was, in Washington’s eyes, the main task of his presidency.
总统受法律约束吗?如果有，怎么做?这些既是历史问题，也是现代问题，也是第一任总统乔治·华盛顿在其八年执政期间向自己和他的顾问提出的问题。当他和他们根据新联邦宪法第二条的空白文本划定行政部门的界限时，他们利用国际法来填补空白，界定关键权力。启蒙时代的法学家，如埃默·德·瓦泰尔(Emer de Vattel)，打算将他们的论文作为传统的“王子之镜”或欧洲统治者的建议书的更新版本，而这正是总统及其内阁阅读它们的方式。正如他一生都在阅读自助书籍以在世界上找到出路一样，华盛顿也向瓦泰尔学习如何治理国家——不仅仅是如何治理他人，更重要的是如何与国内外的其他人一起治理国家。早期的现代国际法不仅提供舞台指导，告诉演员如何与他人交往。它还包含可以借用的工作脚本。瓦特尔特别强调领土主权和开放的商业往来，在华盛顿看来，在这两者之间取得平衡是他总统任期的主要任务。
{"title":"Mirror for Presidents","authors":"Daniel J. Hulsebosch","doi":"10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Is the president bound by law? If so, how? These are historical as well as modern questions, and they are questions that the first president, George Washington, asked himself and his advisors throughout his eight-year administration. As he and they marked the boundaries of the executive under the spare text of the new federal Constitution’s Article II, they used the law of nations to fill the gaps and define key powers. Enlightenment-era jurists like Emer de Vattel intended their treatises to function as updated versions of the traditional “mirror for princes,” or advice books for European rulers, and that is how the president and his cabinet read them. Just as throughout his life he had turned to self-help books to make his way in the world, Washington turned to Vattel to learn how to govern—not just how to govern other people, but more importantly how to govern with other people at home and abroad. The early modern law of nations not only provided stage directions, showing an actor how to behave among others. It also contained working scripts to borrow. Vattel in particular emphasized jealous territorial sovereignty and open commercial intercourse, and striking the balance between them was, in Washington’s eyes, the main task of his presidency.","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134162253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"INDEX","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1nc6rcb.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nc6rcb.18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"36 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129037741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The principle of checks and balances is a guiding premise of the American Constitution and of the definition of the presidency and executive power. Where did it come from? Historians portray it as an eighteenth-century concept, adumbrated by Montesquieu and invoked to identify the wisdom of the English constitution. Yet its origins lay in the mid-seventeenth century, when that constitution had broken down. The England of the 1650s and the America of the 1780s underwent parallel experiences, which produced a parallel of political vocabulary. In both countries the removal of an alleged tyrant—Charles I; George III—was followed by alleged tyrannies of legislative power—the English parliament; Congress and the new state legislatures. In both countries a new executive office—the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell; the presidency—was created to prevent both extremes. The language of checks and balances was invented to vindicate Cromwellian rule.
{"title":"Checks and Balances:","authors":"Blair Worden","doi":"10.2307/J.CTV1NC6RCB.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/J.CTV1NC6RCB.7","url":null,"abstract":"The principle of checks and balances is a guiding premise of the American Constitution and of the definition of the presidency and executive power. Where did it come from? Historians portray it as an eighteenth-century concept, adumbrated by Montesquieu and invoked to identify the wisdom of the English constitution. Yet its origins lay in the mid-seventeenth century, when that constitution had broken down. The England of the 1650s and the America of the 1780s underwent parallel experiences, which produced a parallel of political vocabulary. In both countries the removal of an alleged tyrant—Charles I; George III—was followed by alleged tyrannies of legislative power—the English parliament; Congress and the new state legislatures. In both countries a new executive office—the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell; the presidency—was created to prevent both extremes. The language of checks and balances was invented to vindicate Cromwellian rule.","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"198 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125087525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"List of Figures","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1nc6rcb.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nc6rcb.3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125495619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay argues that both George Washington and Mercy Otis Warren understood their experiences of the Revolutionary era through a shared discourse of classical republicanism, a set of beliefs that interpreted modern events in terms of their continuities with ancient Greece and Rome. By the time Washington became president, however, their beliefs had diverged, particularly in terms of assessing Washington’s stature as a hero in the classical republican mold. Warren, as a chronicler of the American Revolution, believed that she had remained true to the classical republican principles of virtue, honor, and self-sacrifice for the common good. She criticized Washington for having succumbed to the lure of power and fame. The difference in their gender roles contributed to the divergence in their understandings. While Warren’s anti-federalist ideals remained abstract and theoretical, Washington as president was forced to accommodate his principles to the complex realities of governing a new nation and enforcing the U.S. Constitution.
{"title":"Liberty and Power:","authors":"Rosemarie Zagarri","doi":"10.2307/J.CTV1NC6RCB.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/J.CTV1NC6RCB.16","url":null,"abstract":"This essay argues that both George Washington and Mercy Otis Warren understood their experiences of the Revolutionary era through a shared discourse of classical republicanism, a set of beliefs that interpreted modern events in terms of their continuities with ancient Greece and Rome. By the time Washington became president, however, their beliefs had diverged, particularly in terms of assessing Washington’s stature as a hero in the classical republican mold. Warren, as a chronicler of the American Revolution, believed that she had remained true to the classical republican principles of virtue, honor, and self-sacrifice for the common good. She criticized Washington for having succumbed to the lure of power and fame. The difference in their gender roles contributed to the divergence in their understandings. While Warren’s anti-federalist ideals remained abstract and theoretical, Washington as president was forced to accommodate his principles to the complex realities of governing a new nation and enforcing the U.S. Constitution.","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"29 26","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133424364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-08DOI: 10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0009
Lindsay M. Chervinsky
Article II of the U.S. Constitution formed the presidency, but it provides scant details about the day-to-day details of governing. After his inauguration, George Washington set about creating countless precedents guiding the president’s social interactions, relationship with the other branches of government, and executive branch management. His immediate successors, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, largely followed his precedent. Washington’s creation of the cabinet proved to be one of his most influential legacies. This chapter explores the cabinets of the first three presidents—how they organized their cabinet meetings, how they interacted with their subordinates, and when they convened cabinet meetings. By evaluating the similarities and differences between the first three cabinets, this chapter also reveals the continuities between the first administrations and the ongoing evolution of the executive branch.
{"title":"The Political Practices of the First Presidents","authors":"Lindsay M. Chervinsky","doi":"10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5744/florida/9780813066813.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Article II of the U.S. Constitution formed the presidency, but it provides scant details about the day-to-day details of governing. After his inauguration, George Washington set about creating countless precedents guiding the president’s social interactions, relationship with the other branches of government, and executive branch management. His immediate successors, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, largely followed his precedent. Washington’s creation of the cabinet proved to be one of his most influential legacies. This chapter explores the cabinets of the first three presidents—how they organized their cabinet meetings, how they interacted with their subordinates, and when they convened cabinet meetings. By evaluating the similarities and differences between the first three cabinets, this chapter also reveals the continuities between the first administrations and the ongoing evolution of the executive branch.","PeriodicalId":315083,"journal":{"name":"Political Thought and the Origins of the American Presidency","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131616852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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