Brexit raises important issues of the fragmentation impact in EU relations. The Scottish Government Report Scotland: A European Nation, was launched at the end of November 2016, hinting strongly at a second referendum of the Scots on UK independence as well as, significantly, EU membership and aspirations to self-determination in its international relations. Providing continuity in EU membership for Scotland should it breakaway from the UK, is the true challenge for the Union as a result of the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016, both for its internal functioning and its external relations.Were Scotland to reject the UK government’s EU Withdrawal Agreement and seek secession from the United Kingdom, how might Scotland – legally – seek continuity in its rights and obligations as a Member State of the European Union rather than have to make a fresh application for EU membership? This is a relevant question because, at the level of the United Kingdom, being one single EU Member State comprising England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, Brexit lays bare the political and constitutional tensions between England and the devolved powers in Scotland and Northern Ireland in particular, both of which “devolved” jurisdictions voted overwhelmingly to remain within the European Union, while the larger UK partner of England together with Wales, reached a lesser majority in favour of Brexit. It is clear that continuity of Scotland’s membership lies squarely within the logic of the “openness” of the European Union in the text of the legal basis for applications for membership of the Union under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Continuity is certainly intended under the core EU agenda that has existed since The Hague summit of 1969, which set the tone for enlargement as a means of consolidating the end to divisions on the European continent and fostering an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. Precedence should logically be given to the continuity of Scotland as and/or Northern Ireland Member State that have already acceded under Article 49. Therefore, given the constitutional question marks overhanging the UK but also the substantive emptiness of the withdrawal procedure, Article 50 TEU must at least not be interpreted in such a way as to negate the 1972 Accession Treaty under which the Scots have legitimate expectations based on the rule of law and direct effect, not to mention other core principles, now well established in Scots law. Used in such a fragmentation scenario, Article 50 TEU undermines the deepening and widening model that underpins EU integration. Article 49 TEU provides an accession vehicle for Scotland’s smooth transition to EU membership in its own right should it indeed opt out of the UK and for its future at the heart of Europe.The question is: will the EU allow its historic prerogative of inclusive openness on the European continent to be subjugated to the purely destructive nature of Article 50 TEU, and the pr
{"title":"Towards a Continuity and Transition Treaty for Scotland's EU Membership","authors":"K. Inglis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2881471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2881471","url":null,"abstract":"Brexit raises important issues of the fragmentation impact in EU relations. The Scottish Government Report Scotland: A European Nation, was launched at the end of November 2016, hinting strongly at a second referendum of the Scots on UK independence as well as, significantly, EU membership and aspirations to self-determination in its international relations. Providing continuity in EU membership for Scotland should it breakaway from the UK, is the true challenge for the Union as a result of the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016, both for its internal functioning and its external relations.Were Scotland to reject the UK government’s EU Withdrawal Agreement and seek secession from the United Kingdom, how might Scotland – legally – seek continuity in its rights and obligations as a Member State of the European Union rather than have to make a fresh application for EU membership? This is a relevant question because, at the level of the United Kingdom, being one single EU Member State comprising England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, Brexit lays bare the political and constitutional tensions between England and the devolved powers in Scotland and Northern Ireland in particular, both of which “devolved” jurisdictions voted overwhelmingly to remain within the European Union, while the larger UK partner of England together with Wales, reached a lesser majority in favour of Brexit. It is clear that continuity of Scotland’s membership lies squarely within the logic of the “openness” of the European Union in the text of the legal basis for applications for membership of the Union under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Continuity is certainly intended under the core EU agenda that has existed since The Hague summit of 1969, which set the tone for enlargement as a means of consolidating the end to divisions on the European continent and fostering an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. Precedence should logically be given to the continuity of Scotland as and/or Northern Ireland Member State that have already acceded under Article 49. Therefore, given the constitutional question marks overhanging the UK but also the substantive emptiness of the withdrawal procedure, Article 50 TEU must at least not be interpreted in such a way as to negate the 1972 Accession Treaty under which the Scots have legitimate expectations based on the rule of law and direct effect, not to mention other core principles, now well established in Scots law. Used in such a fragmentation scenario, Article 50 TEU undermines the deepening and widening model that underpins EU integration. Article 49 TEU provides an accession vehicle for Scotland’s smooth transition to EU membership in its own right should it indeed opt out of the UK and for its future at the heart of Europe.The question is: will the EU allow its historic prerogative of inclusive openness on the European continent to be subjugated to the purely destructive nature of Article 50 TEU, and the pr","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114741332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are few types of securities as internationally traded as those issued in securitization (also spelled securitisation) transactions. The post-financial crisis regulatory responses to securitization in the United States and Europe are, at least in part, political and ad hoc. To achieve a more systematic regulatory framework, this Essay examines how existing regulation should be supplemented by identifying the market failures that apply distinctively to securitization and analyzing how those market failures could be corrected. Among other things, the Essay argues that Europe’s regulatory framework for simple, transparent, and standardised (“STS”) securitizations goes a long way towards addressing complexity as a market failure, and that the United States should consider a similar regulatory approach.
{"title":"Securitization and Post-Crisis Financial Regulation","authors":"S. Schwarcz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2701556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2701556","url":null,"abstract":"There are few types of securities as internationally traded as those issued in securitization (also spelled securitisation) transactions. The post-financial crisis regulatory responses to securitization in the United States and Europe are, at least in part, political and ad hoc. To achieve a more systematic regulatory framework, this Essay examines how existing regulation should be supplemented by identifying the market failures that apply distinctively to securitization and analyzing how those market failures could be corrected. Among other things, the Essay argues that Europe’s regulatory framework for simple, transparent, and standardised (“STS”) securitizations goes a long way towards addressing complexity as a market failure, and that the United States should consider a similar regulatory approach.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132700317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The main purpose of the two Committees is to engage participation from citizens in order to ensure that EU laws are geared to economic, social and regional conditions. In their core, the Committees are advisory bodies whose purpose is to give interest groups a formal say on EU legislative proposals. Moreover, the CoR has a legal mechanism (an action for annulment) to control the EU legislation. Thus far, there has been much criticism about the effectiveness of their work and the irrational costs that the two Committees produce. However, they represent the decrease of the democratic deficit, which seems to be one of the EU’s incurable diseases. In order to reach a conclusion on the necessity and effectiveness of the two Committees, this paper shall focus on their influence in the legislative procedure and try to determine whether the influence is visible and valuable. Finally, the paper shall assess the effectiveness of the single judicial instrument for control: an action for annulment that the CoR can bring before the CJEU. In accordance with the research results, the paper shall propose one of the possible solutions for the Committees’ future: status quo, the merger of the EESC and CoR into a more effective body or their complete abolition.
{"title":"Is There a Tomorrow for the Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR)?","authors":"T. Petrašević, Dunja Duić","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725200","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of the two Committees is to engage participation from citizens in order to ensure that EU laws are geared to economic, social and regional conditions. In their core, the Committees are advisory bodies whose purpose is to give interest groups a formal say on EU legislative proposals. Moreover, the CoR has a legal mechanism (an action for annulment) to control the EU legislation. Thus far, there has been much criticism about the effectiveness of their work and the irrational costs that the two Committees produce. However, they represent the decrease of the democratic deficit, which seems to be one of the EU’s incurable diseases. In order to reach a conclusion on the necessity and effectiveness of the two Committees, this paper shall focus on their influence in the legislative procedure and try to determine whether the influence is visible and valuable. Finally, the paper shall assess the effectiveness of the single judicial instrument for control: an action for annulment that the CoR can bring before the CJEU. In accordance with the research results, the paper shall propose one of the possible solutions for the Committees’ future: status quo, the merger of the EESC and CoR into a more effective body or their complete abolition.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131779301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the major drivers and draggers of regional economic cooperation and integration (RECI) in Asia and the Pacific (AP). Using both quantitative measures and qualitative evidence, it assesses the roles played by four key determinants of RECI across AP, its subregions, and countries: geography and connectivity; national economic policies; governance and rule of law; and institutions and geopolitics. The assessment suggests that East Asia has been fortunate to have been endowed with favorable geography. At the same time, its national economic policies and governance standards (in terms of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) have been key drivers of its cross-border economic integration, despite its much less democratic political regime. South Asia is almost the obverse image of East Asia – despite a reasonably favorable geography and decades of democratic political regime, its national economic policies and governance standards have been major draggers of cross-border integration. In many ways, Southeast Asia is somewhat closer to East Asia, while the Pacific is somewhat similar to South Asia (except that the Pacific had to content with an unfavorable geography that has been a major dragger of its cross-border integration). Central Asia presents a much more mixed case – it’s land-locked geography as well as somewhat poor governance parameters have acted as draggers on the subregion’s cross-border integration, even as its trade and investment policies have been relatively more open and hence integration-friendly. Political commitment – perhaps the overarching driver of RECI and its institutionalization – is lackluster almost across AP. That said, political commitment seems to be the highest in Southeast Asia and the least in South Asia, with other subregions falling somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.
{"title":"Drivers and Draggers of Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration in Asia and the Pacific","authors":"Srinivasa Madhur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2764934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2764934","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the major drivers and draggers of regional economic cooperation and integration (RECI) in Asia and the Pacific (AP). Using both quantitative measures and qualitative evidence, it assesses the roles played by four key determinants of RECI across AP, its subregions, and countries: geography and connectivity; national economic policies; governance and rule of law; and institutions and geopolitics. The assessment suggests that East Asia has been fortunate to have been endowed with favorable geography. At the same time, its national economic policies and governance standards (in terms of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) have been key drivers of its cross-border economic integration, despite its much less democratic political regime. South Asia is almost the obverse image of East Asia – despite a reasonably favorable geography and decades of democratic political regime, its national economic policies and governance standards have been major draggers of cross-border integration. In many ways, Southeast Asia is somewhat closer to East Asia, while the Pacific is somewhat similar to South Asia (except that the Pacific had to content with an unfavorable geography that has been a major dragger of its cross-border integration). Central Asia presents a much more mixed case – it’s land-locked geography as well as somewhat poor governance parameters have acted as draggers on the subregion’s cross-border integration, even as its trade and investment policies have been relatively more open and hence integration-friendly. Political commitment – perhaps the overarching driver of RECI and its institutionalization – is lackluster almost across AP. That said, political commitment seems to be the highest in Southeast Asia and the least in South Asia, with other subregions falling somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128851404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) exemplify the efficacy and the consequences of fragmentation as a “divide and conquer” strategy. By choosing this negotiating strategy and by maintaining secrecy over the contents of the envisioned rules, the negotiators exclude diverse stakeholders in developed and developing countries who will be affected by agreements that are set to establish rules for the global economy. This Essay outlines the challenges to democracy – both at the domestic level and at the global level – posed by these negotiation processes and by their envisioned outcomes. It then moves on to assess the potential institutional responses that might eventually arise and replicate, at the global level, checks and balances among stakeholders that have traditionally been secured domestically by national constitutions and enforced by national courts and legislatures.
{"title":"Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law","authors":"E. Benvenisti","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2646882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2646882","url":null,"abstract":"The negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) exemplify the efficacy and the consequences of fragmentation as a “divide and conquer” strategy. By choosing this negotiating strategy and by maintaining secrecy over the contents of the envisioned rules, the negotiators exclude diverse stakeholders in developed and developing countries who will be affected by agreements that are set to establish rules for the global economy. This Essay outlines the challenges to democracy – both at the domestic level and at the global level – posed by these negotiation processes and by their envisioned outcomes. It then moves on to assess the potential institutional responses that might eventually arise and replicate, at the global level, checks and balances among stakeholders that have traditionally been secured domestically by national constitutions and enforced by national courts and legislatures.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122313867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article is meant to contribute to the discussion of the relationship between European Union (EU) and international law. It focuses on bilateral investment agreements between EU Member States (intra-EU BITs), the majority of which will continue to have practical relevance. So how should one deal with a scenario in which the compliance with EU law (e.g., state aid law) means that a Member State must breach its obligation under an intra-EU BIT (e.g., by cutting returns on income from an investment protected thereunder)? The article answers this question by critically analysing the protection granted to pre-existing international obligations of the EU Member States under so-called anterior treaties. It criticizes established case law under Article 351 TFEU as having emphasized the wrong issues, and suggests to turn the discussion back to the real questions: precisely when is there a conflict, and how far do a Member State’s duties under Article 351(2)TFEU reach? It is argued that reconsidering Article 351 TFEU will foster doctrinal clarity and flexibility in dealing with the ‘obligations’, and also the ‘rights’ of the EU Member States under anterior treaties. Doctrinal clarity and flexibility will then benefit the relationship between EU and international law more generally.
{"title":"Solving Conflicts with International Investment Treaty Law from an EU Law Perspective: Article 351 TFEU Revisited","authors":"Konstanze von Papp","doi":"10.54648/leie2015021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2015021","url":null,"abstract":"This article is meant to contribute to the discussion of the relationship between European Union (EU) and international law. It focuses on bilateral investment agreements between EU Member States (intra-EU BITs), the majority of which will continue to have practical relevance. So how should one deal with a scenario in which the compliance with EU law (e.g., state aid law) means that a Member State must breach its obligation under an intra-EU BIT (e.g., by cutting returns on income from an investment protected thereunder)? The article answers this question by critically analysing the protection granted to pre-existing international obligations of the EU Member States under so-called anterior treaties. It criticizes established case law under Article 351 TFEU as having emphasized the wrong issues, and suggests to turn the discussion back to the real questions: precisely when is there a conflict, and how far do a Member State’s duties under Article 351(2)TFEU reach? It is argued that reconsidering Article 351 TFEU will foster doctrinal clarity and flexibility in dealing with the ‘obligations’, and also the ‘rights’ of the EU Member States under anterior treaties. Doctrinal clarity and flexibility will then benefit the relationship between EU and international law more generally. ","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"8 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120841787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article uses the EU’s decision to simultaneously impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties against Chinese coated fine papers as a case study to illustrate the complexities involved in EU’s trade defense regime against products originating from non-market economies. Four specific issues are dealt with: analogue country, market economy treatment, individual treatment and double remedy. In examining the reasonableness of the European Commission’s choice of the analogue country, this article develops a two-step approach, firstly against the Basic AD Regulation and secondly against Article X:3 of the GATT 1994. In view of the positive results of the request for individual treatment, this article argues that the EU may pass the “as applied” complainant in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. With regard to the proposed amendment to the Basic AD Regulation, it may also pass the “as such” complaint. In view of the fact that the EU is a third party taking the same position as the respondent in US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, this article explores the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties since one single anti-dumping duty may provide sufficient level of protection. This article argues that the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties is mainly because of the perspective expiry of alternative price comparability methodology as provided in China’s accession protocol, the different nature of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, and practical benefits of concurrent imposition.
{"title":"Key Issues Regarding the EU's Concurrent Imposition of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Chinese Coated Fine Papers: Analogue Country, Market Economy Treatment, Individual Treatment, and Double Remedy","authors":"Chien-Huei Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2236657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2236657","url":null,"abstract":"This article uses the EU’s decision to simultaneously impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties against Chinese coated fine papers as a case study to illustrate the complexities involved in EU’s trade defense regime against products originating from non-market economies. Four specific issues are dealt with: analogue country, market economy treatment, individual treatment and double remedy. In examining the reasonableness of the European Commission’s choice of the analogue country, this article develops a two-step approach, firstly against the Basic AD Regulation and secondly against Article X:3 of the GATT 1994. In view of the positive results of the request for individual treatment, this article argues that the EU may pass the “as applied” complainant in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. With regard to the proposed amendment to the Basic AD Regulation, it may also pass the “as such” complaint. In view of the fact that the EU is a third party taking the same position as the respondent in US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, this article explores the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties since one single anti-dumping duty may provide sufficient level of protection. This article argues that the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties is mainly because of the perspective expiry of alternative price comparability methodology as provided in China’s accession protocol, the different nature of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, and practical benefits of concurrent imposition.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121769322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-12-26DOI: 10.4337/9781785366741.00009
R. Leal-Arcas, Costantino Grasso, Juan Alemany Ríos
The current international energy trade governance system is fragmented and multi-layered. Streamlining it for greater legal cohesiveness and international political and economic cooperation would promote global energy security. The current article explores three levels of energy trade governance: multilateral, regional and bilateral. Most energy-rich countries are part of the multilateral trading system, which is institutionalized by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The article analyzes the multilateral energy trade governance system by focusing on the WTO and energy transportation issues. Regionally, the article focuses on five major regional agreements and their energy-related aspects and examines the various causes that explain the proliferation of regional trade agreements, their compatibility with WTO law, and then provides several examples of regional energy trade governance throughout the world. When it comes to bilateral energy trade governance, this article only addresses the European Union’s (EU) bilateral energy trade relations. The article explores ways in which gaps could be filled and overlaps eliminated whilst remaining true to the high-level normative framework, concentrating on those measures that would enhance EU energy security.
{"title":"Multilateral, Regional and Bilateral Energy Trade Governance","authors":"R. Leal-Arcas, Costantino Grasso, Juan Alemany Ríos","doi":"10.4337/9781785366741.00009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785366741.00009","url":null,"abstract":"The current international energy trade governance system is fragmented and multi-layered. Streamlining it for greater legal cohesiveness and international political and economic cooperation would promote global energy security. The current article explores three levels of energy trade governance: multilateral, regional and bilateral. Most energy-rich countries are part of the multilateral trading system, which is institutionalized by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The article analyzes the multilateral energy trade governance system by focusing on the WTO and energy transportation issues. Regionally, the article focuses on five major regional agreements and their energy-related aspects and examines the various causes that explain the proliferation of regional trade agreements, their compatibility with WTO law, and then provides several examples of regional energy trade governance throughout the world. When it comes to bilateral energy trade governance, this article only addresses the European Union’s (EU) bilateral energy trade relations. The article explores ways in which gaps could be filled and overlaps eliminated whilst remaining true to the high-level normative framework, concentrating on those measures that would enhance EU energy security.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"347 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122842079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-09-17DOI: 10.4172/2375-4516.1000127
Noppanun Supasiripongchai
This article considers the legal changes which must be made to the protection of performers’ rights under the Thai Copyright Act (CA) 1994 if Thailand is going to sign the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the United States or the European Union that would be likely to require Thailand to ratify the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 (WPPT). It argues that the current provisions of the Thai CA 1994 still fall short of the standard for the protection of performers’ rights under the WPPT, the provision of the prospective FTA of the United States and that of the European Union. It recommends that Thailand must improve the provisions on the protection of performers’ rights in the current Thai CA 1994 in order to provide better protection for performers’ rights in Thailand and make such provisions consistent with the standard of the protection of performers’ rights in the WPPT and the prospective FTAs.
{"title":"The Protection of Performer's Rights Under the Copyright Law in Thailand: The Proposed Reform in the Light of the Prospective Free Trade Agreements with the United States and European Union","authors":"Noppanun Supasiripongchai","doi":"10.4172/2375-4516.1000127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4172/2375-4516.1000127","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers the legal changes which must be made to the protection of performers’ rights under the Thai Copyright Act (CA) 1994 if Thailand is going to sign the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the United States or the European Union that would be likely to require Thailand to ratify the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 (WPPT). It argues that the current provisions of the Thai CA 1994 still fall short of the standard for the protection of performers’ rights under the WPPT, the provision of the prospective FTA of the United States and that of the European Union. It recommends that Thailand must improve the provisions on the protection of performers’ rights in the current Thai CA 1994 in order to provide better protection for performers’ rights in Thailand and make such provisions consistent with the standard of the protection of performers’ rights in the WPPT and the prospective FTAs.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123997978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The trade negotiations between the EU and the US on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) are obviously showing that the regulation of international economic and trade relations is tending to go off the track of multilateralism and switch to the bilateral regulation of international trade between the two major economic blocs of the world. Moreover, the T-TIP might overstep the borders of the multilateral framework of the trade liberalization, doing far more than merely to eliminate the already low average tariffs and targets the non-tariff barriers that are typical trade obstacles for the relations between the well-developed industrial nations. The main aim of the present paper is to analyze the characteristics of this bilateral segment of world trade, provide a general examination of the trade relations between the EU and US in the light of the EU negotiation mandate.
{"title":"The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – The Revival of Bilateralism?","authors":"Balázs Horváthy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2587703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2587703","url":null,"abstract":"The trade negotiations between the EU and the US on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) are obviously showing that the regulation of international economic and trade relations is tending to go off the track of multilateralism and switch to the bilateral regulation of international trade between the two major economic blocs of the world. Moreover, the T-TIP might overstep the borders of the multilateral framework of the trade liberalization, doing far more than merely to eliminate the already low average tariffs and targets the non-tariff barriers that are typical trade obstacles for the relations between the well-developed industrial nations. The main aim of the present paper is to analyze the characteristics of this bilateral segment of world trade, provide a general examination of the trade relations between the EU and US in the light of the EU negotiation mandate.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131318183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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