Pub Date : 2021-09-09DOI: 10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2021-02-03-04
Morten Tønnessen
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Pub Date : 2021-03-18DOI: 10.18261/ISSN.1504-2901-2021-01-03
A. Smajdor
In this paper, I aim to show that a certain form of immortality, without the need for any intervention from a supernatural being, is almost inevitable for human beings. I take a physicalist starting point: I am a certain configuration of physical particles. Thus, if these particles were reassembled in the same configuration, I would necessarily come back into existence. I address a number of objections raised against this prospect by Eric T. Olson, who argues that the reassembly of such particles following their dispersal after death would be simply impossible, and that if it did occur, it would necessarily be a mere replica rather than the real ‘me’. I suggest that the random redistribution of particles can be thought of as the throw of cosmic ‘dice’. With any specific throw, the likelihood that it yields the particular configuration that constitutes ‘me’ is vanishingly small. But over infinite spans of time, this likelihood increases until it becomes a near certainty. I show that even if this reconfiguration lacks the same causal features as those that gave rise to the original me, this cannot imply that the reassembled me is a mere replica. I acknowledge that my conjectured form of immortality may be unappealing to theists and non-theists alike. I also note that it rests on a linear conception of time, which may not harmonise with current thinking in physics. However, these issues notwithstanding, my conjectured version of immortality is at least as inexorable as many other things we take for granted, which also rest on potentially flawed beliefs about the nature of time and space.
{"title":"The inexorability of immortality: no need for God?","authors":"A. Smajdor","doi":"10.18261/ISSN.1504-2901-2021-01-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18261/ISSN.1504-2901-2021-01-03","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I aim to show that a certain form of immortality, without the need for any intervention from a supernatural being, is almost inevitable for human beings. I take a physicalist starting point: I am a certain configuration of physical particles. Thus, if these particles were reassembled in the same configuration, I would necessarily come back into existence. I address a number of objections raised against this prospect by Eric T. Olson, who argues that the reassembly of such particles following their dispersal after death would be simply impossible, and that if it did occur, it would necessarily be a mere replica rather than the real ‘me’. I suggest that the random redistribution of particles can be thought of as the throw of cosmic ‘dice’. With any specific throw, the likelihood that it yields the particular configuration that constitutes ‘me’ is vanishingly small. But over infinite spans of time, this likelihood increases until it becomes a near certainty. I show that even if this reconfiguration lacks the same causal features as those that gave rise to the original me, this cannot imply that the reassembled me is a mere replica. I acknowledge that my conjectured form of immortality may be unappealing to theists and non-theists alike. I also note that it rests on a linear conception of time, which may not harmonise with current thinking in physics. However, these issues notwithstanding, my conjectured version of immortality is at least as inexorable as many other things we take for granted, which also rest on potentially flawed beliefs about the nature of time and space.","PeriodicalId":32093,"journal":{"name":"Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46181351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-04-06
D. C. Vogt
{"title":"Kant og stemmeretten","authors":"D. C. Vogt","doi":"10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-04-06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-04-06","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32093,"journal":{"name":"Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44314474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-19DOI: 10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-02-03-08
Kristian Skagen Ekeli
The aim of this paper is to clarify and elaborate some central aspects of my respect-based deontological theory of the moral responsibility and the epistemic duties of voters. The starting point is three objections to my theory set out by Cornelius and Herman Cappelen in their article “Democracy and Ignorance” in this issue.
{"title":"Respekt for personer, epistemiske plikter og klanderverdig politisk uvitenhet","authors":"Kristian Skagen Ekeli","doi":"10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-02-03-08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2020-02-03-08","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to clarify and elaborate some central aspects of my respect-based deontological theory of the moral responsibility and the epistemic duties of voters. The starting point is three objections to my theory set out by Cornelius and Herman Cappelen in their article “Democracy and Ignorance” in this issue.","PeriodicalId":32093,"journal":{"name":"Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46819310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-18DOI: 10.18261/ISSN.1504-2901-2020-01-03
Frode Kjosavik
Aspects of Edmund Husserl’s view of perception and of mathematical intuition are presented in relation to Dagfinn Føllesdal’s philosophical work. His interpretation of Husserl is defended against certain misunderstandings and mis-construals. Connections are drawn between Husserl’s phenomenology and well-defined positions within the philosophy of perception (including internalism/externalism), within the philosophy of language (two-sorted semantics) as well as within the philosophy of mathematics (intuition of abstract objects through founding or variation).
{"title":"Husserls syn på mening og objektivitet – fra persepsjon til matematikk","authors":"Frode Kjosavik","doi":"10.18261/ISSN.1504-2901-2020-01-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18261/ISSN.1504-2901-2020-01-03","url":null,"abstract":"Aspects of Edmund Husserl’s view of perception and of mathematical intuition are presented in relation to Dagfinn Føllesdal’s philosophical work. His interpretation of Husserl is defended against certain misunderstandings and mis-construals. Connections are drawn between Husserl’s phenomenology and well-defined positions within the philosophy of perception (including internalism/externalism), within the philosophy of language (two-sorted semantics) as well as within the philosophy of mathematics (intuition of abstract objects through founding or variation).","PeriodicalId":32093,"journal":{"name":"Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44645316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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