Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0020
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
This chapter focuses on the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, and the impact on CIA. The agency received intense criticism from Congress in the final form of the 9/11 Commission Report, and had to adapt. But it also needed to move extremely quickly in the aftermath of the attacks, working alone and with allies, old and new. Having failed to prevent the attacks, the CIA was the tip of the spear in the US’s retaliation. Document: Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Report of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.
{"title":"Reckoning and Redemption: The 9/11 Commission, the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA at War","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0020","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, and the impact on CIA. The agency received intense criticism from Congress in the final form of the 9/11 Commission Report, and had to adapt. But it also needed to move extremely quickly in the aftermath of the attacks, working alone and with allies, old and new. Having failed to prevent the attacks, the CIA was the tip of the spear in the US’s retaliation.\u0000 Document: Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Report of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117301262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0023
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
This chapter concentrates on technological innovation lead by the CIA, particularly those of the digital era. Key here is the relationship between the CIA and industry. It examines how the CIA started a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley, In-Q-Tel, to learn from the centre of technological development. The chapter then discusses internal changes as a result of technological change: the renaming of the Information Operations Center to the Center for Cyber Intelligence and the creation of the Directorate for Digital Innovation. The chapter then considers the work of this new Directorate, and the challenges CIA has faced in adapting to the age of the internet, including, notably, the challenge of preserving security and preventing leaks. Document: CIA Statement on Claims by Wikileaks.
{"title":"Innovation at the CIA: From Sputnik to Silicon Valley and Venona to Vault 7","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0023","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter concentrates on technological innovation lead by the CIA, particularly those of the digital era. Key here is the relationship between the CIA and industry. It examines how the CIA started a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley, In-Q-Tel, to learn from the centre of technological development. The chapter then discusses internal changes as a result of technological change: the renaming of the Information Operations Center to the Center for Cyber Intelligence and the creation of the Directorate for Digital Innovation. The chapter then considers the work of this new Directorate, and the challenges CIA has faced in adapting to the age of the internet, including, notably, the challenge of preserving security and preventing leaks. \u0000Document: CIA Statement on Claims by Wikileaks.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128584812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0022
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
The chapter focuses on the CIA’s relationship with its political masters and oversight mechanisms in the aftermath of 9/11. The post 9/11 CIA was different, and working to new rules: detentions at Guantanamo, extraordinary renditions, enhanced interrogation techniques, black sites, waterboarding were sanctioned in the global hunt for al-Qaeda members, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Nashiri. However, these techniques became extremely controversial and led to reviewing the oversight of the CIA’s activities. Document: Concerns Over Revised Interrogation Plan For Nashiri.
{"title":"The Terrorist Hunters Become Political Quarry: The CIA and Rendition, Detention and Interrogation","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0022","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter focuses on the CIA’s relationship with its political masters and oversight mechanisms in the aftermath of 9/11. The post 9/11 CIA was different, and working to new rules: detentions at Guantanamo, extraordinary renditions, enhanced interrogation techniques, black sites, waterboarding were sanctioned in the global hunt for al-Qaeda members, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Nashiri. However, these techniques became extremely controversial and led to reviewing the oversight of the CIA’s activities. \u0000Document: Concerns Over Revised Interrogation Plan For Nashiri.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122351714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0010
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
This chapter concerns the case of Nosenko, as defector who was suspected of being a Soviet plant. Before examining the case, the chapter examines the difference between counter intelligence and counter espionage, which are often conflated. It then establishes the context of the CIA at this time, examining the importance of the earlier defection of Golitsyn, and impact of CIA counter intelligence chief James Angleton. The defection of Golitsyn and his information cast a shadow over the information Nosenko subsequently provided, leading in part to his being subject to hostile interrogation over a three and a half year period. On balance most believe that Nosenko was a genuine defector. Document: Golitsyn’s comments on the Nosenko case.
{"title":"The CIA’s Counter-Intelligence Conundrum: The Case of Yuri Nosenko","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter concerns the case of Nosenko, as defector who was suspected of being a Soviet plant. Before examining the case, the chapter examines the difference between counter intelligence and counter espionage, which are often conflated. It then establishes the context of the CIA at this time, examining the importance of the earlier defection of Golitsyn, and impact of CIA counter intelligence chief James Angleton. The defection of Golitsyn and his information cast a shadow over the information Nosenko subsequently provided, leading in part to his being subject to hostile interrogation over a three and a half year period. On balance most believe that Nosenko was a genuine defector. Document: Golitsyn’s comments on the Nosenko case.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"365 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122768267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0001
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
This chapter is an introduction to US intelligence mechanisms before the CIA was created. The focus is on Civil War and codebreaking mechanisms in the First World War. Most of the chapter focuses on changes to the US intelligence community. Analysis of the historic record shows that change began in July 1941 with the creation of the office for the Coordinator of Information soon evolving into the Office of Strategic Services. Key figures in the evolutionary process such as William J. Donovan, Roosevelt and Truman are studies within. It also includes discussion of changes between cessation of hostilities and passing of the National Security Act, 1947, which created both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. Document: Dulles-Jackson-Correra Report.
本章介绍了CIA成立前美国的情报机制。重点是内战和第一次世界大战中的密码破译机制。这一章的大部分内容都集中在美国情报界的变化上。对历史记录的分析表明，变革始于1941年7月，当时设立了新闻协调厅，不久演变为战略事务厅。多诺万(William J. Donovan)、罗斯福(Roosevelt)和杜鲁门(Truman)等演变过程中的关键人物都是研究对象。会议还讨论了从停止敌对行动到通过1947年的《国家安全法》之间的变化。《国家安全法》创立了国家安全委员会和中央情报局。文件:Dulles-Jackson-Correra报告。
{"title":"Intelligence for an American Century: Creating the CIA","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is an introduction to US intelligence mechanisms before the CIA was created. The focus is on Civil War and codebreaking mechanisms in the First World War. Most of the chapter focuses on changes to the US intelligence community. Analysis of the historic record shows that change began in July 1941 with the creation of the office for the Coordinator of Information soon evolving into the Office of Strategic Services. Key figures in the evolutionary process such as William J. Donovan, Roosevelt and Truman are studies within. It also includes discussion of changes between cessation of hostilities and passing of the National Security Act, 1947, which created both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. Document: Dulles-Jackson-Correra Report.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127365262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0008
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
The chapter begins with a survey of the various declassified volumes from numerous strands of the US Government that detail events from the mid-1950s onwards in relation to South East Asia. It then moves on to consider the role that CIA officer, Ed Lansdale had in the late 1950s and 1960s in establishing intelligence networks and paramilitary activities in South Vietnam. As the war developed, however, it became increasingly difficult to gain any kind of meaningful strategic intelligence from Hanoi. And despite notable advances, the US was prone to being surprised. This chapter discusses these issues in the context of the Tet Offensive. Document: Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam.
{"title":"The CIA in Vietnam","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter begins with a survey of the various declassified volumes from numerous strands of the US Government that detail events from the mid-1950s onwards in relation to South East Asia. It then moves on to consider the role that CIA officer, Ed Lansdale had in the late 1950s and 1960s in establishing intelligence networks and paramilitary activities in South Vietnam. As the war developed, however, it became increasingly difficult to gain any kind of meaningful strategic intelligence from Hanoi. And despite notable advances, the US was prone to being surprised. This chapter discusses these issues in the context of the Tet Offensive. Document: Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126229010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0009
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
The chapter opens with an overview of how technological development has developed to allow US intelligence to acquire insight to support counter proliferation efforts. The capability of US intelligence became a key asset in agreeing international agreements, such as SALT. SALT I is the focus of the chapter. Whilst both the USSR and the US agreed to various limits on their strategic weapons verification that the other was abiding by the terms was to become key issue. Intelligence collection focused on imint and elint was the solution. In this case, intelligence was confidence. Document: Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations.
{"title":"The CIA and Arms Control","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter opens with an overview of how technological development has developed to allow US intelligence to acquire insight to support counter proliferation efforts. The capability of US intelligence became a key asset in agreeing international agreements, such as SALT. SALT I is the focus of the chapter. Whilst both the USSR and the US agreed to various limits on their strategic weapons verification that the other was abiding by the terms was to become key issue. Intelligence collection focused on imint and elint was the solution. In this case, intelligence was confidence. Document: Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133965467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0019
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
This chapter is concerned with how the CIA tried to adjust to the new political and strategic realities of the 1990s. During the Clinton and Bush years, the very existence of the agency was challenged by many in congress and the commentariat. But there were no shortage of threats to manage. How did the CIA adapt to the different threat landscape where non-state actors, and terrorists were becoming increasingly dangerous. Primary among these was al Qaeda. The chapter examines how the CIA monitored this group. It focuses on the Bin Ladin Station, also known as ‘Alec station’, detailing its place within the CIA, and its methods of collection and analysis, and finally its outputs in the form of the President’s Daily Brief. The final part of the chapter focuses on how the Daily Brief is collated and presented. Document: Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US.
{"title":"‘The System was Blinking Red’: The Peace Dividend and the Road to 9/11","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0019","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is concerned with how the CIA tried to adjust to the new political and strategic realities of the 1990s. During the Clinton and Bush years, the very existence of the agency was challenged by many in congress and the commentariat. But there were no shortage of threats to manage. How did the CIA adapt to the different threat landscape where non-state actors, and terrorists were becoming increasingly dangerous. Primary among these was al Qaeda. The chapter examines how the CIA monitored this group. It focuses on the Bin Ladin Station, also known as ‘Alec station’, detailing its place within the CIA, and its methods of collection and analysis, and finally its outputs in the form of the President’s Daily Brief. The final part of the chapter focuses on how the Daily Brief is collated and presented. Document: Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122468238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0002
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
The chapter considers how the CIA developed its covert action capabilities. it begins with a discussion of the centrality of OSS figures to the early character and shape of the Agency. It also considers how the dominant political personalities of the Truman administration impacted on the CIA’s development and deployment of it covert actions. It illustrates how inter-departmental rivalries were rife, but how by the end of the Truman administration, covert action was formally centralised and lead by the CIA. Document: NSC 5412/2.
{"title":"The Development of CIA Covert Action","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter considers how the CIA developed its covert action capabilities. it begins with a discussion of the centrality of OSS figures to the early character and shape of the Agency. It also considers how the dominant political personalities of the Truman administration impacted on the CIA’s development and deployment of it covert actions. It illustrates how inter-departmental rivalries were rife, but how by the end of the Truman administration, covert action was formally centralised and lead by the CIA. Document: NSC 5412/2.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131752239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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