Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0015
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
Able Archer 83 was one in a series of NATO exercises designed to test processes, troop movements, secondary missions and tactical nuclear strike against chosen Soviet Bloc targets. The Soviets grew fearful that it was cover for an actual assault. The situation was precarious, perilously close to what generations of analysts considered the most likely cause of a hot war: miscalculation. Fortunately British intelligence had recruited a Soviet intelligence officer, Oleg Gordievsky, who could provide crucial insights, allowing for leaders to offer reassurances and tode-escalate. Documents: Indicators to recognize adversarial preparations for a surprise nuclear missile attack; Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities.
{"title":"Able Archer and the NATO War Scare","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Able Archer 83 was one in a series of NATO exercises designed to test processes, troop movements, secondary missions and tactical nuclear strike against chosen Soviet Bloc targets. The Soviets grew fearful that it was cover for an actual assault. The situation was precarious, perilously close to what generations of analysts considered the most likely cause of a hot war: miscalculation. Fortunately British intelligence had recruited a Soviet intelligence officer, Oleg Gordievsky, who could provide crucial insights, allowing for leaders to offer reassurances and tode-escalate. Documents: Indicators to recognize adversarial preparations for a surprise nuclear missile attack; Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127843048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0003
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
This chapter focuses on CIA activity in Berlin and the construction of the Berlin Tunnel with their British counterparts, also known as Operation Gold and Stopwatch. The aim was to intercept USSR communications, by digging a tunnel from the US sector of West Berlin. Bill Harvey was the central figure for the CIA. The chapter also details quite how close the US and UK were operational in this Operation, and the closeness in sharing of technology, and knowledge built upon mutual trust and recognition of expertise. The operation was betrayed. Operation Gold was compromised almost immediately by George Blake, a British intelligence officer, told the USSR. However the USSR did not use the opportunity to mislead the US and UK by sharing disinformation. Blake was too valuable. Document: The Berlin Tunnel Operation 1952-1956
{"title":"A ‘Gangster Act’: The Berlin Tunnel","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on CIA activity in Berlin and the construction of the Berlin Tunnel with their British counterparts, also known as Operation Gold and Stopwatch. The aim was to intercept USSR communications, by digging a tunnel from the US sector of West Berlin. Bill Harvey was the central figure for the CIA. The chapter also details quite how close the US and UK were operational in this Operation, and the closeness in sharing of technology, and knowledge built upon mutual trust and recognition of expertise. The operation was betrayed. Operation Gold was compromised almost immediately by George Blake, a British intelligence officer, told the USSR. However the USSR did not use the opportunity to mislead the US and UK by sharing disinformation. Blake was too valuable. Document: The Berlin Tunnel Operation 1952-1956","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116068449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0018
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
The CIA worked hard to recruit agents of the KGB. The KGB reciprocated. They had some extraordinary successes. This chapter focuses on one, CIA officer Aldrich Ames. The chapter explores his personal and professional life, and how he came to be a double agent. It considers what information he chose to sell to the KGB and how damaging this was. It then considers the lingering doubts following Ames’ conviction: was he the only one? Document: Unclassified Abstract of the CIA Inspector General’s Report on the Aldrich H. Ames Case.
{"title":"A Mole in Their Midst: The CIA and Aldrich Ames","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0018","url":null,"abstract":"The CIA worked hard to recruit agents of the KGB. The KGB reciprocated. They had some extraordinary successes. This chapter focuses on one, CIA officer Aldrich Ames. The chapter explores his personal and professional life, and how he came to be a double agent. It considers what information he chose to sell to the KGB and how damaging this was. It then considers the lingering doubts following Ames’ conviction: was he the only one? Document: Unclassified Abstract of the CIA Inspector General’s Report on the Aldrich H. Ames Case.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114254823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0016
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
This chapter focuses on the CIA’s study of the leadership of the USSR, a practice sometimes known as Kremlinology. Periods of transition in the leadership of the USSR were extremely significant for the CIA, and the accession of Andropov was no different. Andropov swiftly took power within a week of Brezhnev’s death, and the CIA had to move quicky to assess how he would lead and shape the USSR. This is the focus of the first document. Andropov was but one of a succession of short-lived Soviet premiers, though. And the CIA had to assess the situation constantly. The remainder of the chapter takes a chronological look at successive CIA analyses of the likely successors to the ailing and aging Andropov through to Gorbachev. Documents: Assessment of Andropov’s Power; Gorbachev, the New Broom.
{"title":"The Soviet Leadership and Kremlinology in the 1980s","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on the CIA’s study of the leadership of the USSR, a practice sometimes known as Kremlinology. Periods of transition in the leadership of the USSR were extremely significant for the CIA, and the accession of Andropov was no different. Andropov swiftly took power within a week of Brezhnev’s death, and the CIA had to move quicky to assess how he would lead and shape the USSR. This is the focus of the first document. Andropov was but one of a succession of short-lived Soviet premiers, though. And the CIA had to assess the situation constantly. The remainder of the chapter takes a chronological look at successive CIA analyses of the likely successors to the ailing and aging Andropov through to Gorbachev. Documents: Assessment of Andropov’s Power; Gorbachev, the New Broom.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125595519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0005
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
The chapter is concerned with the CIA’s intelligence relationships with key international partners – the Five Eyes – and wrinkles in the relationship. Despite being extremely robust in general, there were difficulties. China was a notable exception; Britain and the US had fundamentally different policies. Korea was another. The chapter illustrates the impact this had on intelligence sharing. It then goes on to detail the paucity of CIA analysis concerning Korea, and why this was the case. Documents: Minutes of the British Joint Intelligence Committee 24 August 1949; CIA’s Current Capabilities of the Northern Korea Regime.
{"title":"Anglo-American Intelligence Liaison and the Outbreak of the Korean War","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter is concerned with the CIA’s intelligence relationships with key international partners – the Five Eyes – and wrinkles in the relationship. Despite being extremely robust in general, there were difficulties. China was a notable exception; Britain and the US had fundamentally different policies. Korea was another. The chapter illustrates the impact this had on intelligence sharing. It then goes on to detail the paucity of CIA analysis concerning Korea, and why this was the case. Documents: Minutes of the British Joint Intelligence Committee 24 August 1949; CIA’s Current Capabilities of the Northern Korea Regime.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130218033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0017
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
Spying on secretive dictatorships is difficult. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was, in the run up to the first Gulf War, a very hard target. This chapter examines how the CIA tried to overcome this problem. It examines the US’s engagement with Saddam Hussain and Iraq from the 1970s, and considers how the CIA understood Saddam following his rise to power in 1979. It culminates with Desert Storm, and how a mix of technical intelligence collection and analysis changed opinions about the likelihood Iraq invading neighbouring Kuwait. Document: Iraq’s Saddam Husayn: The Next Six Weeks
{"title":"The CIA and the (First) Persian Gulf War","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0017","url":null,"abstract":"Spying on secretive dictatorships is difficult. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was, in the run up to the first Gulf War, a very hard target. This chapter examines how the CIA tried to overcome this problem. It examines the US’s engagement with Saddam Hussain and Iraq from the 1970s, and considers how the CIA understood Saddam following his rise to power in 1979. It culminates with Desert Storm, and how a mix of technical intelligence collection and analysis changed opinions about the likelihood Iraq invading neighbouring Kuwait. Document: Iraq’s Saddam Husayn: The Next Six Weeks","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"223 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127001338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0024
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
Interference in US elections by foreign powers did not start in 2016. The chapter begins with a history of CIA analyses examining Russian propaganda involvement in US Presidential elections from the 1960s. It then moves on to discuss the Russian operation to influence the 2016 election. Specifically, it examines the review, commissioned by President Obama, to examine and explain Russian interference. The report illustrated that propaganda was not confined to the internet; the Russians were operating on a broad spectrum: television and social media were being utilised relentlessly. Inevitably, the report became a political football, subject to attack by Trump and his supporters. Document: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.
{"title":"Entering the Electoral Fray: The CIA and Russian Meddling in the 2016 Election","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0024","url":null,"abstract":"Interference in US elections by foreign powers did not start in 2016. The chapter begins with a history of CIA analyses examining Russian propaganda involvement in US Presidential elections from the 1960s. It then moves on to discuss the Russian operation to influence the 2016 election. Specifically, it examines the review, commissioned by President Obama, to examine and explain Russian interference. The report illustrated that propaganda was not confined to the internet; the Russians were operating on a broad spectrum: television and social media were being utilised relentlessly. Inevitably, the report became a political football, subject to attack by Trump and his supporters. \u0000Document: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134478216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0025
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
The chapter details the CIA’s relationship with Trump during his Presidency. One of Trump’s first actions as President was to visit the CIA where he proclaimed ‘backing’ for the organisation, but the CIA and the President often viewed the world, and, indeed, the mission of the CIA, very differently. This led to serious questions over the Trump administrations’ respect for the independence of the CIA’s analytical judgements, and the potential for politicisation of intelligence, particularly on issues like Iran’s nuclear programme. How did the CIA adapt to this new situation.? Document: Donal J. Trump Tweet.
{"title":"Flying Blind? The CIA and the Trump Administration","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0025","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter details the CIA’s relationship with Trump during his Presidency. One of Trump’s first actions as President was to visit the CIA where he proclaimed ‘backing’ for the organisation, but the CIA and the President often viewed the world, and, indeed, the mission of the CIA, very differently. This led to serious questions over the Trump administrations’ respect for the independence of the CIA’s analytical judgements, and the potential for politicisation of intelligence, particularly on issues like Iran’s nuclear programme. How did the CIA adapt to this new situation.?\u0000Document: Donal J. Trump Tweet.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"3 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114400038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0004
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
This chapter outlines how countering the perceived threat from the USSR became the central mission of the CIA. It also details just how little information the CIA had to work with, and how central judgements and analysis came to be in shaping policy direction about possible USSR actions. Developing analytical capabilities was key to this, and it was institutionalised in CIA as early as 1946 with the creation of the Office of Reports and Estimates. Meanwhile, the CIA continued to evolve. Particularly significant in this regard was Walter Bedell Smith. Document: Intelligence on the Soviet Bloc
{"title":"The CIA and the USSR: The Challenge of Understanding the Soviet Threat","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter outlines how countering the perceived threat from the USSR became the central mission of the CIA. It also details just how little information the CIA had to work with, and how central judgements and analysis came to be in shaping policy direction about possible USSR actions. Developing analytical capabilities was key to this, and it was institutionalised in CIA as early as 1946 with the creation of the Office of Reports and Estimates. Meanwhile, the CIA continued to evolve. Particularly significant in this regard was Walter Bedell Smith. Document: Intelligence on the Soviet Bloc","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"378 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122046247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0013
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman
The chapter provides a background to the proxy conflict between the US and the USSR in Afghanistan, where the CIA supplied the Afghan Mujahedin with resources and weapons. It offers an insight into the Soviet’s decision to invade, charting Brezhnev’s initial reluctance to mobilise a full scale military assault on the Communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and their brutal regime, and how this changed on Christmas Day 1979. The CIA monitored the situation closely, and assessed the likelihood that the Soviet army had walked into a quagmire. Documents: Strategic Warning Staff’s Performance; USSR-Afghanistan Memoranda from Strategic Warning Staff; The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.
{"title":"The CIA and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan","authors":"Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, M. Goodman","doi":"10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter provides a background to the proxy conflict between the US and the USSR in Afghanistan, where the CIA supplied the Afghan Mujahedin with resources and weapons. It offers an insight into the Soviet’s decision to invade, charting Brezhnev’s initial reluctance to mobilise a full scale military assault on the Communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and their brutal regime, and how this changed on Christmas Day 1979. The CIA monitored the situation closely, and assessed the likelihood that the Soviet army had walked into a quagmire. \u0000Documents: Strategic Warning Staff’s Performance; USSR-Afghanistan Memoranda from Strategic Warning Staff; The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.","PeriodicalId":328945,"journal":{"name":"The CIA and the Pursuit of Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130752685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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