{"title":"Determinants of Policy Diffusion in Brazil and the U.S.","authors":"Denilson Bandeira Coêlho","doi":"10.4000/irpp.2254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.2254","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47086280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Peter Kevin SPINK, Beyond Public Policy: A Public Action Languages Approach","authors":"Kate Precious","doi":"10.4000/irpp.2239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.2239","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48676404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Giliberto CAPANO & Michael HOWLETT (Eds.), A Modern Guide to Public Policy","authors":"G. Bazzan","doi":"10.4000/irpp.2210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.2210","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43352557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Andrew MASSEY (Ed.), A Research Agenda for Public Administration","authors":"Petra Svensson","doi":"10.4000/IRPP.1741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/IRPP.1741","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47272991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When a major corruption scandal emerged during the organisation of the 2015 Universal Exposition in Milan, the government set up a brand-new system of preliminary controls for the procurement of all Expo contracts. Controls can certainly be beneficial in many respects, but they inevitably complicate procedures and even produce delays and red tape. Indeed, for a time-pressed schedule as that of the 2015 Expo, preliminary controls were considered a fatal blow. Contrary to expectations, not only bureaucratic delays did not materialise, but controls actually sped up procedures. Therefore, it is worth explaining and learning from this unique outcome. Can it be replicated in other cases? We answer this question by building a model of controls based on programme and non-programme features that support three causal mechanisms: threat attribution, repeated interactions, and actor certification. Such a model is an indispensable tool for designers; it allows to explain how controls work in practice and provide clues on how to adjust the design of the policy to changing contexts. In this respect, the analysis of the Expo controls and their subsequent replications raises several methodological issues relevant to extrapolation-oriented research.
{"title":"When red tape saves time: The Anti-corruption controls for the 2015 Universal Exposition","authors":"Simone Busetti, B. Dente","doi":"10.4000/IRPP.1608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/IRPP.1608","url":null,"abstract":"When a major corruption scandal emerged during the organisation of the 2015 Universal Exposition in Milan, the government set up a brand-new system of preliminary controls for the procurement of all Expo contracts. Controls can certainly be beneficial in many respects, but they inevitably complicate procedures and even produce delays and red tape. Indeed, for a time-pressed schedule as that of the 2015 Expo, preliminary controls were considered a fatal blow. Contrary to expectations, not only bureaucratic delays did not materialise, but controls actually sped up procedures. Therefore, it is worth explaining and learning from this unique outcome. Can it be replicated in other cases? We answer this question by building a model of controls based on programme and non-programme features that support three causal mechanisms: threat attribution, repeated interactions, and actor certification. Such a model is an indispensable tool for designers; it allows to explain how controls work in practice and provide clues on how to adjust the design of the policy to changing contexts. In this respect, the analysis of the Expo controls and their subsequent replications raises several methodological issues relevant to extrapolation-oriented research.","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46061992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
COVID-19 poses a new challenge to governmental decision-making. With a great level of uncertainty regarding the roots, distribution, prevention, and effects of the pandemic, and with scientific insights and recommendations changing on a daily basis, politicians face the difficult task of reacting quickly but justifiably to the developments. Neo-institutional perspectives of policy research can contribute to the understanding of similarities and differences in strategies to deal with the pandemic by focusing on the interrelationship of institutions and the policy process. A comparison of France and Germany highlights the effects of different patterns of democracy. In what way does the national institutional setting, particularly federalism and centralization, contribute to decision-making? How are political decisions instrumentalized in public debates? The findings indicate that the different patterns of democracy in France (unitary majoritarian system) and Germany (federal consensus system) provide distinctive challenges and make it difficult to transfer successful policies from one country to another.
{"title":"Patterns of Democracy Matter in the COVID-19 Crisis","authors":"N. Bandelow, P. Hassenteufel, Johanna Hornung","doi":"10.4000/IRPP.1788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/IRPP.1788","url":null,"abstract":"COVID-19 poses a new challenge to governmental decision-making. With a great level of uncertainty regarding the roots, distribution, prevention, and effects of the pandemic, and with scientific insights and recommendations changing on a daily basis, politicians face the difficult task of reacting quickly but justifiably to the developments. Neo-institutional perspectives of policy research can contribute to the understanding of similarities and differences in strategies to deal with the pandemic by focusing on the interrelationship of institutions and the policy process. A comparison of France and Germany highlights the effects of different patterns of democracy. In what way does the national institutional setting, particularly federalism and centralization, contribute to decision-making? How are political decisions instrumentalized in public debates? The findings indicate that the different patterns of democracy in France (unitary majoritarian system) and Germany (federal consensus system) provide distinctive challenges and make it difficult to transfer successful policies from one country to another.","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44469932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Malcolm TORRY, A Modern Guide to Citizen’s Basic Income: A Multidisciplinary Approach","authors":"Arya Pillai","doi":"10.4000/IRPP.1763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/IRPP.1763","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44816369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In policy implementation the roles of ambiguity and uncertainty have been theorized but insufficiently tested. This study contributes to the policy process literature by arguing that ambiguity and uncertainty are two sides of the same coin in implementation. Their effects are linked to the credibility of policy, the clarity of goals, and agency capacity. We analyze ambiguity and uncertainty through the lens of post-disaster policy in local government using primary qualitative data from 22 local government officials across 8 counties and 6 cities that were affected by Hurricane Harvey. We find that the credibility of a policy is evaluated separately from the credibility of the formulator; experience moderates the effects of ambiguity; and uncertainty in implementation has a similar effect as ambiguity and is not lessened with more information. The distinction between the political manipulation of ambiguous circumstances and the rational, technocratic approach to gathering more information to reduce uncertainty may be less clear than previously considered.
{"title":"Ambiguity, Uncertainty and Implementation","authors":"K. Taylor, S. Zarb, Nathan Jeschke","doi":"10.4000/IRPP.1638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/IRPP.1638","url":null,"abstract":"In policy implementation the roles of ambiguity and uncertainty have been theorized but insufficiently tested. This study contributes to the policy process literature by arguing that ambiguity and uncertainty are two sides of the same coin in implementation. Their effects are linked to the credibility of policy, the clarity of goals, and agency capacity. We analyze ambiguity and uncertainty through the lens of post-disaster policy in local government using primary qualitative data from 22 local government officials across 8 counties and 6 cities that were affected by Hurricane Harvey. We find that the credibility of a policy is evaluated separately from the credibility of the formulator; experience moderates the effects of ambiguity; and uncertainty in implementation has a similar effect as ambiguity and is not lessened with more information. The distinction between the political manipulation of ambiguous circumstances and the rational, technocratic approach to gathering more information to reduce uncertainty may be less clear than previously considered.","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49205761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S In 2019, the government of Ghana overhauled its access to public information rules through the Right to information Act. Prior to this legislation, access to public sector information was not formally regulated and the new legislation provided a legal framework for making public sector information accessible to the general public. From an Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) perspective, the passage of the Right to Information Act represents a major policy change and provides a case in which the ACF theory of major policy change can be investigated. This case is also interesting because it took place in a unitary policy subsystem, as opposed to a competitive or collaborative subsystem. Unitary subsystems are characterized by a single, dominant advocacy coalition, in this case a pro-transparency coalition, and are relatively uncommon in the ACF literature. The purpose of this paper is to investigate ACF policy change theory in the Ghanaian public sector information policy subsystem – as a unitary subsystem – to determine whether it can explain the major policy change that took place with the passage of the Right to Information Act. The investigation finds strong empirical support for the ACF’s ‘pathways’ hypothesis and moderate support for the ‘power’ hypothesis.
S 2019年,加纳政府通过《信息权法》对其获取公共信息的规则进行了彻底改革。在这项立法之前,公共部门信息的获取没有受到正式监管,新立法为公众获取公共部门信息提供了法律框架。从倡导联盟框架(ACF)的角度来看,《信息权法》的通过代表了一项重大政策变化,并提供了一个可以调查ACF重大政策变化理论的案例。这种情况也很有趣,因为它发生在一个单一的策略子系统中,而不是竞争或协作子系统。单一子系统的特点是一个单一的、占主导地位的倡导联盟,在这种情况下是一个支持透明度的联盟,在ACF文献中相对罕见。本文的目的是研究加纳公共部门信息政策子系统中的ACF政策变化理论,以确定它是否能够解释随着《信息权法》的通过而发生的重大政策变化。调查发现,ACF的“途径”假说得到了强有力的实证支持,而“权力”假说则得到了适度的支持。
{"title":"Investigating ACF Policy Change Theory in a Unitary Policy Subsystem: The Case of Ghanaian Public Sector Information Policy","authors":"B. T. Heinmiller, E. Osei, Eugene Danso","doi":"10.4000/IRPP.1894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/IRPP.1894","url":null,"abstract":"S In 2019, the government of Ghana overhauled its access to public information rules through the Right to information Act. Prior to this legislation, access to public sector information was not formally regulated and the new legislation provided a legal framework for making public sector information accessible to the general public. From an Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) perspective, the passage of the Right to Information Act represents a major policy change and provides a case in which the ACF theory of major policy change can be investigated. This case is also interesting because it took place in a unitary policy subsystem, as opposed to a competitive or collaborative subsystem. Unitary subsystems are characterized by a single, dominant advocacy coalition, in this case a pro-transparency coalition, and are relatively uncommon in the ACF literature. The purpose of this paper is to investigate ACF policy change theory in the Ghanaian public sector information policy subsystem – as a unitary subsystem – to determine whether it can explain the major policy change that took place with the passage of the Right to Information Act. The investigation finds strong empirical support for the ACF’s ‘pathways’ hypothesis and moderate support for the ‘power’ hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48525941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a significant capability to choose how to implement their decisions to be effective, given the mix of managerial autonomy, supervisory powers and political independence that most of these agencies enjoy. As such, traditional approaches which focus on their institutional characteristics or their reputational problems do not fully capture the variation in IRAs’ behavior. This paper suggests a complementary approach to interpreting IRAs’ autonomous behavior, focusing on the possibilities that the practice of accountability offers to these public agencies to make relevant choices for the agency itself and the policy environment. To that end, we identify a key background variable that affects the practice of IRAs, namely, the varying power configurations existing among the regulatees and focus on how this factor shapes their voluntary accountability in different contexts. Lastly, we examine several cases of IRA accountability behavior to discuss whether the patterns we submit might constitute a starting point for a theoretical development on the use of accountability by IRAs.
{"title":"Varying Power Configurations and the Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies","authors":"Fulya Apaydin, J. Jordana","doi":"10.4000/irpp.1458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.1458","url":null,"abstract":"Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a significant capability to choose how to implement their decisions to be effective, given the mix of managerial autonomy, supervisory powers and political independence that most of these agencies enjoy. As such, traditional approaches which focus on their institutional characteristics or their reputational problems do not fully capture the variation in IRAs’ behavior. This paper suggests a complementary approach to interpreting IRAs’ autonomous behavior, focusing on the possibilities that the practice of accountability offers to these public agencies to make relevant choices for the agency itself and the policy environment. To that end, we identify a key background variable that affects the practice of IRAs, namely, the varying power configurations existing among the regulatees and focus on how this factor shapes their voluntary accountability in different contexts. Lastly, we examine several cases of IRA accountability behavior to discuss whether the patterns we submit might constitute a starting point for a theoretical development on the use of accountability by IRAs.","PeriodicalId":33409,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Public Policy","volume":" 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41251788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}