This is our third article already in the previously promised series to focus on FDI & DIA, as unitary fluid substance world owned, and so flows and stocks and country actors carrying these, but respective amounts unevenly distribute on these country actors. Once more, our approach on FDI won’t change any of its previous paradigm, coordinates and criteria considered, i.e dynamics mean individual country versus world speed difference along the 1994-2015 interval, in which the 1994 stocks accumulate FDI&DIA flows since 1990, and top countries range up to an important majority of stocks amounts in the total and so a relatively stable percentage, on the one hand, and down to 0.2% on FDI/inflows and to 0.1% of the same total world stocks on DIA/outflows, on the other. This time we will stay in Europe to focus on two so-called ‘sub-regions’ of this continent with interesting FDI-DIA contents, that will then interestingly aggregate for something that might equally become a territory more economically homogeneous than previously thought.
{"title":"World FDI, An ‘Unequal Partners’ and ‘Concentric Circles’ Design Part III. Studying the Rest of Europe: Western, versus Central and Eastern Europe","authors":"D. Andrei, L. Andrei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2834110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834110","url":null,"abstract":"This is our third article already in the previously promised series to focus on FDI & DIA, as unitary fluid substance world owned, and so flows and stocks and country actors carrying these, but respective amounts unevenly distribute on these country actors. Once more, our approach on FDI won’t change any of its previous paradigm, coordinates and criteria considered, i.e dynamics mean individual country versus world speed difference along the 1994-2015 interval, in which the 1994 stocks accumulate FDI&DIA flows since 1990, and top countries range up to an important majority of stocks amounts in the total and so a relatively stable percentage, on the one hand, and down to 0.2% on FDI/inflows and to 0.1% of the same total world stocks on DIA/outflows, on the other. This time we will stay in Europe to focus on two so-called ‘sub-regions’ of this continent with interesting FDI-DIA contents, that will then interestingly aggregate for something that might equally become a territory more economically homogeneous than previously thought.","PeriodicalId":341206,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Capital-Labor Relations & Institutional Change (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116639750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most studies of worker participation examine either formal participatory structures or informal participation. Yet, increasingly, works councils and other formal participatory bodies are operating in parallel with collective bargaining or are filling the void left by its decline. Moreover, these bodies are sprouting in workplaces in which workers have long held a modicum of influence, authority, and production- or service-related information. This study leverages a case from the healthcare sector to examine the interaction between formal and informal worker participation. Seeking to determine whether or not these two forces — each independently shown to benefit production or service delivery — complement or undermine one another, we find evidence for the latter. In the case of the 27 primary care departments that we study, formal structures appeared to help less participatory departments improve their performance. However, these same structures also appeared to impede those departments with previously high levels of informal participation. While we remain cautious with respect to generalizability, the case serves as a warning to those seeking to institute participation in an environment in which some workers have long felt they had the requisite authority, influence, and information necessary to perform their jobs effectively.
{"title":"Complementary or Conflictual? Formal Participation, Informal Participation, and Organizational Performance","authors":"A. S. Litwin, A. E. Eaton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2201704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2201704","url":null,"abstract":"Most studies of worker participation examine either formal participatory structures or informal participation. Yet, increasingly, works councils and other formal participatory bodies are operating in parallel with collective bargaining or are filling the void left by its decline. Moreover, these bodies are sprouting in workplaces in which workers have long held a modicum of influence, authority, and production- or service-related information. This study leverages a case from the healthcare sector to examine the interaction between formal and informal worker participation. Seeking to determine whether or not these two forces — each independently shown to benefit production or service delivery — complement or undermine one another, we find evidence for the latter. In the case of the 27 primary care departments that we study, formal structures appeared to help less participatory departments improve their performance. However, these same structures also appeared to impede those departments with previously high levels of informal participation. While we remain cautious with respect to generalizability, the case serves as a warning to those seeking to institute participation in an environment in which some workers have long felt they had the requisite authority, influence, and information necessary to perform their jobs effectively.","PeriodicalId":341206,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Capital-Labor Relations & Institutional Change (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127894103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We document how a plant-specific shock to investment opportunities at one plant of a firm ("treated plant") spills over to other plants of the same firm-but only if the firm is financially constrained. While the shock triggers an increase in investment and employment at the treated plant, this increase is offset by a decrease at other plants of the same magnitude, consistent with headquarters channeling scarce resources away from other plants and toward the treated plant. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm-wide productivity increases, suggesting that the reallocation is beneficial for the firm as a whole. We also show that-in order to provide the treated plant with scarce resources-headquarters does not uniformly "tax" all of the firm's other plants in the same way: It is more likely to take away resources from plants that are less productive, are not part of the firm's core industries, and are located far away from headquarters. We do not find any evidence of investment or employment spillovers at financially unconstrained firms.
{"title":"Capital and Labor Reallocation Inside Firms","authors":"Xavier Giroud, Holger M. Mueller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2255665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2255665","url":null,"abstract":"We document how a plant-specific shock to investment opportunities at one plant of a firm (\"treated plant\") spills over to other plants of the same firm-but only if the firm is financially constrained. While the shock triggers an increase in investment and employment at the treated plant, this increase is offset by a decrease at other plants of the same magnitude, consistent with headquarters channeling scarce resources away from other plants and toward the treated plant. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm-wide productivity increases, suggesting that the reallocation is beneficial for the firm as a whole. We also show that-in order to provide the treated plant with scarce resources-headquarters does not uniformly \"tax\" all of the firm's other plants in the same way: It is more likely to take away resources from plants that are less productive, are not part of the firm's core industries, and are located far away from headquarters. We do not find any evidence of investment or employment spillovers at financially unconstrained firms.","PeriodicalId":341206,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Capital-Labor Relations & Institutional Change (Topic)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124648112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the enduring lessons of the global financial crisis is that regulatory laxity heightens systemic risk. This paper examines the political sources of regulatory laxity, highlighting the influence of interest groups on governments' commitments to competition (antitrust) regulation in democracies. I argue that competition policy enforcement reflects the relative political strength of two contending groups. A rent-preserving alliance of incumbent producers and affiliated labor ("insiders") opposes competition policies that erode its market dominance. A pro-competition coalition of consumers, unorganized workers, and entrepreneurs ("outsiders") favors regulatory oversight. A simple model illustrates that policymakers' commitments to competition policy vary according to the distributive effects of reform. Where insiders are concentrated and encompassing, commitments to antitrust regulatory reform are weakened. To test the propositions, I create an original dataset measuring competition agency design over the period 1975-2007. The results, which are robust to multiple specifications and instrumental variables, suggest that anticompetitive interest groups slow the reform process and weaken governments' commitments to a robust regulatory regime.
{"title":"Organized Business, Affiliated Labor, and Competition Policy Reform in Developing Democracies","authors":"Stephen Weymouth","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1633190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1633190","url":null,"abstract":"One of the enduring lessons of the global financial crisis is that regulatory laxity heightens systemic risk. This paper examines the political sources of regulatory laxity, highlighting the influence of interest groups on governments' commitments to competition (antitrust) regulation in democracies. I argue that competition policy enforcement reflects the relative political strength of two contending groups. A rent-preserving alliance of incumbent producers and affiliated labor (\"insiders\") opposes competition policies that erode its market dominance. A pro-competition coalition of consumers, unorganized workers, and entrepreneurs (\"outsiders\") favors regulatory oversight. A simple model illustrates that policymakers' commitments to competition policy vary according to the distributive effects of reform. Where insiders are concentrated and encompassing, commitments to antitrust regulatory reform are weakened. To test the propositions, I create an original dataset measuring competition agency design over the period 1975-2007. The results, which are robust to multiple specifications and instrumental variables, suggest that anticompetitive interest groups slow the reform process and weaken governments' commitments to a robust regulatory regime.","PeriodicalId":341206,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Capital-Labor Relations & Institutional Change (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128351458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This work is aiming primarily at discussing the thesis that the search for new currency systems in World Economy is not the reason but the result of production crisis. The approach initiated with the three works of Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber which are carried out since 2003, i.e. the development of “2nd Bretton Woods” monetary system, and proposals of Eichengreen, Goldstein, Kamin, McKinnon, Obstfeld, Roubini, Truman and Stiglitz, who participated in this development with their works, will be examined within the thesis in question. Mainly, the effects of these discussions to the developing countries and Economy of Turkey will be focused on. Considering that the world trade volume and movements of currency determines the type of industrialization in developing countries, labor markets and the relation between sectoral structures in developing countries and foreign capital will be discussed by proceeding from the studies which are carried out by transnational foundations such as IMF, World Bank, Unido, OECD and UNCTAD. For instance, we have to opportunity to explain, why in spite of its current accounts deficit China does not want to reduce U.S. dollars/Yuan parity to its real value and why in spite of extraordinary current accounts deficit the U.S. dollars/YTL parity in Turkey does not rise to its real value, in terms of trade and capital flows. It is not possible to say that the factors increasing and maintaining capital flows are different from the production types and industrialization periods. Therefore, we think that we can understand world monetary system or unsystematicness of it better by looking to real indicators behind interest rate parameter….
{"title":"World Economy while Second Bretton Woods Declines and Evaluation on Developing Countries","authors":"M. Şi̇şman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1508027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1508027","url":null,"abstract":"This work is aiming primarily at discussing the thesis that the search for new currency systems in World Economy is not the reason but the result of production crisis. The approach initiated with the three works of Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber which are carried out since 2003, i.e. the development of “2nd Bretton Woods” monetary system, and proposals of Eichengreen, Goldstein, Kamin, McKinnon, Obstfeld, Roubini, Truman and Stiglitz, who participated in this development with their works, will be examined within the thesis in question. Mainly, the effects of these discussions to the developing countries and Economy of Turkey will be focused on. Considering that the world trade volume and movements of currency determines the type of industrialization in developing countries, labor markets and the relation between sectoral structures in developing countries and foreign capital will be discussed by proceeding from the studies which are carried out by transnational foundations such as IMF, World Bank, Unido, OECD and UNCTAD. For instance, we have to opportunity to explain, why in spite of its current accounts deficit China does not want to reduce U.S. dollars/Yuan parity to its real value and why in spite of extraordinary current accounts deficit the U.S. dollars/YTL parity in Turkey does not rise to its real value, in terms of trade and capital flows. It is not possible to say that the factors increasing and maintaining capital flows are different from the production types and industrialization periods. Therefore, we think that we can understand world monetary system or unsystematicness of it better by looking to real indicators behind interest rate parameter….","PeriodicalId":341206,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Capital-Labor Relations & Institutional Change (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116087458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study explores the determinants of FDI in CEE economies based on a panel data model of 10 CEE countries over a period of 10 years. The aim of this research is to identify driving forces behind the decision of foreign actors to invest in the region. Three groups of relevant determinants are identified: traditional market- and efficiency-seeking factors as well as transition-specific variables. Fixed effects and random effects models are employed to compare the results of various estimation methods. Results suggest that besides the importance of traditional factors, the impact of transitional variables in the region should not be neglected.
{"title":"The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe","authors":"Nadezda Kudriavceva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2007606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2007606","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the determinants of FDI in CEE economies based on a panel data model of 10 CEE countries over a period of 10 years. The aim of this research is to identify driving forces behind the decision of foreign actors to invest in the region. Three groups of relevant determinants are identified: traditional market- and efficiency-seeking factors as well as transition-specific variables. Fixed effects and random effects models are employed to compare the results of various estimation methods. Results suggest that besides the importance of traditional factors, the impact of transitional variables in the region should not be neglected.","PeriodicalId":341206,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Capital-Labor Relations & Institutional Change (Topic)","volume":"15 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132569058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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