Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0029
Brian L. Keeley
Where does entertaining (or promoting) conspiracy theories stand with respect to rational inquiry? According to one view, conspiracy theorists are open-minded skeptics, being careful not to accept uncritically common wisdom, exploring alternative explanations of events no matter how unlikely they might seem at first glance. Seen this way, they are akin to scientists attempting to explain the social world. On the other hand, they are also sometimes seen as overly credulous, believing everything they read on the Internet, say. In addition to conspiracy theorists and scientists, another significant form of explanation of the events of the world can be found in religious contexts, such as when a disaster is explained as being an “act of God.” By comparing conspiratorial thinking with scientific and religious forms of explanation, features of all three are brought into clearer focus. For example, anomalies and a commitment to naturalist explanation are seen as important elements of scientific explanation, although the details are less clear. This paper uses conspiracy theories as a lens through which to investigate rational or scientific inquiry. In addition, a better understanding of the scientific method as it might be applied in the study of events of interest to conspiracy theorists can help understand their epistemic virtues and vices.
{"title":"The Credulity of Conspiracy Theorists","authors":"Brian L. Keeley","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0029","url":null,"abstract":"Where does entertaining (or promoting) conspiracy theories stand with respect to rational inquiry? According to one view, conspiracy theorists are open-minded skeptics, being careful not to accept uncritically common wisdom, exploring alternative explanations of events no matter how unlikely they might seem at first glance. Seen this way, they are akin to scientists attempting to explain the social world. On the other hand, they are also sometimes seen as overly credulous, believing everything they read on the Internet, say. In addition to conspiracy theorists and scientists, another significant form of explanation of the events of the world can be found in religious contexts, such as when a disaster is explained as being an “act of God.” By comparing conspiratorial thinking with scientific and religious forms of explanation, features of all three are brought into clearer focus. For example, anomalies and a commitment to naturalist explanation are seen as important elements of scientific explanation, although the details are less clear. This paper uses conspiracy theories as a lens through which to investigate rational or scientific inquiry. In addition, a better understanding of the scientific method as it might be applied in the study of events of interest to conspiracy theorists can help understand their epistemic virtues and vices.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121347807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0027
Tanya Filer
Critics note that conspiracy theory offers populist leaders a ready narrative form for producing fear of “outsiders.” Yet conspiracy theory also helps to sustain populist authority in other, less commented, ways. This chapter explores the varied uses of conspiracy theory to populism through a case study of Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007—2015). It identifies two styles of conspiracy theory, which I term “the hidden” and “the revealed,” that Fernández actively engaged in her attempt to control the political narrative in Argentina and to maintain popular legitimacy. Together, these dual forms of conspiracy theory furnished Fernández with an efficient method for bolstering two crucial tenets of populist authority: vertical leadership, and the illusion of direct contact with “the people.”
批评人士指出，阴谋论为民粹主义领导人提供了一种现成的叙事形式，可以制造对“局外人”的恐惧。然而，阴谋论也以其他较少被评论的方式帮助维持民粹主义权威。本章通过对阿根廷总统克里斯蒂娜Fernández de Kirchner(2007-2015)的案例研究，探讨了阴谋论在民粹主义中的各种用途。它确定了两种风格的阴谋论，我称之为“隐藏的”和“揭示的”，Fernández积极参与她试图控制阿根廷的政治叙事，并维持民众的合法性。总之，这两种形式的阴谋论为Fernández提供了一种有效的方法来支持民粹主义权威的两个关键原则:垂直领导和与“人民”直接接触的幻觉。
{"title":"The Hidden and the Revealed","authors":"Tanya Filer","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0027","url":null,"abstract":"Critics note that conspiracy theory offers populist leaders a ready narrative form for producing fear of “outsiders.” Yet conspiracy theory also helps to sustain populist authority in other, less commented, ways. This chapter explores the varied uses of conspiracy theory to populism through a case study of Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007—2015). It identifies two styles of conspiracy theory, which I term “the hidden” and “the revealed,” that Fernández actively engaged in her attempt to control the political narrative in Argentina and to maintain popular legitimacy. Together, these dual forms of conspiracy theory furnished Fernández with an efficient method for bolstering two crucial tenets of populist authority: vertical leadership, and the illusion of direct contact with “the people.”","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127838539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0012
Steven Smallpage
When university professors engage with conspiracy theories, the public is pushed to the limit in terms of what it will or will not tolerate. Professors that publicly hold conspiracy beliefs force the central question of political tolerance: what is the line between the intellectual inquiry that allows for communities to flourish, on the one hand, and the expression of viewpoints that undermine that community’s integrity altogether, on the other? The line is blurry, as careful skepticism underlies both the best academic work and the psychology of conspiracy thinking. Since conspiracy theorists often anger, provoke, and sometimes harass the public, we must decide as a community if we will tolerate professors who hold controversial conspiracy beliefs. Such decisions require thoughtful reflection on the similarities and differences between conspiracy thinking and its relationship to desirable traits of democratic citizens, like tolerance, independent thinking, and academic freedom.
{"title":"Conspiracy Thinking, Tolerance, and Democracy","authors":"Steven Smallpage","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"When university professors engage with conspiracy theories, the public is pushed to the limit in terms of what it will or will not tolerate. Professors that publicly hold conspiracy beliefs force the central question of political tolerance: what is the line between the intellectual inquiry that allows for communities to flourish, on the one hand, and the expression of viewpoints that undermine that community’s integrity altogether, on the other? The line is blurry, as careful skepticism underlies both the best academic work and the psychology of conspiracy thinking. Since conspiracy theorists often anger, provoke, and sometimes harass the public, we must decide as a community if we will tolerate professors who hold controversial conspiracy beliefs. Such decisions require thoughtful reflection on the similarities and differences between conspiracy thinking and its relationship to desirable traits of democratic citizens, like tolerance, independent thinking, and academic freedom.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124267043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0020
A. Enders, Steven Smallpage
Conspiracy theories have always been fixtures of American politics and culture. Indeed, conspiracy theories have been used to explain major events from national tragedies, terrorist attacks, and mass violence to national accomplishments, election outcomes, and power structures. Rather than the incoherent ramblings of a “crazy” few, a majority of Americans endorse at least one conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theories also have an important political component: Where members of both parties engage in conspiratorial thinking, the actual conspiracy theories endorsed by Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives are very different, and oftentimes used to achieve political goals. Finally, conspiracy theories have consequences including declining trust in government, the exacerbation of social polarization, and the proliferation of the politics of disruption that have characterized recent electoral cycles.
{"title":"Polls, Plots, and Party Politics","authors":"A. Enders, Steven Smallpage","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0020","url":null,"abstract":"Conspiracy theories have always been fixtures of American politics and culture. Indeed, conspiracy theories have been used to explain major events from national tragedies, terrorist attacks, and mass violence to national accomplishments, election outcomes, and power structures. Rather than the incoherent ramblings of a “crazy” few, a majority of Americans endorse at least one conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theories also have an important political component: Where members of both parties engage in conspiratorial thinking, the actual conspiracy theories endorsed by Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives are very different, and oftentimes used to achieve political goals. Finally, conspiracy theories have consequences including declining trust in government, the exacerbation of social polarization, and the proliferation of the politics of disruption that have characterized recent electoral cycles.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131985544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0019
Kathryn S. Olmstead
Although many Americans believe that conspiratorial thinking is reaching new heights in the twenty-first century, conspiracy theories have been commonplace throughout U.S. history. In the colonial and early republic eras, Americans feared that Catholics, Jews, Masons, Indians, and African Americans were plotting against them. In the nineteenth century they added international bankers, rich businessmen, and Mormons to the list of potential conspirators. In the twentieth century, conspiracy theories continued to evolve, and many Americans began to suspect the U.S. government itself of plotting against them. These theories gained more credibility after the revelation of real government conspiracies, notably CIA assassination plots, the Watergate scandal, and the Iran–-Contra affair.
{"title":"Conspiracy Theories in U.S. History","authors":"Kathryn S. Olmstead","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0019","url":null,"abstract":"Although many Americans believe that conspiratorial thinking is reaching new heights in the twenty-first century, conspiracy theories have been commonplace throughout U.S. history. In the colonial and early republic eras, Americans feared that Catholics, Jews, Masons, Indians, and African Americans were plotting against them. In the nineteenth century they added international bankers, rich businessmen, and Mormons to the list of potential conspirators. In the twentieth century, conspiracy theories continued to evolve, and many Americans began to suspect the U.S. government itself of plotting against them. These theories gained more credibility after the revelation of real government conspiracies, notably CIA assassination plots, the Watergate scandal, and the Iran–-Contra affair.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125122988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0018
P. Bost
Recent years have seen a sharp acceleration in the publication of empirical studies on conspiracy beliefs. Collectively this work demonstrates markers of an energized but exploratory field still seeking theoretical focus and depth. The research has arrived at an inflection point that will lead to increased expectations for theory-driven work that tests specific predictions and arrives at answers with the potential to improve public discourse about conspiracy theories. Three specific lines of research can advance our understanding of the place of conspiracy beliefs in adaptive cognition: clearly defining the phenomenon under investigation, exploring the situational factors that contribute to conspiracy beliefs, and testing the positive as well as negative outcomes that result from conspiracy beliefs.
{"title":"The Truth Is Around Here Somewhere","authors":"P. Bost","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0018","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have seen a sharp acceleration in the publication of empirical studies on conspiracy beliefs. Collectively this work demonstrates markers of an energized but exploratory field still seeking theoretical focus and depth. The research has arrived at an inflection point that will lead to increased expectations for theory-driven work that tests specific predictions and arrives at answers with the potential to improve public discourse about conspiracy theories. Three specific lines of research can advance our understanding of the place of conspiracy beliefs in adaptive cognition: clearly defining the phenomenon under investigation, exploring the situational factors that contribute to conspiracy beliefs, and testing the positive as well as negative outcomes that result from conspiracy beliefs.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"56 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120839366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0003
Jesse Walker
The meaning of “conspiracy theory” constantly contracts and expands. On one hand, the phrase is regularly used to describe fringe views that do not involve alleged conspiracies. On the other hand, people tend to avoid using the phrase when describing conspiracy claims embraced by the mainstream, even when those ideas are highly dubious. Popular narratives about terrorism, gang activity, and new religious movements resemble more marginal conspiracy theories, particularly when they confuse decentralized networks with centralized organizations, perceive plots that don’t exist at all, or draw on the lurid imagery of pulp fiction.
{"title":"What We Mean When We Say “Conspiracy Theory”","authors":"Jesse Walker","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"The meaning of “conspiracy theory” constantly contracts and expands. On one hand, the phrase is regularly used to describe fringe views that do not involve alleged conspiracies. On the other hand, people tend to avoid using the phrase when describing conspiracy claims embraced by the mainstream, even when those ideas are highly dubious. Popular narratives about terrorism, gang activity, and new religious movements resemble more marginal conspiracy theories, particularly when they confuse decentralized networks with centralized organizations, perceive plots that don’t exist at all, or draw on the lurid imagery of pulp fiction.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"236 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122709796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0013
Josh Pasek
Scholars assessing the public understanding of science have long regarded informing Americans about scientific facts as key to raising Americans’ scientific literacy. But many Americans appear to be aware of the scientific consensus and nonetheless reject it. The individuals who are aware of the scientific consensus and reject its tenets tend to distrust scientists. They also focus their rejection on particular issues for which they may be otherwise motivated. This rejection may be driven by elites, who argue against the scientific consensus on issues like climate change by asserting either that the science is unsettled or by contending that the scientific consensus is itself a conspiratorial ploy. Individuals’ patterns of beliefs seem to imply that they view scientific evidence they dislike as the result of a conspiracy.
{"title":"Don’t Trust the Scientists! Rejecting the Scientific Consensus “Conspiracy”","authors":"Josh Pasek","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars assessing the public understanding of science have long regarded informing Americans about scientific facts as key to raising Americans’ scientific literacy. But many Americans appear to be aware of the scientific consensus and nonetheless reject it. The individuals who are aware of the scientific consensus and reject its tenets tend to distrust scientists. They also focus their rejection on particular issues for which they may be otherwise motivated. This rejection may be driven by elites, who argue against the scientific consensus on issues like climate change by asserting either that the science is unsettled or by contending that the scientific consensus is itself a conspiratorial ploy. Individuals’ patterns of beliefs seem to imply that they view scientific evidence they dislike as the result of a conspiracy.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128356913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0014
Morgan Marietta, D. Barker
Polarized perceptions of facts have become a defining feature of American politics. Scholars have described this phenomenon as contested facts, misinformation, cultural cognition, partisan facts, and dueling fact perceptions. But is there a connection between conspiratorial thinking and dueling facts? Are conspiratorial thinkers more likely to have different perceptions of climate change, the national debt, racism, or several other disputed facts like the safety of GMOs or the origins of sexual orientation? Recent survey evidence suggests that conspiratorial thinking is strongly related to some of the most prominent dueling fact perceptions on both right and left, grounded in rejection of scientific and scholarly consensus.
{"title":"Conspiratorial Thinking and Dueling Fact Perceptions","authors":"Morgan Marietta, D. Barker","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"Polarized perceptions of facts have become a defining feature of American politics. Scholars have described this phenomenon as contested facts, misinformation, cultural cognition, partisan facts, and dueling fact perceptions. But is there a connection between conspiratorial thinking and dueling facts? Are conspiratorial thinkers more likely to have different perceptions of climate change, the national debt, racism, or several other disputed facts like the safety of GMOs or the origins of sexual orientation? Recent survey evidence suggests that conspiratorial thinking is strongly related to some of the most prominent dueling fact perceptions on both right and left, grounded in rejection of scientific and scholarly consensus.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129575361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-27DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0015
T. Goertzel
The conspiracy theory pyramid scheme has three tiers. First, writers and intellectuals who reinforce and legitimate conspiracy memes, sometimes without explicitly endorsing conspiracy theories. Second, people with a psychological affinity for conspiracy theories. And third, people who feel threatened by a specific issue and become persuaded that a conspiracy is at work. The pyramid metaphor should not be taken to imply that the top tier is in control and dominates the second and third tiers of the pyramid. Interaction between the tiers is reciprocal, not hierarchical. The authors examined in this chapter have played an important role on the first tier of the conspiracy theory pyramids: Andrew Wakefield, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Frederick Seitz, James Inhofe, Vandana Shiva, Noam Chomsky, and Edward Herman.
{"title":"The Conspiracy Theory Pyramid Scheme","authors":"T. Goertzel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"The conspiracy theory pyramid scheme has three tiers. First, writers and intellectuals who reinforce and legitimate conspiracy memes, sometimes without explicitly endorsing conspiracy theories. Second, people with a psychological affinity for conspiracy theories. And third, people who feel threatened by a specific issue and become persuaded that a conspiracy is at work. The pyramid metaphor should not be taken to imply that the top tier is in control and dominates the second and third tiers of the pyramid. Interaction between the tiers is reciprocal, not hierarchical. The authors examined in this chapter have played an important role on the first tier of the conspiracy theory pyramids: Andrew Wakefield, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Frederick Seitz, James Inhofe, Vandana Shiva, Noam Chomsky, and Edward Herman.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131431967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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