If a litigated patent has previously been licensed to a third party, the courts generally adopt the terms of the prior agreement as the best measure of damages. However, while administratively convenient, this “licensing-based damages” standard creates problematic incentives and undermines the efficient commercialization of patented inventions. It rests on the trivialized (and generally false) presumption that a patent license is like a commodity, with the patentee charging a common price to all comers. As a consequence, patentees distort their future recovery prospects – and by extension the outcomes of future licensing negotiations – whenever they license their patents, whether or not today’s agreement will be a good proxy for tomorrow’s dealings or disputes. Knowing this, patentees are discouraged from licensing at anything less than a high royalty rate, even if they could reach many additional mutually-beneficial agreements on more modest terms. The result is that patent holders rationally cut off the bottom segment of the licensing market, creating substantial deadweight loss. This injures not only patentees, but also prospective licensees and their consumers. The standard creates additional problems by encouraging secrecy and “gamesmanship” in patent licensing. We propose that the licensing-based damages standard be abandoned, and that damages should generally be awarded ad hoc. This does not mean that private parties should ignore comparable licenses in their private dealings; it simply means that courts should not use them as a measure of damages. That this necessitates some speculation does not suggest it is the less desirable approach, for it is better that damages be somewhat random than systematically harmful. Further, while the licensing-based damages standard is clearly easy to apply, there is little reason to believe it is accurate in a typical case. As such, its apparent lack of randomness does not suggest that it is producing good results.
{"title":"How Patent Damages Skew Licensing Markets","authors":"Erik N. Hovenkamp, J. Masur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2825236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2825236","url":null,"abstract":"If a litigated patent has previously been licensed to a third party, the courts generally adopt the terms of the prior agreement as the best measure of damages. However, while administratively convenient, this “licensing-based damages” standard creates problematic incentives and undermines the efficient commercialization of patented inventions. It rests on the trivialized (and generally false) presumption that a patent license is like a commodity, with the patentee charging a common price to all comers. As a consequence, patentees distort their future recovery prospects – and by extension the outcomes of future licensing negotiations – whenever they license their patents, whether or not today’s agreement will be a good proxy for tomorrow’s dealings or disputes. Knowing this, patentees are discouraged from licensing at anything less than a high royalty rate, even if they could reach many additional mutually-beneficial agreements on more modest terms. The result is that patent holders rationally cut off the bottom segment of the licensing market, creating substantial deadweight loss. This injures not only patentees, but also prospective licensees and their consumers. The standard creates additional problems by encouraging secrecy and “gamesmanship” in patent licensing. We propose that the licensing-based damages standard be abandoned, and that damages should generally be awarded ad hoc. This does not mean that private parties should ignore comparable licenses in their private dealings; it simply means that courts should not use them as a measure of damages. That this necessitates some speculation does not suggest it is the less desirable approach, for it is better that damages be somewhat random than systematically harmful. Further, while the licensing-based damages standard is clearly easy to apply, there is little reason to believe it is accurate in a typical case. As such, its apparent lack of randomness does not suggest that it is producing good results.","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125275130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-08-17DOI: 10.4337/9781784714833.00020
Samuel L. Bray
This essay considers whether punitive damages should be awarded against trustees. It concludes that a satisfactory justification for awarding them has not been given. Seen from the rightful-position perspective, punitive damages fail to support the plaintiff’s forward movement to the rightful position. They are also inconsistent with the scope of liability in trust law. From the perspective of optimal deterrence, punitive damages would increase deterrence for those who need it least (risk-averse internalizers), and decrease deterrence for those who need it most (risk-seeking externalizers). From the viewpoint of law and equity, punitive damages in trust law would be an idiosyncrasy requiring an explanation, whereas no explanation is needed for their absence. Even if punitive damages were used selectively, they would likely be overused relative to the constructive trust. Indeed, the uncanny coinciding of the rise of punitive damages against trustees with the decline in American lawyers’ familiarity with the constructive trust raises the possibility that it is not greater knowledge, but greater ignorance, that led to the development. Whatever the reason for this rise, the best verdict that can be rendered for punitive damages against trustees is “not proven.”
{"title":"Punitive Damages Against Trustees?","authors":"Samuel L. Bray","doi":"10.4337/9781784714833.00020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781784714833.00020","url":null,"abstract":"This essay considers whether punitive damages should be awarded against trustees. It concludes that a satisfactory justification for awarding them has not been given. Seen from the rightful-position perspective, punitive damages fail to support the plaintiff’s forward movement to the rightful position. They are also inconsistent with the scope of liability in trust law. From the perspective of optimal deterrence, punitive damages would increase deterrence for those who need it least (risk-averse internalizers), and decrease deterrence for those who need it most (risk-seeking externalizers). From the viewpoint of law and equity, punitive damages in trust law would be an idiosyncrasy requiring an explanation, whereas no explanation is needed for their absence. Even if punitive damages were used selectively, they would likely be overused relative to the constructive trust. Indeed, the uncanny coinciding of the rise of punitive damages against trustees with the decline in American lawyers’ familiarity with the constructive trust raises the possibility that it is not greater knowledge, but greater ignorance, that led to the development. Whatever the reason for this rise, the best verdict that can be rendered for punitive damages against trustees is “not proven.”","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131053856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For joint liability problems concerning tort law, a legal compensation scheme may be based on lower and upper bounds of compensation for injury and on case-system consistency. Introducing several properties inspired from this observation, we analyze compensation schemes axiomatically under the situation where causation of the cumulative injury appears in multiple sequences of wrongful acts. The situation underlying the model is described by a rooted-tree graph. We show that there is a unique compensation scheme that satisfies three axioms, one about lower bounds of individual compensations, one about upper bounds of individual compensations, and one about case-system consistency. This unique compensation scheme is the nucleolus of an associated liability game.
{"title":"An Axiomatic Analysis of Joint Liability Problems with Rooted ― Tree Structure","authors":"Takayuki Oishi, G. van der Laan, R. van den Brink","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2787032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2787032","url":null,"abstract":"For joint liability problems concerning tort law, a legal compensation scheme may be based on lower and upper bounds of compensation for injury and on case-system consistency. Introducing several properties inspired from this observation, we analyze compensation schemes axiomatically under the situation where causation of the cumulative injury appears in multiple sequences of wrongful acts. The situation underlying the model is described by a rooted-tree graph. We show that there is a unique compensation scheme that satisfies three axioms, one about lower bounds of individual compensations, one about upper bounds of individual compensations, and one about case-system consistency. This unique compensation scheme is the nucleolus of an associated liability game.","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116671033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The conventional wisdom is that the distinction between legal and equitable remedies is outmoded and serves no purpose. This Article challenges that view. It argues that the equitable remedies and remedy-related doctrines that presently exist in American law can be understood as a system. The components of the system fall into three categories: (1) the equitable remedies themselves, (2) equitable managerial devices, and (3) equitable constraints. These components interact subtly and pervasively. Together, they make the equitable remedies apt for compelling action (or inaction), especially when the action may be continuing or iterative and is not easily measured. The system of equitable remedies is a useful and integrated whole.This argument offers some support for an emerging body of Supreme Court cases that have sharply distinguished between legal and equitable remedies — cases such as Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, eBay v. MercExchange, and Petrella v. MGM. Moreover, this argument helps explain why there has been so little merger between law and equity in remedies, even as merger has occurred in other aspects of American law. Finally, this argument offers a new perspective on the requirement that a plaintiff, in order to receive an equitable remedy, must show that legal remedies are inadequate. That requirement helps maintain the system of equitable remedies.
传统观点认为，区分法律救济和衡平法救济已经过时，没有任何意义。本文对这一观点提出了挑战。本文认为，目前存在于美国法律中的衡平法救济和与救济有关的理论可以被理解为一个制度。该制度的组成部分分为三类:(1)公平的补救措施本身;(2)公平的管理手段;(3)公平的约束。这些组件相互作用微妙而普遍。总之，它们使公平的补救措施适用于强制行动(或不作为)，特别是当行动可能是持续的或反复的并且不易衡量时。衡平法救济制度是一个有益而完整的整体。这一论点为最高法院正在兴起的一系列案件提供了一些支持，这些案件鲜明地区分了法律救济和公平救济——比如great west Life & Annuity Ins案。Co.诉Knudson案，eBay诉MercExchange案，以及Petrella诉MGM案。此外，这一论点有助于解释为什么法律与衡平法在救济方面很少合并，尽管合并在美国法律的其他方面已经发生。最后，这一论点为原告为了获得公平的救济，必须证明法律救济是不充分的这一要求提供了一个新的视角。这项规定有助于维持公平补救制度。
{"title":"The System of Equitable Remedies","authors":"Samuel L. Bray","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2622850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2622850","url":null,"abstract":"The conventional wisdom is that the distinction between legal and equitable remedies is outmoded and serves no purpose. This Article challenges that view. It argues that the equitable remedies and remedy-related doctrines that presently exist in American law can be understood as a system. The components of the system fall into three categories: (1) the equitable remedies themselves, (2) equitable managerial devices, and (3) equitable constraints. These components interact subtly and pervasively. Together, they make the equitable remedies apt for compelling action (or inaction), especially when the action may be continuing or iterative and is not easily measured. The system of equitable remedies is a useful and integrated whole.This argument offers some support for an emerging body of Supreme Court cases that have sharply distinguished between legal and equitable remedies — cases such as Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, eBay v. MercExchange, and Petrella v. MGM. Moreover, this argument helps explain why there has been so little merger between law and equity in remedies, even as merger has occurred in other aspects of American law. Finally, this argument offers a new perspective on the requirement that a plaintiff, in order to receive an equitable remedy, must show that legal remedies are inadequate. That requirement helps maintain the system of equitable remedies.","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122206926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors contend that an appellate court should not grant or deny entitlement to appellate fees without the benefit of the trial court’s ruling on the validity of a proposal for settlement or contractual agreement because entitlement may depend on the trial court’s resolving factual issues. Thus, ruling on entitlement to appellate fees without the benefit of a developed trial court record raises procedural and substantive due process concerns. The authors conclude that if the appellate court decides to grant a motion for appellate fees in reviewing the final judgment, then the court should grant fees conditioned upon the trial’s court finding that the proposal for settlement or contractual agreement is valid.Appellate court orders deciding entitlement to fees without the benefit of a developed record raise substantive due process issues with profound consequences, in particular because such fee orders deprive litigants of substantive due process, as they require litigants to lose a significant property interest by paying their adversary’s attorneys’ fees for the underlying trial and subsequent appeals. The problem is that sometimes there is no underlying legal basis for attorneys’ fees when the trial court finds a proposal for settlement was not made in good faith. But a party should not be deprived of its due process right to a meaningful, full, and fair hearing before it is held liable for its opponent’s attorneys’ fees.An appellate court should not grant or deny entitlement to appellate fees without the benefit of the trial court’s ruling on the validity of a proposal for settlement or contractual agreement because it is premature for the appellate court to rule on a motion for attorneys’ fees without the benefit of a developed record. If the appellate court decides to grant a motion for appellate fees in the first appeal, then the court should grant fees conditioned upon the trial court’s finding that the proposal for settlement or contractual agreement is valid. Otherwise, appellate orders granting fees unconditionally, when the issue of entitlement has not been decided at the trial court, will infringe on litigants’ rights to procedural and substantive due process.
{"title":"Attorneys' Fees on Appeal: Misapplication of the Law of the Case Doctrine Raises Procedural and Substantive Due Process Concerns","authors":"Larry R. Fleurantin, M. L. Davidson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2742434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2742434","url":null,"abstract":"The authors contend that an appellate court should not grant or deny entitlement to appellate fees without the benefit of the trial court’s ruling on the validity of a proposal for settlement or contractual agreement because entitlement may depend on the trial court’s resolving factual issues. Thus, ruling on entitlement to appellate fees without the benefit of a developed trial court record raises procedural and substantive due process concerns. The authors conclude that if the appellate court decides to grant a motion for appellate fees in reviewing the final judgment, then the court should grant fees conditioned upon the trial’s court finding that the proposal for settlement or contractual agreement is valid.Appellate court orders deciding entitlement to fees without the benefit of a developed record raise substantive due process issues with profound consequences, in particular because such fee orders deprive litigants of substantive due process, as they require litigants to lose a significant property interest by paying their adversary’s attorneys’ fees for the underlying trial and subsequent appeals. The problem is that sometimes there is no underlying legal basis for attorneys’ fees when the trial court finds a proposal for settlement was not made in good faith. But a party should not be deprived of its due process right to a meaningful, full, and fair hearing before it is held liable for its opponent’s attorneys’ fees.An appellate court should not grant or deny entitlement to appellate fees without the benefit of the trial court’s ruling on the validity of a proposal for settlement or contractual agreement because it is premature for the appellate court to rule on a motion for attorneys’ fees without the benefit of a developed record. If the appellate court decides to grant a motion for appellate fees in the first appeal, then the court should grant fees conditioned upon the trial court’s finding that the proposal for settlement or contractual agreement is valid. Otherwise, appellate orders granting fees unconditionally, when the issue of entitlement has not been decided at the trial court, will infringe on litigants’ rights to procedural and substantive due process.","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129140961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Collection of civil shoplifting statutes by state. This collection contains the full text of each states' laws which provide merchants a civil remedy against individuals accused of shoplifting. These statutes operate independently from and in addition to the states' criminal sanctions for shoplifting.
{"title":"Civil Shoplifting Statutes by State","authors":"Ryan Sullivan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2770545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2770545","url":null,"abstract":"Collection of civil shoplifting statutes by state. This collection contains the full text of each states' laws which provide merchants a civil remedy against individuals accused of shoplifting. These statutes operate independently from and in addition to the states' criminal sanctions for shoplifting.","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132358583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
תקציר בעברית: בתי-המשפט נאלצים פעמים רבות להעריך את הנזק שנגרם לתובע באמצעות פנייה לנתונים סטטיסטיים, המסייעים בהערכת הנזק בקירוב כאשר אין בנמצא נתונים קונקרטיים המאפשרים לשום את הנזק שנגרם לניזוק באופן ישיר. אף שמדובר בפרקטיקה רווחת, בתי-המשפט בישראל אינם בוחנים לרוב אם ההנחות העומדות בבסיס הנתון הסטטיסטי המשמש אותם מתיישבות עם מטרותיהם של דיני הפיצויים. בפועל, פעמים רבות קיים פער בין הנימוק המשמש את בית-המשפט בעת חישוב הפיצויים לבין הנתון הסטטיסטי שנבחר.לתופעה זו יש שני מופעים החוזרים בהקשרים שונים בפסיקה. המופע הראשון קשור לאופן שבו נבנה מסד הנתונים שממנו בית-המשפט גוזר את הנתון הסטטיסטי. שימוש בנתונים סטטיסטיים תוך התעלמות מהנחות-היסוד העומדות בבסיסו של מסד הנתונים מוביל לעיתים לטעויות בעת חישוב הנזק. כך, ביחס לאובדן כושר ההשתכרות, כאשר קיימים נתונים חלקיים ביחס לניזוק, בתי-המשפט מביאים בחשבון את האפשרות שהניזוק יהיה מובטל בעתיד, אולם כאשר הם עושים שימוש בנתונים סטטיסטיים, הם מתעלמים מאפשרות זו.המופע השני של תופעה זו קשור לבחירה בנתון הסטטיסטי מתוך מסד הנתונים. הנתון הסטטיסטי המשמש את בית-המשפט בעת קביעת הפיצויים אינו מתיישב לעיתים עם הנימוק הניתן בפסק-הדין. כך, ההסבר שניתן בפסיקה לחישוב אובדן ההשתכרות וקיצור תוחלת החיים בתנאי אי-ודאות מתיישב עם שימוש בנתון החציוני, אשר משקף את הנזק הסביר ביותר לניזוק הספציפי, ותואם את השימוש הרווח במשפט הפרטי בכלל מאזן ההסתברויות במסגרת ההתמודדות עם מצבי אי-ודאות. אולם בתי-המשפט עושים בפועל שימוש בנתון הממוצע, אשר מתיישב עם מטרת ההרתעה של דיני הנזיקין, אך אינו מתיישב עם המטרה של השבת מצבו של הניזוק לקדמותו. המאמר סוקר כמה טעויות נפוצות, ומציע קווים לפתרונן של טעויות אלה וכן של טעויות אחרות שיתגלו בעתיד.English Abstract: In personal injury cases, Israeli courts often use statistical data in order to assess the harm done to the plaintiff when no case-specific evidences are available. Despite this being a common practice, rarely does the Israeli court examine the underline assumptions of the statistical figure used in the process of calculating damages. As it were, many times a gap exists between the explanation the court gives when calculating the damages, and the statistical data that it puts into use.This phenomenon presents in two distinct ways. First, the court sometimes uses one measure of central location, the weighted mean, while the argument it uses in the opinion calls for the use of another, the median. Specifically, when the court determines the plaintiffs lost income and remaining life expectancy, the court argues that damages should be calculated in a way that restores the plaintiff to her condition before the accident, in accordance with corrective justice principals. In this article, I would argue that the court's logic calls for the use of the median. However, the court uses the weighted average when calculating damages.Second, the court sometimes fails to examine the underline assumptions used in the construction of the database. This in turn often leads the court to reach the wrong conclusion from the data. For example, when the court is presented with evidence about the plaintiffs future inc
{"title":"חישוב הנזק בתנאי אי-ודאות – התאמת הנתון הסטטיסטי למטרותיהם של דיני הפיצויים(Assessing Damages Under Uncertainty – Applying Tort Theory to the Use of Statistical Data)","authors":"Omer Pelled","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2605575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2605575","url":null,"abstract":"תקציר בעברית: בתי-המשפט נאלצים פעמים רבות להעריך את הנזק שנגרם לתובע באמצעות פנייה לנתונים סטטיסטיים, המסייעים בהערכת הנזק בקירוב כאשר אין בנמצא נתונים קונקרטיים המאפשרים לשום את הנזק שנגרם לניזוק באופן ישיר. אף שמדובר בפרקטיקה רווחת, בתי-המשפט בישראל אינם בוחנים לרוב אם ההנחות העומדות בבסיס הנתון הסטטיסטי המשמש אותם מתיישבות עם מטרותיהם של דיני הפיצויים. בפועל, פעמים רבות קיים פער בין הנימוק המשמש את בית-המשפט בעת חישוב הפיצויים לבין הנתון הסטטיסטי שנבחר.לתופעה זו יש שני מופעים החוזרים בהקשרים שונים בפסיקה. המופע הראשון קשור לאופן שבו נבנה מסד הנתונים שממנו בית-המשפט גוזר את הנתון הסטטיסטי. שימוש בנתונים סטטיסטיים תוך התעלמות מהנחות-היסוד העומדות בבסיסו של מסד הנתונים מוביל לעיתים לטעויות בעת חישוב הנזק. כך, ביחס לאובדן כושר ההשתכרות, כאשר קיימים נתונים חלקיים ביחס לניזוק, בתי-המשפט מביאים בחשבון את האפשרות שהניזוק יהיה מובטל בעתיד, אולם כאשר הם עושים שימוש בנתונים סטטיסטיים, הם מתעלמים מאפשרות זו.המופע השני של תופעה זו קשור לבחירה בנתון הסטטיסטי מתוך מסד הנתונים. הנתון הסטטיסטי המשמש את בית-המשפט בעת קביעת הפיצויים אינו מתיישב לעיתים עם הנימוק הניתן בפסק-הדין. כך, ההסבר שניתן בפסיקה לחישוב אובדן ההשתכרות וקיצור תוחלת החיים בתנאי אי-ודאות מתיישב עם שימוש בנתון החציוני, אשר משקף את הנזק הסביר ביותר לניזוק הספציפי, ותואם את השימוש הרווח במשפט הפרטי בכלל מאזן ההסתברויות במסגרת ההתמודדות עם מצבי אי-ודאות. אולם בתי-המשפט עושים בפועל שימוש בנתון הממוצע, אשר מתיישב עם מטרת ההרתעה של דיני הנזיקין, אך אינו מתיישב עם המטרה של השבת מצבו של הניזוק לקדמותו. המאמר סוקר כמה טעויות נפוצות, ומציע קווים לפתרונן של טעויות אלה וכן של טעויות אחרות שיתגלו בעתיד.English Abstract: In personal injury cases, Israeli courts often use statistical data in order to assess the harm done to the plaintiff when no case-specific evidences are available. Despite this being a common practice, rarely does the Israeli court examine the underline assumptions of the statistical figure used in the process of calculating damages. As it were, many times a gap exists between the explanation the court gives when calculating the damages, and the statistical data that it puts into use.This phenomenon presents in two distinct ways. First, the court sometimes uses one measure of central location, the weighted mean, while the argument it uses in the opinion calls for the use of another, the median. Specifically, when the court determines the plaintiffs lost income and remaining life expectancy, the court argues that damages should be calculated in a way that restores the plaintiff to her condition before the accident, in accordance with corrective justice principals. In this article, I would argue that the court's logic calls for the use of the median. However, the court uses the weighted average when calculating damages.Second, the court sometimes fails to examine the underline assumptions used in the construction of the database. This in turn often leads the court to reach the wrong conclusion from the data. For example, when the court is presented with evidence about the plaintiffs future inc","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116493781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-09-07DOI: 10.1628/093245616x14491404040418
Jonah B. Gelbach
I point out that the Coase theorem suggests there should not be wasteful discovery, in the sense that the value to the requester is less than the cost to the responder. I use a toy model to show that a sufficiently informed court could design a mechanism under which the Coasean prediction is borne out. I then suggest that the actual information available to courts is too little to effect this mechanism, and I consider alternatives. In discussing mechanisms intended to avoid wasteful discovery where courts have limited information, I emphasize the role of normative considerations.
{"title":"Can Simple Mechanism Design Results Be Used to Implement the Proportionality Standard in Discovery?","authors":"Jonah B. Gelbach","doi":"10.1628/093245616x14491404040418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616x14491404040418","url":null,"abstract":"I point out that the Coase theorem suggests there should not be wasteful discovery, in the sense that the value to the requester is less than the cost to the responder. I use a toy model to show that a sufficiently informed court could design a mechanism under which the Coasean prediction is borne out. I then suggest that the actual information available to courts is too little to effect this mechanism, and I consider alternatives. In discussing mechanisms intended to avoid wasteful discovery where courts have limited information, I emphasize the role of normative considerations.","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"315 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123477228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-07-28DOI: 10.4337/9781784718138.00013
D. Jutras
The author conducts a brief comparative overview of alternative schemes of compensation that have emerged over the past century. This chapter specifically addresses regimes that now provide direct compensation to victims of defined tortious hazards independently of any attribution of responsibility to the author of the injury. The analysis reveals three main recurring themes that have driven the emergence of these alternative schemes of compensation. First, alternative compensation regimes are almost by definition legislative solutions to problems encountered within domestic tort law. Second, while currently focused on monetary indemnitites, alternative compensation regimes may also address systemic harm and mass torts through non-monetary remedies. Finally, renewed attention to regulatory frameworks may tilt the balance away from ex post compensation in favour of ex ante intervention.
{"title":"Alternative Compensation Schemes from a Comparative Perspective","authors":"D. Jutras","doi":"10.4337/9781784718138.00013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781784718138.00013","url":null,"abstract":"The author conducts a brief comparative overview of alternative schemes of compensation that have emerged over the past century. This chapter specifically addresses regimes that now provide direct compensation to victims of defined tortious hazards independently of any attribution of responsibility to the author of the injury. The analysis reveals three main recurring themes that have driven the emergence of these alternative schemes of compensation. First, alternative compensation regimes are almost by definition legislative solutions to problems encountered within domestic tort law. Second, while currently focused on monetary indemnitites, alternative compensation regimes may also address systemic harm and mass torts through non-monetary remedies. Finally, renewed attention to regulatory frameworks may tilt the balance away from ex post compensation in favour of ex ante intervention.","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132963901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benedetti v Sawiris was concerned with the measure of a quantum meruit, and in particular whether a ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ measure should be preferred. The Supreme Court addressed the issue broadly in line with the approach in the mainstream academic literature on unjust enrichment, according to which this is a problem of how to measure benefit. The article argues that this unjust enrichment approach is misguided because it obscures the role of agreement and conflates transfer and exchange, and that a contractual analysis of the case would make the issues clearer and easier to resolve.
{"title":"Unjust Enrichment and Contract","authors":"Peter Jaffey","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12099","url":null,"abstract":"Benedetti v Sawiris was concerned with the measure of a quantum meruit, and in particular whether a ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ measure should be preferred. The Supreme Court addressed the issue broadly in line with the approach in the mainstream academic literature on unjust enrichment, according to which this is a problem of how to measure benefit. The article argues that this unjust enrichment approach is misguided because it obscures the role of agreement and conflates transfer and exchange, and that a contractual analysis of the case would make the issues clearer and easier to resolve.","PeriodicalId":344388,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Civil Procedure eJournal","volume":"361 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126965332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：