Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.1142/S2282717X19400024
I. Panetta, Sabrina Leo, Fabrizio Santoboni, Gianfranco Vento
This paper examines the evolution of the attention paid by a sample of EU banks on IT governance. We propose an analysis based on IT public disclosure to contribute to the less explored strand of literature on IT governance transparency. We explore if the attention paid by banks to this topic has grown after the crises and if the greater importance ascribed to IT governance is due to the Supervisors’ pressure or the value-driven decisions. In particular, we test if, as for other corporate governance mechanisms, there is a verifiable linkage between IT governance (disclosure) and banks’ performance.
{"title":"HOW DO YOU DISCLOSE? SOME EVIDENCE ON IT GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE IN EUROPEAN BANKING SYSTEM","authors":"I. Panetta, Sabrina Leo, Fabrizio Santoboni, Gianfranco Vento","doi":"10.1142/S2282717X19400024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2282717X19400024","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the evolution of the attention paid by a sample of EU banks on IT governance. We propose an analysis based on IT public disclosure to contribute to the less explored strand of literature on IT governance transparency. We explore if the attention paid by banks to this topic has grown after the crises and if the greater importance ascribed to IT governance is due to the Supervisors’ pressure or the value-driven decisions. In particular, we test if, as for other corporate governance mechanisms, there is a verifiable linkage between IT governance (disclosure) and banks’ performance.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84992802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S2591768418500095
Rossella Locatelli, Cristiana-Maria Schena, A. Tanda, Andrea Uselli
Most of the studies in corporate governance in banks and other types of firms investigate board diversity and quality separately, without considering the possible relationship between these two. To fill this gap, this study investigates through a new methodological approach the level of quality and diversity of the boards of a sample of Italian banks using a proprietary hand-collected database; in addition, it examines the relationship between diversity and quality of boards to verify whether more diversity consistently relates to higher quality, in accordance with the regulatory approach. Evidence shows that especially small and mutual banks need to improve quality and diversity, as they probably suffer from their limited attractiveness to top profile directors. Moreover, on analyzing interrelations we find evidence of a positive association between board diversity and quality. In particular, financial skills and experience of directors improve the qualitative level of banking boards.
{"title":"DIVERSITY MEASURES AND QUALITY OF BANKS’ BOARDS: THE ITALIAN CASE","authors":"Rossella Locatelli, Cristiana-Maria Schena, A. Tanda, Andrea Uselli","doi":"10.1142/S2591768418500095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2591768418500095","url":null,"abstract":"Most of the studies in corporate governance in banks and other types of firms investigate board diversity and quality separately, without considering the possible relationship between these two. To fill this gap, this study investigates through a new methodological approach the level of quality and diversity of the boards of a sample of Italian banks using a proprietary hand-collected database; in addition, it examines the relationship between diversity and quality of boards to verify whether more diversity consistently relates to higher quality, in accordance with the regulatory approach. Evidence shows that especially small and mutual banks need to improve quality and diversity, as they probably suffer from their limited attractiveness to top profile directors. Moreover, on analyzing interrelations we find evidence of a positive association between board diversity and quality. In particular, financial skills and experience of directors improve the qualitative level of banking boards.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89586103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S2282717X18500081
Panayiotis G. Artikis
This study examines whether there is a strong relationship between stock liquidity, which proxies for the implicit cost of trading shares, and future stock returns in an asset-pricing context in the UK stock market. The time period, 1994–2016, includes the most recent global financial crisis that drained liquidity from financial markets worldwide. Four different measures of stock liquidity are employed; the empirical findings indicate that liquidity is a systematic pricing factor and explains a significant portion of the variation in stock returns, even after the inclusion of the other traditional risk factors. The results are robust to both forms of liquidity, either as a residual effect or in its original form as a separate risk factor. Finally, for the first time quantile regression is applied, showing that the liquidity risk factor (LIQ) absorbs a significant portion of the information content of the size and value factors, while remaining independent of the momentum factor.
{"title":"LIQUIDITY AS AN ASSET PRICING FACTOR IN THE UK","authors":"Panayiotis G. Artikis","doi":"10.1142/S2282717X18500081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2282717X18500081","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether there is a strong relationship between stock liquidity, which proxies for the implicit cost of trading shares, and future stock returns in an asset-pricing context in the UK stock market. The time period, 1994–2016, includes the most recent global financial crisis that drained liquidity from financial markets worldwide. Four different measures of stock liquidity are employed; the empirical findings indicate that liquidity is a systematic pricing factor and explains a significant portion of the variation in stock returns, even after the inclusion of the other traditional risk factors. The results are robust to both forms of liquidity, either as a residual effect or in its original form as a separate risk factor. Finally, for the first time quantile regression is applied, showing that the liquidity risk factor (LIQ) absorbs a significant portion of the information content of the size and value factors, while remaining independent of the momentum factor.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"312 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82897931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S2282717X1850010X
S. Bressan, Alex Weissensteiner
This paper studies to what extent bank-specific characteristics relate to stock return skewness. The main finding is that stock return skewness decreases significantly in bank size, measured in terms of total assets, i.e stocks of large banks are less skewed than those of small banks. This result holds for backward-looking skewness computed using the past stock returns, as well as for forward-looking skewness extracted from stock options. We interpret the empirical evidence by arguing that bank size increases the likelihood to have severe losses, to the point that investors expect to be compensated by receiving higher expected returns.
{"title":"THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STOCK RETURN SKEWNESS AND BANK FEATURES","authors":"S. Bressan, Alex Weissensteiner","doi":"10.1142/S2282717X1850010X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2282717X1850010X","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies to what extent bank-specific characteristics relate to stock return skewness. The main finding is that stock return skewness decreases significantly in bank size, measured in terms of total assets, i.e stocks of large banks are less skewed than those of small banks. This result holds for backward-looking skewness computed using the past stock returns, as well as for forward-looking skewness extracted from stock options. We interpret the empirical evidence by arguing that bank size increases the likelihood to have severe losses, to the point that investors expect to be compensated by receiving higher expected returns.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79860622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-12DOI: 10.1142/S2282717X1850007X
Kazuhiro Takino
In this study, we develop an equilibrium pricing model for an option contract with a counterparty risk, a collateral agreement, a counterparty risk constraint, and a threshold. Since we consider the option market to be an example of the derivatives market, we suppose that the buyer of an option has only countertparty risk of a seller defaulting. In addition, we consider a model where the buyer is allowed to enter into an option contract within an allocated amount of risk capital for counterparty risk, and requires (cash) collateral to the seller if the exposure exceeds the threshold. The counterparty risk is measured as a credit valuation adjustment. We provide an equilibrium pricing rule and an equilibrium volume formula by solving participants’ static utility-maximization problems. Based on numerical simulations, we verify the mechanisms through which collateralization, risk capital, and the threshold affect the size of the over-the-counter (OTC) option market. Finally, we analyze the influence of the buyer’s risk-aversion on the market, without collateralization. The results imply that the risk constraint might be a proxy for an investor’s attitude towards risk.
{"title":"AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR AN OTC DERIVATIVE MARKET UNDER A COUNTERPARTY RISK CONSTRAINT","authors":"Kazuhiro Takino","doi":"10.1142/S2282717X1850007X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2282717X1850007X","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we develop an equilibrium pricing model for an option contract with a counterparty risk, a collateral agreement, a counterparty risk constraint, and a threshold. Since we consider the option market to be an example of the derivatives market, we suppose that the buyer of an option has only countertparty risk of a seller defaulting. In addition, we consider a model where the buyer is allowed to enter into an option contract within an allocated amount of risk capital for counterparty risk, and requires (cash) collateral to the seller if the exposure exceeds the threshold. The counterparty risk is measured as a credit valuation adjustment. We provide an equilibrium pricing rule and an equilibrium volume formula by solving participants’ static utility-maximization problems. Based on numerical simulations, we verify the mechanisms through which collateralization, risk capital, and the threshold affect the size of the over-the-counter (OTC) option market. Finally, we analyze the influence of the buyer’s risk-aversion on the market, without collateralization. The results imply that the risk constraint might be a proxy for an investor’s attitude towards risk.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80358837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-01DOI: 10.1142/s2282717x18990013
{"title":"AUTHOR INDEX VOLUME 6 (2018)","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/s2282717x18990013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2282717x18990013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86892149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1142/S2282717X18500068
Giulio Anselmi
In this paper, we investigate the role of liquidity in banks lending activity and how liquidity provision is related to bank’s credit risk and others market-based risk measures, such as bank’s implied volatility skew from options traded on the market and realized volatility from futures contract on LIBOR, during periods of global financial distress. Credit risk is given by the ratio between loan loss reserves and total assets and we find that losses from lending activity force banks to build up new liquidity provisions only during the period of financial distress. Liquidity ratio is given by the sum of cash and short-term assets over total assets and we discovered that credit risk reduces liquidity ratio only in bad times, as this demand for liquid asset is suddenly switched on and the more reserves from loan losses the bank has, the more it cleans its balance sheet from long-term commitments in order to replenish its cash and short-term securities. When we control for market-based risk measures, we evidence that both implied volatility skew and LIBOR’s realized volatility are negatively related with the liquidity ratio and are useful in predicting a distress in bank’s liquidity holdings.
{"title":"VOLATILITY MEASURES, LIQUIDITY AND CREDIT LOSS PROVISIONS DURING PERIODS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS","authors":"Giulio Anselmi","doi":"10.1142/S2282717X18500068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2282717X18500068","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the role of liquidity in banks lending activity and how liquidity provision is related to bank’s credit risk and others market-based risk measures, such as bank’s implied volatility skew from options traded on the market and realized volatility from futures contract on LIBOR, during periods of global financial distress. Credit risk is given by the ratio between loan loss reserves and total assets and we find that losses from lending activity force banks to build up new liquidity provisions only during the period of financial distress. Liquidity ratio is given by the sum of cash and short-term assets over total assets and we discovered that credit risk reduces liquidity ratio only in bad times, as this demand for liquid asset is suddenly switched on and the more reserves from loan losses the bank has, the more it cleans its balance sheet from long-term commitments in order to replenish its cash and short-term securities. When we control for market-based risk measures, we evidence that both implied volatility skew and LIBOR’s realized volatility are negatively related with the liquidity ratio and are useful in predicting a distress in bank’s liquidity holdings.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89389707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-01DOI: 10.1142/S2591768418500010
H. Nguyen
This paper explores the relationship between banks’ “reward culture” and banks’ performance and risk during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Reward culture is defined as a result-oriented culture influenced through the incentives structure. Reward culture reflects three dimensions: (i) Chief Executive Officer incentives; (ii) Vice Presidents’ incentives; and (iii) employee incentives. A reward culture score represents the common factor in incentives across all employee levels. I find strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between reward culture and bank returns and risk. Classifying banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups in the pre-crisis year 2006, I find that during the crisis period, banks within both the high and low reward culture groups performed worse, and were more risky than banks within the average reward culture group. The findings are consistent with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard associated with incentive misalignment when incentives are too low or too high.
{"title":"REWARD CULTURE AND BANKS’ PERFORMANCE DURING THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS","authors":"H. Nguyen","doi":"10.1142/S2591768418500010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2591768418500010","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the relationship between banks’ “reward culture” and banks’ performance and risk during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Reward culture is defined as a result-oriented culture influenced through the incentives structure. Reward culture reflects three dimensions: (i) Chief Executive Officer incentives; (ii) Vice Presidents’ incentives; and (iii) employee incentives. A reward culture score represents the common factor in incentives across all employee levels. I find strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between reward culture and bank returns and risk. Classifying banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups in the pre-crisis year 2006, I find that during the crisis period, banks within both the high and low reward culture groups performed worse, and were more risky than banks within the average reward culture group. The findings are consistent with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard associated with incentive misalignment when incentives are too low or too high.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78946556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-01DOI: 10.1142/S2591768418500034
Sangheon Shin, Jan M. Smolarski, Gökçe Soydemir
This paper models hedge fund exposure to risk factors and examines time-varying performance of hedge funds. From existing models such as asset-based style (ABS)-factor model, standard asset class (SAC)-factor model, and four-factor model, we extract the best six factors for each hedge fund portfolio by investment strategy. Then, we find combinations of risk factors that explain most of the variance in performance of each hedge fund portfolio based on investment strategy. The results show instability of coefficients in the performance attribution regression. Incorporating a time-varying factor exposure feature would be the best way to measure hedge fund performance. Furthermore, the optimal models with fewer factors exhibit greater explanatory power than existing models. Using rolling regressions, our customized investment strategy model shows how hedge funds are sensitive to risk factors according to market conditions.
{"title":"HEDGE FUNDS: RISK AND PERFORMANCE","authors":"Sangheon Shin, Jan M. Smolarski, Gökçe Soydemir","doi":"10.1142/S2591768418500034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2591768418500034","url":null,"abstract":"This paper models hedge fund exposure to risk factors and examines time-varying performance of hedge funds. From existing models such as asset-based style (ABS)-factor model, standard asset class (SAC)-factor model, and four-factor model, we extract the best six factors for each hedge fund portfolio by investment strategy. Then, we find combinations of risk factors that explain most of the variance in performance of each hedge fund portfolio based on investment strategy. The results show instability of coefficients in the performance attribution regression. Incorporating a time-varying factor exposure feature would be the best way to measure hedge fund performance. Furthermore, the optimal models with fewer factors exhibit greater explanatory power than existing models. Using rolling regressions, our customized investment strategy model shows how hedge funds are sensitive to risk factors according to market conditions.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85929462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-01DOI: 10.1142/S2591768418500058
Matteo Bonaventura, S. Bonini, Vincenzo Capizzi, G. Giudici
In this paper, we investigate the post-IPO operating performance of acquiring companies listed in the US in the period 1986–2008. We find that acquiring IPO firms delivers better operating returns when compared to non-acquiring IPO firms in the five years after the listing. This result holds controlling for both IPO and firm-specific characteristics. Furthermore, acquiring targets already listed on the stock exchange and running stock deals are associated with the improved operating performance. Finally, we find that acquisitions also affect the newly listed companies’ survival, reducing both the time to failure and the time to being acquired, which suggest a structural acceleration of the “natural” company lifecycle.
{"title":"DOES POST-IPO M&A ACTIVITY AFFECT FIRMS’ PROFITABILITY AND SURVIVAL?","authors":"Matteo Bonaventura, S. Bonini, Vincenzo Capizzi, G. Giudici","doi":"10.1142/S2591768418500058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2591768418500058","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the post-IPO operating performance of acquiring companies listed in the US in the period 1986–2008. We find that acquiring IPO firms delivers better operating returns when compared to non-acquiring IPO firms in the five years after the listing. This result holds controlling for both IPO and firm-specific characteristics. Furthermore, acquiring targets already listed on the stock exchange and running stock deals are associated with the improved operating performance. Finally, we find that acquisitions also affect the newly listed companies’ survival, reducing both the time to failure and the time to being acquired, which suggest a structural acceleration of the “natural” company lifecycle.","PeriodicalId":34440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Management Markets and Institutions","volume":"78 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72597218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：