What are the political consequences of rising household debt in the context of fiscal austerity? Cuts in welfare benefits privatize social obligations as voters address ensuing financial shortfalls by borrowing money. I argue that debt re-commodifies individuals and shifts their electoral support from incumbents to opposition and anti-establishment parties by provoking feelings of political neglect, economic vulnerability, and strong emotional responses. I examine this argument by leveraging spatial and temporal variation in the rollout of Universal Credit, a large-scale welfare reform in the United Kingdom. Using fine-grained administrative data on unsecured debt, I demonstrate that fiscal austerity generated an increase in indebtedness, which lower support for the incumbent Conservatives and strengthened support for Labour and UKIP. I then use individual-level survey data to explore the mechanisms that link debt and political behavior. The results suggest that rising indebtedness increases the political costs of welfare retrenchment and creates new political cleavages.
{"title":"The Electoral Consequences of Indebtedness under Austerity","authors":"Andreas Wiedemann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3736144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3736144","url":null,"abstract":"What are the political consequences of rising household debt in the context of fiscal austerity? Cuts in welfare benefits privatize social obligations as voters address ensuing financial shortfalls by borrowing money. I argue that debt re-commodifies individuals and shifts their electoral support from incumbents to opposition and anti-establishment parties by provoking feelings of political neglect, economic vulnerability, and strong emotional responses. I examine this argument by leveraging spatial and temporal variation in the rollout of Universal Credit, a large-scale welfare reform in the United Kingdom. Using fine-grained administrative data on unsecured debt, I demonstrate that fiscal austerity generated an increase in indebtedness, which lower support for the incumbent Conservatives and strengthened support for Labour and UKIP. I then use individual-level survey data to explore the mechanisms that link debt and political behavior. The results suggest that rising indebtedness increases the political costs of welfare retrenchment and creates new political cleavages.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127250434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic policy decisions often involve a tradeoff between equality and efficiency implemented through income redistribution. We test whether people are more likely to purchase equality with their own money versus transferring someone else’s money to a low-income group member which reduces inequality at the cost of group efficiency. We synthesize (Andreoni & Miller 2002) and (Engellman & Strobel 2004) by using an experiment that allows us to measure willingness-to-pay for equality both with own income and other people’s money. Subjects are more likely to purchase equality with others' money at the cost of group efficiency. The average individual prefers an outcome with more own income and more inequality relative to our experimental status quo. The average willingness-to-pay for equality is positive when using others' money. However, our subjects are sensitive to prices even when making purchases with others' money. When the cost in terms of group efficiency is very high, subjects usually do not choose to reduce inequality. We find the same outcome when subjects decide as a dictator or with majority-rule decisions.
经济政策决策往往涉及通过收入再分配实现的平等与效率之间的权衡。我们测试了人们是否更倾向于用自己的钱购买平等，而不是把别人的钱转移给低收入群体的成员，后者以群体效率为代价减少了不平等。我们综合(Andreoni & Miller 2002)和(Engellman & Strobel 2004)，通过使用一个实验，使我们能够衡量自己的收入和他人的钱的平等支付意愿。研究对象更有可能以牺牲群体效率为代价，换取与他人金钱的平等。相对于我们的实验现状，普通人更喜欢自己收入更高、不平等程度更高的结果。在使用他人的钱时，平均为平等付费的意愿是积极的。然而，我们的研究对象对价格很敏感，即使是用别人的钱买东西。当群体效率方面的成本非常高时，受试者通常不会选择减少不平等。我们发现，当受试者以独裁者的方式或多数人的方式做出决定时，结果也是一样的。
{"title":"Other People’s Money: Preferences for Equality in Groups","authors":"Joy A. Buchanan, Gavin Roberts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3717153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3717153","url":null,"abstract":"Economic policy decisions often involve a tradeoff between equality and efficiency implemented through income redistribution. We test whether people are more likely to purchase equality with their own money versus transferring someone else’s money to a low-income group member which reduces inequality at the cost of group efficiency. We synthesize (Andreoni & Miller 2002) and (Engellman & Strobel 2004) by using an experiment that allows us to measure willingness-to-pay for equality both with own income and other people’s money. Subjects are more likely to purchase equality with others' money at the cost of group efficiency. The average individual prefers an outcome with more own income and more inequality relative to our experimental status quo. The average willingness-to-pay for equality is positive when using others' money. However, our subjects are sensitive to prices even when making purchases with others' money. When the cost in terms of group efficiency is very high, subjects usually do not choose to reduce inequality. We find the same outcome when subjects decide as a dictator or with majority-rule decisions.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121715986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We evaluate social insurance program designs for the disabled by empirically implementing a frictional labor market model with screening employment contracts. In the model, firms post a screening contract consisting of wage and job amenities, and workers with different levels of disability make labor supply decisions. We first theoretically analyze the optimal structure of disability insurance (DI) and firm subsidies for hiring the disabled. Then, by exploiting policy variation in hiring subsidies for the disabled, we empirically examine which job amenities may be used by firms to screen out the disabled, and we structurally estimate our equilibrium model. Using the estimated model, we quantitatively explore the optimal joint design of DI and firm subsidies for employing disabled workers. We find a welfare improving role of firm subsidies that encourage firms to provide more job amenities, mitigating the labor supply disincentives of DI and labor market distortions induced by firms screening contracts. Finally, we show that the presence of a firm's screening incentive significantly affects the effectiveness of the policies: the optimal level of DI should be higher to ameliorate contract distortions caused by the firm's screening activities.
{"title":"Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled","authors":"Naoki Aizawa, Soojin Kim, Serena Rhee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3442117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3442117","url":null,"abstract":"We evaluate social insurance program designs for the disabled by empirically implementing a frictional labor market model with screening employment contracts. In the model, firms post a screening contract consisting of wage and job amenities, and workers with different levels of disability make labor supply decisions. We first theoretically analyze the optimal structure of disability insurance (DI) and firm subsidies for hiring the disabled. Then, by exploiting policy variation in hiring subsidies for the disabled, we empirically examine which job amenities may be used by firms to screen out the disabled, and we structurally estimate our equilibrium model. Using the estimated model, we quantitatively explore the optimal joint design of DI and firm subsidies for employing disabled workers. We find a welfare improving role of firm subsidies that encourage firms to provide more job amenities, mitigating the labor supply disincentives of DI and labor market distortions induced by firms screening contracts. Finally, we show that the presence of a firm's screening incentive significantly affects the effectiveness of the policies: the optimal level of DI should be higher to ameliorate contract distortions caused by the firm's screening activities.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129127524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Six percent of children in the United States enter foster care by age 18. We estimate the effects of foster care on children's outcomes by exploiting the quasi-random assignment of child welfare investigators in Michigan. We find that foster care improved children's safety and educational outcomes. Gains emerged after children exited the foster system when most were reunified with their birth parents, suggesting that improvements made by their parents were an important mechanism. These results indicate that safely reducing the use of foster care, a goal of recent federal legislation, requires more effective in-home, prevention-focused efforts. (JEL H75, I21, J13, K42)
{"title":"Temporary Stays and Persistent Gains: The Causal Effects of Foster Care","authors":"Max Gross, E. Baron","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3576640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576640","url":null,"abstract":"Six percent of children in the United States enter foster care by age 18. We estimate the effects of foster care on children's outcomes by exploiting the quasi-random assignment of child welfare investigators in Michigan. We find that foster care improved children's safety and educational outcomes. Gains emerged after children exited the foster system when most were reunified with their birth parents, suggesting that improvements made by their parents were an important mechanism. These results indicate that safely reducing the use of foster care, a goal of recent federal legislation, requires more effective in-home, prevention-focused efforts. (JEL H75, I21, J13, K42)","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129955966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Social enterprises (SEs) have been active for some decades and have been regulated by law in several countries. Their operation showed ability to complement the provision of welfare services, especially social services, by the public sector and private enterprises, and to innovate in the introduction of new services, organizational and managerial models. In some cases, SEs succeeded in producing and innovating in an autonomous way, without depending on public financial support and procurement agreements. This paper starts from the state of the art in the study of SEs to propose different avenues through which they can be able to expand supply of welfare services and contribute to the decentralization of welfare systems. It traces these specific abilities to SEs’ peculiar institutional structure, especially their non-profit nature, the pursuit of public benefit and social missions, and multi-stakeholder governance. This last feature is considered the most remarkable emerging characteristic in the evolution of this organizational form. The paper then proceeds to focus on price discrimination as specific governance mechanism of the relations of production and exchange, involving different stakeholders and allowing SEs to widen their supply of services, achieve financial sustainability and contribute to the decentralization of the welfare system.
{"title":"Social Enterprises and Welfare Systems. The Role of Multi-Stakeholder Governance and Price Discrimination","authors":"E. Tortia, C. Borzaga","doi":"10.5947/JEOD.2020.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5947/JEOD.2020.007","url":null,"abstract":"Social enterprises (SEs) have been active for some decades and have been regulated by law in several countries. Their operation showed ability to complement the provision of welfare services, especially social services, by the public sector and private enterprises, and to innovate in the introduction of new services, organizational and managerial models. In some cases, SEs succeeded in producing and innovating in an autonomous way, without depending on public financial support and procurement agreements. This paper starts from the state of the art in the study of SEs to propose different avenues through which they can be able to expand supply of welfare services and contribute to the decentralization of welfare systems. It traces these specific abilities to SEs’ peculiar institutional structure, especially their non-profit nature, the pursuit of public benefit and social missions, and multi-stakeholder governance. This last feature is considered the most remarkable emerging characteristic in the evolution of this organizational form. The paper then proceeds to focus on price discrimination as specific governance mechanism of the relations of production and exchange, involving different stakeholders and allowing SEs to widen their supply of services, achieve financial sustainability and contribute to the decentralization of the welfare system.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128713565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper estimates the long-run human capital effects of two types of care a child received before age 6: informal childcare provided by grandparents, and formal childcare by kindergarten, for those who were born between 1950 and 1995 in China. To correct for the endogeneity of childcare choice, I adopt the instrumental variables strategy: The survival status of paternal grandparents when a child was before age 6 is used to construct instruments for informal care; The existence of kindergarten in the community is used as an instrument for formal care. I find that both types of childcare lead to higher educational attainment and better job outcomes. Moreover, the effect of grand-parental childcare is stronger for girls, consistent with the parental preference for boys. I also find evidence that the kindergarten effect on human capital accumulation is caused by increased maternal labor income and decreased family size. Those findings highlight the important role of grandparents and public childcare for children in under-developed areas.
{"title":"Childcare Choice and Long-Run Human Capital Outcomes in China","authors":"Lei Lei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3474026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3474026","url":null,"abstract":"This paper estimates the long-run human capital effects of two types of care a child received before age 6: informal childcare provided by grandparents, and formal childcare by kindergarten, for those who were born between 1950 and 1995 in China. To correct for the endogeneity of childcare choice, I adopt the instrumental variables strategy: The survival status of paternal grandparents when a child was before age 6 is used to construct instruments for informal care; The existence of kindergarten in the community is used as an instrument for formal care. I find that both types of childcare lead to higher educational attainment and better job outcomes. Moreover, the effect of grand-parental childcare is stronger for girls, consistent with the parental preference for boys. I also find evidence that the kindergarten effect on human capital accumulation is caused by increased maternal labor income and decreased family size. Those findings highlight the important role of grandparents and public childcare for children in under-developed areas.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131142905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper evaluates the effects of the War on Poverty’s Legal Services Program (LSP) on family structure and welfare participation. LSPs provided subsidized legal assistance to poor communities, focusing on divorce and welfare access. We use a difference-in-differences research design based on the rollout of the program to 251 counties from 1965 to 1975. We find temporary increases in divorce and persistent increases in welfare participation and nonmarital birth rates. Nonmarital births rose because marriage rates fell, not because birth rates rose. Expanded access to legal institutions thus contributed, directly and indirectly, to changes in family structure in the 1960s.
{"title":"Changes in Family Structure and Welfare Participation Since the 1960s: The Role of Legal Services","authors":"Andrew Goodman-Bacon, Jamein P. Cunningham","doi":"10.3386/w26238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26238","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates the effects of the War on Poverty’s Legal Services Program (LSP) on family structure and welfare participation. LSPs provided subsidized legal assistance to poor communities, focusing on divorce and welfare access. We use a difference-in-differences research design based on the rollout of the program to 251 counties from 1965 to 1975. We find temporary increases in divorce and persistent increases in welfare participation and nonmarital birth rates. Nonmarital births rose because marriage rates fell, not because birth rates rose. Expanded access to legal institutions thus contributed, directly and indirectly, to changes in family structure in the 1960s.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"30 26","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113934422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Authoritarian local leaders face two driving forces in social policy making: top-down pressure from the regime and bottom-up motivations derived from local conditions. Existing studies recognize the importance of both forces but remain unclear as to how they interact and which of them is more influential in driving local policy adoption. Focusing on two health insurance integration policies in China, we find that when the policy entails substantial class or distributive conflicts and bureaucratic friction, top-down pressure for compliance is a dominant driver for local policy adoption; when the policy does not entail such conflicts or bureaucratic infighting, bottom-up motivations based on local economic geography together with top-down pressure drive local adoption. We find support for this argument from an analysis of an original city-level dataset in China from 2004 to 2016. This study has implications for social policy reform, decentralization and government responsiveness in authoritarian countries with multilevel governance.
{"title":"When Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up: Local Adoption of Social Policy Reform in China","authors":"Xianguo Huang, S. Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3713248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3713248","url":null,"abstract":"Authoritarian local leaders face two driving forces in social policy making: top-down pressure from the regime and bottom-up motivations derived from local conditions. Existing studies recognize the importance of both forces but remain unclear as to how they interact and which of them is more influential in driving local policy adoption. Focusing on two health insurance integration policies in China, we find that when the policy entails substantial class or distributive conflicts and bureaucratic friction, top-down pressure for compliance is a dominant driver for local policy adoption; when the policy does not entail such conflicts or bureaucratic infighting, bottom-up motivations based on local economic geography together with top-down pressure drive local adoption. We find support for this argument from an analysis of an original city-level dataset in China from 2004 to 2016. This study has implications for social policy reform, decentralization and government responsiveness in authoritarian countries with multilevel governance.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125786429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Working Paper brings together two parallel but complementary approaches to the impact of the platform economy on working conditions and social law. The first part of the study shows that the business models of some platforms is a combination of technological disruption and social evasion. The second part of this working paper confirms that it is in the gaps and ambiguities in social legislation that platforms are trying to legitimise a business model abrogating all social responsibility. It is in this sense that we can talk about the risk of “social evasion” of several major platforms, exactly in the same way as fiscal evasion.
{"title":"The Platform Economy and Social Law: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective","authors":"Isabelle Daugareilh, C. Degryse, P. Pochet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3432441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3432441","url":null,"abstract":"This Working Paper brings together two parallel but complementary approaches to the impact of the platform economy on working conditions and social law. The first part of the study shows that the business models of some platforms is a combination of technological disruption and social evasion. The second part of this working paper confirms that it is in the gaps and ambiguities in social legislation that platforms are trying to legitimise a business model abrogating all social responsibility. It is in this sense that we can talk about the risk of “social evasion” of several major platforms, exactly in the same way as fiscal evasion.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127896040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Child well-being is inextricably linked to the performance of the macroeconomy. Although not always explicit, there are very clear and powerful channels that need to be understood, monitored and linked to decision-making processes, including economic growth, labour markets, price levels and the fiscal balance. As the young and fast-growing population in the Eastern and Southern Africa region (ESAR) explodes from 540 million today to more than a billion in less than 30 years, the stakes for children have never been higher. And this is the main objective of the report: to understand whether macroeconomic forces will catalyse sustainable change for children – or not. When looking at recent trends and projections, optimism is hard to come by: * Economic growth is not nearly fast enough to propel incomes and poverty alleviation on a meaningful scale. * Labour markets are not providing the quality jobs needed by parents and young workers to improve their lives and the lives of children. * Rising prices are negatively influencing real economic output, the impact of government investment and household welfare. * Continuous budget deficits, rising debt and the changing foreign aid landscape limit available funding for children’s services. * The current levels, design and performance of social sector budgets prevent systems from delivering the services demanded by children and their families. However, many factors could influence the outlook. Economic growth could outperform expectations… Labour markets could rapidly expand and create formal sector opportunities for young and adult workers… Price levels could permanently stabilize… Domestic resource mobilization and other financing efforts could produce unprecedented returns… And social sector investment could suddenly grow in size and impact… Sound policies and favorable external conditions could help improve the macroeconomic trajectory for children, but achieving meaningful improvements in child well-being will largely be dictated by the investment choices of governments starting today. UNICEF country offices can play a critical role in influencing budgets for children as well as in protecting and promoting child well-being in response to different macroeconomic situations.
{"title":"The Macroeconomic and Social Investment Outlook for Children in Eastern and Southern Africa","authors":"M. Cummins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3523554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3523554","url":null,"abstract":"Child well-being is inextricably linked to the performance of the macroeconomy. Although not always explicit, there are very clear and powerful channels that need to be understood, monitored and linked to decision-making processes, including economic growth, labour markets, price levels and the fiscal balance. As the young and fast-growing population in the Eastern and Southern Africa region (ESAR) explodes from 540 million today to more than a billion in less than 30 years, the stakes for children have never been higher. And this is the main objective of the report: to understand whether macroeconomic forces will catalyse sustainable change for children – or not. When looking at recent trends and projections, optimism is hard to come by: * Economic growth is not nearly fast enough to propel incomes and poverty alleviation on a meaningful scale. * Labour markets are not providing the quality jobs needed by parents and young workers to improve their lives and the lives of children. * Rising prices are negatively influencing real economic output, the impact of government investment and household welfare. * Continuous budget deficits, rising debt and the changing foreign aid landscape limit available funding for children’s services. * The current levels, design and performance of social sector budgets prevent systems from delivering the services demanded by children and their families. However, many factors could influence the outlook. Economic growth could outperform expectations… Labour markets could rapidly expand and create formal sector opportunities for young and adult workers… Price levels could permanently stabilize… Domestic resource mobilization and other financing efforts could produce unprecedented returns… And social sector investment could suddenly grow in size and impact… Sound policies and favorable external conditions could help improve the macroeconomic trajectory for children, but achieving meaningful improvements in child well-being will largely be dictated by the investment choices of governments starting today. UNICEF country offices can play a critical role in influencing budgets for children as well as in protecting and promoting child well-being in response to different macroeconomic situations.","PeriodicalId":347116,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Social Welfare Policy (Topic)","volume":"322 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132251483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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