Pub Date : 2021-04-22DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-49
Alexander A. Guerrero
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In this chapter, I discuss how the medieval Islamic Philosophers wrestled with issues to do with the role and function of expertise. I show how this leads them to an epistemological position I call ‘Islamic Moderate Evidentialism’ and show how it directly bears upon their political philosophy whereby the Prophet is thought to be the ideal political leader. I then move to a more contemporary context and note parallels of this thought in the mid-twentieth-century revolutionary Islamism of Sayyid Qutb and Abul A’la Maududi. I show how understanding this movement from the perspective of medieval Islamic Philosophy leads us to articulating a unique political position where both Perfectionist Liberal thought and Anarcho-Socialism sit together side by side.
在这一章中，我将讨论中世纪的伊斯兰哲学家是如何与专家的角色和功能有关的问题进行斗争的。我展示了这如何将他们引向一种认识论立场，我称之为“伊斯兰温和证据主义”，并展示了它如何直接影响他们的政治哲学，即先知被认为是理想的政治领袖。然后，我转移到一个更现代的背景下，并注意到这种思想在20世纪中期的伊斯兰革命的Sayyid Qutb和Abul a 'la Maududi的相似之处。我展示了如何从中世纪伊斯兰哲学的角度来理解这一运动，从而使我们清晰地表达出一种独特的政治立场，即完美主义自由主义思想和无政府社会主义思想并存。
{"title":"Epistemology and politics in Islamic Philosophy","authors":"A. Booth","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-6","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, I discuss how the medieval Islamic Philosophers wrestled with issues to do with the role and function of expertise. I show how this leads them to an epistemological position I call ‘Islamic Moderate Evidentialism’ and show how it directly bears upon their political philosophy whereby the Prophet is thought to be the ideal political leader. I then move to a more contemporary context and note parallels of this thought in the mid-twentieth-century revolutionary Islamism of Sayyid Qutb and Abul A’la Maududi. I show how understanding this movement from the perspective of medieval Islamic Philosophy leads us to articulating a unique political position where both Perfectionist Liberal thought and Anarcho-Socialism sit together side by side.","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114096192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-21DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-34
Robin McKenna
{"title":"Asymmetrical irrationality","authors":"Robin McKenna","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-34","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128171637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-21DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-15
R. Rowland, R. Simpson
. There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable for someone in a similar position have a totally different set of political commitments. This chapter examines three explanatory theses that might be used to make sense of this difference: (1) that practical commitments are desire dependent in a way that beliefs are not; (2) that there are reasons to be resolute in practical commitments, but not in beliefs; and (3) that compromise in the face of practical political disagreement doesn’t mitigate controversy, whereas compromise in the face of disagreement about mere beliefs does mitigate controversy.
{"title":"Epistemic Permissivism and Reasonable Pluralism","authors":"R. Rowland, R. Simpson","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-15","url":null,"abstract":". There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable for someone in a similar position have a totally different set of political commitments. This chapter examines three explanatory theses that might be used to make sense of this difference: (1) that practical commitments are desire dependent in a way that beliefs are not; (2) that there are reasons to be resolute in practical commitments, but not in beliefs; and (3) that compromise in the face of practical political disagreement doesn’t mitigate controversy, whereas compromise in the face of disagreement about mere beliefs does mitigate controversy.","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132529151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-13
S. Iyengar
{"title":"The polarization of American politics","authors":"S. Iyengar","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128614884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-48
Cameron Boult
: The chapter develops a taxonomy of views about the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. Prominent approaches to epistemic democracy, epistocracy, epistemic libertarianism, and pure proceduralism are examined through the lens of this taxonomy. The primary aim is to explore options for developing an account of the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. The chapter also argues that a number of recent attacks on democracy may not adequately register the availability of a minimal approach to the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy.
{"title":"The epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy","authors":"Cameron Boult","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-48","url":null,"abstract":": The chapter develops a taxonomy of views about the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. Prominent approaches to epistemic democracy, epistocracy, epistemic libertarianism, and pure proceduralism are examined through the lens of this taxonomy. The primary aim is to explore options for developing an account of the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. The chapter also argues that a number of recent attacks on democracy may not adequately register the availability of a minimal approach to the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy.","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126128506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-19
Michael Hannon, J. Ridder
An intuitive and widely accepted view is that (a) beliefs aim at truth, (b) many citizens have stable and meaningful political beliefs, and (c) citizens choose to support political candidates or parties on the basis of their political beliefs. We argue that all three claims are false. First, we argue that political beliefs often differ from ordinary world-modelling beliefs because they do not aim at truth. Second, we draw on empirical evidence from political science and psychology to argue that most people lack stable and meaningful political beliefs. Third, we claim that the true psychological basis for voting behavior is not an individual’s political beliefs but rather group identity. Along the way, we reflect on what this means for normative democratic theory.
{"title":"The point of political belief","authors":"Michael Hannon, J. Ridder","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-19","url":null,"abstract":"An intuitive and widely accepted view is that (a) beliefs aim at truth, (b) many citizens have stable and meaningful political beliefs, and (c) citizens choose to support political candidates or parties on the basis of their political beliefs. We argue that all three claims are false. First, we argue that political beliefs often differ from ordinary world-modelling beliefs because they do not aim at truth. Second, we draw on empirical evidence from political science and psychology to argue that most people lack stable and meaningful political beliefs. Third, we claim that the true psychological basis for voting behavior is not an individual’s political beliefs but rather group identity. Along the way, we reflect on what this means for normative democratic theory.","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133532961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-10
A. Greene
To describe our political climate as ‘post-truth’ is both compelling and poisonous. It is compelling, I argue, because it captures the lack of confidence between groups with divergent political outlooks. To illustrate, I portray two groups with different political outlooks: the heartlanders , whose concern for truthfulness is anchored in personal and relational integrity, and the metropolitans , whose concern for truthfulness is anchored in impartiality and cosmopolitanism. In this tale of two tribes, each group exhibits qualities of truthfulness – sincerity and accuracy -- in ways that the other group does not recognize. The result is that each group interprets the other group's political participation as an abandonment of truth for the sake of power, thereby undermining political legitimacy. Building on the work of Bernard Williams and John Stuart Mill, I argue that finding common ground is necessary if truth is to play a role in the resistance of tyranny. I critically examine several ways to restore a common concern for truth between the two tribes, offering reasons to doubt that they will succeed. Instead, I propose a rethinking of the widespread acceptance of a strict dichotomy between facts and values. Since public deliberation is characterized by a complex interplay between facts and values, I suggest that a better way forward is to openly explore this interplay, instead of impugning each other's commitment to truthfulness. I conclude that, in the absence of a widely shared political outlook, it is politically poisonous to describe our age in ‘post-truth’ terms.
{"title":"Tyranny, tribalism, and post-truth politics","authors":"A. Greene","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-10","url":null,"abstract":"To describe our political climate as ‘post-truth’ is both compelling and poisonous. It is compelling, I argue, because it captures the lack of confidence between groups with divergent political outlooks. To illustrate, I portray two groups with different political outlooks: the heartlanders , whose concern for truthfulness is anchored in personal and relational integrity, and the metropolitans , whose concern for truthfulness is anchored in impartiality and cosmopolitanism. In this tale of two tribes, each group exhibits qualities of truthfulness – sincerity and accuracy -- in ways that the other group does not recognize. The result is that each group interprets the other group's political participation as an abandonment of truth for the sake of power, thereby undermining political legitimacy. Building on the work of Bernard Williams and John Stuart Mill, I argue that finding common ground is necessary if truth is to play a role in the resistance of tyranny. I critically examine several ways to restore a common concern for truth between the two tribes, offering reasons to doubt that they will succeed. Instead, I propose a rethinking of the widespread acceptance of a strict dichotomy between facts and values. Since public deliberation is characterized by a complex interplay between facts and values, I suggest that a better way forward is to openly explore this interplay, instead of impugning each other's commitment to truthfulness. I conclude that, in the absence of a widely shared political outlook, it is politically poisonous to describe our age in ‘post-truth’ terms.","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116482696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-17
Daniel J. Singer, P. Grim, A. Bramson, B. Holman, Jiin Jung, William J. Berger
{"title":"Epistemic networks and polarization","authors":"Daniel J. Singer, P. Grim, A. Bramson, B. Holman, Jiin Jung, William J. Berger","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130577964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-27
Megan Hyska
I argue that propaganda does not characteristically interfere with individual rationality, but instead with group agency. Whereas it is often claimed that propaganda involves some sort of incitement to irrationality, I show that this is neither necessary nor sufficient for a case’s being one or propaganda. For instance, some propaganda constitutes evidence of the speaker’s power, or else of the risk and futility of opposing them, and there is nothing irrational about taking such evidence seriously. I outline an alternative account of propaganda inspired by Hannah Arendt, on which propaganda characteristically creates or destroys group agency. One aspiring to control the public should have an interest in both creating and suppressing group agency, I argue, both because groups have capacities that individuals don’t, and because participation in group action can have a transformative effect upon the individual. Finally, I suggest that my characterization of propaganda suggests a vision of resistance to propaganda quite unlike the one that emerges from irrational-belief accounts, on which propaganda cannot be resisted by oneself.
{"title":"Propaganda, irrationality, and group agency","authors":"Megan Hyska","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-27","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that propaganda does not characteristically interfere with individual rationality, but instead with group agency. Whereas it is often claimed that propaganda involves some sort of incitement to irrationality, I show that this is neither necessary nor sufficient for a case’s being one or propaganda. For instance, some propaganda constitutes evidence of the speaker’s power, or else of the risk and futility of opposing them, and there is nothing irrational about taking such evidence seriously. I outline an alternative account of propaganda inspired by Hannah Arendt, on which propaganda characteristically creates or destroys group agency. One aspiring to control the public should have an interest in both creating and suppressing group agency, I argue, both because groups have capacities that individuals don’t, and because participation in group action can have a transformative effect upon the individual. Finally, I suggest that my characterization of propaganda suggests a vision of resistance to propaganda quite unlike the one that emerges from irrational-belief accounts, on which propaganda cannot be resisted by oneself.","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121158855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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