In this chapter, we provide a necessarily brief and partial survey of recent work in the cognitive sciences directly on or closely related to the psychology of fake news, in particular fake news in the political domain. We focus on whether and why people believe fake news. While we argue that it is likely that a large proportion of people who purport to believe fake news really do, we provide evidence that this proportion might be significantly smaller than is usually thought (and smaller than is suggested by surveys). Assertion of belief is inflated, we suggest, by insincere report, whether to express support for one side of political debate or simply for fun. It is also inflated by the use of motivated inference of one sort or another, which lead respondents to report believing things about which they had no opinion prior to being probed. We then turn to rival accounts that aim to explain why people believe in fake news when they do. While partisan explanations, turning on motivated reasoning, are probably best known, we show they face serious challenges from accounts that explain belief by reference to analytic thinking.
{"title":"The cognitive science of fake news","authors":"N. Levy, R. Ross","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/3nuzj","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/3nuzj","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we provide a necessarily brief and partial survey of recent work in the cognitive sciences directly on or closely related to the psychology of fake news, in particular fake news in the political domain. We focus on whether and why people believe fake news. While we argue that it is likely that a large proportion of people who purport to believe fake news really do, we provide evidence that this proportion might be significantly smaller than is usually thought (and smaller than is suggested by surveys). Assertion of belief is inflated, we suggest, by insincere report, whether to express support for one side of political debate or simply for fun. It is also inflated by the use of motivated inference of one sort or another, which lead respondents to report believing things about which they had no opinion prior to being probed. We then turn to rival accounts that aim to explain why people believe in fake news when they do. While partisan explanations, turning on motivated reasoning, are probably best known, we show they face serious challenges from accounts that explain belief by reference to analytic thinking.","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121384752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of ‘fake news’. I then go on to argue that fake news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate. According to the news and the proclamations of world leaders, apparently there is a lot of fake news out there. In order to make sense of the seemingly modern phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to define what fake news and what fake news is not. Once we are clear what falls under the rubric of ‘fake news’ it becomes clear that fake news is not itself a new problem. Rather, the issue that makes fake news both interesting and challenging is its newfound centrality in public discourse. Fake news challenges our conception of what the ‘news’ is, which in turn leads to issues as to how we appraise the sincerity and intent of those who disseminate it. When talking about how to analyse any phenomena, it is helpful to get clear about what it is we are talking about. Fake news is, at least when it comes to the kind of thing world leaders like U.S. President Donald J. Trump talk about, a new phenomenon. As such, what is thing called ‘fake news?’
:关于假新闻的讨论在当代政治中很流行，但什么是假新闻，如果有的话，它与假新闻有什么不同?我认为，为了理解假新闻现象，有必要首先对其进行定义，然后显示哪些属于“假新闻”，哪些不属于“假新闻”。然后我接着说，假新闻不是一个新问题。相反，如果假新闻存在问题，那就是它在当代公共辩论中的中心地位。根据新闻和世界领导人的声明，显然有很多假新闻。为了理解看似现代的假新闻现象，有必要定义什么是假新闻，什么不是假新闻。一旦我们弄清楚什么是“假新闻”，假新闻本身并不是一个新问题就变得很明显了。相反，让假新闻既有趣又具有挑战性的是它在公共话语中的新中心地位。假新闻挑战了我们对“新闻”的概念，这反过来又导致了我们如何评估传播新闻者的诚意和意图的问题。在谈论如何分析任何现象时，弄清楚我们在谈论的是什么是有帮助的。假新闻是一种新现象，至少在美国总统唐纳德·j·特朗普(Donald J. Trump)等世界领导人谈论的那种事情上是这样。因此，什么是所谓的“假新闻”?”
{"title":"What is fake news?","authors":"Axel Gelfert","doi":"10.5840/tpm20188399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/tpm20188399","url":null,"abstract":": Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of ‘fake news’. I then go on to argue that fake news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate. According to the news and the proclamations of world leaders, apparently there is a lot of fake news out there. In order to make sense of the seemingly modern phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to define what fake news and what fake news is not. Once we are clear what falls under the rubric of ‘fake news’ it becomes clear that fake news is not itself a new problem. Rather, the issue that makes fake news both interesting and challenging is its newfound centrality in public discourse. Fake news challenges our conception of what the ‘news’ is, which in turn leads to issues as to how we appraise the sincerity and intent of those who disseminate it. When talking about how to analyse any phenomena, it is helpful to get clear about what it is we are talking about. Fake news is, at least when it comes to the kind of thing world leaders like U.S. President Donald J. Trump talk about, a new phenomenon. As such, what is thing called ‘fake news?’","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123513554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"General introduction","authors":"Hannon Michael, J. Ridder","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117120587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Identifying upward","authors":"C. Fraser","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127045498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780429326769-16
Elizabeth Edenberg
{"title":"Political disagreement","authors":"Elizabeth Edenberg","doi":"10.4324/9780429326769-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":348849,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134595255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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