In 2012 the state of Washington created a legal framework for production and retail sales of marijuana. Nine other U.S. states and Canada have followed. These states hope to generate tax revenue for their state budgets while limiting harms associated with marijuana consumption. We use a unique administrative dataset containing all transactions in the history of the industry in Washington to evaluate the effectiveness of different tax and regulatory policies under consideration by policymakers and study the role of imperfect competition in determining these results. We examine 3 main research questions. First, how effective is Washington’s excise tax at raising revenue? With the nation’s highest tax rate on marijuana, is Washington maximizing revenue or potentially overtaxing, leading to reduced legal sales and lower tax revenue. Second, what is the incidence of taxes in this industry? Finally, most states have restricted entry, resulting in firms with substantial market power. What is the role of imperfect competition in studying these basic questions on tax policy? We combine structural methods and a reduced form sufficient statistic approach to show a number of results. First, Washington’s 37% excise tax is still on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve and state revenue could be substantially higher with a higher tax rate. The amount of revenue generated by a tax increase is significantly larger due to retailer market power than it would be under perfect competition. In addition, these taxes are primarily borne by consumers and not by firms, and there is a large social cost associated with each dollar raised.
{"title":"Taxation and Market Power in the Legal Marijuana Industry","authors":"Brett Hollenbeck, Kosuke Uetake","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3237729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3237729","url":null,"abstract":"In 2012 the state of Washington created a legal framework for production and retail sales of marijuana. Nine other U.S. states and Canada have followed. These states hope to generate tax revenue for their state budgets while limiting harms associated with marijuana consumption. We use a unique administrative dataset containing all transactions in the history of the industry in Washington to evaluate the effectiveness of different tax and regulatory policies under consideration by policymakers and study the role of imperfect competition in determining these results. We examine 3 main research questions. First, how effective is Washington’s excise tax at raising revenue? With the nation’s highest tax rate on marijuana, is Washington maximizing revenue or potentially overtaxing, leading to reduced legal sales and lower tax revenue. Second, what is the incidence of taxes in this industry? Finally, most states have restricted entry, resulting in firms with substantial market power. What is the role of imperfect competition in studying these basic questions on tax policy? We combine structural methods and a reduced form sufficient statistic approach to show a number of results. First, Washington’s 37% excise tax is still on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve and state revenue could be substantially higher with a higher tax rate. The amount of revenue generated by a tax increase is significantly larger due to retailer market power than it would be under perfect competition. In addition, these taxes are primarily borne by consumers and not by firms, and there is a large social cost associated with each dollar raised.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128590856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that an insight from taxation theory allows identification of both the supply and demand elasticities with only one instrument. Ramsey (1928) and subsequent models of taxation assume that a tax levied on the demand side only affects demand through the price after taxation. Econometrically, we show that this assumption functions as an additional exclusion restriction. Under the Ramsey Exclusion Restriction (RER) a tax reform can serve to simultaneously identify elasticities of supply and demand. We develop a TSLS estimator for both elasticities, a test to assess instrument strength and a test for the RER. Our result extends to a supply-demand system with J goods, and a setting with supply-side or non-linear taxes. Further, we show that key results in the sufficient statistics literature rely on the RER. One example is Harberger’s formula for the excess burden of a tax. We apply our method to the Norwegian labor market.
{"title":"How to Use One Instrument to Identify Two Elasticities","authors":"E. Gavrilova, F. Zoutman, Arnt O. Hopland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2933598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2933598","url":null,"abstract":"We show that an insight from taxation theory allows identification of both the supply and demand elasticities with only one instrument. Ramsey (1928) and subsequent models of taxation assume that a tax levied on the demand side only affects demand through the price after taxation. Econometrically, we show that this assumption functions as an additional exclusion restriction. Under the Ramsey Exclusion Restriction (RER) a tax reform can serve to simultaneously identify elasticities of supply and demand. We develop a TSLS estimator for both elasticities, a test to assess instrument strength and a test for the RER. Our result extends to a supply-demand system with J goods, and a setting with supply-side or non-linear taxes. Further, we show that key results in the sufficient statistics literature rely on the RER. One example is Harberger’s formula for the excess burden of a tax. We apply our method to the Norwegian labor market.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131601279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of the controversy surrounding recent policy proposals to broaden the base for value added taxes (VAT) revolves around who ultimately bears the burden of these taxes. The typical assumption is that consumer prices fully reflect taxes, so that the main empirical question is how the tax induced price changes affect members of different income groups. However, the evidence base is scarce and market imperfections could generate both over and under-shifting of VAT to consumer prices. In this paper, we examine the incidence and distributional effects of VAT in a setting with plausibly exogenous variation in tax rates. The context of our study is a sharp change in the VAT policy on food items in Norway. Using a regression discontinuity design, we examine the direct impact of the policy change on the consumer prices of food items as well as any cross-price effects on other goods. Our estimates suggest that taxes levied on food items are completely shifted to consumer prices, whereas the pricing of other goods is not materially affected. To understand the distributional effects of the VAT reform, we use expenditure data and estimate the compensating variation of the tax induced price changes. We find that lowering the VAT on food attenuates inequality in consumer welfare, in part because households adjust their spending patterns in response to the price changes. By comparison, the usual first order approximation of the distributional effects, which ignores behavioral responses, seriously understates the redistributive nature of the VAT reform.
{"title":"Incidence and Distributional Effects of Value Added Taxes","authors":"Ingvil Gaarder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2784559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2784559","url":null,"abstract":"Much of the controversy surrounding recent policy proposals to broaden the base for value added taxes (VAT) revolves around who ultimately bears the burden of these taxes. The typical assumption is that consumer prices fully reflect taxes, so that the main empirical question is how the tax induced price changes affect members of different income groups. However, the evidence base is scarce and market imperfections could generate both over and under-shifting of VAT to consumer prices. In this paper, we examine the incidence and distributional effects of VAT in a setting with plausibly exogenous variation in tax rates. The context of our study is a sharp change in the VAT policy on food items in Norway. Using a regression discontinuity design, we examine the direct impact of the policy change on the consumer prices of food items as well as any cross-price effects on other goods. Our estimates suggest that taxes levied on food items are completely shifted to consumer prices, whereas the pricing of other goods is not materially affected. To understand the distributional effects of the VAT reform, we use expenditure data and estimate the compensating variation of the tax induced price changes. We find that lowering the VAT on food attenuates inequality in consumer welfare, in part because households adjust their spending patterns in response to the price changes. By comparison, the usual first order approximation of the distributional effects, which ignores behavioral responses, seriously understates the redistributive nature of the VAT reform.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127394397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how the general equilibrium incidence of an environmental tax depends on the effect of different incomes and preferences of heterogeneous households on aggregate outcomes. We develop a Harberger-type model with general forms of preferences and substitution between capital, labor, and pollution in production that captures the impact of household heterogeneity and interactions with production characteristics on the general equilibrium. We theoretically show that failing to incorporate household heterogeneity can qualitatively affect incidence. We quantitatively illustrate that this aggregation bias can be important for assessing the incidence of a carbon tax, mainly by affecting the returns to factors of production. Our findings are robust to a number of extensions including alternative revenue recycling schemes, pre-existing taxes, non-separable utility in pollution, labor–leisure choice, and multiple commodities.
{"title":"Household Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and the Distributional Impacts of Environmental Taxes","authors":"S. Rausch, S. Giacomo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2714879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2714879","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how the general equilibrium incidence of an environmental tax depends on the effect of different incomes and preferences of heterogeneous households on aggregate outcomes. We develop a Harberger-type model with general forms of preferences and substitution between capital, labor, and pollution in production that captures the impact of household heterogeneity and interactions with production characteristics on the general equilibrium. We theoretically show that failing to incorporate household heterogeneity can qualitatively affect incidence. We quantitatively illustrate that this aggregation bias can be important for assessing the incidence of a carbon tax, mainly by affecting the returns to factors of production. Our findings are robust to a number of extensions including alternative revenue recycling schemes, pre-existing taxes, non-separable utility in pollution, labor–leisure choice, and multiple commodities.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131164976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper explores theoretically and empirically Brazil’s tax revenue from a political and political economy perspective. The absence of ‘big bang’ reforms to the tax code and tax administration suggests that policy models are less directly relevant to explaining the rise in the tax/GDP ratio. The paper makes the argument that public consent to the hike in taxes is explained by a combination of democratisation, strong preferences for redistribution, fiscally responsible centre-left coalitions, and bureaucratic capacity. New political incentives under democracy combined with high state capacity and a powerful presidency with the political resource necessary to pass an agenda of social reforms to sustain this new equilibrium of high taxation and high redistribution. The current level of taxation and spending in the country in a context in which poverty and inequality is high (although declining rapidly) has prompted concerns about the fiscal sustainability of this equilibrium. The paper argues against pessimistic accounts of this dilemma - such as the arguments based on the concepts of fiscal illusion and inequality traps - and advances an optimistic perspective based on the notion that a new fiscal contract seems to be emerging.
{"title":"Taxation, Redistribution and the Social Contract in Brazil","authors":"M. Melo, A. Barrientos, A. Coelho","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2501433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2501433","url":null,"abstract":"The paper explores theoretically and empirically Brazil’s tax revenue from a political and political economy perspective. The absence of ‘big bang’ reforms to the tax code and tax administration suggests that policy models are less directly relevant to explaining the rise in the tax/GDP ratio. The paper makes the argument that public consent to the hike in taxes is explained by a combination of democratisation, strong preferences for redistribution, fiscally responsible centre-left coalitions, and bureaucratic capacity. New political incentives under democracy combined with high state capacity and a powerful presidency with the political resource necessary to pass an agenda of social reforms to sustain this new equilibrium of high taxation and high redistribution. The current level of taxation and spending in the country in a context in which poverty and inequality is high (although declining rapidly) has prompted concerns about the fiscal sustainability of this equilibrium. The paper argues against pessimistic accounts of this dilemma - such as the arguments based on the concepts of fiscal illusion and inequality traps - and advances an optimistic perspective based on the notion that a new fiscal contract seems to be emerging.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116888170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-06-01DOI: 10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.05.012
A. Auerbach, Lorenz Kueng, Ronald D. Lee
{"title":"Propagation and Smoothing of Shocks in Alternative Social Security Systems","authors":"A. Auerbach, Lorenz Kueng, Ronald D. Lee","doi":"10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.05.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.05.012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120713499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-05-01DOI: 10.5089/9781484323335.001.A001
Antonio C. David, Martin Petri
Using data from three household surveys, we review whether growth in Mauritius was inclusive and discuss the incidence of public expenditures and taxes. Generally, Mauritius enjoys an even income distribution and low rates of poverty. Nevertheless, over the 2000s, despite overall progress, the benefits of growth appear to have become more skewed. Employment income is the main contributor to inequality in Mauritius. Social protection expenditures reduce poverty and inequality, but could be better targeted, particularly for pensions. Income taxes are progressive, though given their small relative weight they have a negligible impact on income distribution. The VAT appears relatively progressive compared to other developing countries, although its impact on the overall distribution is also small. With better targeting of the sizable social spending, significant further progress in poverty alleviation could be achieved.
{"title":"Inclusive Growth and the Incidence of Fiscal Policy in Mauritius — Much Progress, But More Could Be Done","authors":"Antonio C. David, Martin Petri","doi":"10.5089/9781484323335.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484323335.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"Using data from three household surveys, we review whether growth in Mauritius was inclusive and discuss the incidence of public expenditures and taxes. Generally, Mauritius enjoys an even income distribution and low rates of poverty. Nevertheless, over the 2000s, despite overall progress, the benefits of growth appear to have become more skewed. Employment income is the main contributor to inequality in Mauritius. Social protection expenditures reduce poverty and inequality, but could be better targeted, particularly for pensions. Income taxes are progressive, though given their small relative weight they have a negligible impact on income distribution. The VAT appears relatively progressive compared to other developing countries, although its impact on the overall distribution is also small. With better targeting of the sizable social spending, significant further progress in poverty alleviation could be achieved.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122238110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Empirical evidence on the degree of business-tax shifting to employees via the wage level is highly controversial and rare. It remains open to which extent the tax burden is shifted, whether there are differences for tax increases and decreases, or whether there exists some treatment heterogeneity, that drive the respective results. Using a large administrative panel data set, we exploit the regional variation of the German business income taxation to address these issues. Our results suggest an elasticity of wages with respect to business taxes that ranges between -0.28 to -0.46, once we control for invariant unobserved regional and individual characteristics. Workers with low bargaining power, e.g., low-skilled, are affected most from business tax shifting, indicating that business-tax incidence involves distributional effects. Finally, we find evidence for an asymmetric tax incidence.
{"title":"Business Taxation and Wages: Evidence from Individual Panel Data","authors":"T. Bauer, Tanja Kasten, Lars H.R. Siemers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2122520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2122520","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical evidence on the degree of business-tax shifting to employees via the wage level is highly controversial and rare. It remains open to which extent the tax burden is shifted, whether there are differences for tax increases and decreases, or whether there exists some treatment heterogeneity, that drive the respective results. Using a large administrative panel data set, we exploit the regional variation of the German business income taxation to address these issues. Our results suggest an elasticity of wages with respect to business taxes that ranges between -0.28 to -0.46, once we control for invariant unobserved regional and individual characteristics. Workers with low bargaining power, e.g., low-skilled, are affected most from business tax shifting, indicating that business-tax incidence involves distributional effects. Finally, we find evidence for an asymmetric tax incidence.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130855827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I evaluate the effects of a regional experiment that reduced payroll taxes by 3–6 percentage points of the firms’ wage sum in northern and eastern Finland. I estimate the effect of the payroll tax reduction on firms’ employment levels, wage sum and profits, and on workers’ hourly pay and monthly hours worked, by comparing the changes in employment and wages before and after the start of the experiment to a control region. My results indicate that the reduction in payroll taxes did not lead to any unequivocal aggregate effects in the target region.
{"title":"The Finnish Payroll Tax Cut Experiment Revisited","authors":"Ossi Korkeamäki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1926644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1926644","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I evaluate the effects of a regional experiment that reduced payroll taxes by 3–6 percentage points of the firms’ wage sum in northern and eastern Finland. I estimate the effect of the payroll tax reduction on firms’ employment levels, wage sum and profits, and on workers’ hourly pay and monthly hours worked, by comparing the changes in employment and wages before and after the start of the experiment to a control region. My results indicate that the reduction in payroll taxes did not lead to any unequivocal aggregate effects in the target region.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"298 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121449322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-04-01DOI: 10.1628/001522112X631998
Doina Radulescu
This paper analyses the implications of a currently publicly debated issue, namely the introduction of a bonus tax. We shed light on the effects of the bonus tax on compensation components and study its incidence. We use the Principal Agent model within a two-country framework and consider two main scenarios. In the first scenario the firm cannot relocate managers between countries whereas in the second scenario relocation possibilities exist. Our findings show that the effort based compensation component always rises in the country introducing the tax such that the optimal contracts are tilted towards more effort based pay. Moreover, the bonus tax negatively affects profits and dividends and thus the incidence falls on the firm’s shareholders. With no relocation possibilities, the country that does not introduce such a tax will be worse off in terms of welfare, as the dividend income accruing to its residents declines. Accordingly, the bonus tax can be interpreted as a transfer from the worldwide shareholders to the government levying the tax. However, the welfare results may be reversed when manager relocation is an alternative. In this case, welfare in the country introducing the tax is lower than in the no relocation scenario, while the country that does not levy a bonus tax might even gain in welfare terms.
{"title":"The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare","authors":"Doina Radulescu","doi":"10.1628/001522112X631998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/001522112X631998","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the implications of a currently publicly debated issue, namely the introduction of a bonus tax. We shed light on the effects of the bonus tax on compensation components and study its incidence. We use the Principal Agent model within a two-country framework and consider two main scenarios. In the first scenario the firm cannot relocate managers between countries whereas in the second scenario relocation possibilities exist. Our findings show that the effort based compensation component always rises in the country introducing the tax such that the optimal contracts are tilted towards more effort based pay. Moreover, the bonus tax negatively affects profits and dividends and thus the incidence falls on the firm’s shareholders. With no relocation possibilities, the country that does not introduce such a tax will be worse off in terms of welfare, as the dividend income accruing to its residents declines. Accordingly, the bonus tax can be interpreted as a transfer from the worldwide shareholders to the government levying the tax. However, the welfare results may be reversed when manager relocation is an alternative. In this case, welfare in the country introducing the tax is lower than in the no relocation scenario, while the country that does not levy a bonus tax might even gain in welfare terms.","PeriodicalId":350541,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Incidence (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121553226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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