Pub Date : 2022-09-25DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2110473
John R. Deni
ABSTRACT The recent reconceptualization of national and/or defense strategies, hangovers from the sovereign debt crisis, and the impact of the pandemic-induced recession in four of the most powerful European countries – France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom – will have profound implications for the United States. Through Republican and Democratic administrations, most American political leaders, experts in academia and think tanks, and other opinion leaders in the media and elsewhere have consistently held that Europe is vital to American national security. This is particularly true during an era of great power competition, as the United States works to prevent China’s authoritarian governance system and its statist economic model from becoming dominant. Given recent changes in the grand strategies of America’s most important European allies and their shifting abilities to fulfill those strategies, Washington will have an increasingly difficult time fulfilling its own goals and objectives. American strategy relies on European allies for competition with near-peers as well as defense of the global commons and projection of hard and soft power overseas to favorably influence events. Shifting capabilities, capacity, and will within Europe – all framed within evolving European strategies – will make it difficult for Washington to rely on its allies.
{"title":"European strategies in post-pandemic peer competition: implications for America","authors":"John R. Deni","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2110473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110473","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The recent reconceptualization of national and/or defense strategies, hangovers from the sovereign debt crisis, and the impact of the pandemic-induced recession in four of the most powerful European countries – France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom – will have profound implications for the United States. Through Republican and Democratic administrations, most American political leaders, experts in academia and think tanks, and other opinion leaders in the media and elsewhere have consistently held that Europe is vital to American national security. This is particularly true during an era of great power competition, as the United States works to prevent China’s authoritarian governance system and its statist economic model from becoming dominant. Given recent changes in the grand strategies of America’s most important European allies and their shifting abilities to fulfill those strategies, Washington will have an increasingly difficult time fulfilling its own goals and objectives. American strategy relies on European allies for competition with near-peers as well as defense of the global commons and projection of hard and soft power overseas to favorably influence events. Shifting capabilities, capacity, and will within Europe – all framed within evolving European strategies – will make it difficult for Washington to rely on its allies.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"644 - 665"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45192038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-25DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2110485
Xinchuchu Gao, Xuechen Chen
ABSTRACT This research seeks to unpack the development of the EU as a security actor in cyberspace. Drawing on the theoretical approach of role theory, this article shows that the EU’s role in cyberspace should be understood in relationality to the other poles. On the one hand, the declining hegemonic role of the US in cyberspace as well as the divergence between the US and the EU with regard to cybersecurity governance has made the EU more aware of the need for cyber sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Therefore, the EU seeks to pursue a role of an autonomous cybersecurity player through the enactment of cybersecurity at institutional and operational level. On the other hand, under conditions of increasing interdependence, the EU has considered international cooperation to address challenges in cyberspace as a strategic priority, therefore seeking to act as a promoter of a multi-stakeholder model. Moreover, interpolariy in cyberspace determines the contestation of EU role by other poles. While the EU has recorded some small successes as a regulation-setter, emerging poles of power in the cybersecurity domain contest the EU’s desired role, promoting more state-centric approaches and seeking to transfer regulatory authority in the cybersecurity domain to the UN.
{"title":"Role enactment and the contestation of global cybersecurity governance","authors":"Xinchuchu Gao, Xuechen Chen","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2110485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110485","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This research seeks to unpack the development of the EU as a security actor in cyberspace. Drawing on the theoretical approach of role theory, this article shows that the EU’s role in cyberspace should be understood in relationality to the other poles. On the one hand, the declining hegemonic role of the US in cyberspace as well as the divergence between the US and the EU with regard to cybersecurity governance has made the EU more aware of the need for cyber sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Therefore, the EU seeks to pursue a role of an autonomous cybersecurity player through the enactment of cybersecurity at institutional and operational level. On the other hand, under conditions of increasing interdependence, the EU has considered international cooperation to address challenges in cyberspace as a strategic priority, therefore seeking to act as a promoter of a multi-stakeholder model. Moreover, interpolariy in cyberspace determines the contestation of EU role by other poles. While the EU has recorded some small successes as a regulation-setter, emerging poles of power in the cybersecurity domain contest the EU’s desired role, promoting more state-centric approaches and seeking to transfer regulatory authority in the cybersecurity domain to the UN.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"689 - 708"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48728111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-25DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2110476
Lorenzo Cladi
ABSTRACT Over the past few years, European security cooperation has been revived. The EU has launched several defence initiatives and some member states, such as France have launched their own collaborative initiatives. The renewed activism in European security cooperation followed several years of inactivity and warrants theoretical investigation. Hedging is a concept that has been employed to make sense of renewed activism in European security cooperation. By pursuing hedging, Europeans are preparing for a future in which the US might be unwilling or unable to get involved, and to assist with, European security affairs. Advancing a neorealist analysis, this article argues that European states’ efforts to increase cooperation remain consistent with the broader trajectory of European security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. European states remain dependent on the US for their security and are still far from autonomously projecting their influence internationally. This article illustrates the argument with reference to the recent withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and the French promise to wind down its commitment in the Sahel. The implications of this argument are discussed in detail.
{"title":"Persevering with bandwagoning, not hedging: why European security cooperation still conforms to realism","authors":"Lorenzo Cladi","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2110476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110476","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Over the past few years, European security cooperation has been revived. The EU has launched several defence initiatives and some member states, such as France have launched their own collaborative initiatives. The renewed activism in European security cooperation followed several years of inactivity and warrants theoretical investigation. Hedging is a concept that has been employed to make sense of renewed activism in European security cooperation. By pursuing hedging, Europeans are preparing for a future in which the US might be unwilling or unable to get involved, and to assist with, European security affairs. Advancing a neorealist analysis, this article argues that European states’ efforts to increase cooperation remain consistent with the broader trajectory of European security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. European states remain dependent on the US for their security and are still far from autonomously projecting their influence internationally. This article illustrates the argument with reference to the recent withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and the French promise to wind down its commitment in the Sahel. The implications of this argument are discussed in detail.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"624 - 643"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49564081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-25DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2110486
Ö. Terzi
ABSTRACT This concluding piece to the Special Issue on Interpolarity: Revisiting Security and the Global Order focuses on the concept of interpolarity as both a conceptual tool to understanding multipolar interdependencies and as an approach aiming to change the nature of multipolarity from one of rivalry and contestation toward one of cooperation in the face of global challenges. It engages with the question: To what extent is overcoming the tension between these poles a dilemma between interpolarity being a desirable goal and being a normative compromise on the values these poles want to uphold in the international arena? After presenting both sides of the dilemma, this piece concludes that an “interpolar” approach to conceptualizing International Relations (IR) can facilitate a more inclusive and comprehensive approach toward a truly global study of IR.
{"title":"Conclusion: interpolarity - bridging international relations with a dilemma","authors":"Ö. Terzi","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2110486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110486","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This concluding piece to the Special Issue on Interpolarity: Revisiting Security and the Global Order focuses on the concept of interpolarity as both a conceptual tool to understanding multipolar interdependencies and as an approach aiming to change the nature of multipolarity from one of rivalry and contestation toward one of cooperation in the face of global challenges. It engages with the question: To what extent is overcoming the tension between these poles a dilemma between interpolarity being a desirable goal and being a normative compromise on the values these poles want to uphold in the international arena? After presenting both sides of the dilemma, this piece concludes that an “interpolar” approach to conceptualizing International Relations (IR) can facilitate a more inclusive and comprehensive approach toward a truly global study of IR.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"736 - 742"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48228703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT An extensive size of literature has investigated the multifaceted dimensions of differentiated integration in Europe. Notwithstanding, we know little about the drivers and strategic underpinnings of differentiated integration in the high politics areas concerning national and international security, such as foreign policy, security and defence. What explains the variation in states’ foreign policy preferences of integration in multilateral security orders? In this article, we seek to explain this variation by putting forward a two-level argument. First, we claim that states adopt a genuine role player conception underpinned by a mixture of relative gains, absolute gains, and normative factors. Second, we propose a novel operational model to examine member states’ efforts for cooperation and integration in the security and defence domain based on their threat perceptions, level of ambitions, strategic partnerships, military spending, and troop deployments. To illustrate our argument, we employ a comparative case study design, examining four countries: Germany, France, Ireland and Romania. The article finds that the analysed countries play conspicuous roles in the Euro-Atlantic security order. France takes the role of an agile power-projector, Germany embraces the role of a global responsibility taker, Ireland plays the role of a peacekeeping neutral, and Romania of a small regional power.
{"title":"Differentiated integration and role conceptions in multilateral security orders. A comparative study of France, Germany, Ireland and Romania","authors":"Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, Cornelia-Adriana Baciu","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2110475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110475","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT An extensive size of literature has investigated the multifaceted dimensions of differentiated integration in Europe. Notwithstanding, we know little about the drivers and strategic underpinnings of differentiated integration in the high politics areas concerning national and international security, such as foreign policy, security and defence. What explains the variation in states’ foreign policy preferences of integration in multilateral security orders? In this article, we seek to explain this variation by putting forward a two-level argument. First, we claim that states adopt a genuine role player conception underpinned by a mixture of relative gains, absolute gains, and normative factors. Second, we propose a novel operational model to examine member states’ efforts for cooperation and integration in the security and defence domain based on their threat perceptions, level of ambitions, strategic partnerships, military spending, and troop deployments. To illustrate our argument, we employ a comparative case study design, examining four countries: Germany, France, Ireland and Romania. The article finds that the analysed countries play conspicuous roles in the Euro-Atlantic security order. France takes the role of an agile power-projector, Germany embraces the role of a global responsibility taker, Ireland plays the role of a peacekeeping neutral, and Romania of a small regional power.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"666 - 688"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45888597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-25DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2110477
G. R. Olsen
ABSTRACT The existing, liberal world order is under pressure and transatlantic cooperation on security is challenged. The paper raises the question, why have the European steps and policy initiatives towards addressing the new international threats and challenges to Europe been so limited and cautious. The first argument states it is because the European decision-makers were unable to agree when it came to implementing salient and concrete policies addressing new security threats and building strategic autonomy. The second argument states that the European decision-makers were only able to reach agreement on diffuse and symbolic policy ideas like building “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. The third argument states that the Europeans were able to address some of the new security challenges if it took place within NATO. The analysis shows that the European responses and reactions to the increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific were subdued. The Europeans were unable to launch any concrete reactions to the American unilateral abrogation of the Iranian nuclear deal, to the unilateral American policy initiatives in the Israel-Palestine conflict or to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, the Europeans increased the level of their defense spending and they also cooperated closely with their transatlantic partner to counter the assertive Russian foreign policy behavior.
{"title":"Transatlantic cooperation in flux: Europe’s small and cautious steps towards “strategic autonomy”","authors":"G. R. Olsen","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2110477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110477","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The existing, liberal world order is under pressure and transatlantic cooperation on security is challenged. The paper raises the question, why have the European steps and policy initiatives towards addressing the new international threats and challenges to Europe been so limited and cautious. The first argument states it is because the European decision-makers were unable to agree when it came to implementing salient and concrete policies addressing new security threats and building strategic autonomy. The second argument states that the European decision-makers were only able to reach agreement on diffuse and symbolic policy ideas like building “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. The third argument states that the Europeans were able to address some of the new security challenges if it took place within NATO. The analysis shows that the European responses and reactions to the increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific were subdued. The Europeans were unable to launch any concrete reactions to the American unilateral abrogation of the Iranian nuclear deal, to the unilateral American policy initiatives in the Israel-Palestine conflict or to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, the Europeans increased the level of their defense spending and they also cooperated closely with their transatlantic partner to counter the assertive Russian foreign policy behavior.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"609 - 623"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45897627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-24DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2113516
Gintautas Razma
ABSTRACT This article explores the new research area of so-called strategic facts by examining the theoretical interaction between political and military elements in the context of defence. The research methodology uses a systems-thinking approach to conceptual interpretation. Specifically, the article references the work of French philosopher Émile Durkheim and his notion of social facts. The study concludes by suggesting that it is possible to compile an explanatory framework of the political-military nexus at the strategic level of defence by applying strategic facts as a model for defence analysis. It is also possible to identify strategic facts in the area of “defence as politics.” Further research into this topic would be useful.
{"title":"Strategic Facts as a Comprehensive Model for Defence Analysis","authors":"Gintautas Razma","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2113516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2113516","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores the new research area of so-called strategic facts by examining the theoretical interaction between political and military elements in the context of defence. The research methodology uses a systems-thinking approach to conceptual interpretation. Specifically, the article references the work of French philosopher Émile Durkheim and his notion of social facts. The study concludes by suggesting that it is possible to compile an explanatory framework of the political-military nexus at the strategic level of defence by applying strategic facts as a model for defence analysis. It is also possible to identify strategic facts in the area of “defence as politics.” Further research into this topic would be useful.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"254 - 273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45799168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-18DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2110481
Thornton Rod, Marina Miron
ABSTRACT The United Kingdom’s homeland resilience capacity is poor. The COVID-19 pandemic proved this. Back in 2019, the UK had been labeled as the best prepared country in the world for a pandemic. And yet, by 2020, and once COVID-19 had struck, the UK became “unequivocally” the hardest hit country in Europe – particularly in terms of excess mortality. In this article it is argued that the UK’s continental neighbors coped better than the UK because they had better homeland resilience capacity. This was provided by their having civil defense organizations, paramilitary forces and militaries which are specifically designed to contribute to homeland emergencies. The UK, in contrast and almost uniquely in the world, lacks both civil defense and paramilitary bodies and, moreover, it has armed forces that are not actually structured to provide help in domestic emergencies. Given the problems highlighted during COVID-19, is it now time for the UK to set up its own bodies specifically tasked with alleviating domestic emergencies? This article explores this question by comparing the UK’s pandemic response with that of Spain – a country which, according to all available data, should have performed worse than the UK. But it did not. Why?
{"title":"Learning the lessons of COVID-19: homeland resilience in the United Kingdom - is it now time for both a dedicated civil defense organization and a paramilitary force?","authors":"Thornton Rod, Marina Miron","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2110481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110481","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The United Kingdom’s homeland resilience capacity is poor. The COVID-19 pandemic proved this. Back in 2019, the UK had been labeled as the best prepared country in the world for a pandemic. And yet, by 2020, and once COVID-19 had struck, the UK became “unequivocally” the hardest hit country in Europe – particularly in terms of excess mortality. In this article it is argued that the UK’s continental neighbors coped better than the UK because they had better homeland resilience capacity. This was provided by their having civil defense organizations, paramilitary forces and militaries which are specifically designed to contribute to homeland emergencies. The UK, in contrast and almost uniquely in the world, lacks both civil defense and paramilitary bodies and, moreover, it has armed forces that are not actually structured to provide help in domestic emergencies. Given the problems highlighted during COVID-19, is it now time for the UK to set up its own bodies specifically tasked with alleviating domestic emergencies? This article explores this question by comparing the UK’s pandemic response with that of Spain – a country which, according to all available data, should have performed worse than the UK. But it did not. Why?","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"105 - 125"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42594479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-22DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2102486
James Johnson
ABSTRACT This article argues that artificial intelligence (AI) enabled capabilities cannot effectively or reliably compliment (let alone replace) the role of humans in understanding and apprehending the strategic environment to make predictions and judgments that inform strategic decisions. Furthermore, the rapid diffusion of and growing dependency on AI technology at all levels of warfare will have strategic consequences that counterintuitively increase the importance of human involvement in these tasks. Therefore, restricting the use of AI technology to automate decision-making tasks at a tactical level will do little to contain or control the effects of this synthesis at a strategic level of warfare. The article re-visits John Boyd’s observation-orientation-decision-action metaphorical decision-making cycle (or “OODA loop”) to advance an epistemological critique of AI-enabled capabilities (especially machine learning approaches) to augment command-and-control decision-making processes. In particular, the article draws insights from Boyd’s emphasis on “orientation” as a schema to elucidate the role of human cognition (perception, emotion, and heuristics) in defense planning in a non-linear world characterized by complexity, novelty, and uncertainty. It also engages with the Clausewitzian notion of “military genius” – and its role in “mission command” – human cognition, systems, and evolution theory to consider the strategic implications of automating the OODA loop.
{"title":"Automating the OODA loop in the age of intelligent machines: reaffirming the role of humans in command-and-control decision-making in the digital age","authors":"James Johnson","doi":"10.1080/14702436.2022.2102486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2102486","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that artificial intelligence (AI) enabled capabilities cannot effectively or reliably compliment (let alone replace) the role of humans in understanding and apprehending the strategic environment to make predictions and judgments that inform strategic decisions. Furthermore, the rapid diffusion of and growing dependency on AI technology at all levels of warfare will have strategic consequences that counterintuitively increase the importance of human involvement in these tasks. Therefore, restricting the use of AI technology to automate decision-making tasks at a tactical level will do little to contain or control the effects of this synthesis at a strategic level of warfare. The article re-visits John Boyd’s observation-orientation-decision-action metaphorical decision-making cycle (or “OODA loop”) to advance an epistemological critique of AI-enabled capabilities (especially machine learning approaches) to augment command-and-control decision-making processes. In particular, the article draws insights from Boyd’s emphasis on “orientation” as a schema to elucidate the role of human cognition (perception, emotion, and heuristics) in defense planning in a non-linear world characterized by complexity, novelty, and uncertainty. It also engages with the Clausewitzian notion of “military genius” – and its role in “mission command” – human cognition, systems, and evolution theory to consider the strategic implications of automating the OODA loop.","PeriodicalId":35155,"journal":{"name":"Defence Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"43 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43672783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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