Pub Date : 2019-01-14DOI: 10.1108/SAMPJ-03-2018-0093
Mahalaximi Adhikariparajul, A. Hassan, Mary Fletcher, Ahmed A. Elamer
Purpose This paper aims to examine trends in the content of reporting within 135 UK higher education institutions (HEIs). It explores the extent to which integrated reporting (IR) content elements, reflecting integrated thinking, are disclosed voluntarily and whether HEI-specific features influence the resulting disclosures. Design/methodology/approach Existing IR guidelines given by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) and the adoption of content analysis have provided the opportunity to examine the trend and extent of IR content elements associated in HEI corporate reports. The evidence was obtained from 405 UK HEI annual reports covering the period 2014-2016. Findings The results indicate a significant increase in the number of IR content elements embedded in HEI annual reports. The HEI-specific characteristics examined, such as the establishment of HEI (before or after 1992), adoption of IR framework and size of HEI, are all significantly and positively associated with IR content elements disclosure. This paper argues that institutional theory, isomorphism and isopraxism are relevant for explaining the changes in the contents of HEI annual reports. The findings also suggest that universities are beginning to adopt an integrated thinking approach to the reporting of their activities. Research limitations/implications The study is based on IR content elements only and could be extended to include the fundamental concepts and basic principles of the IR framework. There are other factors that have a potentially crucial influence on HEI core activities (such as teaching and learning research and internationalisation) which have been omitted from this study. Practical implications The findings will allow policymakers to evaluate the extent to which integrated thinking is taking place and influencing the UK HEI sector in the selection and presentation of information. A further implication of the findings is that an appropriate a sector-wide enforcement and compliance body, for instance, the British Universities Finance Directors Group (BUFDG), may consider developing voluntary IR guidance in a clear, consistent, concise and comparable format. Also, it may pursue regulatory support for this guidance. In doing so, it may monitor the compliance and disclosure levels of appropriate IR requirements. Within such a framework, IR could be used to assist HEIs to make more sustainable choices and allow stakeholders to better understand aspects of HEI performance. Social implications The research has implications for society within and beyond the unique UK HEI sector. Universities are places of advanced thinking and can lead the way for other sectors by demonstrating the potential of integrated thinking to create a cohesive wide-ranging discourse and create engagement among stakeholder groups. Specifically, IR builds on the strong points of accounting, for instance, robust quantitative evidence collecting, relevance, reliability, ma
{"title":"Integrated Reporting in UK Higher Education Institutions","authors":"Mahalaximi Adhikariparajul, A. Hassan, Mary Fletcher, Ahmed A. Elamer","doi":"10.1108/SAMPJ-03-2018-0093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/SAMPJ-03-2018-0093","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Purpose\u0000This paper aims to examine trends in the content of reporting within 135 UK higher education institutions (HEIs). It explores the extent to which integrated reporting (IR) content elements, reflecting integrated thinking, are disclosed voluntarily and whether HEI-specific features influence the resulting disclosures.\u0000\u0000\u0000Design/methodology/approach\u0000Existing IR guidelines given by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) and the adoption of content analysis have provided the opportunity to examine the trend and extent of IR content elements associated in HEI corporate reports. The evidence was obtained from 405 UK HEI annual reports covering the period 2014-2016.\u0000\u0000\u0000Findings\u0000The results indicate a significant increase in the number of IR content elements embedded in HEI annual reports. The HEI-specific characteristics examined, such as the establishment of HEI (before or after 1992), adoption of IR framework and size of HEI, are all significantly and positively associated with IR content elements disclosure. This paper argues that institutional theory, isomorphism and isopraxism are relevant for explaining the changes in the contents of HEI annual reports. The findings also suggest that universities are beginning to adopt an integrated thinking approach to the reporting of their activities.\u0000\u0000\u0000Research limitations/implications\u0000The study is based on IR content elements only and could be extended to include the fundamental concepts and basic principles of the IR framework. There are other factors that have a potentially crucial influence on HEI core activities (such as teaching and learning research and internationalisation) which have been omitted from this study.\u0000\u0000\u0000Practical implications\u0000The findings will allow policymakers to evaluate the extent to which integrated thinking is taking place and influencing the UK HEI sector in the selection and presentation of information. A further implication of the findings is that an appropriate a sector-wide enforcement and compliance body, for instance, the British Universities Finance Directors Group (BUFDG), may consider developing voluntary IR guidance in a clear, consistent, concise and comparable format. Also, it may pursue regulatory support for this guidance. In doing so, it may monitor the compliance and disclosure levels of appropriate IR requirements. Within such a framework, IR could be used to assist HEIs to make more sustainable choices and allow stakeholders to better understand aspects of HEI performance.\u0000\u0000\u0000Social implications\u0000The research has implications for society within and beyond the unique UK HEI sector. Universities are places of advanced thinking and can lead the way for other sectors by demonstrating the potential of integrated thinking to create a cohesive wide-ranging discourse and create engagement among stakeholder groups. Specifically, IR builds on the strong points of accounting, for instance, robust quantitative evidence collecting, relevance, reliability, ma","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121901390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accounting journals regularly include articles where regression coefficients are estimated and reported. However, the level of accuracy with which the estimated coefficients are reported is often not consistent within a single paper. Furthermore, in almost all cases, the level of accuracy claimed for the estimated coefficients, by re porting to so many significant figures, is far in excess of the level of accuracy that is plausible given the reported t-statistics and hence the implied standard errors of the estimated coefficients.
{"title":"On the Misleading Reporting of Regression Coefficients","authors":"Stephen J. Brown","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3311730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3311730","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting journals regularly include articles where regression coefficients are estimated and reported. However, the level of accuracy with which the estimated coefficients are reported is often not consistent within a single paper. Furthermore, in almost all cases, the level of accuracy claimed for the estimated coefficients, by re porting to so many significant figures, is far in excess of the level of accuracy that is plausible given the reported t-statistics and hence the implied standard errors of the estimated coefficients.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124857590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.24191/APMAJ.V14I2.922
Grégory Wegmann
This article examines cost accounting methods containing one or more activity-based costing (ABC) like dimensions. The objective is to analyze cost accounting proposals with, in part, a philosophy reminiscent ABC. The research purposes are to analyze the strategic dimension of the methods described and to build a typology useful for managers. The discussion leads to a four-dimensional typology based on three strategic objectives assigned to the cost accounting systems. The foundation of the research is the Strategic Cost Management Theory from which emerges the ABC philosophy. The methodology applied is an academic and professional literature review. The typology designed shows common points and similarities of the methods observed and their strategic dimensions. Some of the methods studied are more or less useful for practitioners, according to the situation of their companies.
{"title":"A Typology of Cost Accounting Practices Based on Activity-Based Costing - a Strategic Cost Management Approach","authors":"Grégory Wegmann","doi":"10.24191/APMAJ.V14I2.922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24191/APMAJ.V14I2.922","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines cost accounting methods containing one or more activity-based costing (ABC) like dimensions. The objective is to analyze cost accounting proposals with, in part, a philosophy reminiscent ABC. The research purposes are to analyze the strategic dimension of the methods described and to build a typology useful for managers. The discussion leads to a four-dimensional typology based on three strategic objectives assigned to the cost accounting systems. The foundation of the research is the Strategic Cost Management Theory from which emerges the ABC philosophy. The methodology applied is an academic and professional literature review. The typology designed shows common points and similarities of the methods observed and their strategic dimensions. Some of the methods studied are more or less useful for practitioners, according to the situation of their companies.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132237911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine whether proxy advisory firms (PAs) serve primarily an information intermediary role by providing research and voting recommendations to shareholders, or directly influence executive compensation by exerting pressure on firms to adopt preferred pay practices. Through a field study, we find that PAs are perceived as both information intermediaries and agenda setters and that these roles provide leverage to enable PAs to exercise significant influence over executive pay practices. Boards feel, and sometimes yield to, pressure to conform to PA “best” practices despite their own preferred compensation philosophies, even in the absence of overt PA scrutiny or negative shareholder votes. We also find that PAs are susceptible to conflicts of interest and generally use a “one-size-fits-all” approach to voting recommendations. Overall, however, PAs are viewed as improving compensation practices by increasing transparency and accountability and fostering dialogue between firms and their shareholders.
{"title":"Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter?: Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors","authors":"Christie Hayne, Marshall D. Vance","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3325622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3325622","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether proxy advisory firms (PAs) serve primarily an information intermediary role by providing research and voting recommendations to shareholders, or directly influence executive compensation by exerting pressure on firms to adopt preferred pay practices. Through a field study, we find that PAs are perceived as both information intermediaries and agenda setters and that these roles provide leverage to enable PAs to exercise significant influence over executive pay practices. Boards feel, and sometimes yield to, pressure to conform to PA “best” practices despite their own preferred compensation philosophies, even in the absence of overt PA scrutiny or negative shareholder votes. We also find that PAs are susceptible to conflicts of interest and generally use a “one-size-fits-all” approach to voting recommendations. Overall, however, PAs are viewed as improving compensation practices by increasing transparency and accountability and fostering dialogue between firms and their shareholders.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128694191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The centrality of private information in the design of accounting institutions has been explored via agency models that address control concerns as well as disclosure models that amplify valuation issues. Somewhat surprisingly, the joint analysis of control and valuation considerations, and their implication for firms’ voluntary disclosure practices have not received much attention. Our paper addresses this shortcoming. With embedded control and valuation concerns, the nature of the firm’s disclosure in the stock market is altered profoundly – disclosure is two-tailed or intermediate, but not single-tailed as is the norm in the disclosure literature bereft of control problems. The severity of the control problem is also altered in that disclosure changes managerial incentives to acquire and exploit private information.
{"title":"Voluntary Disclosure in Light of Control Concerns","authors":"Anil Arya, Ramachandran Ramanan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3314678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3314678","url":null,"abstract":"The centrality of private information in the design of accounting institutions has been explored via agency models that address control concerns as well as disclosure models that amplify valuation issues. Somewhat surprisingly, the joint analysis of control and valuation considerations, and their implication for firms’ voluntary disclosure practices have not received much attention. Our paper addresses this shortcoming. With embedded control and valuation concerns, the nature of the firm’s disclosure in the stock market is altered profoundly – disclosure is two-tailed or intermediate, but not single-tailed as is the norm in the disclosure literature bereft of control problems. The severity of the control problem is also altered in that disclosure changes managerial incentives to acquire and exploit private information.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114739836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the role of a firm's debt maturity structure when refinancing its debt after a liquidity shock that reduces the firm's cash flow. Staggered debt diminishes the share of outstanding debt that a firm has to refinance at any given time, which should be most beneficial for highly levered firms. However, we show that for highly levered firms, a firm's ability to roll over its maturing debt hinges on its ability to prefinance its outstanding debt expiring in future periods. Prefinancing involves holding sufficient cash to repay the outstanding debt when it expires and eliminates the potential benefits of staggered debt. If agency problems prevent a firm from holding sufficient cash to implement this strategy, then staggered debt can reduce a firm's ability to withstand a negative cash flow shock.
{"title":"Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Shocks","authors":"Julian Kolm, C. Laux, G. Loranth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3307398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3307398","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the role of a firm's debt maturity structure when refinancing its debt after a liquidity shock that reduces the firm's cash flow. Staggered debt diminishes the share of outstanding debt that a firm has to refinance at any given time, which should be most beneficial for highly levered firms. However, we show that for highly levered firms, a firm's ability to roll over its maturing debt hinges on its ability to prefinance its outstanding debt expiring in future periods. Prefinancing involves holding sufficient cash to repay the outstanding debt when it expires and eliminates the potential benefits of staggered debt. If agency problems prevent a firm from holding sufficient cash to implement this strategy, then staggered debt can reduce a firm's ability to withstand a negative cash flow shock.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133899102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jeremy Douthit, Jing L. Davis, Steven T. Schwartz, Richard A. Young
This study investigates the effect of a principal’s choice on the availability of discretionary controls, where discretionary controls are defined as those not supported by enforceable explicit contracts. In contrast to prior findings on explicit controls, we find that agent reciprocity is not significantly less when principals choose a discretionary control than when they are exogenously available. That is, we find no hidden costs of discretionary control. We tentatively attribute this finding to agents viewing discretionary controls as less intrusive than explicit controls. Interestingly, we find that agent reciprocity is less when principals choose to forgo discretionary controls than when the discretionary controls are not available. One explanation for this result is that agents perceive that principals who turn down the option to have discretionary controls available place less value on agents’ norm-adhering behavior than other principals. These findings support the often-used managerial practice of using discretionary controls.
{"title":"The Hidden Costs of Not Using Discretionary Controls","authors":"Jeremy Douthit, Jing L. Davis, Steven T. Schwartz, Richard A. Young","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3308632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308632","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the effect of a principal’s choice on the availability of discretionary controls, where discretionary controls are defined as those not supported by enforceable explicit contracts. In contrast to prior findings on explicit controls, we find that agent reciprocity is not significantly less when principals choose a discretionary control than when they are exogenously available. That is, we find no hidden costs of discretionary control. We tentatively attribute this finding to agents viewing discretionary controls as less intrusive than explicit controls. Interestingly, we find that agent reciprocity is less when principals choose to forgo discretionary controls than when the discretionary controls are not available. One explanation for this result is that agents perceive that principals who turn down the option to have discretionary controls available place less value on agents’ norm-adhering behavior than other principals. These findings support the often-used managerial practice of using discretionary controls.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134032954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study whether executives receive pay premiums for the uncertainty of their match with a new firm. Using changes in executive-firm matches from Execucomp, we document that executives receive significant attraction premiums when they move to new firms. These premiums vary with proxies that capture potential sources of uncertainty about the quality of the match, and are incremental to pay for managerial talent, generalist ability, industry turnover risk, and potential additional costs incurred by the new employer to attract the executive to the firm, such as payments for forfeited equity and relocation costs. Consistent with compensation for uncertainty of fit, we find that the premiums decrease with the executive's tenure at the new firm, as the uncertainty about the executive-firm match is resolved over time. Our findings raise the possibility that attraction premiums are an additional cost of executive turnover and may contribute to the overall rise in executive pay. JEL Classifications: J24; J33; M12; M52. Data Availability: Data are available from sources cited in the text.
{"title":"Matching Premiums in the Executive Labor Market","authors":"Mary Ellen Carter, F. Franco, İrem Tuna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3304705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3304705","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study whether executives receive pay premiums for the uncertainty of their match with a new firm. Using changes in executive-firm matches from Execucomp, we document that executives receive significant attraction premiums when they move to new firms. These premiums vary with proxies that capture potential sources of uncertainty about the quality of the match, and are incremental to pay for managerial talent, generalist ability, industry turnover risk, and potential additional costs incurred by the new employer to attract the executive to the firm, such as payments for forfeited equity and relocation costs. Consistent with compensation for uncertainty of fit, we find that the premiums decrease with the executive's tenure at the new firm, as the uncertainty about the executive-firm match is resolved over time. Our findings raise the possibility that attraction premiums are an additional cost of executive turnover and may contribute to the overall rise in executive pay.\u0000 JEL Classifications: J24; J33; M12; M52.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from sources cited in the text.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123251605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The study aims to investigate the effect of internal control by using COSO Framework on Employee Performance in public hospital in South of Tangerang, Indonesia. The study use public hospital which owned by Indonesian local government as sample of the study In addition, twenty respondents are participated of the study which consists of accounting & finance staff, cashier, internal audit/control unit and head of finance department. There are five elements of COSO framework that implement in the business activities and the study finds only two element of COSO framework i.e., control activities and risk assessment have significant effect to employee performance in a public hospital in Indonesia while the others element such as, control environment, information and communication and monitoring have not significant effect to employee performance. It indicates that implementation of policies and rules regulations play significant role to enhance employee performance. in addition, it also indicates rewards and punishment as a tool to control the employee and lead to employee performance.
{"title":"The Effect of Internal Control by using COSO Framework on Revenue Toward Employee Performance: A Case Study in Public Hospital of South of Tangerang, Indonesia","authors":"S. Dhillon, Alfi Andri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3299235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3299235","url":null,"abstract":"The study aims to investigate the effect of internal control by using COSO Framework on Employee Performance in public hospital in South of Tangerang, Indonesia. The study use public hospital which owned by Indonesian local government as sample of the study In addition, twenty respondents are participated of the study which consists of accounting & finance staff, cashier, internal audit/control unit and head of finance department. There are five elements of COSO framework that implement in the business activities and the study finds only two element of COSO framework i.e., control activities and risk assessment have significant effect to employee performance in a public hospital in Indonesia while the others element such as, control environment, information and communication and monitoring have not significant effect to employee performance. It indicates that implementation of policies and rules regulations play significant role to enhance employee performance. in addition, it also indicates rewards and punishment as a tool to control the employee and lead to employee performance. <br>","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115131578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study provides further evidence on the cross‐listing valuation premium using a sample of Asian firms from 2000 to 2010. First, following Doidge et al. (2004), we document a premium, but it disappears when we incorporate firm fixed effects. Second, consistent with Gozzi et al. (2008), we find that the premium arises immediately preceding the cross‐listing year and disappears shortly thereafter. Of central interest, consistent with our proposition that the listing is strategically timed like an SEO, we document a similar pattern in operating performance, and increased financing activity in the listing year and the following 2 years.
本研究以2000年至2010年的亚洲公司为样本，为交叉上市估值溢价提供了进一步的证据。首先，根据Doidge et al.(2004)，我们记录了溢价，但当我们纳入公司固定效应时，溢价就消失了。其次，与Gozzi等人(2008)的研究结果一致，我们发现溢价在交叉上市年份之前立即出现，之后不久就消失了。最重要的是，与我们的观点一致，即上市的战略时机就像SEO一样，我们记录了类似的经营业绩模式，以及上市年度和随后两年的融资活动增加。
{"title":"Market Timing as an Explanation for the Short‐Lived Premium on Cross‐Listing","authors":"Peter M. Clarkson, Stephen Gray, V. Ragunathan","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12310","url":null,"abstract":"This study provides further evidence on the cross‐listing valuation premium using a sample of Asian firms from 2000 to 2010. First, following Doidge et al. (2004), we document a premium, but it disappears when we incorporate firm fixed effects. Second, consistent with Gozzi et al. (2008), we find that the premium arises immediately preceding the cross‐listing year and disappears shortly thereafter. Of central interest, consistent with our proposition that the listing is strategically timed like an SEO, we document a similar pattern in operating performance, and increased financing activity in the listing year and the following 2 years.","PeriodicalId":357263,"journal":{"name":"Managerial Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120986015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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