Pub Date : 2015-01-30DOI: 10.5555/RELI.22.2.E750427P0723G178
W. Wong, J. Lee, Nasir Daud, Pooi Leng Ng, W. S. Chan
Despite its existence in the property market scene for over a century, little is known about the property auction market in Malaysia. We analyze the types, size, occurrence, and performance of property auctions in Malaysia. In comparison to mature markets such as Australia and New Zealand, the auction market in Malaysia is relatively small (0.03% of total property sales) and dominated by distress or foreclosure sales. Outdated laws coupled with an unregulated auction environment have generated myriad challenges among which are the presence of syndicates (dummy bidders) and negative stigma associated with auctions. We highlight initiatives that could be taken by policymakers to revitalize the property auction market in Malaysia.
{"title":"Strategic Development of Property Auctions Market in Malaysia","authors":"W. Wong, J. Lee, Nasir Daud, Pooi Leng Ng, W. S. Chan","doi":"10.5555/RELI.22.2.E750427P0723G178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5555/RELI.22.2.E750427P0723G178","url":null,"abstract":"Despite its existence in the property market scene for over a century, little is known about the property auction market in Malaysia. We analyze the types, size, occurrence, and performance of property auctions in Malaysia. In comparison to mature markets such as Australia and New Zealand, the auction market in Malaysia is relatively small (0.03% of total property sales) and dominated by distress or foreclosure sales. Outdated laws coupled with an unregulated auction environment have generated myriad challenges among which are the presence of syndicates (dummy bidders) and negative stigma associated with auctions. We highlight initiatives that could be taken by policymakers to revitalize the property auction market in Malaysia.","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"3 1","pages":"261-278"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78906522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2015.12090407
O. Akinsomi, Radiyya Pahad, Lebogang Nape, J. Margolis
The purpose of this paper is to establish the barriers to entry in African real estate markets from a South African investor's perspective. Questionnaires were administered to 36 listed property companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and data on diversification strategies was gathered from annual reports. We find that property rights are the most substantial market selection criteria that South African listed real estate companies consider and the main barrier to entry into the African markets is legal and title risk. We also find that geographic diversification within South Africa is a strategy mostly adopted by listed South African real estate companies. Central Africa is ranked as the region with the highest criteria for barriers to entry while Nigeria ranked highest in terms of country. Ghana is an investment destination for South African real estate investors. For African countries to attract real estate investment from South Africa, they need to improve their legal and property rights regulations.
{"title":"Geographic Diversification Issues in Real Estate Markets in Africa","authors":"O. Akinsomi, Radiyya Pahad, Lebogang Nape, J. Margolis","doi":"10.1080/10835547.2015.12090407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2015.12090407","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to establish the barriers to entry in African real estate markets from a South African investor's perspective. Questionnaires were administered to 36 listed property companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and data on diversification strategies was gathered from annual reports. We find that property rights are the most substantial market selection criteria that South African listed real estate companies consider and the main barrier to entry into the African markets is legal and title risk. We also find that geographic diversification within South Africa is a strategy mostly adopted by listed South African real estate companies. Central Africa is ranked as the region with the highest criteria for barriers to entry while Nigeria ranked highest in terms of country. Ghana is an investment destination for South African real estate investors. For African countries to attract real estate investment from South Africa, they need to improve their legal and property rights regulations.","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"23 1","pages":"259-295"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86941232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2013.12090347
K. Winson-Geideman, Nicholas E. Evangelopoulos
With the development and evolution of real estate literature a number of studies, primarily qualitative, have attempted to build structure into the body of published research. This research uses La...
{"title":"Topics in Real Estate Research, 1973-2010: A Latent Semantic Analysis","authors":"K. Winson-Geideman, Nicholas E. Evangelopoulos","doi":"10.1080/10835547.2013.12090347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2013.12090347","url":null,"abstract":"With the development and evolution of real estate literature a number of studies, primarily qualitative, have attempted to build structure into the body of published research. This research uses La...","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"102 1","pages":"59-76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76812038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2012.12090313
B. Renaud
Dubai experienced one of the world's most massive real estate bubbles in 2003-2008. This paper examines the dynamics of this bubble. There are several key questions. What were the multiple drivers ...
{"title":"Real Estate Bubble and Financial Crisis in Dubai: Dynamics and Policy Responses","authors":"B. Renaud","doi":"10.1080/10835547.2012.12090313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2012.12090313","url":null,"abstract":"Dubai experienced one of the world's most massive real estate bubbles in 2003-2008. This paper examines the dynamics of this bubble. There are several key questions. What were the multiple drivers ...","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"5 1","pages":"51-77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88084470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-05DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2011.12090299
G. Thrall, S. E. Thrall
This is an annotated bibliography of data relevant to real estate analysis. Without supporting data, our research, business advice, and policy recommendations are limited to being conjectural. Consider this "rule of 80s" and how it applies to real estate analysis: Eighty percent of what we do is data, and 80% of data is geospatial. To go beyond conjectural, we need data. Preferably reliable data, at the right geographic resolution, and data that is cost effective.
{"title":"DATA, METHODS, AND TECHNOLOGY: DATA RESOURCES FOR REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS GEOGRAPHY MARKET ANALYSIS: A COMPREHENSIVE STRUCTURED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, VERSION 2.0","authors":"G. Thrall, S. E. Thrall","doi":"10.1080/10835547.2011.12090299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2011.12090299","url":null,"abstract":"This is an annotated bibliography of data relevant to real estate analysis. Without supporting data, our research, business advice, and policy recommendations are limited to being conjectural. Consider this \"rule of 80s\" and how it applies to real estate analysis: Eighty percent of what we do is data, and 80% of data is geospatial. To go beyond conjectural, we need data. Preferably reliable data, at the right geographic resolution, and data that is cost effective.","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"48 1","pages":"413-468"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82172846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Housing Boom and Bust. Thomas Sowell. 184 pages, New York: Basic Books, 2009. Virtually from the onset of the U.S. housing market's precipitous price decline in 2006-07, academicians, politicians, and the media have sought to explain how the housing bubble that set the stage for the debacle developed and grew to such dangerous proportions. Not all observers were caught off-guard by the bubble. As early as 2003, for example, The Economist cautioned against the risk of expecting continued housing price escalation or, worse yet, the "risk that house prices will take such a tumble that they take whole economies with them." Again, in 2005, the same publication observed that "the day of reckoning is closer at hand," and "it is not going to be pretty." When it finally arrived, the housing market's "day of reckoning" was ugly indeed, bringing with it bruising housing price declines, unprecedented foreclosure rates and, in a follow-on effect, a crisis on Wall Street in which institutions and investors realized that the default risk embedded in widely traded mortgage-based financial instruments had been grossly mispriced. Whether or not one foresaw it, the core question remains: What actually caused the housing boom (and bust)? Equally important, how might a similar crisis be averted in the future? These are the questions that Thomas Sowell, Rose and Milton Friedman Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, addresses in his highly readable and informative book The Housing Boom and Bust. From the outset of the book-totaling a compact 148 pages, excluding 29 pages of source material at the end-Dr. Sowell qualifies that "there was no single cause of the housing crisis, and there is certainly plenty of blame to go around." Readers, of course, will be acquainted with oft-cited explanations for the fiasco, including: the Federal Reserve nurtured a bubble with low interest rates over an extended period of time; lenders offered exotic loan products that simultaneously confused less knowledgeable participants and enhanced the ability of sophisticated speculators to buy and re-sell homes without using their own cash; a lack of serious regulatory oversight enabled lenders to ignore reasonable standards of lending (i.e., those consistent with actual borrower creditworthiness) and make loans based upon inaccurate or incomplete applicant information (e.g., "low-doc" and "no-doc" loans); the credit rating agencies (e.g., Moody's) failed to accurately assess risk inherent in subprime mortgages; and so on. In Sowell's account, borrowers, lenders, government, and financial markets were each responsible for the crisis. As he succinctly puts it, "All were responsible and many were irresponsible." However, the central premise of the book is that responsibility among these players was not shared equally. The chief culprit, by far, was government, both local and federal, in the form of ill-advised interventions (or interference). Writing in language accessible to both expert
房地产繁荣与萧条。托马斯·索威尔著,184页,纽约:Basic Books出版社,2009年。实际上,从2006-07年美国房地产市场价格急剧下跌开始,学者、政治家和媒体就一直试图解释房地产泡沫是如何为崩溃奠定基础的,并发展到如此危险的程度。并非所有观察人士都对泡沫猝不及防。例如,早在2003年,《经济学人》就警告过房价持续上涨的风险,或者更糟的是,“房价暴跌会拖累整个经济的风险”。2005年,同一份出版物再次指出,“清算的日子越来越近了”,而且“情况不会很好”。当它最终到来时,房地产市场的“清算日”确实是丑陋的,随之而来的是惨烈的房价下跌,前所未有的止赎率,以及随之而来的华尔街危机。在这场危机中,机构和投资者意识到,广泛交易的以抵押贷款为基础的金融工具所蕴含的违约风险被严重错误地定价了。不管人们是否预见到了这一点,核心问题仍然存在:到底是什么导致了房地产的繁荣(和萧条)?同样重要的是,未来如何避免类似的危机?这些都是胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)罗斯和米尔顿·弗里德曼高级研究员托马斯·索威尔(Thomas Sowell)在其可读性强、信息量大的著作《房地产繁荣与萧条》(the Housing Boom and Bust)中提出的问题。这本书总共有148页,不包括结尾29页的原始资料。Sowell认为“房市危机并不是单一原因造成的,而且肯定有很多责任可以推卸。”当然,读者们会熟悉对这次惨败经常被引用的解释,包括:美联储在很长一段时间内以低利率孕育了泡沫;贷款机构提供了一些奇特的贷款产品,这些产品既迷惑了不太懂行的参与者,又增强了老练的投机者在不动用自有资金的情况下买卖房屋的能力;由于缺乏严格的监管,贷款人可以忽视合理的贷款标准(即与借款人实际信誉相符的标准),并根据不准确或不完整的申请人信息(例如,“低文件”和“无文件”贷款)发放贷款;信用评级机构(如穆迪)未能准确评估次级抵押贷款的内在风险;等等......在索厄尔的描述中,借款人、贷款人、政府和金融市场都对这场危机负有责任。正如他简洁地指出的那样,“所有人都有责任,许多人不负责任。”然而,这本书的中心前提是,这些参与者之间的责任并不是平等分担的。到目前为止,罪魁祸首是地方和联邦政府,他们采取了不明智的干预(或干涉)。索威尔用专家和外行都能理解的语言写作,并提供了大量的文件来支持他的观点,他列出了发生的事情的简单因果顺序:随着土地变得越来越昂贵,美国房价的繁荣起源于(而且很大程度上限于)特定的地理位置,比如加利福尼亚沿海和迈阿密。他认为,这些地方的地价上涨并不是因为过高的建设成本或收入增长率,而是因为政府实体以保护开放空间、保护农田、防止城市扩张和类似理由的名义实施了土地使用限制。这些限制使得在陆地上建造房屋要么不可能,要么要比在陆地上建造房屋昂贵得多。随着土地价格的飙升,整体房价也在上涨。由于限制土地使用而造成了“住房负担能力”问题,政府允许风险越来越大的借款人融资,使问题更加复杂。…
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Pub Date : 2009-01-01DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2009.12090248
R. Shakir
The leadership structure of a firm can be categorized in two different forms: (1) a combined leadership structure where the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) also holds the chairmanship of the firm and...
{"title":"International Articles: Examining the Effect of Leadership Structure and CEO Tenure on Malaysian Property Firm Performance","authors":"R. Shakir","doi":"10.1080/10835547.2009.12090248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2009.12090248","url":null,"abstract":"The leadership structure of a firm can be categorized in two different forms: (1) a combined leadership structure where the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) also holds the chairmanship of the firm and...","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"27 1","pages":"45-62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78012281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Discriminating Risk: The U.S. Mortgage Lending Industry in the Twentieth Century. Guy Stuart. 248 pages. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2003. The title of Guy Stuart's book suggests that it would provide an objective summary of the evolution of the lending decisions of the American mortgage lending industry in the twentieth century. Instead, the primary focus of the book is on the way lenders ''construct risk'' in ways that discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities- namely, blacks and Hispanics. Stuart's book begins with an explanation of his concept of risk construction in which cultural, institutional, and spatial issues affect the lending decision in a manner that discriminates against certain minority groups. He distinguishes [following Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921)] between the concepts of uncertainty and risk by explaining that uncertain decisions are those in which the decision maker is not aware of the probability distribution of future events, whereas risk decisions are made when decision makers attempt to translate uncertainty into risk by evaluating the probability distribution of future events. Cultural, institutional, and spatial issues affect the way lenders construct risk in the face of uncertainty. Without delving into the quagmire of whether lenders engage in blatant discrimination, as implied by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study (Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell, 1992), Stuart argues that the ways lenders construct risk result in unfair treatment of minority loan applicants. In particular, he suggests that lenders construct risk in an implicit social context that affects the way they receive and process information and thereby develop lending rules. Furthermore, he suggests that the lending guidelines promulgated by the dominant institutions in the mortgage industry [the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)] continue to put minority borrowers at a disadvantage in mortgage lending decisions. Lastly, he argues that the manner in which appraisers and lenders identify and delineate neighborhoods makes the conclusions lenders reach regarding changes in property value a self-fulfilling prophecy. Chapter 1 of the book considers the ''meaning of value'' and the role that appraisers play in the mortgage lending decision. Stuart provides an interesting discussion of the progress made by the appraisal profession (largely at the urging of the Department of Justice) toward reducing explicit racial and ethnic discrimination. He comments on Frederick Babcock's writings in the Federal Housing Administration's Underwriting Manual (1936), used for many years after the FHA's inception under the Roosevelt administration, and concludes (p. 58) that the ''. . . (misguided) genius of Babcock's solution'' that calls for the careful delineation of ''neighborhoods'' from which comparables should be chosen
辨别风险:20世纪的美国抵押贷款行业。盖·斯图尔特,248页。康奈尔大学出版社,伊萨卡,纽约,2003年。盖伊·斯图尔特(Guy Stuart)这本书的标题表明,它将对20世纪美国抵押贷款行业的贷款决策演变进行客观总结。相反,这本书的主要焦点是贷款人如何以歧视种族和少数民族(即黑人和西班牙裔)的方式“构建风险”。斯图尔特的书首先解释了他的风险构建概念,其中文化、制度和空间问题以歧视某些少数群体的方式影响贷款决策。他(遵循凯恩斯(1921)和奈特(1921))区分了不确定性和风险的概念,解释说不确定性决策是决策者不知道未来事件的概率分布的决策,而风险决策是决策者试图通过评估未来事件的概率分布将不确定性转化为风险时做出的决策。文化、制度和空间问题影响贷款人在面对不确定性时构建风险的方式。斯图尔特没有深入研究波士顿联邦储备银行的研究(Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell, 1992)所暗示的出借人是否公然歧视的困境,而是认为出借人构建风险的方式导致了对少数族裔贷款申请人的不公平待遇。他特别指出,出借人在一种隐性的社会背景下构建风险,这种社会背景会影响他们接收和处理信息的方式,从而制定贷款规则。此外,他认为,抵押贷款行业的主要机构[联邦住房管理局(FHA)、联邦全国抵押贷款协会(房利美)、联邦住房贷款抵押公司(房地美)]颁布的贷款指导方针,继续使少数族裔借款人在抵押贷款决策中处于不利地位。最后,他认为,评估师和贷款人识别和划定社区的方式,使得贷款人对房地产价值变化的结论成为一种自我实现的预言。本书的第一章考虑了“价值的意义”和评估师在抵押贷款决策中所扮演的角色。斯图尔特对评估行业(主要是在司法部的敦促下)在减少明显的种族和民族歧视方面所取得的进展进行了有趣的讨论。他评论了弗雷德里克·巴布科克(Frederick Babcock)在《联邦住房管理局承保手册》(1936)中的著作,该书在罗斯福政府下联邦住房管理局成立多年后仍被使用,并得出结论(第58页):“……(被误导的)巴布科克解决方案的天才”,该方案要求仔细划定“社区”,在销售比较过程中应该从中选择可比性,这创造了一个阶级和种族敏感的评估过程。最终在1976年,司法部、美国房地产估价师协会和房地产估价师协会同意从他们的培训材料中删除所有带有种族主义色彩的语言。1975年《住房抵押贷款披露法》和1977年《社区再投资法》的通过为贷款行业带来了透明度,这有助于揭露贷款决策过程中明显的种族歧视。今天,抵押贷款行业的主要参与者明确禁止基于居民种族的社区歧视。但是,斯图尔特(第187页)认为,“……评估过程的逻辑决定了,在选择可比房产时,隔离(继续)被默认。第2章“评估借款人和管理行为风险的规则”考虑了贷款价值比(LTV)、债务收入比和信用记录如何帮助贷款人构建风险。...
{"title":"Discriminating Risk: The U.S. Mortgage Lending Industry in the Twentieth Century","authors":"M. Allen","doi":"10.5860/choice.41-1678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.41-1678","url":null,"abstract":"Discriminating Risk: The U.S. Mortgage Lending Industry in the Twentieth Century. Guy Stuart. 248 pages. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2003. The title of Guy Stuart's book suggests that it would provide an objective summary of the evolution of the lending decisions of the American mortgage lending industry in the twentieth century. Instead, the primary focus of the book is on the way lenders ''construct risk'' in ways that discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities- namely, blacks and Hispanics. Stuart's book begins with an explanation of his concept of risk construction in which cultural, institutional, and spatial issues affect the lending decision in a manner that discriminates against certain minority groups. He distinguishes [following Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921)] between the concepts of uncertainty and risk by explaining that uncertain decisions are those in which the decision maker is not aware of the probability distribution of future events, whereas risk decisions are made when decision makers attempt to translate uncertainty into risk by evaluating the probability distribution of future events. Cultural, institutional, and spatial issues affect the way lenders construct risk in the face of uncertainty. Without delving into the quagmire of whether lenders engage in blatant discrimination, as implied by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study (Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell, 1992), Stuart argues that the ways lenders construct risk result in unfair treatment of minority loan applicants. In particular, he suggests that lenders construct risk in an implicit social context that affects the way they receive and process information and thereby develop lending rules. Furthermore, he suggests that the lending guidelines promulgated by the dominant institutions in the mortgage industry [the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)] continue to put minority borrowers at a disadvantage in mortgage lending decisions. Lastly, he argues that the manner in which appraisers and lenders identify and delineate neighborhoods makes the conclusions lenders reach regarding changes in property value a self-fulfilling prophecy. Chapter 1 of the book considers the ''meaning of value'' and the role that appraisers play in the mortgage lending decision. Stuart provides an interesting discussion of the progress made by the appraisal profession (largely at the urging of the Department of Justice) toward reducing explicit racial and ethnic discrimination. He comments on Frederick Babcock's writings in the Federal Housing Administration's Underwriting Manual (1936), used for many years after the FHA's inception under the Roosevelt administration, and concludes (p. 58) that the ''. . . (misguided) genius of Babcock's solution'' that calls for the careful delineation of ''neighborhoods'' from which comparables should be chosen ","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"28 1","pages":"464"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89463419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-01DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2006.12090174
Cieleback Marcus
Internationally, Germany has a low owner-occupation rate of approximately 43%. Therefore, the rented apartment sector is traditionally of great importance. Nevertheless, only a limited number of empirical studies for the German apartment sector exist. This study provides insight into the rental dynamics of the market for newly built apartments by examining the factors that influence rental change. The empirical results show that the real rental growth of newly built apartments is influenced by income growth, migration patterns and past growth in real construction costs. The results also support the assumption of a backward looking expectation formation process from the developers when applying for a building permit and the structurally higher rental growth rate in southern Germany.
{"title":"The Rental Dynamics of the West German Market for Newly Built Apartments","authors":"Cieleback Marcus","doi":"10.1080/10835547.2006.12090174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2006.12090174","url":null,"abstract":"Internationally, Germany has a low owner-occupation rate of approximately 43%. Therefore, the rented apartment sector is traditionally of great importance. Nevertheless, only a limited number of empirical studies for the German apartment sector exist. This study provides insight into the rental dynamics of the market for newly built apartments by examining the factors that influence rental change. The empirical results show that the real rental growth of newly built apartments is influenced by income growth, migration patterns and past growth in real construction costs. The results also support the assumption of a backward looking expectation formation process from the developers when applying for a building permit and the structurally higher rental growth rate in southern Germany.","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"34 1","pages":"27-38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81018163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-01DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2005.12090163
Michel Baroni, Fabrice Barthélémy, M. Mokrane
Abstract This paper offers an alternative methodology to estimate an index for Paris residential housing prices: the now standard repeat sales method (Case and Shiller, 1987). The same dataset as the official Notaires/INSEE Index is employed, and after discussing the main assumptions and their implications for estimation robustness, the estimated index for the 1982-2002 period is compared with the Notaires/INSEE Index. The findings indicate that the estimation is quite robust whatever the estimation period, and that this index is significantly different from the official residential index for Paris. Introduction Every real estate investor faces an objective difficulty concerning the measurement of real estate investment performance and risk. The reasons explaining this difficulty are numerous: an absence of centralized trading, or even price lists; a low degree of buildings or apartment turnover in investor portfolios; a lack of transparency in transactions; the heterogeneity and indivisibility of real estate properties; and a tradition of confidentiality in the industry. The official price index for the Paris residential market (Notaires/INSEE Index) is a hedonic one based on transaction prices. This index can be used to have an estimation of the price growth by comparing the index value at two different dates. For instance, the price return in capital between December 1985 and December 1991 is 249%, according to this index. This paper offers an alternative methodology to estimate an index for Paris residential housing prices: the now standard repeat sales method. The same dataset as the official index is used, and after discussing the main assumptions and their implications for estimation robustness, the estimated index for the 1982-2002 period is compared with the Notaires/INSEE Index. The next section contains a review of the repeat sales literature. The case and Shiller repeat sales framework (thereafter referred to as WRS) is developed next. The data available to estimate the Paris WRS sales index follows, along with the estimation results and robustness analysis. This sales index is then compared to the French one in an index perspective, and a comparison is then made on a return and volatility point of view. The paper wraps up with some concluding remarks. Repeat Sales Methodology: Literature Review The repeat sales method is a means of constructing real estate price indices based on a repeated observation of property transactions. The method begins by stating that the price of say good z at date t is a function of four terms: the good's quality at date t, the value of the underlying global real estate index at date t, a random walk variable linked to good i at date t and an error term, here again linked to good i at date t (modeled as a white noise). case and Shiller (1987) generalize the work of Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) and thus provide the first approach of repeat measures methods for construction of real estate indices. The main
{"title":"Real Estate Prices: A Paris Repeat Sales Residential Index","authors":"Michel Baroni, Fabrice Barthélémy, M. Mokrane","doi":"10.1080/10835547.2005.12090163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2005.12090163","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper offers an alternative methodology to estimate an index for Paris residential housing prices: the now standard repeat sales method (Case and Shiller, 1987). The same dataset as the official Notaires/INSEE Index is employed, and after discussing the main assumptions and their implications for estimation robustness, the estimated index for the 1982-2002 period is compared with the Notaires/INSEE Index. The findings indicate that the estimation is quite robust whatever the estimation period, and that this index is significantly different from the official residential index for Paris. Introduction Every real estate investor faces an objective difficulty concerning the measurement of real estate investment performance and risk. The reasons explaining this difficulty are numerous: an absence of centralized trading, or even price lists; a low degree of buildings or apartment turnover in investor portfolios; a lack of transparency in transactions; the heterogeneity and indivisibility of real estate properties; and a tradition of confidentiality in the industry. The official price index for the Paris residential market (Notaires/INSEE Index) is a hedonic one based on transaction prices. This index can be used to have an estimation of the price growth by comparing the index value at two different dates. For instance, the price return in capital between December 1985 and December 1991 is 249%, according to this index. This paper offers an alternative methodology to estimate an index for Paris residential housing prices: the now standard repeat sales method. The same dataset as the official index is used, and after discussing the main assumptions and their implications for estimation robustness, the estimated index for the 1982-2002 period is compared with the Notaires/INSEE Index. The next section contains a review of the repeat sales literature. The case and Shiller repeat sales framework (thereafter referred to as WRS) is developed next. The data available to estimate the Paris WRS sales index follows, along with the estimation results and robustness analysis. This sales index is then compared to the French one in an index perspective, and a comparison is then made on a return and volatility point of view. The paper wraps up with some concluding remarks. Repeat Sales Methodology: Literature Review The repeat sales method is a means of constructing real estate price indices based on a repeated observation of property transactions. The method begins by stating that the price of say good z at date t is a function of four terms: the good's quality at date t, the value of the underlying global real estate index at date t, a random walk variable linked to good i at date t and an error term, here again linked to good i at date t (modeled as a white noise). case and Shiller (1987) generalize the work of Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) and thus provide the first approach of repeat measures methods for construction of real estate indices. The main","PeriodicalId":35888,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Real Estate Literature","volume":"28 1","pages":"303-322"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79307842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}