{"title":"Epicurean Questions: From Tradition to Theology","authors":"Enrico Piergiacomi","doi":"10.14746/PEA.2018.1.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/PEA.2018.1.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89472312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his works on natural sciences, primarily in the Physics, Aristotle focuses on different forms of metabolē and distinguishes movement in general from substantial change. The On generation and corruption deals with the latter. When reading this treatise, one should pay particular attention to the concept of mixture. Apart from being the subject of a specific chapter (I 10), the problem of mixture permeates the whole work. But what exactly is mixture? Is it a simple combination of small parts? Can a compound of water and wine be called mixture? If so, is this mixture and nothing more? In the course of the discussion, it is argued that the Aristotelian idea of mixis does not correspond to the concept that is usually associated with it. Rather, it is shown that mixis is fundamental for comprehending the physical world and constitutes not only the term per quem the first elements of all material bodies originate, but also plays a fundamental role in all natural sciences, particularly, in biology.
{"title":"Mixture and Transformation in Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione","authors":"Arman Zarifian","doi":"10.14746/PEA.2018.1.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/PEA.2018.1.4","url":null,"abstract":"In his works on natural sciences, primarily in the Physics, Aristotle focuses on different forms of metabolē and distinguishes movement in general from substantial change. The On generation and corruption deals with the latter. When reading this treatise, one should pay particular attention to the concept of mixture. Apart from being the subject of a specific chapter (I 10), the problem of mixture permeates the whole work. But what exactly is mixture? Is it a simple combination of small parts? Can a compound of water and wine be called mixture? If so, is this mixture and nothing more? In the course of the discussion, it is argued that the Aristotelian idea of mixis does not correspond to the concept that is usually associated with it. Rather, it is shown that mixis is fundamental for comprehending the physical world and constitutes not only the term per quem the first elements of all material bodies originate, but also plays a fundamental role in all natural sciences, particularly, in biology.","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"191 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85416867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is meant under the genuine title of Aristotle’s ta Analytika is rarely properly understood. Presumably, his analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis. For Aristotle, this was a regressive or heuristic procedure, departing from a proposed conclusion (or problem) and asking which premises could be found in order to syllogize, demonstrate or explain it. The terms that form categorical and modal propositions play a fundamental role in analytics. Aristotle introduces letters in lieu of the triples of terms (major – middle – minor) constituting the propositions and the three syllogistic figures that schematize them. His formulation of the three syllogistic figures refers to a syntactical and predicative order and position of the triples of terms, arranged in some diagrammed schemata, which, regrettably, are missing from the extant text of the Prior Analytics. Considering planar and graphic arrangements, both vertical and horizontal orders as well as the position of the three terms involved, we propose a reconstruction, at least to some extent, of these probable lettered diagrams. In such reconstructed diagrams, we can appropriately capture the definition of syllogism as a predicative connexion of terms, and easier survey a synoptic account of all valid predicative relations and transpositions, and also reduce the imperfect syllogisms into the moods of the first figure. Aristotle’s syllogistic is an analytical calculation of terms, understood as predicates and subjects within the categorical propositions, and more precisely of three terms schematized in three figures in predicative links such that, by means of a middle, follows from necessity a conclusion of the extreme terms. The necessity of the consequence is not based on the implication or inference of the propositions, but on a predictive transitivity through the middle term within the syllogistic figures. Syllogism must draw its conclusion through the way its terms are predicated of one another. Aristotle in his Prior Analytics (I 3, 8–22) developed also a complex account of modal syllogisms within necessity and possibility of belonging (predicating). This account involves also such an analytical reduction to the syllogistic figures. In this analytical perspective, we try to throw some light on his modal syllogisms, although this difficult and nowadays thoroughly discussed topic would require a much wider treatment.
{"title":"The Analytical Perspective of Aristotle’s Categorical and Modal Syllogisms","authors":"M. Wesoły","doi":"10.14746/PEA.2018.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/PEA.2018.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"What is meant under the genuine title of Aristotle’s ta Analytika is rarely properly understood. Presumably, his analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis. For Aristotle, this was a regressive or heuristic procedure, departing from a proposed conclusion (or problem) and asking which premises could be found in order to syllogize, demonstrate or explain it. The terms that form categorical and modal propositions play a fundamental role in analytics. Aristotle introduces letters in lieu of the triples of terms (major – middle – minor) constituting the propositions and the three syllogistic figures that schematize them. His formulation of the three syllogistic figures refers to a syntactical and predicative order and position of the triples of terms, arranged in some diagrammed schemata, which, regrettably, are missing from the extant text of the Prior Analytics. Considering planar and graphic arrangements, both vertical and horizontal orders as well as the position of the three terms involved, we propose a reconstruction, at least to some extent, of these probable lettered diagrams. In such reconstructed diagrams, we can appropriately capture the definition of syllogism as a predicative connexion of terms, and easier survey a synoptic account of all valid predicative relations and transpositions, and also reduce the imperfect syllogisms into the moods of the first figure. Aristotle’s syllogistic is an analytical calculation of terms, understood as predicates and subjects within the categorical propositions, and more precisely of three terms schematized in three figures in predicative links such that, by means of a middle, follows from necessity a conclusion of the extreme terms. The necessity of the consequence is not based on the implication or inference of the propositions, but on a predictive transitivity through the middle term within the syllogistic figures. Syllogism must draw its conclusion through the way its terms are predicated of one another. Aristotle in his Prior Analytics (I 3, 8–22) developed also a complex account of modal syllogisms within necessity and possibility of belonging (predicating). This account involves also such an analytical reduction to the syllogistic figures. In this analytical perspective, we try to throw some light on his modal syllogisms, although this difficult and nowadays thoroughly discussed topic would require a much wider treatment.","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78029753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this study is to discuss an original philosophical contribution made by Philoponus, who in In Cat. 18, 14–22 equates koinon in its most peculiar meaning with the concept of koinônia understood as a particular case of Platonic methexis. First, the paper analyzes the passages where the Neoplatonic commentators of the Categories distinguish four distinct meanings of the Aristotelian concept of koinon. Subsequently, this article emphasizes the differences between Philoponus’ hermeneutical suggestions and those of the other commentators. Philoponus clarifies that while every koinon is methekton, Aristotle’s koinon is characterized by the fact that the participation is ex isou and kata meros. Thus, koinônia, according to Philoponus, is a particular case of methexis, where everyone participating in something participates in it equally and singly. The example cited by Philoponus to explain Aristotle’s koinon is that of men participating equally and singly in human nature. The study concludes with a discussion of the relationship among the concepts of koinon, koinônia and methexis.
{"title":"Koinon and koinônia: A Particular Case of Participation in John Philoponus","authors":"Daniele Granata","doi":"10.14746/PEA.2018.1.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/PEA.2018.1.6","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this study is to discuss an original philosophical contribution made by Philoponus, who in In Cat. 18, 14–22 equates koinon in its most peculiar meaning with the concept of koinônia understood as a particular case of Platonic methexis. First, the paper analyzes the passages where the Neoplatonic commentators of the Categories distinguish four distinct meanings of the Aristotelian concept of koinon. Subsequently, this article emphasizes the differences between Philoponus’ hermeneutical suggestions and those of the other commentators. Philoponus clarifies that while every koinon is methekton, Aristotle’s koinon is characterized by the fact that the participation is ex isou and kata meros. Thus, koinônia, according to Philoponus, is a particular case of methexis, where everyone participating in something participates in it equally and singly. The example cited by Philoponus to explain Aristotle’s koinon is that of men participating equally and singly in human nature. The study concludes with a discussion of the relationship among the concepts of koinon, koinônia and methexis.","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83127866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The two extant versions of Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos (PTMO) have been preserved by an anonymous author (MXG) and by Sextus Empiricus (S.E.). Both versions have been differently interpreted by scholars who examine either the doctrine or the rhetorical-communicational dimension (the first option being dominant). When comparing the PTMO with the rest of Gorgias’ works, the present paper aims to demonstrate that S.E. offers a more precise account of Gorgias’ modus argumentandi. Thus, S.E. shows the following, typical features of Gorgias’ demonstrative reasoning: 1) application of demonstrandum and quod erat demonstrandum, 2) continuous employment of reductio ad absurdum and 3) a refined formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (similar to the one in Pal. 25). The MXG, on the other hand, is accurate in the discussion of particular arguments (e.g. the third kephalaion), but presents an interpreter who is more interested in questioning Gorgias rather than doing justice to his thought. Hence, this article concludes that it was S.E., who had the text or at least a relatively accurate summary of the PTMO.
{"title":"Following Sextus: Demonstrative Argument in Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos","authors":"Stefania Giombini","doi":"10.14746/pea.2018.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/pea.2018.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"The two extant versions of Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos (PTMO) have been preserved by an anonymous author (MXG) and by Sextus Empiricus (S.E.). Both versions have been differently interpreted by scholars who examine either the doctrine or the rhetorical-communicational dimension (the first option being dominant). When comparing the PTMO with the rest of Gorgias’ works, the present paper aims to demonstrate that S.E. offers a more precise account of Gorgias’ modus argumentandi. Thus, S.E. shows the following, typical features of Gorgias’ demonstrative reasoning: 1) application of demonstrandum and quod erat demonstrandum, 2) continuous employment of reductio ad absurdum and 3) a refined formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (similar to the one in Pal. 25). The MXG, on the other hand, is accurate in the discussion of particular arguments (e.g. the third kephalaion), but presents an interpreter who is more interested in questioning Gorgias rather than doing justice to his thought. Hence, this article concludes that it was S.E., who had the text or at least a relatively accurate summary of the PTMO.","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"112 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87777616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Plato tries to explain the becoming of the cosmos by referring to the concepts of order and disorder. Scholars have usually focused on the relationship between the cosmos and the demiurge that Plato puts forward to explain the reasonable (i.e., well-ordered) development. Along these lines, scholarship has examined the providential role played by both the demiurge and the soul of the world. Yet, an interesting problem still remains open: what exactly is the function of disorder? What is the sense of the concept of a perfectly established order if we do not know the manner in which it is achieved, since we have no understanding of the conditions that make it possible? Pursuing this line of thought, one may point to a providential role of the disorder given the balance of forces that operates in Plato’s cosmic becoming.
{"title":"Providential Disorder in Plato’s Timaeus?","authors":"S. Maso","doi":"10.14746/PEA.2018.1.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/PEA.2018.1.3","url":null,"abstract":"Plato tries to explain the becoming of the cosmos by referring to the concepts of order and disorder. Scholars have usually focused on the relationship between the cosmos and the demiurge that Plato puts forward to explain the reasonable (i.e., well-ordered) development. Along these lines, scholarship has examined the providential role played by both the demiurge and the soul of the world. Yet, an interesting problem still remains open: what exactly is the function of disorder? What is the sense of the concept of a perfectly established order if we do not know the manner in which it is achieved, since we have no understanding of the conditions that make it possible? Pursuing this line of thought, one may point to a providential role of the disorder given the balance of forces that operates in Plato’s cosmic becoming.","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89378844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the fragments of Damascius’ Vita Isidori one can observe a significant presence of the “marvellous.” In many cases, the marvellous seems to manifest a sacral and anagogical value in line with the philosophical and religious conceptions of late Neo-Platonism. A similar value of the marvellous can also be found in a passage of De Principiis (I, 14, 1–19), where Damascius hails the totally ineffable Principle as supremely marvellous, upon which he presents it as absolutely unknowable and expressible only in an aporetic way.
{"title":"Sacral and Anagogical Aspects of the “Marvellous” in Damascius. An Interpretation","authors":"Valerio Napoli","doi":"10.14746/pea.2018.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/pea.2018.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"In the fragments of Damascius’ Vita Isidori one can observe a significant presence of the “marvellous.” In many cases, the marvellous seems to manifest a sacral and anagogical value in line with the philosophical and religious conceptions of late Neo-Platonism. A similar value of the marvellous can also be found in a passage of De Principiis (I, 14, 1–19), where Damascius hails the totally ineffable Principle as supremely marvellous, upon which he presents it as absolutely unknowable and expressible only in an aporetic way.","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89493643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-24DOI: 10.14746/peitho.2017.12223
A. Brancacci
The question of the method was central in the thought and teaching of Prodicus. We have abundant information on this method but it is, probably, closely connected to various other issues (natural investigations, rhetoric and rhetorical theory, questions concerning the gods, ethics), on which we are less well informed. The right method to solve diverse linguistic problems comprised two moments and not just one as it frequently assumed. Similarly, the terms orthotes and diairesis of names, which appear in the sources, do not designate one single and simple procedure, but rather a double and more complex one, which is reconstructed in this article and whose objectives are clarified.
{"title":"Orthotes and Diairesis of Names. The Question of Method in Prodicus","authors":"A. Brancacci","doi":"10.14746/peitho.2017.12223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/peitho.2017.12223","url":null,"abstract":"The question of the method was central in the thought and teaching of Prodicus. We have abundant information on this method but it is, probably, closely connected to various other issues (natural investigations, rhetoric and rhetorical theory, questions concerning the gods, ethics), on which we are less well informed. The right method to solve diverse linguistic problems comprised two moments and not just one as it frequently assumed. Similarly, the terms orthotes and diairesis of names, which appear in the sources, do not designate one single and simple procedure, but rather a double and more complex one, which is reconstructed in this article and whose objectives are clarified.","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"440 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78789100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The essay considers synthetically the passages of Hesiod’s Theogony concerning Khaos, Gaia, Uranòs, and Tàrtaros as describing the cosmic structure at its very beginning and at its present state. The final result of the cosmogenetic process consists of three solid parallel disks of equal size separated from one another by the space of Khaos/Aèr. The whole structure is conceived of as an ideal cylinder (ideal because it has no real lateral walls), whose superior base is Uranòs (the Sky), the inferior one is Tàrtaros (the Hell) and the median section is Gaia (the Earth), dividing the whole cylinder into two high semicylinders full of Khaos/Aèr. From this Khaos/Aèr, the primal Four Elements (earth, water, misty air and fire) derive, as plants do from their roots, from which all other substances of the universe originate in turn. Thus, Khaos is arkhè (the ‘beginning’) not only in the chronological-historical sense, but also in the sense of an eternal generative substance of all things. We may conclude that the Hesiodic word khaos is a lexical ancestor of the later physical and philosophical term hyle because it conveys the primeval notion of ‘matter’.
{"title":"The Concept of ‘Matter’ in Archaic Greece, 1: Khaos/Aèr in Hesiod’s Theogony","authors":"G. Cerri","doi":"10.14746/PEA.2017.1.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/PEA.2017.1.3","url":null,"abstract":"The essay considers synthetically the passages of Hesiod’s Theogony concerning Khaos, Gaia, Uranòs, and Tàrtaros as describing the cosmic structure at its very beginning and at its present state. The final result of the cosmogenetic process consists of three solid parallel disks of equal size separated from one another by the space of Khaos/Aèr. The whole structure is conceived of as an ideal cylinder (ideal because it has no real lateral walls), whose superior base is Uranòs (the Sky), the inferior one is Tàrtaros (the Hell) and the median section is Gaia (the Earth), dividing the whole cylinder into two high semicylinders full of Khaos/Aèr. From this Khaos/Aèr, the primal Four Elements (earth, water, misty air and fire) derive, as plants do from their roots, from which all other substances of the universe originate in turn. Thus, Khaos is arkhè (the ‘beginning’) not only in the chronological-historical sense, but also in the sense of an eternal generative substance of all things. We may conclude that the Hesiodic word khaos is a lexical ancestor of the later physical and philosophical term hyle because it conveys the primeval notion of ‘matter’.","PeriodicalId":36201,"journal":{"name":"Peitho","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89425114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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