Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.2
Isabella Lorenzoni
Recent technological developments are transforming the way antitrust is enforced as well as the way market players are infringing competition law. As a result, enforcers are starting to equip themselves with sophisticated digital investigation tools. This paper explores this interest in building an Artificial Intelligence (AI) arsenal for the fight against algorithmic infringements. What are the key factors motivating regulators to develop their own technological tools to enforce competition law? Building on interviews with a number of competition authorities, this paper finds that changes in digital markets, the need for enforcers to reverseengineer companies’ algorithms in order to better understand their implications for competition law, the need to enhance efficiency and keep pace with the fast evolution of the digital economy, and, finally, the decrease in leniency applications, are all reasons for which competition authorities should strive for more innovative and alternative means to boost their ex officio investigations.
{"title":"Why do Competition Authorities need Artificial Intelligence?","authors":"Isabella Lorenzoni","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.2","url":null,"abstract":"Recent technological developments are transforming the way antitrust is enforced as well as the way market players are infringing competition law. As a result, enforcers are starting to equip themselves with sophisticated digital investigation tools. This paper explores this interest in building an Artificial Intelligence (AI) arsenal for the fight against algorithmic infringements. What are the key factors motivating regulators to develop their own technological tools to enforce competition law? Building on interviews with a number of competition authorities, this paper finds that changes in digital markets, the need for enforcers to reverseengineer companies’ algorithms in order to better understand their implications for competition law, the need to enhance efficiency and keep pace with the fast evolution of the digital economy, and, finally, the decrease in leniency applications, are all reasons for which competition authorities should strive for more innovative and alternative means to boost their ex officio investigations.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47502962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.3
A. Gerasymenko, N. Mazaraki
Competition law, economics and policy are facing a regulatory metamorphosis due to the rise of the digital economy. US, China and EU jurisdictions have announced and partially introduced systemic changes to their competition law frameworks to keep pace with technological developments. The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine is following the principle of ‘three monkeys’, it sees no on-line platforms, hears no on-line platforms, speaks of no on-line platforms, so nothing has been undertaken or even announced. The paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the economic background and features of the digital economy and shows why the available instruments of competition enforcement are ineffective. The second part of the paper shows why the current Ukrainian competition law framework is (in)capable of dealing with challenges posed by on-line giants. Regarding the need for a recalibration of regulatory approaches in digital markets, Ukraine faces the dilemma of a proper combination of ex ante and ex post measures.
{"title":"Competition law enforcement in Ukraine: challenges from on-line giants","authors":"A. Gerasymenko, N. Mazaraki","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.3","url":null,"abstract":"Competition law, economics and policy are facing a regulatory metamorphosis due to the rise of the digital economy. US, China and EU jurisdictions have announced and partially introduced systemic changes to their competition law frameworks to keep pace with technological developments. The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine is following the principle of ‘three monkeys’, it sees no on-line platforms, hears no on-line platforms, speaks of no on-line platforms, so nothing has been undertaken or even announced. The paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the economic background and features of the digital economy and shows why the available instruments of competition enforcement are ineffective. The second part of the paper shows why the current Ukrainian competition law framework is (in)capable of dealing with challenges posed by on-line giants. Regarding the need for a recalibration of regulatory approaches in digital markets, Ukraine faces the dilemma of a proper combination of ex ante and ex post measures.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46496934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.5
C. Massa
Given that a lot has already been written by legal scholars on the practical implications that the entry into force of the Digital Markets Act will have, the present article intends to bring the discussion back to the theoretical level, trying to find out where the roots of this proposed regulation lie, with an analysis of the context in which it falls, the EU principles and values upon which it is based, the objectives it intends to pursue, and the legal-economic theories behind it.
{"title":"The Digital Markets Act between the EU Economic Constitutionalism and the EU Competition Policy","authors":"C. Massa","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.5","url":null,"abstract":"Given that a lot has already been written by legal scholars on the practical implications that the entry into force of the Digital Markets Act will have, the present article intends to bring the discussion back to the theoretical level, trying to find out where the roots of this proposed regulation lie, with an analysis of the context in which it falls, the EU principles and values upon which it is based, the objectives it intends to pursue, and the legal-economic theories behind it.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44646212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.6
Judit Firniksz, B. Dömötörfy, Péter Mezei
The Google Shopping case has provided significant lessons that reach beyond antitrust enforcement. ‘Enabling and discovery tools’ create a layer that serves as a gateway to the Internet ecosystem. Therefore, on the one hand, they play a key role in ensuring the openness of the Internet ecosystem, and on the other hand, they exercise a primary influence on consumer experiences and their cognitive processes, which in turn determine online consumer transactions. Enabling and discovery tools, such as adopting design methods based on applied behavioural sciences (for example: user experience design (UX) and user interface design (UI)), create global challenges at the crossroads of antitrust, consumer law and platform regulation. At the same time, in light of the complexity of the platform economy, some market phenomena might be particularly difficult to identify and address, while fast and efficient adaptation is an essential factor for market players. This brings advocacy – the promotion of a competitive environment – into the focus also at the national level, particularly where a dual enforcement regime makes a multifocal approach possible.
{"title":"Gateways to the Internet Ecosystem – Enabling and Discovery Tools in the Age of Global Online Platforms","authors":"Judit Firniksz, B. Dömötörfy, Péter Mezei","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.6","url":null,"abstract":"The Google Shopping case has provided significant lessons that reach beyond antitrust enforcement. ‘Enabling and discovery tools’ create a layer that serves as a gateway to the Internet ecosystem. Therefore, on the one hand, they play a key role in ensuring the openness of the Internet ecosystem, and on the other hand, they exercise a primary influence on consumer experiences and their cognitive processes, which in turn determine online consumer transactions. Enabling and discovery tools, such as adopting design methods based on applied behavioural sciences (for example: user experience design (UX) and user interface design (UI)), create global challenges at the crossroads of antitrust, consumer law and platform regulation. At the same time, in light of the complexity of the platform economy, some market phenomena might be particularly difficult to identify and address, while fast and efficient adaptation is an essential factor for market players. This brings advocacy – the promotion of a competitive environment – into the focus also at the national level, particularly where a dual enforcement regime makes a multifocal approach possible.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45527155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.7
K. Dobosz
The case commentary examines the recent ruling of the Court of Justice in the Nordzucker case. This judgment is important not only for the new approach to the ne bis in idem principle in competition law (which was first established in the Bpost case, issued the same day), but also for the clarification of the concept of “idem” with respect to the territorial effects of the infringement on the territories of two member states. The judgment thus provides guidance for the extraterritorial application of EU competition law.
{"title":"The Housekeeping of the Court of Justice: The ne bis in idem Principle and the Territorial Scope of NCA Decisions. Case Comment to the Nordzucker Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 March 2022, Case C-151/20","authors":"K. Dobosz","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.7","url":null,"abstract":"The case commentary examines the recent ruling of the Court of Justice in the Nordzucker case. This judgment is important not only for the new approach to the ne bis in idem principle in competition law (which was first established in the Bpost case, issued the same day), but also for the clarification of the concept of “idem” with respect to the territorial effects of the infringement on the territories of two member states. The judgment thus provides guidance for the extraterritorial application of EU competition law.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46181394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.4
Tabea Bauermeister
As the European Union kept on struggling with its Digital Markets Act, Germany forged ahead and implemented its own ‘Lex GAFA’ in early 2021. The paper will introduce this new Section 19a and explain its inner workings. Furthermore, Section 19a will be compared to classic Article 102 TFEU-procedure and contrasted with the DMA. Thereby, the paper will present the advantages and disadvantages of Section 19a in comparison to existing and future European law to assess whether Section 19a is in fact the lighthouse project it was presented to be – or rather a superfluous national solo run.
{"title":"Section 19a GWB as the German ‘Lex GAFA’ – lighthouse project or superfluous national solo run?","authors":"Tabea Bauermeister","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.4","url":null,"abstract":"As the European Union kept on struggling with its Digital Markets Act, Germany forged ahead and implemented its own ‘Lex GAFA’ in early 2021. The paper will introduce this new Section 19a and explain its inner workings. Furthermore, Section 19a will be compared to classic Article 102 TFEU-procedure and contrasted with the DMA. Thereby, the paper will present the advantages and disadvantages of Section 19a in comparison to existing and future European law to assess whether Section 19a is in fact the lighthouse project it was presented to be – or rather a superfluous national solo run.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42054546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.6
M. M. Csirszki
The article aims to compare the sectoral antitrust exemption for agriculture that exists in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). The roots for the privileged position of agriculture under antitrust laws date back to 1914. Section 6 of the Clayton Act was the first US law which exempted certain cooperatives. In 1922, the protection was extended to a broader range of agricultural entities by the Capper-Volstead Act. These two acts have since then determined the scope and extent of the US exemption but have evolved through judiciary interpretation. The EU has had a similar exemption for agriculture since the beginnings of European integration. After presenting briefly the likely explanations for the privileged treatment of this sector under antitrust, the article aims to analyse the regulations in force in order to explore their similarities and differences. The analysis also seeks to answer the question of whether the ‘accusation’ that EU competition law – in contrast with the US antitrust regime – is not purely based on efficiency considerations can also be extended to the agricultural sector’s privileged treatment. In the end, the rules in force of the two jurisdictions are compared and conclusions drawn.
{"title":"The Comparison of the US and EU Agricultural Antitrust Exemptions","authors":"M. M. Csirszki","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.6","url":null,"abstract":"The article aims to compare the sectoral antitrust exemption for agriculture that exists in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). The roots for the privileged position of agriculture under antitrust laws date back to 1914. Section 6 of the Clayton Act was the first US law which exempted certain cooperatives. In 1922, the protection was extended to a broader range of agricultural entities by the Capper-Volstead Act. These two acts have since then determined the scope and extent of the US exemption but have evolved through judiciary interpretation. The EU has had a similar exemption for agriculture since the beginnings of European integration. After presenting briefly the likely explanations for the privileged treatment of this sector under antitrust, the article aims to analyse the regulations in force in order to explore their similarities and differences. The analysis also seeks to answer the question of whether the ‘accusation’ that EU competition law – in contrast with the US antitrust regime – is not purely based on efficiency considerations can also be extended to the agricultural sector’s privileged treatment. In the end, the rules in force of the two jurisdictions are compared and conclusions drawn.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41414657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.3
B. Wardhaugh
One common criticism of the EU’s competition regime is that it hinders adequate mitigation of crises by preventing a collaborative response to the problem. We suggest that this view is incorrect. We suggest that a collaborative response is unlikely to effectively mitigate most problems. Yet some forms of cooperation can facilitate a crisis solution. These may be at the margin of legality, giving uncertainty as to whether the proposed practice is permitted. With the possibility of significant penalties for competition infringements, most undertakings will not engage in such cooperative practices. There are significant legal and institutional impediments to providing this Guidance. Such gaps lead to uncertainty found in the nature of the EU competition rules and in NCA practice. We argue that the means forward is with greater engagement and guidance by the Commission and NCAs.
{"title":"Enforcement of Competition Law in Times of Crisis: Is Guided Self-Assessment the Answer?","authors":"B. Wardhaugh","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.3","url":null,"abstract":"One common criticism of the EU’s competition regime is that it hinders adequate mitigation of crises by preventing a collaborative response to the problem. We suggest that this view is incorrect. We suggest that a collaborative response is unlikely to effectively mitigate most problems. Yet some forms of cooperation can facilitate a crisis solution. These may be at the margin of legality, giving uncertainty as to whether the proposed practice is permitted. With the possibility of significant penalties for competition infringements, most undertakings will not engage in such cooperative practices. There are significant legal and institutional impediments to providing this Guidance. Such gaps lead to uncertainty found in the nature of the EU competition rules and in NCA practice. We argue that the means forward is with greater engagement and guidance by the Commission and NCAs.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41903969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.4
Raimundas Moisejevas, Justina Nasutavičienė, Andrius Puksas
This article focuses on the personal liability of managers of undertakings for breaches of competition law. This article starts with a review of the sanction regime for managers of undertakings according to the Competition law of the Republic of Lithuania. Reviewed are legal provisions and judicial practice of the Lithuanian courts starting from 2017, that is, when the first request to sanction a manager of an undertaking was submitted to the court by the Competition Council (CC). It is pointed out that in most cases the courts do not fully accept the requests of the CC with respect to the severity of the sanctions to be imposed on managers. The second part of the Article comprehensively analyses the case-law of administrative courts of the Republic of Lithuania, and presents key elements of the imposition of sanctions on company managers. Firstly, in exceptional circumstances, courts may impose a lower penalty than the one specified by competition law. Secondly, the courts may impose both, the main sanction as well as an additional one, or any of them. Thirdly, the level of sanctions should be determined the light of the fines imposed on undertakings for their infringements of competition law. The article concludes with a short summary.
{"title":"Personal liability of managers of undertakings for infringements of competition law in the Republic of Lithuania: the sanctions regime from the perspective of the principle of legal certainty","authors":"Raimundas Moisejevas, Justina Nasutavičienė, Andrius Puksas","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.4","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on the personal liability of managers of undertakings for breaches of competition law. This article starts with a review of the sanction regime for managers of undertakings according to the Competition law of the Republic of Lithuania. Reviewed are legal provisions and judicial practice of the Lithuanian courts starting from 2017, that is, when the first request to sanction a manager of an undertaking was submitted to the court by the Competition Council (CC). It is pointed out that in most cases the courts do not fully accept the requests of the CC with respect to the severity of the sanctions to be imposed on managers. The second part of the Article comprehensively analyses the case-law of administrative courts of the Republic of Lithuania, and presents key elements of the imposition of sanctions on company managers. Firstly, in exceptional circumstances, courts may impose a lower penalty than the one specified by competition law. Secondly, the courts may impose both, the main sanction as well as an additional one, or any of them. Thirdly, the level of sanctions should be determined the light of the fines imposed on undertakings for their infringements of competition law. The article concludes with a short summary.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43352373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.1
Lena Hornkohl
This paper focuses on the procedural instrument of ‘competition-expert’ lay judges to ease damages calculations and private actions for damages for the violation of competition law in general. To this end, the paper analyses various forms of ‘expert’ lay participation that already exist in Europe. It concentrates, in particular, on commercial and intellectual property proceedings, but also delves into the few existing examples of competition-expert lay judges for private enforcement of competition law. It assesses their transferability for competition damages proceedings and attempts to test EU and national competition as well as procedural law boundaries more generally. The paper considers common grounds, advantages and disadvantages, as well as best practices in this context. It concludes with early proposals for including competition-expert lay judges in private enforcement of competition law.
{"title":"Leave it to the experts: A comparative analysis of competition-expert lay judges in private enforcement of competition law","authors":"Lena Hornkohl","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.25.1","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on the procedural instrument of ‘competition-expert’ lay judges to ease damages calculations and private actions for damages for the violation of competition law in general. To this end, the paper analyses various forms of ‘expert’ lay participation that already exist in Europe. It concentrates, in particular, on commercial and intellectual property proceedings, but also delves into the few existing examples of competition-expert lay judges for private enforcement of competition law. It assesses their transferability for competition damages proceedings and attempts to test EU and national competition as well as procedural law boundaries more generally. The paper considers common grounds, advantages and disadvantages, as well as best practices in this context. It concludes with early proposals for including competition-expert lay judges in private enforcement of competition law.","PeriodicalId":36276,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48053609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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