Abstract The article thematizes the relevance of Paul Kahn’s conception of political sacrifice for contemporary constitutional studies. Kahn’s approach to political sacrifice is compared with another extremely influential theory of sacrifice, René Girard’s theory of sacrifice. The main aim is to show why Kahn’s view of sacrifice in constitutional orders escapes the logic of victimization that affects Girard’s seminal work, and it provides a better understanding of a political conception of modern constitutional orders. In the final section, the article shows that although Kahn’s version of political sacrifice is seen as the embodiment of the principle of sovereignty, it can be expanded beyond it.
{"title":"Beyond Victimization: On the Lasting Relevance of Political Sacrifice","authors":"M. Goldoni","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.39","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article thematizes the relevance of Paul Kahn’s conception of political sacrifice for contemporary constitutional studies. Kahn’s approach to political sacrifice is compared with another extremely influential theory of sacrifice, René Girard’s theory of sacrifice. The main aim is to show why Kahn’s view of sacrifice in constitutional orders escapes the logic of victimization that affects Girard’s seminal work, and it provides a better understanding of a political conception of modern constitutional orders. In the final section, the article shows that although Kahn’s version of political sacrifice is seen as the embodiment of the principle of sovereignty, it can be expanded beyond it.","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"646 - 656"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42422802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In recent years, the emerging field of comparative constitutional law has been swept by a new approach with a scientific allure known as the Large-N approach. The methodology of this approach requires flattening the world of constitutional law by reducing the meaning of constitutional determinations into countable data. One of the difficulties in resisting this trend is that while many constitutional scholars have offered accounts that do not flatten the world of constitutional law, their methodology remains unarticulated and rarely discussed. Paul Kahn is one of the few scholars who offered an account of how to conduct non-doctrinal research of constitutional law. This Article aims to distil several principles of Kahn’s methodology, discuss its limitations, and demonstrate why it is superior to the Large-N approach. To achieve these goals, I chose to focus on three books on the German constitutional system that are based on dissertations written at Yale University, where Kahn teaches. Based on my discussion of these three books, I argue that Kahn’s methodology offers an approach which I dub the “Rich Picture” approach (or Rich-P). The Rich-P approach exposes that participants in a constitutional discourses understand constitutional materials, such as constitutional documents or judicial opinions, through a conceptual array that varies between legal orders. Without acknowledging the conceptual “eyeglasses” we wear when investigating constitutional determinations, measurements of the entire world of constitutionalism may lead to catchy soundbites and tweets, but to conclusions that are misleading at best.
{"title":"The World of Constitutionalism is Not Flat","authors":"Or Bassok","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.47","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, the emerging field of comparative constitutional law has been swept by a new approach with a scientific allure known as the Large-N approach. The methodology of this approach requires flattening the world of constitutional law by reducing the meaning of constitutional determinations into countable data. One of the difficulties in resisting this trend is that while many constitutional scholars have offered accounts that do not flatten the world of constitutional law, their methodology remains unarticulated and rarely discussed. Paul Kahn is one of the few scholars who offered an account of how to conduct non-doctrinal research of constitutional law. This Article aims to distil several principles of Kahn’s methodology, discuss its limitations, and demonstrate why it is superior to the Large-N approach. To achieve these goals, I chose to focus on three books on the German constitutional system that are based on dissertations written at Yale University, where Kahn teaches. Based on my discussion of these three books, I argue that Kahn’s methodology offers an approach which I dub the “Rich Picture” approach (or Rich-P). The Rich-P approach exposes that participants in a constitutional discourses understand constitutional materials, such as constitutional documents or judicial opinions, through a conceptual array that varies between legal orders. Without acknowledging the conceptual “eyeglasses” we wear when investigating constitutional determinations, measurements of the entire world of constitutionalism may lead to catchy soundbites and tweets, but to conclusions that are misleading at best.","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"686 - 704"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47993720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. A Double Perspective The German Law Journal and Paul Kahn are no strangers to one another. In 2020, the Journal published an extended and highly informative interview with Kahn by Daniel Bonilla Maldonado on the very idea of the Cultural Analysis of Law that is so central to Kahn’s work.1 This Special Issue takes a deeper dive into many of the topics raised in that earlier interview. Originating in a two day Workshop in Glasgow in April 2022,2 the project brings together a number of scholars who either have a close scholarly connection with Kahn (as ex-students or academic interlocutors) or have been inspired by his work. We make no claim to be comprehensive in what we have produced, or as to who has been involved in its production. Over more than 30 years Kahn’s writings have been prodigious in quantity and dazzlingly diverse in their breadth.3 In the fullness of time, there will surely be more and more rounded studies of his important and highly distinctive corpus. It is hoped that the present collection will supply a foundation for any such future work. Hopefully too, its key themes and stresses indicate something of what makes Kahn’s work both important and distinctive. What are these themes? To begin with, the overall composition of the Special Issue reflects the double sense in which we should be interested in “the perspective of Paul Kahn.” For our editorial aim has been one both of detailed inquiry into the perspective of Kahn, and of the consideration and illumination of a number of topical questions on the relationship between law and political
{"title":"Law and Political Imagination: The Perspective of Paul Kahn","authors":"Neil Walker, M. Goldoni","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.41","url":null,"abstract":"A. A Double Perspective The German Law Journal and Paul Kahn are no strangers to one another. In 2020, the Journal published an extended and highly informative interview with Kahn by Daniel Bonilla Maldonado on the very idea of the Cultural Analysis of Law that is so central to Kahn’s work.1 This Special Issue takes a deeper dive into many of the topics raised in that earlier interview. Originating in a two day Workshop in Glasgow in April 2022,2 the project brings together a number of scholars who either have a close scholarly connection with Kahn (as ex-students or academic interlocutors) or have been inspired by his work. We make no claim to be comprehensive in what we have produced, or as to who has been involved in its production. Over more than 30 years Kahn’s writings have been prodigious in quantity and dazzlingly diverse in their breadth.3 In the fullness of time, there will surely be more and more rounded studies of his important and highly distinctive corpus. It is hoped that the present collection will supply a foundation for any such future work. Hopefully too, its key themes and stresses indicate something of what makes Kahn’s work both important and distinctive. What are these themes? To begin with, the overall composition of the Special Issue reflects the double sense in which we should be interested in “the perspective of Paul Kahn.” For our editorial aim has been one both of detailed inquiry into the perspective of Kahn, and of the consideration and illumination of a number of topical questions on the relationship between law and political","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"619 - 622"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43613926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What can the cultural study of law tell us about the European Union (EU)? How can we study the European political imagination? This paper demonstrates that the European political imagination is both composite and multifaceted. It is structured not merely by EU law but also by the constitutional orders of the EU Member States. A cultural analysis of European law must therefore include the constitutional worldviews of the Member States. In the political imagination of most of the Member States, “Europe” plays an important symbolic role. Yet since the Member States are shaped by different ‘varieties of constitutionalism’, the meaning ascribed to “Europe” is not uniform. The study of the constitutional worldviews of the Member States, however, should not come at the expense of studying the European political imagination sustained by EU institutions. This political imagination is currently undergoing a transformation. EU authority is increasingly legitimized by appealing to the “the people of Europe” and there are calls for “European sovereignty.” This emerging European political imagination transcends the dominant view of the literature where Europe is understood as a space of “post-sovereignty.”
{"title":"Imagining Europe","authors":"S. Larsen","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.37","url":null,"abstract":"What can the cultural study of law tell us about the European Union (EU)? How can we study the European political imagination? This paper demonstrates that the European political imagination is both composite and multifaceted. It is structured not merely by EU law but also by the constitutional orders of the EU Member States. A cultural analysis of European law must therefore include the constitutional worldviews of the Member States. In the political imagination of most of the Member States, “Europe” plays an important symbolic role. Yet since the Member States are shaped by different ‘varieties of constitutionalism’, the meaning ascribed to “Europe” is not uniform. The study of the constitutional worldviews of the Member States, however, should not come at the expense of studying the European political imagination sustained by EU institutions. This political imagination is currently undergoing a transformation. EU authority is increasingly legitimized by appealing to the “the people of Europe” and there are calls for “European sovereignty.” This emerging European political imagination transcends the dominant view of the literature where Europe is understood as a space of “post-sovereignty.”","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"705 - 717"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49088981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Paul Kahn has offered a fascinating account of the role of political theology in the field of law, through an exploration of some core concepts of the discipline. This article explores the nature of Kahn’s undertaking through a comparison with Carl Schmitt. The conclusion is that, rather than actual theology, Kahn’s “political theology” is a valuable form of legal anthropology anchored in an exploration of our legal culture.
{"title":"God and Paul Kahn (A Note on Political Theology)","authors":"D. Baranger","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.46","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Paul Kahn has offered a fascinating account of the role of political theology in the field of law, through an exploration of some core concepts of the discipline. This article explores the nature of Kahn’s undertaking through a comparison with Carl Schmitt. The conclusion is that, rather than actual theology, Kahn’s “political theology” is a valuable form of legal anthropology anchored in an exploration of our legal culture.","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"637 - 645"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42619572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In the context of growing anxieties regarding the place and role of law in the future of the Europe Union (EU), this article reflects upon the extent to which Paul Kahn’s cultural study of law’s rule could be relevant for the place and role of EU law in these respects. Drawing upon Kahn’s monograph Making the Case: The Art of the Judicial Opinion, this article analyses the Laval judgment for these purposes, as one of the most controversial cases ever decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). On this basis, the article shows how the cultural analysis of law advanced by Kahn can help us to sharpen our sensibilities with regard to the deeper layers of moral and political meaning that EU law expounds and to thereby enable us to expand our horizons as well as conversations on the socio-political and economic composition of EU law. Yet this article also raises skepticism about the cultural study of EU law’s rule. Given the diverse cultural idiosyncrasies and traditions by which citizens of EU Member States live, it questions whether EU law can be assessed from the point of view of a collective identity believed to best persuade EU citizens of the authority of EU law.
{"title":"Kahn in Luxembourg: A Prolegomena to the Cultural Study of EU Law","authors":"S. Mair","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.42","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the context of growing anxieties regarding the place and role of law in the future of the Europe Union (EU), this article reflects upon the extent to which Paul Kahn’s cultural study of law’s rule could be relevant for the place and role of EU law in these respects. Drawing upon Kahn’s monograph Making the Case: The Art of the Judicial Opinion, this article analyses the Laval judgment for these purposes, as one of the most controversial cases ever decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). On this basis, the article shows how the cultural analysis of law advanced by Kahn can help us to sharpen our sensibilities with regard to the deeper layers of moral and political meaning that EU law expounds and to thereby enable us to expand our horizons as well as conversations on the socio-political and economic composition of EU law. Yet this article also raises skepticism about the cultural study of EU law’s rule. Given the diverse cultural idiosyncrasies and traditions by which citizens of EU Member States live, it questions whether EU law can be assessed from the point of view of a collective identity believed to best persuade EU citizens of the authority of EU law.","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"735 - 751"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42493926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article centers on the idea that there is a non-fungible value inherent in local associations. It uses the work of Paul Kahn to animate what that value might be and to consider why law might not have a clear sightline to it. In Democracy in Our America, Kahn, leaning on Tocqueville’s earlier work, reflects on the nature of volunteerism in local self-government and the value of local associations. Drawing on his experience-based account of the practice of local self-government, I suggest that local associations have a non-fungible value which comes in three dimensions: The dimension of care, the dimension of character, and the dimension of forum vibrancy. In The Cultural Study of Law, meanwhile, Kahn considers what the practice of the rule of law looks like and suggests that law is blind to other possible ways of framing and analyzing events. Building on this perspective, I reflect on how the practice of the rule of law ends up being blind to the value that is intrinsic to the local associations that vivify local communities. Through this lens, we can also understand more fully than has been possible to date why legal codifications of the principle of subsidiarity fail to result in a genuine preference for proximity.
{"title":"The Non-Fungible Value of Local Associations and its Invisibility to Law","authors":"Maria Cahill","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.40","url":null,"abstract":"This article centers on the idea that there is a non-fungible value inherent in local associations. It uses the work of Paul Kahn to animate what that value might be and to consider why law might not have a clear sightline to it. In Democracy in Our America, Kahn, leaning on Tocqueville’s earlier work, reflects on the nature of volunteerism in local self-government and the value of local associations. Drawing on his experience-based account of the practice of local self-government, I suggest that local associations have a non-fungible value which comes in three dimensions: The dimension of care, the dimension of character, and the dimension of forum vibrancy. In The Cultural Study of Law, meanwhile, Kahn considers what the practice of the rule of law looks like and suggests that law is blind to other possible ways of framing and analyzing events. Building on this perspective, I reflect on how the practice of the rule of law ends up being blind to the value that is intrinsic to the local associations that vivify local communities. Through this lens, we can also understand more fully than has been possible to date why legal codifications of the principle of subsidiarity fail to result in a genuine preference for proximity.","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"672 - 685"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45825366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article offers a reading of Paul Kahn’s Democracy in Our America that places this intimate “work of local political theory” in a central position in the landscape of his political thought. The article argues that the figure of the volunteer, as it appears in the volume, holds a space for love and meaning—and for political happiness—that secures for it a critical role in the system of beliefs and practices that sustain self-government in the United States. That framing draws the volunteer into relationship with Kahn’s thinking about the family, the veteran, and law. But it also means that the erosion of the volunteer spirit that Kahn traces in his own New England town of Killingworth, Connecticut, is best understood as the loss of the site of action that reflects a reaching for political meaning beyond self-interest and, with it, the loss of the possibility of self-government. Reading the volunteer as a powerful placeholder for the erotic at the heart of the political—and then tracing eros and happiness through Plato, Freud, and Arendt—this article reconstructs Kahn’s link between our unhappy lives and our unhappy politics.
{"title":"Political Theory and the Volunteer: Lessons from Kahn’s Ethnography of ‘Our Unhappy Politics’","authors":"Benjamin L. Berger","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.38","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article offers a reading of Paul Kahn’s Democracy in Our America that places this intimate “work of local political theory” in a central position in the landscape of his political thought. The article argues that the figure of the volunteer, as it appears in the volume, holds a space for love and meaning—and for political happiness—that secures for it a critical role in the system of beliefs and practices that sustain self-government in the United States. That framing draws the volunteer into relationship with Kahn’s thinking about the family, the veteran, and law. But it also means that the erosion of the volunteer spirit that Kahn traces in his own New England town of Killingworth, Connecticut, is best understood as the loss of the site of action that reflects a reaching for political meaning beyond self-interest and, with it, the loss of the possibility of self-government. Reading the volunteer as a powerful placeholder for the erotic at the heart of the political—and then tracing eros and happiness through Plato, Freud, and Arendt—this article reconstructs Kahn’s link between our unhappy lives and our unhappy politics.","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"657 - 671"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46256664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the extent to which key normative and institutional responses to the challenges raised by the digital age are compatible with, or interact with, changes in key features of the existing international human rights law (IHRL) framework. Furthermore, the article claims that the IHRL framework is already changing, partly due to its interaction with digital human rights. This moving normative landscape creates new opportunities for promoting human rights in the digital age, but might also raise new concerns about the political acceptability of IHRL. Following an introduction, Section B of the article will describe the development of digital human rights, using a “three generations” typology. Section C will explain how new developments in the field of digital human rights coincide with broader developments in IHRL, including: the extra-territorial application of human rights, obligations on governments to actively regulate private businesses and the erosion of normative boundaries separating specific human rights treaties from other parts of IHRL and international law. These two segments are followed by concluding remarks.
{"title":"Digital Rights and the Outer Limits of International Human Rights Law","authors":"Y. Shany","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.35","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the extent to which key normative and institutional responses to the challenges raised by the digital age are compatible with, or interact with, changes in key features of the existing international human rights law (IHRL) framework. Furthermore, the article claims that the IHRL framework is already changing, partly due to its interaction with digital human rights. This moving normative landscape creates new opportunities for promoting human rights in the digital age, but might also raise new concerns about the political acceptability of IHRL. Following an introduction, Section B of the article will describe the development of digital human rights, using a “three generations” typology. Section C will explain how new developments in the field of digital human rights coincide with broader developments in IHRL, including: the extra-territorial application of human rights, obligations on governments to actively regulate private businesses and the erosion of normative boundaries separating specific human rights treaties from other parts of IHRL and international law. These two segments are followed by concluding remarks.","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"461 - 472"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45342797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract It is increasingly clear that autonomous agents can commit international crimes such as torture and genocide. This article aims to construct ‘electronic liability’ for such international crimes. It will argue that it is not sufficient to hold the persons or programmers behind the autonomous agents liable, but that it should be possible to hold the autonomous agents that commit international crimes liable. It will examine ways in which legal personality can be attributed to machines and argue that if there is a continuum of potential subjects of ICL, then the argument for electronic personhood and liability of machines is as compelling as for other non-humans such as corporate entities and animals. It will be argued that the ICC will potentially only be able to meaningfully prosecute international crimes committed by autonomous agents if it is willing to accommodate strict liability and other faultless models of liability that have so far been anathema to international criminal justice.
{"title":"Constructing “Electronic Liability” for International Crimes: Transcending the Individual in International Criminal Law","authors":"M. Swart","doi":"10.1017/glj.2023.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.28","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is increasingly clear that autonomous agents can commit international crimes such as torture and genocide. This article aims to construct ‘electronic liability’ for such international crimes. It will argue that it is not sufficient to hold the persons or programmers behind the autonomous agents liable, but that it should be possible to hold the autonomous agents that commit international crimes liable. It will examine ways in which legal personality can be attributed to machines and argue that if there is a continuum of potential subjects of ICL, then the argument for electronic personhood and liability of machines is as compelling as for other non-humans such as corporate entities and animals. It will be argued that the ICC will potentially only be able to meaningfully prosecute international crimes committed by autonomous agents if it is willing to accommodate strict liability and other faultless models of liability that have so far been anathema to international criminal justice.","PeriodicalId":36303,"journal":{"name":"German Law Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":"589 - 602"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41329512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：