Pub Date : 2023-02-21DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3783
Mariya Omelicheva
Between March and December of 2020, more than three dozen states received various types of COVID-19 assistance from Moscow. The Russian government emphasized a humanitarian character of what has become the largest package of emergency aid since Russia’s independence. The Western governments and commentators cautioned that Moscow had strategic and nefarious motives in choosing the recipients of its coronavirus aid. This study theorizes humanitarian aid allocations by authoritarian states and tests theoretical expectations using novel data on Russia’s COVID-19 aid allocations. Far from being driven by humanitarian concerns, Russia has used humanitarian assistance for projecting power on the global stage and supporting diverse political objectives. Moscow’s use of humanitarian aid for geopolitical benefits has not been a critical disruptor in the humanitarian system by itself. However, jointly with other instruments of foreign policy, Russia’s approaches to humanitarianism can be detrimental to the future of the international humanitarian system.
{"title":"A “Good” Samaritan? The Geopolitics of Russia’s Covid-19 Assistance","authors":"Mariya Omelicheva","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3783","url":null,"abstract":"Between March and December of 2020, more than three dozen states received various types of COVID-19 assistance from Moscow. The Russian government emphasized a humanitarian character of what has become the largest package of emergency aid since Russia’s independence. The Western governments and commentators cautioned that Moscow had strategic and nefarious motives in choosing the recipients of its coronavirus aid. This study theorizes humanitarian aid allocations by authoritarian states and tests theoretical expectations using novel data on Russia’s COVID-19 aid allocations. Far from being driven by humanitarian concerns, Russia has used humanitarian assistance for projecting power on the global stage and supporting diverse political objectives. Moscow’s use of humanitarian aid for geopolitical benefits has not been a critical disruptor in the humanitarian system by itself. However, jointly with other instruments of foreign policy, Russia’s approaches to humanitarianism can be detrimental to the future of the international humanitarian system.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41253672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-21DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3779
A. Demchuk, V. Kapitsyn, A. Karateev
Based on empirical quantitative data, the article provides a comparative analysis of existing studies of the policy of countering COVID-19 infection in selected European Union countries and Russia, the specifics of restrictive governmental measures (including institutional dimension), and also provides a quantitative analysis of the relationship between the severity of epidemiological situation in a particular country, the stringency of governmental response measures, and the institutional characteristics of the country (including the quality of healthcare, management, the level of public trust in the government, value orientations, etc.), which determine the specifics of measures taken and their effectiveness. Using the developed index of the severity of the epidemiological situation, institutional characteristics that most affect the effectiveness of the measures applied and, if possible, allow combining the relatively easy passage of the pandemic with relatively lax measures were identified.
{"title":"Restrictive COVID-19 policies in selected EU countries and Russia: an Institutional Approach","authors":"A. Demchuk, V. Kapitsyn, A. Karateev","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3779","url":null,"abstract":"Based on empirical quantitative data, the article provides a comparative analysis of existing studies of the policy of countering COVID-19 infection in selected European Union countries and Russia, the specifics of restrictive governmental measures (including institutional dimension), and also provides a quantitative analysis of the relationship between the severity of epidemiological situation in a particular country, the stringency of governmental response measures, and the institutional characteristics of the country (including the quality of healthcare, management, the level of public trust in the government, value orientations, etc.), which determine the specifics of measures taken and their effectiveness. Using the developed index of the severity of the epidemiological situation, institutional characteristics that most affect the effectiveness of the measures applied and, if possible, allow combining the relatively easy passage of the pandemic with relatively lax measures were identified.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47273121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-21DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3955
Matthew Blackburn, Derek S. Hutcheson, Elena Tsumarova, B. Petersson
As was the case with other federal states, Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility to regional governors. Contrary to the common highly centralized governance in Russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. Using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across Russia. It examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the Russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk. There are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government.
{"title":"Covid-19 and the Russian Regional Response","authors":"Matthew Blackburn, Derek S. Hutcheson, Elena Tsumarova, B. Petersson","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3955","url":null,"abstract":"As was the case with other federal states, Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility to regional governors. Contrary to the common highly centralized governance in Russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. Using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across Russia. It examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the Russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk. There are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48253681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-23DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v15i2.3330
Dong Tu, Lukasz Zamecki
The aim of this paper is to examine questions that have not yet been researched thoroughly: how are the positions of the RRPs on China shaping and changing, what causes such differing positions on China among these RPPs, and have there been any changes in their approach to China in the times of COVID-19? This paper aims to answer these questions by analyzing the policies toward China of said political parties (primarily, the Hungarian Fidesz, Italian Lega Nord, French Rassemblement National, but also parties such as the British UKIP, the PiS, Dutch PVV, and the German AfD). The paper underlines that RPPs’ policies on China are formulated basing on what they perceive the development of international politics can do “for the people”. Their attitudes depend mainly on their stance toward free-market globalization, their need for alternatives in relations with the US and the EU, and their axiological perception of China.
{"title":"European Right-Wing Populist Parties’ Approach toward China: Between Anti-Globalization and Appeal for Diversified International Partnerships","authors":"Dong Tu, Lukasz Zamecki","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v15i2.3330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v15i2.3330","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to examine questions that have not yet been researched thoroughly: how are the positions of the RRPs on China shaping and changing, what causes such differing positions on China among these RPPs, and have there been any changes in their approach to China in the times of COVID-19? This paper aims to answer these questions by analyzing the policies toward China of said political parties (primarily, the Hungarian Fidesz, Italian Lega Nord, French Rassemblement National, but also parties such as the British UKIP, the PiS, Dutch PVV, and the German AfD). The paper underlines that RPPs’ policies on China are formulated basing on what they perceive the development of international politics can do “for the people”. Their attitudes depend mainly on their stance toward free-market globalization, their need for alternatives in relations with the US and the EU, and their axiological perception of China.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44788614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-23DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v15i2.3284
Sean Havel
As of 2021, the European Union (EU) is now a foundational part of Europe’s defense architecture, with programmes such as PESCO now enabling the EU to organise civil-military responses to crise and coordinate the defense-planning cycles of 25 European countries. This article asks why EU member states have opted to use the EU to enable their capabilities and manage ongoing security crises? In answering this question, the article uses a pluralistic reading, utilising realist and liberal-intergovernmentalist frameworks to assess complementary hypotheses for this cooperation. The second part assesses the state of the international system, concluding its increasing insecurity has prompted a collective awareness that a more strategic response to collective security is necessary. The third part evaluates the role of the political and economic balance of bargaining power between EU member states, assessing Germany, France, and Poland as case studies. The paper concludes briefly on the implications of this cooperation and the need for pluralistic readings of EU defense cooperation.
{"title":"Strategic Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?","authors":"Sean Havel","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v15i2.3284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v15i2.3284","url":null,"abstract":"As of 2021, the European Union (EU) is now a foundational part of Europe’s defense architecture, with programmes such as PESCO now enabling the EU to organise civil-military responses to crise and coordinate the defense-planning cycles of 25 European countries. This article asks why EU member states have opted to use the EU to enable their capabilities and manage ongoing security crises? In answering this question, the article uses a pluralistic reading, utilising realist and liberal-intergovernmentalist frameworks to assess complementary hypotheses for this cooperation. The second part assesses the state of the international system, concluding its increasing insecurity has prompted a collective awareness that a more strategic response to collective security is necessary. The third part evaluates the role of the political and economic balance of bargaining power between EU member states, assessing Germany, France, and Poland as case studies. The paper concludes briefly on the implications of this cooperation and the need for pluralistic readings of EU defense cooperation.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44329331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-20DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v15i1.3288
Leah Rasmussen
Russia’s relationship with nation is marred by contradictions that stem from its place in comparison to the West. Cultural nationalism in artistic production originated with the arrival of the Peredvizhniki [Wanderers] in the 1870s. Moscow merchant Pavel Tretyakov, in collecting Russian and European art, openly embraced a nation that encompassed Western ideas in conjunction with distinctly Russian themes. The unparalleled collecting of French modern art by Moscow merchants Sergei Shchukin and Ivan Morozov in the early 20th century continued this embrace. The nature of their collected paintings produced shockwaves in late tsarist and Soviet society and politics before being inculcated into Russian national identity in the 21st century. This article explores the life of Henri Matisse’s The Dance (1909), commissioned by Sergei Shchukin. It follows the work across time and regimes as it assumes pride of place in not only Russia’s national collections but also within its identity. Through a focus on the 2008 exhibition From Russia at the Royal Academy of Arts in London, this article examines Russia’s relations and protection of this work to understand, why even as the country seeks to define itself once more actively through its opposition to the West, their cultural diplomacy speaks to an openness built on a transnational history of the most prized works in their national collections.
{"title":"Curating Russia: The Shchukin Collection, Nationalism, and Border Crossing from Lenin to Putin","authors":"Leah Rasmussen","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v15i1.3288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v15i1.3288","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s relationship with nation is marred by contradictions that stem from its place in comparison to the West. Cultural nationalism in artistic production originated with the arrival of the Peredvizhniki [Wanderers] in the 1870s. Moscow merchant Pavel Tretyakov, in collecting Russian and European art, openly embraced a nation that encompassed Western ideas in conjunction with distinctly Russian themes. The unparalleled collecting of French modern art by Moscow merchants Sergei Shchukin and Ivan Morozov in the early 20th century continued this embrace. The nature of their collected paintings produced shockwaves in late tsarist and Soviet society and politics before being inculcated into Russian national identity in the 21st century. This article explores the life of Henri Matisse’s The Dance (1909), commissioned by Sergei Shchukin. It follows the work across time and regimes as it assumes pride of place in not only Russia’s national collections but also within its identity. Through a focus on the 2008 exhibition From Russia at the Royal Academy of Arts in London, this article examines Russia’s relations and protection of this work to understand, why even as the country seeks to define itself once more actively through its opposition to the West, their cultural diplomacy speaks to an openness built on a transnational history of the most prized works in their national collections.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48015078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-20DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v15i1.2815
Debanjali Ghosh
Ever since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Europe has experienced a huge influx of refugees, which has led to demographic and social changes and created fears about the erosion of the European civilisation and Christian values. The Continent has also experienced several Islamic terrorist attacks- like those in Paris, London, Brussels and Berlin. This, coupled with the rise of the right-wing in Europe, has led to increasing xeno-racism, particularly of an Islamophobic variety that has resulted in the creation of an environment of intolerance and exclusion. At times this has manifested itself as outright hostility towards the Muslim community through hate crimes which take the form of physical and verbal attacks on visibly identifiable and more tangible symbols of Islam like hijabs, headscarves, burkhas and mosques. Yet, most of these hate crimes remain unreported and unaddressed. The European Union (EU) is a one of a kind post-modern entity professing values of equality, democracy and human rights. Given this commitment, this paper attempts to take stock of the EU’s response to rising xeno-racism with particular attention to Islamophobia and the Member States’ attempts to grapple with the same.
{"title":"European Union’s Response to Rising Xeno-Racism in Europe","authors":"Debanjali Ghosh","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v15i1.2815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v15i1.2815","url":null,"abstract":"Ever since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Europe has experienced a huge influx of refugees, which has led to demographic and social changes and created fears about the erosion of the European civilisation and Christian values. The Continent has also experienced several Islamic terrorist attacks- like those in Paris, London, Brussels and Berlin. This, coupled with the rise of the right-wing in Europe, has led to increasing xeno-racism, particularly of an Islamophobic variety that has resulted in the creation of an environment of intolerance and exclusion. At times this has manifested itself as outright hostility towards the Muslim community through hate crimes which take the form of physical and verbal attacks on visibly identifiable and more tangible symbols of Islam like hijabs, headscarves, burkhas and mosques. Yet, most of these hate crimes remain unreported and unaddressed. The European Union (EU) is a one of a kind post-modern entity professing values of equality, democracy and human rights. Given this commitment, this paper attempts to take stock of the EU’s response to rising xeno-racism with particular attention to Islamophobia and the Member States’ attempts to grapple with the same.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49492638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-20DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v15i1.3286
Alexandra Yao
In 2003 Yukos, the largest private oil company in Russia at the time, was in the middle of merger talks with ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil, an unprecedented deal which would have created the largest oil company in the world. The other shoe dropped when later that year, Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of tax fraud. Yukos was sold for parts in court-mandated auctions and through a series of manoeuvres, eventually acquired by state oil company Rosneft. Since Yukos was auctioned off at staggeringly low prices, Yukos shareholders suffered a tremendous loss of capital and have since appealed to the international courts. For nearly two decades, the shareholders and the Russian government have continued to overturn and reinstate compensation rulings of a $50 billion payout in international courts. My research question is: what are the implications of the recent constitutional changes on authoritarian constitutionalism in Russia and judicial pragmatism between the RCC and the state? This paper is threefold: In Part I, I trace the authoritarian constitutionalism balancing act in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In Part II, I trace key developments of the Yukos trials and the immediate responsive constitutional changes in Russia to argue that the Yukos trials were the elephant in the room in major Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) decisions. In Part III, I illustrate the severity of the recent constitutional changes in Russia for judicial independence. I argue that the constitutional changes accelerated by the Yukos trials have offset the RCC’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism with the state by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary.
{"title":"The Impact of the 2020 Constitutional Changes on Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Russia: Judicial Pragmatism Between the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) and the State","authors":"Alexandra Yao","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v15i1.3286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v15i1.3286","url":null,"abstract":"In 2003 Yukos, the largest private oil company in Russia at the time, was in the middle of merger talks with ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil, an unprecedented deal which would have created the largest oil company in the world. The other shoe dropped when later that year, Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of tax fraud. Yukos was sold for parts in court-mandated auctions and through a series of manoeuvres, eventually acquired by state oil company Rosneft. Since Yukos was auctioned off at staggeringly low prices, Yukos shareholders suffered a tremendous loss of capital and have since appealed to the international courts. For nearly two decades, the shareholders and the Russian government have continued to overturn and reinstate compensation rulings of a $50 billion payout in international courts. \u0000My research question is: what are the implications of the recent constitutional changes on authoritarian constitutionalism in Russia and judicial pragmatism between the RCC and the state? \u0000This paper is threefold: In Part I, I trace the authoritarian constitutionalism balancing act in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In Part II, I trace key developments of the Yukos trials and the immediate responsive constitutional changes in Russia to argue that the Yukos trials were the elephant in the room in major Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) decisions. In Part III, I illustrate the severity of the recent constitutional changes in Russia for judicial independence. \u0000I argue that the constitutional changes accelerated by the Yukos trials have offset the RCC’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism with the state by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48162411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-27DOI: 10.22215/CJERS.V14I2.2764
H. Clarke, Jon H. Pammett
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN RECENT BRITISH AND CANADIAN ELECTIONS The 2019 elections in Britain and Canada illustrate the difficulties in communication between a concerned public and prospective office-holders on the most critical set of issues of our times. An increased level of public awareness and concern about the state of the environment has been expressed in public opinion polls, social movement activity has increased, and Green parties have expanded their appeal. Despite these developments in recent years, environmental issues have not been able to exert a major impact on individual voting behaviour in elections, or on overall election outcomes. Issues related to the environment are usually treated, by both politicians and the public, in valence terms. Valence issues are ones upon which there is broad consensus about the goals of public policy, and political debate focuses not on "what to accomplish" but rather on "how to do it" and "who is best able." Regarding the environment, general formulations like global warming and climate change prompt politicians to offer concerned rhetoric and engage in virtue signaling, but specific policy proposals are often absent. This paper examines four reasons why environmental/climate change issues did not have a major impact on the 2019 Canadian and British elections. First, environmental concern in society at large was imperfectly translated into election issues. Second, the major political parties produced inadequate and unconvincing environmental manifestos. Third, environmental issues were not central to most voting decisions. Fourth, environmental issues had limited impacts on election outcomes.
{"title":"Environmental Issues in Recent British and Canadian Elections","authors":"H. Clarke, Jon H. Pammett","doi":"10.22215/CJERS.V14I2.2764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/CJERS.V14I2.2764","url":null,"abstract":"ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN RECENT BRITISH AND CANADIAN ELECTIONS \u0000 \u0000 The 2019 elections in Britain and Canada illustrate the difficulties in communication between a concerned public and prospective office-holders on the most critical set of issues of our times. An increased level of public awareness and concern about the state of the environment has been expressed in public opinion polls, social movement activity has increased, and Green parties have expanded their appeal. Despite these developments in recent years, environmental issues have not been able to exert a major impact on individual voting behaviour in elections, or on overall election outcomes. Issues related to the environment are usually treated, by both politicians and the public, in valence terms. Valence issues are ones upon which there is broad consensus about the goals of public policy, and political debate focuses not on \"what to accomplish\" but rather on \"how to do it\" and \"who is best able.\" Regarding the environment, general formulations like global warming and climate change prompt politicians to offer concerned rhetoric and engage in virtue signaling, but specific policy proposals are often absent. \u0000 This paper examines four reasons why environmental/climate change issues did not have a major impact on the 2019 Canadian and British elections. First, environmental concern in society at large was imperfectly translated into election issues. Second, the major political parties produced inadequate and unconvincing environmental manifestos. Third, environmental issues were not central to most voting decisions. Fourth, environmental issues had limited impacts on election outcomes.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44357684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-27DOI: 10.22215/CJERS.V14I2.2766
S. Schott, M. Schreurs
Canada and Germany are both pursuing major energy transitions and far-reaching climate programs but differ in terms of policies towards some energy sources and their preferred policy instruments. Both countries have committed to large scale emission reductions despite the challenge of regional divestment from fossil fuels: hard coal in North Rhine Westphalia and the Saarland; lignite in the Rhineland, on the German-Polish border in the Lusatsia (Lausitz) region, and in central Germany; coal in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia; and oil in Western Canada. We contrast the current Pan Canadian framework (PCF) on Clean Growth and Climate Change to the German Climate Law and the European Green Deal setting targets to become climate neutral by 2050. Germany has plans for a dual phase out of nuclear energy by 2022 and coal by 2038. In contrast, Canada differs by province in terms of policies on fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Both are leaders in renewable energies, but differ in the type of renewable energy which dominates. We further examine the international action components of the PCF and its implications for collaboration with Germany and the EU. We discuss potential partnerships and strategic alliances between Canada and Germany in the context of their mutual interest to enable an energy transition and to lead to the implementation of the Paris agreement for climate change action. We identify political challenges within each federation, and especially the approach to impacted coal regions in Germany and Poland as well as the Canadian oil sands. Barriers to progress for meeting identified targets and timelines are considered. We conclude with insights on the possibility and likelihood of linking policies and regulatory measures across the Atlantic, and the political threats of advancing towards decarbonization and an energy transition away from fossil fuels in each jurisdiction.
{"title":"Climate and Energy Politics in Canada and Germany: Dealing with Fossil Fuel Legacies","authors":"S. Schott, M. Schreurs","doi":"10.22215/CJERS.V14I2.2766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/CJERS.V14I2.2766","url":null,"abstract":"Canada and Germany are both pursuing major energy transitions and far-reaching climate programs but differ in terms of policies towards some energy sources and their preferred policy instruments. Both countries have committed to large scale emission reductions despite the challenge of regional divestment from fossil fuels: hard coal in North Rhine Westphalia and the Saarland; lignite in the Rhineland, on the German-Polish border in the Lusatsia (Lausitz) region, and in central Germany; coal in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia; and oil in Western Canada. We contrast the current Pan Canadian framework (PCF) on Clean Growth and Climate Change to the German Climate Law and the European Green Deal setting targets to become climate neutral by 2050. Germany has plans for a dual phase out of nuclear energy by 2022 and coal by 2038. In contrast, Canada differs by province in terms of policies on fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Both are leaders in renewable energies, but differ in the type of renewable energy which dominates. We further examine the international action components of the PCF and its implications for collaboration with Germany and the EU. We discuss potential partnerships and strategic alliances between Canada and Germany in the context of their mutual interest to enable an energy transition and to lead to the implementation of the Paris agreement for climate change action. We identify political challenges within each federation, and especially the approach to impacted coal regions in Germany and Poland as well as the Canadian oil sands. Barriers to progress for meeting identified targets and timelines are considered. We conclude with insights on the possibility and likelihood of linking policies and regulatory measures across the Atlantic, and the political threats of advancing towards decarbonization and an energy transition away from fossil fuels in each jurisdiction.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"29-55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47364391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}