Pub Date : 2023-12-18DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4097
Alo Raun
This study of 28 post-communist regimes distinguishes a group of countries significantly less democratic than predicted by its very high Human Development Index score: Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. It also appears that, contrary to theoretical assumptions, such ‘developed dictatorships’ convert their economic growth into human development remarkably well. To measure such conversion, a new tool, the Growth Conversion Index is introduced. Considering these results, the explanatory power of several theories is briefly examined. While some theories imply possible explanations (e.g., the concept of patronal politics and the conditional approach to resource dependence), none of them discloses sufficiently the actual workings of such conversion mechanism, implying the need for more in-depth studies.
{"title":"Too Much Development or Not Enough Democracy? Exploring an Anomaly in the Democratization of Post-Communist Countries","authors":"Alo Raun","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4097","url":null,"abstract":"This study of 28 post-communist regimes distinguishes a group of countries significantly less democratic than predicted by its very high Human Development Index score: Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. It also appears that, contrary to theoretical assumptions, such ‘developed dictatorships’ convert their economic growth into human development remarkably well. To measure such conversion, a new tool, the Growth Conversion Index is introduced. Considering these results, the explanatory power of several theories is briefly examined. While some theories imply possible explanations (e.g., the concept of patronal politics and the conditional approach to resource dependence), none of them discloses sufficiently the actual workings of such conversion mechanism, implying the need for more in-depth studies.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"163 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139174318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-18DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4034
A. Schwartz, Christabelle Sethna, Danielle Lyn Carron
Drawing from two published literary narratives, the German wartime diary by Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, and the novel based on women’s testimonies of war rape and unwanted pregnancies in Bosnia by Slavenka Drakulić, S.: A Novel About the Balkans, in addition to published testimonies and unpublished interview data by now young adult (in the case of Bosnia) and elderly (in the case of Germany) children born of war rape (CBOWR), this article examines the intergenerational impact of wartime sexual violence. Applying feminist narrative analysis, the authors demonstrate the situation of “impossible motherhood” and experiences of children who were not supposed to be born. The article focuses on the narrative process marked by trauma but also by agency and resilience so as to challenge dominant stories of war and unwanted pregnancy following rape in armed conflict. The authors propose a resolution of tensions around the ethnic identity of CBOWR along their maternal lineage rather than the imposition of the paternal heritage of the enemy.
{"title":"Not Supposed to be Born?","authors":"A. Schwartz, Christabelle Sethna, Danielle Lyn Carron","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4034","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing from two published literary narratives, the German wartime diary by Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, and the novel based on women’s testimonies of war rape and unwanted pregnancies in Bosnia by Slavenka Drakulić, S.: A Novel About the Balkans, in addition to published testimonies and unpublished interview data by now young adult (in the case of Bosnia) and elderly (in the case of Germany) children born of war rape (CBOWR), this article examines the intergenerational impact of wartime sexual violence. Applying feminist narrative analysis, the authors demonstrate the situation of “impossible motherhood” and experiences of children who were not supposed to be born. The article focuses on the narrative process marked by trauma but also by agency and resilience so as to challenge dominant stories of war and unwanted pregnancy following rape in armed conflict. The authors propose a resolution of tensions around the ethnic identity of CBOWR along their maternal lineage rather than the imposition of the paternal heritage of the enemy.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"9 36","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138995515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-18DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4479
Sofya du Boulay
{"title":"Bo Petersson, The Putin Predicament: Problems of Legitimacy and Succession in Russia","authors":"Sofya du Boulay","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i3.4479","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"79 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139173729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-18DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i3.3727
Attila Antal
We live in an era of overlapping states of exceptions: the climate and ecological emergency, the permanent crisis of global capitalism, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the Hungarian political regime, this paper investigates how and why exceptional measures restructure our life. It can be argued that the main outcome of the exceptional measures is the rise of a new executive power, and it is demonstrated how heavily authoritarian regimes rely on the state of exception. It has been argued here that behind the strengthening of the emergency power there is the new rise of unlimited executive power, which is nothing more than the legal and political fulfilment of two-thirds majority power. Upon the case of the permanent state of exception of the Orbán regime, it can be said that the COVID-19 as an epidemiological crisis cannot be traced back to the Orbán administration, but the executive power has found a way to create a new political crisis based on the epidemic. The paper briefly discusses the impact of the 2022 Hungarian national election campaign period and the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 on the Hungarian emergency powers.
{"title":"Emergency Power in Hungary and the COVID-19","authors":"Attila Antal","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i3.3727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i3.3727","url":null,"abstract":"We live in an era of overlapping states of exceptions: the climate and ecological emergency, the permanent crisis of global capitalism, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the Hungarian political regime, this paper investigates how and why exceptional measures restructure our life. It can be argued that the main outcome of the exceptional measures is the rise of a new executive power, and it is demonstrated how heavily authoritarian regimes rely on the state of exception. It has been argued here that behind the strengthening of the emergency power there is the new rise of unlimited executive power, which is nothing more than the legal and political fulfilment of two-thirds majority power. Upon the case of the permanent state of exception of the Orbán regime, it can be said that the COVID-19 as an epidemiological crisis cannot be traced back to the Orbán administration, but the executive power has found a way to create a new political crisis based on the epidemic. The paper briefly discusses the impact of the 2022 Hungarian national election campaign period and the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 on the Hungarian emergency powers.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":" 21","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138994988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4148
T. Casier
This paper argues that to understand the invasion of Ukraine, we need to have better insights into the Kremlin’s particular world view and Russia’s place within it. This view is based on a sense of entitlement to great power status, going hand in hand with an identity of itself as a country that extends beyond the actual borders of the Russian Federation. What makes the position unique is that the geopolitical and identity arguments are inseparable: in the Kremlin’s world view, Russia can only be a great power if it also exists as greater Russia. This structural factor is labelled the geopolitics-identity nexus. To explain why the invasion happened in 2022, three additional process factors are outlined: a radicalisation of the view of Ukraine as Russian lands, driven by the feeling of existential crisis when tensions over Ukraine escalated in 2014; an escalation of policy options resulting from consecutive failures in Russia’s Ukraine policy; and a reversal of the argument that Russia has to be a great power to exist within its 1991 borders into an argument that Russia has to expand its territory to be a great power.
{"title":"No Great Russia without Greater Russia","authors":"T. Casier","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4148","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that to understand the invasion of Ukraine, we need to have better insights into the Kremlin’s particular world view and Russia’s place within it. This view is based on a sense of entitlement to great power status, going hand in hand with an identity of itself as a country that extends beyond the actual borders of the Russian Federation. What makes the position unique is that the geopolitical and identity arguments are inseparable: in the Kremlin’s world view, Russia can only be a great power if it also exists as greater Russia. This structural factor is labelled the geopolitics-identity nexus. To explain why the invasion happened in 2022, three additional process factors are outlined: a radicalisation of the view of Ukraine as Russian lands, driven by the feeling of existential crisis when tensions over Ukraine escalated in 2014; an escalation of policy options resulting from consecutive failures in Russia’s Ukraine policy; and a reversal of the argument that Russia has to be a great power to exist within its 1991 borders into an argument that Russia has to expand its territory to be a great power.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139200943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4147
Joan DeBardeleben
An introduction to the special issue.
特刊导言。
{"title":"Introduction: The Ukraine War: A Paradigm Shift in EU-Russian Relations?","authors":"Joan DeBardeleben","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4147","url":null,"abstract":"An introduction to the special issue.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139200980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4105
Liia Vihmand-Veebel, Viljar Veebel
Given Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine and its hostile remarks toward its NATO neighbours, the question of why the credible deterrence posture of the Alliance is not producing the desired results is becoming increasingly important. Either Russian political leaders do not want to comply with the Western credible deterrence posture, or they do not understand what is expected from them. Linguistic factors (e.g., the ‘lost in translation’ effect) affect the effectiveness of the conversation on deterrence between Russia and the West, including NATO. The Russian language does not have one unambiguous equivalent for the Western term “deterrence.” There are several possible translations for deterrence in Russian, including sderzhivaniye, ustrasheniye, sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya, sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem, as well as others. These terms are not synonymous, with each having its own different meaning and some being used in Russian military-political theory, where they refer to different concepts. The current study focuses on the most visible linguistic complications in the deterrence dialogue between Russia and the West. Based on the current study, it would often be more reasonable to talk to the Russian political and military elite about containment or coercion, which are more common and have clear, specific meanings in Russian.
鉴于俄罗斯在乌克兰的侵略行动及其对北约邻国的敌对言论,联盟的可信威慑态势为何没有产生预期效果的问题变得越来越重要。要么是俄罗斯政治领导人不想遵守西方的可信威慑态势,要么是他们不理解对他们的期望。语言因素(如 "翻译遗失 "效应)影响了俄罗斯与包括北约在内的西方国家之间威慑对话的效果。俄语中没有一个明确对应的西方术语 "威慑"。俄语中的威慑有几种可能的译法,包括 sderzhivaniye、ustrasheniye、sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya、sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem 以及其他。这些术语并非同义词,每个术语都有自己不同的含义,有些术语在俄罗斯军事政治理论中使用,但它们指的是不同的概念。本次研究的重点是俄罗斯与西方之间威慑对话中最明显的语言复杂性。根据目前的研究,与俄罗斯政治和军事精英谈论遏制或胁迫往往更为合理,因为这两个词在俄语中更为常见,并有明确、具体的含义。
{"title":"The Linguistic Factor in the Deterrence Conversation between Russia and the West: If and How Russians Understand the Meaning of “Deterrence?”","authors":"Liia Vihmand-Veebel, Viljar Veebel","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4105","url":null,"abstract":"Given Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine and its hostile remarks toward its NATO neighbours, the question of why the credible deterrence posture of the Alliance is not producing the desired results is becoming increasingly important. Either Russian political leaders do not want to comply with the Western credible deterrence posture, or they do not understand what is expected from them. Linguistic factors (e.g., the ‘lost in translation’ effect) affect the effectiveness of the conversation on deterrence between Russia and the West, including NATO. The Russian language does not have one unambiguous equivalent for the Western term “deterrence.” There are several possible translations for deterrence in Russian, including sderzhivaniye, ustrasheniye, sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya, sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem, as well as others. These terms are not synonymous, with each having its own different meaning and some being used in Russian military-political theory, where they refer to different concepts. The current study focuses on the most visible linguistic complications in the deterrence dialogue between Russia and the West. Based on the current study, it would often be more reasonable to talk to the Russian political and military elite about containment or coercion, which are more common and have clear, specific meanings in Russian.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139207852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4150
Luca Ratti
Abstract The paper debates the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It argues that the invasion has changed dramatically Europe’s security landscape, carrying major implications for both organizations and their relationship. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan and deepening frictions between the US and its European allies about burden-sharing, the war instilled a new sense of purpose into NATO, placing renewed emphasis on its core functions of territorial defense and deterrence. However, the war was also a reality check for the EU, raising important questions about the future of the European security architecture, the Union’s role within it, and its relationship with NATO (hereafter also referred to as the Alliance). The aim of this article is to try to answer some of these questions, by providing an initial assessment of the impact of the war on the relationship between NATO and the CSDP, and to sketch out potential avenues for strengthening the EU’s role in transatlantic security. More specifically, the paper will try to answer the following questions: what are the implications of the conflict on the Alliance? How did the war impact on the CSDP and the Union’s aspiration to strategic autonomy? Where is EU-NATO cooperation heading as a result of the war? Will the conflict ramp up cooperation between the two organizations or will European defence efforts be channelled mostly through NATO? Will EU leaders grab the momentum created by the war to further institutional integration also in security and defence and or will the war turn into another missed opportunity to promote a more effective burden-sharing in transatlantic security?
{"title":"NATO and the CSDP after the Ukraine War: The End of European Strategic Autonomy?","authors":"Luca Ratti","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4150","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper debates the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It argues that the invasion has changed dramatically Europe’s security landscape, carrying major implications for both organizations and their relationship. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan and deepening frictions between the US and its European allies about burden-sharing, the war instilled a new sense of purpose into NATO, placing renewed emphasis on its core functions of territorial defense and deterrence. However, the war was also a reality check for the EU, raising important questions about the future of the European security architecture, the Union’s role within it, and its relationship with NATO (hereafter also referred to as the Alliance). The aim of this article is to try to answer some of these questions, by providing an initial assessment of the impact of the war on the relationship between NATO and the CSDP, and to sketch out potential avenues for strengthening the EU’s role in transatlantic security. More specifically, the paper will try to answer the following questions: what are the implications of the conflict on the Alliance? How did the war impact on the CSDP and the Union’s aspiration to strategic autonomy? Where is EU-NATO cooperation heading as a result of the war? Will the conflict ramp up cooperation between the two organizations or will European defence efforts be channelled mostly through NATO? Will EU leaders grab the momentum created by the war to further institutional integration also in security and defence and or will the war turn into another missed opportunity to promote a more effective burden-sharing in transatlantic security?","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"140 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139203329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i2.2765
M. Schreurs
The February 2022 Russian invasion of the Ukraine has led to radical changes in European energy politics and placed new urgency on plans to expand renewable energy and enhance energy efficiency. The European Union, the United States, and many other states have slapped a series of crippling sanctions on Russia and reduced or completely cut their fossil fuel imports in an effort to stop the cash flow the Kremlin needs to finance its war. Russian fossil fuel is being replaced by imports from other regions while demand has been reduced through energy savings by households and businesses. Putin's aggression against Ukraine has forced Europe to speed up its energy transition, meaning that Russia has unintentionally spurred on European climate policy. China, on the other hand, is deepening its trade ties with Russia, supporting the country by buying more oil and gas. New alliances are forming that will have long-term consequences for the geopolitics of energy and could also affect the potential for further cooperation on climate change globally.
{"title":"Implications of the Russian War on Ukraine for Climate Policy and the Geopolitics of Energy","authors":"M. Schreurs","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i2.2765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.2765","url":null,"abstract":"The February 2022 Russian invasion of the Ukraine has led to radical changes in European energy politics and placed new urgency on plans to expand renewable energy and enhance energy efficiency. The European Union, the United States, and many other states have slapped a series of crippling sanctions on Russia and reduced or completely cut their fossil fuel imports in an effort to stop the cash flow the Kremlin needs to finance its war. Russian fossil fuel is being replaced by imports from other regions while demand has been reduced through energy savings by households and businesses. Putin's aggression against Ukraine has forced Europe to speed up its energy transition, meaning that Russia has unintentionally spurred on European climate policy. China, on the other hand, is deepening its trade ties with Russia, supporting the country by buying more oil and gas. New alliances are forming that will have long-term consequences for the geopolitics of energy and could also affect the potential for further cooperation on climate change globally.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"43 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139204641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4130
Toms Rostoks
Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but it has failed to attain its political and military objectives. Since then, Russia has doubled down on its war effort. This article claims that Russia’s decision to continue the war despite initial setbacks and a high number of casualties is the result of using the strategy of ‘outsuffering’ its adversaries. This article explains the origins and instrumentalization of this strategy by Vladimir Putin, as well as its implications for Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia’s foreign policy more generally, and Russia’s domestic politics. The article concludes that although insensitivity to costs can be an important advantage when states pursue confrontational foreign policy strategies, Russia’s attempts to outsuffer its adversaries in a war of attrition raise questions about the viability of this strategy. Thus, the strategy’s ominous promise for Russia is suffering without end.
{"title":"Russia’s Strategy of Outsuffering and the War in Ukraine","authors":"Toms Rostoks","doi":"10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4130","url":null,"abstract":"Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but it has failed to attain its political and military objectives. Since then, Russia has doubled down on its war effort. This article claims that Russia’s decision to continue the war despite initial setbacks and a high number of casualties is the result of using the strategy of ‘outsuffering’ its adversaries. This article explains the origins and instrumentalization of this strategy by Vladimir Putin, as well as its implications for Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia’s foreign policy more generally, and Russia’s domestic politics. The article concludes that although insensitivity to costs can be an important advantage when states pursue confrontational foreign policy strategies, Russia’s attempts to outsuffer its adversaries in a war of attrition raise questions about the viability of this strategy. Thus, the strategy’s ominous promise for Russia is suffering without end.","PeriodicalId":36350,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies","volume":"47 33","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139204062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}