type="main"> We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on firm performance in emerging markets. Using a unique data set from China, we exploit the introduction of policies to attract talented emigrants and increase the supply of individuals with foreign experience in different provinces at different times. We document that performance increases after firms hire directors with foreign experience and identify the channels through which the emigration of talent may lead to a brain gain. Our findings provide evidence on how directors transmit knowledge about management practices and corporate governance to firms in emerging markets.
{"title":"The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: Evidence from China","authors":"Mariassunta Giannetti, Guanmin Liao, Xiaoyun Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1966996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1966996","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\"> We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on firm performance in emerging markets. Using a unique data set from China, we exploit the introduction of policies to attract talented emigrants and increase the supply of individuals with foreign experience in different provinces at different times. We document that performance increases after firms hire directors with foreign experience and identify the channels through which the emigration of talent may lead to a brain gain. Our findings provide evidence on how directors transmit knowledge about management practices and corporate governance to firms in emerging markets.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125619828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate whether market makers with inventory concerns are compensated with subsequent monthly returns in the cross-section. We find a significant negative relation between order flows and monthly returns, “the order flow effect,” suggesting that market makers lower prices for stocks with sell order flows and demand a reward in the form of higher expected returns. Further, the order flow effect is stronger for high-volatility or high-volume stocks for which market makers have serious inventory concerns. Funding liquidity of market makers also affects the order flow effect. Finally, our finding is independent of existing regularities and robust to the decimalization.
{"title":"Order Flows and Stock Returns: Compensation for Market Makers with Inventory Concerns","authors":"Moonsoo Kang, Bong‐Soo Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1787760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787760","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether market makers with inventory concerns are compensated with subsequent monthly returns in the cross-section. We find a significant negative relation between order flows and monthly returns, “the order flow effect,” suggesting that market makers lower prices for stocks with sell order flows and demand a reward in the form of higher expected returns. Further, the order flow effect is stronger for high-volatility or high-volume stocks for which market makers have serious inventory concerns. Funding liquidity of market makers also affects the order flow effect. Finally, our finding is independent of existing regularities and robust to the decimalization.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132008262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market, in which certification of issuer quality is most valuable to investors owing to low liquidity and issuing firms’ high opacity and default risk. We find bonds underwritten by the most reputable underwriters to be associated with significantly higher downgrade and default risk. Investors seem to be aware of this relation, as we further find the private information conveyed via the issuer-reputable underwriter match to have a significantly positive effect on at-issue yield spreads. Our results are consistent with the market-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism.
{"title":"Underwriter Reputation and the Quality of Certification: Evidence from High-Yield Bonds","authors":"C. Andres, A. Betzer, P. Limbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2024570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024570","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market, in which certification of issuer quality is most valuable to investors owing to low liquidity and issuing firms’ high opacity and default risk. We find bonds underwritten by the most reputable underwriters to be associated with significantly higher downgrade and default risk. Investors seem to be aware of this relation, as we further find the private information conveyed via the issuer-reputable underwriter match to have a significantly positive effect on at-issue yield spreads. Our results are consistent with the market-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127169926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We demonstrate that managers’ “normal” operating decisions associated with large (positive or negative) net external financing activities are likely to lead to significant measurement errors in unexpected accruals. The problem occurs pervasively in samples drawn from different time periods, samples that reflect a wide variety of alleged earnings management stimuli, as well as random samples. Simulation tests show that even at modest levels of net external financing changes, rejection frequencies for the null hypothesis of no earnings management rise dramatically. These results are robust to controls for performance and firm growth. Further analysis suggests that net debt financing is more likely to induce measurement error than equity financing. We find that the use of a matched-firm approach using industry and external financing matches is generally appropriate. These findings highlight the importance of controlling for the effect of external financing on unexpected accruals measures, and also have implications for research testing earnings management and financial reporting quality.
{"title":"Earnings Management or Measurement Error? The Effect of External Financing on Unexpected Accruals","authors":"Yaowen Shan, Stephen L Taylor, T. Walter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1572164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572164","url":null,"abstract":"We demonstrate that managers’ “normal” operating decisions associated with large (positive or negative) net external financing activities are likely to lead to significant measurement errors in unexpected accruals. The problem occurs pervasively in samples drawn from different time periods, samples that reflect a wide variety of alleged earnings management stimuli, as well as random samples. Simulation tests show that even at modest levels of net external financing changes, rejection frequencies for the null hypothesis of no earnings management rise dramatically. These results are robust to controls for performance and firm growth. Further analysis suggests that net debt financing is more likely to induce measurement error than equity financing. We find that the use of a matched-firm approach using industry and external financing matches is generally appropriate. These findings highlight the importance of controlling for the effect of external financing on unexpected accruals measures, and also have implications for research testing earnings management and financial reporting quality.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131017112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How portable are top management skills? Should (and do) firms care about firm-manager fit when they hire new managers? How is fit related to managerial 'style'? We hypothesize that if firms and managers are matched with each other on the basis of fit on multiple dimensions, then firms that employ the same manager at adjacent points of time should have similar characteristics. We find strong evidence that firms that employ the same manager sort on a number of characteristics. Our empirical design ensures that these results are not explained by managerial style, or by moves among firms of similar size, or within the same industry. We construct a measure for the quality of fit. We find that a worse fit leads to less positive stock price reaction to the announcement of managerial appointments, lower managerial pay, and shorter tenure for the manager, suggesting that management skills do not necessarily transfer from one firm environment to another. We also find evidence that when the firm and the manager do not fit well, managers influence several firm-specific variables, consistent with managerial style.
{"title":"Fit, Style, and the Portability of Managerial Talent","authors":"Yuk Ying Chang, S. Dasgupta, J. Gan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1960559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1960559","url":null,"abstract":"How portable are top management skills? Should (and do) firms care about firm-manager fit when they hire new managers? How is fit related to managerial 'style'? We hypothesize that if firms and managers are matched with each other on the basis of fit on multiple dimensions, then firms that employ the same manager at adjacent points of time should have similar characteristics. We find strong evidence that firms that employ the same manager sort on a number of characteristics. Our empirical design ensures that these results are not explained by managerial style, or by moves among firms of similar size, or within the same industry. We construct a measure for the quality of fit. We find that a worse fit leads to less positive stock price reaction to the announcement of managerial appointments, lower managerial pay, and shorter tenure for the manager, suggesting that management skills do not necessarily transfer from one firm environment to another. We also find evidence that when the firm and the manager do not fit well, managers influence several firm-specific variables, consistent with managerial style.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128136408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how the information quality of ratings from an issuer-paid rating agency (Standard and Poor's) responds to the entry of an investor-paid rating agency, the Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR). By comparing S&P's ratings quality before and after EJR initiates coverage of each firm, I find a significant improvement in S&P's ratings quality following EJR's coverage initiation. S&P's ratings become more responsive to credit risk and its rating changes incorporate higher information content. These results differ from the existing literature documenting a deterioration in the incumbents' ratings quality following the entry of a third issuer-paid agency. I further show that the issuer-paid agency seems to improve the ratings quality because EJR's coverage has elevated its reputational concerns.
{"title":"Can Investor-Paid Credit Rating Agencies Improve the Information Quality of Issuer-Paid Rating Agencies?","authors":"Han Xia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1981516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1981516","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how the information quality of ratings from an issuer-paid rating agency (Standard and Poor's) responds to the entry of an investor-paid rating agency, the Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR). By comparing S&P's ratings quality before and after EJR initiates coverage of each firm, I find a significant improvement in S&P's ratings quality following EJR's coverage initiation. S&P's ratings become more responsive to credit risk and its rating changes incorporate higher information content. These results differ from the existing literature documenting a deterioration in the incumbents' ratings quality following the entry of a third issuer-paid agency. I further show that the issuer-paid agency seems to improve the ratings quality because EJR's coverage has elevated its reputational concerns.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134357250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the ability of government bond fund managers to time the bond market, based on their monthly or quarterly holdings of Treasury securities during the 1997--2006 period. We find that, on average, government bond funds exhibit significantly positive timing ability at the one-month horizon under an unconditional holdings-based timing measure. However, our results indicate that managers' actions based on public information can explain the documented positive timing ability---namely, the average government bond fund has neutral or even slightly negative conditional market timing ability once public information is controlled for. Nonetheless, we find evidence that fund managers specializing in Treasury securities can better interpret public information than general government bond fund managers do. This paper was accepted by Wei Xiong, finance.
{"title":"Timing Ability of Government Bond Fund Managers: Evidence from Portfolio Holdings","authors":"Jing Huang, Y. Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1297403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1297403","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the ability of government bond fund managers to time the bond market, based on their monthly or quarterly holdings of Treasury securities during the 1997--2006 period. We find that, on average, government bond funds exhibit significantly positive timing ability at the one-month horizon under an unconditional holdings-based timing measure. However, our results indicate that managers' actions based on public information can explain the documented positive timing ability---namely, the average government bond fund has neutral or even slightly negative conditional market timing ability once public information is controlled for. Nonetheless, we find evidence that fund managers specializing in Treasury securities can better interpret public information than general government bond fund managers do. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by Wei Xiong, finance.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131236805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The unique characteristics of the U.S. initial public offering IPO process, particularly the strict quiet period regulations, allow us to explore the effects of media coverage when the coverage does not contain genuine news i.e., hard information that was previously unknown. We show that a simple, objective measure of pre-IPO media coverage is positively related to the stock's long-term value, liquidity, analyst coverage, and institutional investor ownership. Our results are robust to additional controls for size, to using abnormal or excess media, and to an instrumental variable approach. We also find that pre-IPO media coverage is negatively related to future expected returns, measured by the implied cost of capital. In all, we find a long-term role for media coverage, consistent with Merton's attention or investor recognition hypothesis. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.
{"title":"The Long-Run Role of the Media: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings","authors":"L. Liu, Ann E. Sherman, Yong Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1737544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1737544","url":null,"abstract":"The unique characteristics of the U.S. initial public offering IPO process, particularly the strict quiet period regulations, allow us to explore the effects of media coverage when the coverage does not contain genuine news i.e., hard information that was previously unknown. We show that a simple, objective measure of pre-IPO media coverage is positively related to the stock's long-term value, liquidity, analyst coverage, and institutional investor ownership. Our results are robust to additional controls for size, to using abnormal or excess media, and to an instrumental variable approach. We also find that pre-IPO media coverage is negatively related to future expected returns, measured by the implied cost of capital. In all, we find a long-term role for media coverage, consistent with Merton's attention or investor recognition hypothesis. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123874181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study firms with past asbestos ties that suffer from significant increases in legal liabilities after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1999. This event provides a natural experiment setting to estimate the indirect effects of financial distress on real activities. While direct litigation and bankruptcy costs are significant, value computations and clinical evidence at the operational level show that defendant firms suffer only minor indirect costs of financial distress. Furthermore, these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations during distress. Overall, my results provide support for potentially significant disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities.
{"title":"The Disciplinary Effects of Non-Debt Liabilities: Evidence from Asbestos Litigation","authors":"Jérôme P. Taillard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1571885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571885","url":null,"abstract":"I study firms with past asbestos ties that suffer from significant increases in legal liabilities after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1999. This event provides a natural experiment setting to estimate the indirect effects of financial distress on real activities. While direct litigation and bankruptcy costs are significant, value computations and clinical evidence at the operational level show that defendant firms suffer only minor indirect costs of financial distress. Furthermore, these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations during distress. Overall, my results provide support for potentially significant disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132864842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (or "common errors"), such as industry-specific shocks, is a fundamental challenge in empirical research.This paper discusses the limitations of two approaches widely used in corporate finance and asset pricing research: demeaning the dependent variable with respect to the group (e.g., "industry-adjusting") and adding the mean of the group's dependent variable as a control. We show that these methods produce inconsistent estimates and can distort inference. In contrast, the fixed effects estimator is consistent and should be used instead. We also explain how to estimate the fixed effects model when traditional methods are computationally infeasible.
{"title":"Common Errors: How to (and Not to) Control for Unobserved Heterogeneity","authors":"Todd A. Gormley, David A. Matsa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2023868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023868","url":null,"abstract":"Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (or \"common errors\"), such as industry-specific shocks, is a fundamental challenge in empirical research.This paper discusses the limitations of two approaches widely used in corporate finance and asset pricing research: demeaning the dependent variable with respect to the group (e.g., \"industry-adjusting\") and adding the mean of the group's dependent variable as a control. We show that these methods produce inconsistent estimates and can distort inference. In contrast, the fixed effects estimator is consistent and should be used instead. We also explain how to estimate the fixed effects model when traditional methods are computationally infeasible.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"19 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120877857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}