Pub Date : 2011-08-03DOI: 10.4337/9781849806107.00018
R. Ayadi, E. Arbak, Willem Pieter De Groen
Recent financial crisis has renewed attention on compensation schemes and their impact on risk-taking in depository institutions. Without ample theoretical and empirical backing, the recent policy proposals in the EU have suggested that long-term incentive plans that are closely linked to bank performance would lead to less risk-taking. Using a novel database on executive pay for 53 systemically important banks in the EU for the years 1999-2009, our analysis shows, instead, that the presence of the so-called “long-term incentive plans” may actually augment risk-taking. Moreover, although their values depend closely on long-term market performance, the presence of an option plan does not seem to lead to more risk. Our results are robust to the consideration of the joint determination of compensation and risk as well as alternative risk measures.
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We examine the relation between organizational structure (public vs private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of U.S. offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded firms focus more on shorter term performance, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive to prior fund performance when making replacement decisions and experience smaller post turnover performance improvements. Additional testing suggests a higher likelihood of fund manager replacement when mutual funds are team managed and when fund boards more independent. Overall, our results indicate that organizational form plays a pivotal role in the managerial labor market for mutual funds.
{"title":"Public vs Private Ownership, Board Structure and Fund Manager Turnover","authors":"John C. Adams, S. Mansi, Takeshi Nishikawa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1492846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1492846","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the relation between organizational structure (public vs private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of U.S. offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded firms focus more on shorter term performance, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive to prior fund performance when making replacement decisions and experience smaller post turnover performance improvements. Additional testing suggests a higher likelihood of fund manager replacement when mutual funds are team managed and when fund boards more independent. Overall, our results indicate that organizational form plays a pivotal role in the managerial labor market for mutual funds.","PeriodicalId":373523,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129879300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The arguments pros and cons a non-binding vote by shareholders on executive compensation do not readily tip the balance in one direction or the other. The sense of unfairness and the frustration with some patent cases of excessive compensation have generated a good deal of sympathy for more direct and vigorous measures to curb extravagant compensation practices. Nevertheless, boards of directors fully responsible and accountable for the governance of publicly traded corporations do form the cornerstone of our system of corporate governance.
{"title":"Giving a Shareholders a Say on Pay: A Measure Leading to Better Governance","authors":"Yvan Allaire","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1580071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1580071","url":null,"abstract":"The arguments pros and cons a non-binding vote by shareholders on executive compensation do not readily tip the balance in one direction or the other. The sense of unfairness and the frustration with some patent cases of excessive compensation have generated a good deal of sympathy for more direct and vigorous measures to curb extravagant compensation practices. Nevertheless, boards of directors fully responsible and accountable for the governance of publicly traded corporations do form the cornerstone of our system of corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":373523,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129193539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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