Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2020.1779555
Harry Stratton
ABSTRACT This article argues against the court striking out defamation claims on the basis that they are ‘disproportionate’, that is, they cost more to litigate than they raise in damages. We begin by setting out the so-called problem of disproportionality. Next, we show that the court’s current solution of striking out the claimant’s claim should be rejected in defamation cases. The value of the claim is partly subjective and not purely monetary, such that its true costs and benefits are better reflected in the parties’ willingness to fight the case on its merits rather than the court’s comparison of the money sums involved. In any event, if the court must refuse to hear the case, it should be willing to strike out the defendant’s defence rather than the claimant’s claim in appropriate cases – because it is often hearing the defence, rather than the claim, that causes disproportionate expenditure in defamation cases.
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Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2020.1760474
Elisabeth Bechtold
ABSTRACT This article examines questions relating to the appropriate role of digital intermediaries in regulating online terrorist-related content and the extent to which proponents of human rights should be concerned with the free speech implications of intermediary liability, through a comparative analysis of recent developments in Europe and the United States. While Europe is contemplating introducing compulsory frameworks to regulate intermediaries, the United States is continuing to apply existing frameworks that incorporate traditional notions of harm and causation and immunise intermediaries for the expression of third party users. Ultimately, this examination leads to the conclusion that compulsory regulation of intermediaries for online terrorist-related speech creates significant dangers to the exercise of free speech, the effects of which ripple far beyond the terrestrial borders of those jurisdictions engaging in such regulation.
{"title":"Terrorism, the internet, and the threat to freedom of expression: the regulation of digital intermediaries in Europe and the United States","authors":"Elisabeth Bechtold","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2020.1760474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2020.1760474","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines questions relating to the appropriate role of digital intermediaries in regulating online terrorist-related content and the extent to which proponents of human rights should be concerned with the free speech implications of intermediary liability, through a comparative analysis of recent developments in Europe and the United States. While Europe is contemplating introducing compulsory frameworks to regulate intermediaries, the United States is continuing to apply existing frameworks that incorporate traditional notions of harm and causation and immunise intermediaries for the expression of third party users. Ultimately, this examination leads to the conclusion that compulsory regulation of intermediaries for online terrorist-related speech creates significant dangers to the exercise of free speech, the effects of which ripple far beyond the terrestrial borders of those jurisdictions engaging in such regulation.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2020.1760474","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41459410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2020.1783125
A. Antoniou, Dimitris Akrivos
ABSTRACT This article evaluates regulatory responses to stereotypical gender portrayals in advertising in the UK before and after the 2019 changes in the Advertising Standards Authority's (ASA) harm and offensiveness framework. It systematises for the first time the ASA's rulings in this territory and brings a new perspective in its modern practice by examining it within Deaux and Lewis’ theoretical framework on the multicomponent structure of gender stereotypes. We argue that the ASA's new rule and guidelines represent a missed opportunity to take bolder steps against ads that objectify or inappropriately sexualise individuals and are not sufficiently attentive to the multi-faceted nature and fluidity of modern gender identities. We conclude by making recommendations for improving the effectiveness and implementation of the ASA's guidance on the depiction of gender stereotypes.
{"title":"Gender portrayals in advertising: stereotypes, inclusive marketing and regulation","authors":"A. Antoniou, Dimitris Akrivos","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2020.1783125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2020.1783125","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article evaluates regulatory responses to stereotypical gender portrayals in advertising in the UK before and after the 2019 changes in the Advertising Standards Authority's (ASA) harm and offensiveness framework. It systematises for the first time the ASA's rulings in this territory and brings a new perspective in its modern practice by examining it within Deaux and Lewis’ theoretical framework on the multicomponent structure of gender stereotypes. We argue that the ASA's new rule and guidelines represent a missed opportunity to take bolder steps against ads that objectify or inappropriately sexualise individuals and are not sufficiently attentive to the multi-faceted nature and fluidity of modern gender identities. We conclude by making recommendations for improving the effectiveness and implementation of the ASA's guidance on the depiction of gender stereotypes.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2020.1783125","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49327728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2020.1790864
Jan Oster
{"title":"Positive free speech. Rationales, methods and implications, hart","authors":"Jan Oster","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2020.1790864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2020.1790864","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2020.1790864","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47313347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT This article empirically analyses the judicial construction of section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 within the first five years of the serious reputational harm threshold coming into operation. The relevant judgments considering serious harm have been carefully examined and dissected with a qualitative analysis approach, in which prominent themes and factors discussed in judicial interpretations have been distilled and evaluated. To this pursuit, the analysis investigates the evolution of judicial opinion in the development of section 1(1), exhibiting the merits of a multi-circumstantial approach in assessing the existence or likelihood of serious reputational harm in line with the leading Supreme Court construction of the serious harm test.
{"title":"More serious harm than good? An empirical observation and analysis of the effects of the serious harm requirement in section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013","authors":"C. Sewell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3473183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473183","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article empirically analyses the judicial construction of section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 within the first five years of the serious reputational harm threshold coming into operation. The relevant judgments considering serious harm have been carefully examined and dissected with a qualitative analysis approach, in which prominent themes and factors discussed in judicial interpretations have been distilled and evaluated. To this pursuit, the analysis investigates the evolution of judicial opinion in the development of section 1(1), exhibiting the merits of a multi-circumstantial approach in assessing the existence or likelihood of serious reputational harm in line with the leading Supreme Court construction of the serious harm test.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46212552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-17DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2019.1697475
N. Moreham
A handful of recent English authorities have held that, up to the point of charge, individuals will usually have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of police investigations into their c...
最近的一些英国当局认为，在被指控之前，个人通常会对警方调查他们的隐私有合理的期望。
{"title":"Privacy, reputation and alleged wrongdoing: why police investigations should not be regarded as private","authors":"N. Moreham","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2019.1697475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1697475","url":null,"abstract":"A handful of recent English authorities have held that, up to the point of charge, individuals will usually have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of police investigations into their c...","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2019.1697475","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43349382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-26DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2019.1697477
I. Cram
How do liberal democracies respond to the fact of multiple speakers in public discourse? Previous approaches to media regulation were predicated upon a few speakers-many readers/listeners/viewers m...
{"title":"Keeping the demos out of liberal democracy? Participatory politics, ‘fake news’ and the online speaker","authors":"I. Cram","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2019.1697477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1697477","url":null,"abstract":"How do liberal democracies respond to the fact of multiple speakers in public discourse? Previous approaches to media regulation were predicated upon a few speakers-many readers/listeners/viewers m...","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2019.1697477","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48180704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2020.1727155
A. Koltay
{"title":"The Internet, warts and all. Free speech, privacy and truth","authors":"A. Koltay","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2020.1727155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2020.1727155","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2020.1727155","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47334315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2019.1708010
Peter Coe
{"title":"New media and freedom of expression","authors":"Peter Coe","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2019.1708010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1708010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2019.1708010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41756040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2019.1679424
Rachael Craufurd Smith
ABSTRACT The United Kingdom is currently examining far-reaching regulatory proposals designed to address the online transmission of harmful content, including disinformation. Of particular interest, therefore, is French Law no. 2018–1202 on the ‘fight against the manipulation of information’. The French Law establishes a fast-track civil procedure to tackle the transmission of false information prior to key elections and referenda; addresses foreign state-funded broadcast propaganda; and seeks to enhance transparency regarding the financing and distribution of online content. Restrictions on the transmission of information, particularly in the run-up to elections, are inherently suspect and the Conseil constitutionnel carefully reviewed the French proposals to ensure that any constraints on freedom of expression were both justified and necessary. French Law 2018–1202 thus offers an example of a rather ‘muscular’ form of intervention in the election field, but one which seeks to preserve democratic legitimacy without undermining the individual freedoms on which it rests.
{"title":"Fake news, French Law and democratic legitimacy: lessons for the United Kingdom?","authors":"Rachael Craufurd Smith","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2019.1679424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1679424","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The United Kingdom is currently examining far-reaching regulatory proposals designed to address the online transmission of harmful content, including disinformation. Of particular interest, therefore, is French Law no. 2018–1202 on the ‘fight against the manipulation of information’. The French Law establishes a fast-track civil procedure to tackle the transmission of false information prior to key elections and referenda; addresses foreign state-funded broadcast propaganda; and seeks to enhance transparency regarding the financing and distribution of online content. Restrictions on the transmission of information, particularly in the run-up to elections, are inherently suspect and the Conseil constitutionnel carefully reviewed the French proposals to ensure that any constraints on freedom of expression were both justified and necessary. French Law 2018–1202 thus offers an example of a rather ‘muscular’ form of intervention in the election field, but one which seeks to preserve democratic legitimacy without undermining the individual freedoms on which it rests.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2019.1679424","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45376145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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