Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2019.1573569
Irini Katsirea
ABSTRACT Against the backdrop of the regulatory furore over ‘fake news’, this article examines the protection that is afforded to untruthful expression by the European Court of Human Rights and by national courts in Germany, the UK and the US. It argues that the suppression of ‘fake news’ in the face of uncertainty over the contours of this highly politicised term and of the evidentiary vacuum as to the harm posed, may run counter to constitutional guarantees of free speech. Regulatory interventions seeking to curb the flow of ‘fake news’, which is not per se illegal, require careful consideration lest they should empower governments or unaccountable technology corporations without editorial culture to become the arbiters of truth.
{"title":"“Fake news”: reconsidering the value of untruthful expression in the face of regulatory uncertainty","authors":"Irini Katsirea","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2019.1573569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1573569","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Against the backdrop of the regulatory furore over ‘fake news’, this article examines the protection that is afforded to untruthful expression by the European Court of Human Rights and by national courts in Germany, the UK and the US. It argues that the suppression of ‘fake news’ in the face of uncertainty over the contours of this highly politicised term and of the evidentiary vacuum as to the harm posed, may run counter to constitutional guarantees of free speech. Regulatory interventions seeking to curb the flow of ‘fake news’, which is not per se illegal, require careful consideration lest they should empower governments or unaccountable technology corporations without editorial culture to become the arbiters of truth.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2019.1573569","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43513143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2019.1574468
A. Antoniou
ABSTRACT The article assesses how the English courts have compensated defamed claimants who had misconducted themselves before action or during the course of litigation. It demonstrates that in recent years judges appear to have liberalised their approach to accepting evidence in mitigation of libel damages and allowed claimants’ disreputable conduct to restrict the level of awards almost to a vanishing point. The article argues that this emerging approach does not cohere with that adopted in other branches of tort, where claimants’ misbehaviour does not affect the level of general damages awarded, and carries with it the risk of undermining the vindicatory policy of libel law.
{"title":"When the litigation winner becomes the loser: undeserving claimants and mitigation of damages in libel claims","authors":"A. Antoniou","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2019.1574468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1574468","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article assesses how the English courts have compensated defamed claimants who had misconducted themselves before action or during the course of litigation. It demonstrates that in recent years judges appear to have liberalised their approach to accepting evidence in mitigation of libel damages and allowed claimants’ disreputable conduct to restrict the level of awards almost to a vanishing point. The article argues that this emerging approach does not cohere with that adopted in other branches of tort, where claimants’ misbehaviour does not affect the level of general damages awarded, and carries with it the risk of undermining the vindicatory policy of libel law.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2019.1574468","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43864006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2019.1592337
N. Moreham, Yvette Tinsley
ABSTRACT The depiction of grief and intense anxiety is commonplace in modern journalism. Little work has been done, however, to examine the impact of the collection and publication of such material on those who appear in it. This article explores that issue, drawing both on secondary literature and the authors’ original qualitative research into the experiences of family members of 29 men killed in a New Zealand mining tragedy. It concludes that the effects of grief-focused journalism on its subjects can be significant. Five negative impacts are explored: fear and loss of physical security; stress and loss of emotional equilibrium; feelings of violation and exploitation; loss of autonomy and control; and interference with relationships and emotional recovery.
{"title":"The impact of grief journalism on its subjects: lessons from the Pike River mining disaster","authors":"N. Moreham, Yvette Tinsley","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2019.1592337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1592337","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The depiction of grief and intense anxiety is commonplace in modern journalism. Little work has been done, however, to examine the impact of the collection and publication of such material on those who appear in it. This article explores that issue, drawing both on secondary literature and the authors’ original qualitative research into the experiences of family members of 29 men killed in a New Zealand mining tragedy. It concludes that the effects of grief-focused journalism on its subjects can be significant. Five negative impacts are explored: fear and loss of physical security; stress and loss of emotional equilibrium; feelings of violation and exploitation; loss of autonomy and control; and interference with relationships and emotional recovery.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2019.1592337","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43295008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2018.1466442
Anna K. Bernzen
ABSTRACT Video journalists currently reporting from English courts operate within a strict framework set by both statutory and common law. The main argument for these tight rules has traditionally been that the cameras pose a threat to the proper administration of justice. Their potential danger to the privacy of those involved in the trial, on the other hand, has never been properly examined. This comment aims to fill this gap and argues in favour of taking privacy into account when developing future rules for using cameras in court.
{"title":"The court and the camera: should privacy be a concern in court reporting?*","authors":"Anna K. Bernzen","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2018.1466442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2018.1466442","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Video journalists currently reporting from English courts operate within a strict framework set by both statutory and common law. The main argument for these tight rules has traditionally been that the cameras pose a threat to the proper administration of justice. Their potential danger to the privacy of those involved in the trial, on the other hand, has never been properly examined. This comment aims to fill this gap and argues in favour of taking privacy into account when developing future rules for using cameras in court.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2018.1466442","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46908955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2018.1458403
Felix Hempel
ABSTRACT This article analyses the latest judgment of the European Court of Human Rights dealing with the right of reply. The court held that the compulsion for a publisher to print a reply to an editorial he had written and published in his newspaper did not violate his fundamental rights. Exploring the key findings, this analysis sets out the decision’s wider implications for freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial, and the right to private life. Particularly, the case comes to significant conclusions that might result in the widening of the admissible content of a reply and an extension of the scope of the remedy. By reinterpreting the normative foundations of the right of reply, it also combines disparate approaches from previous case law. Thus, this article highlights both the ruling’s practical implications and potential repercussions for future application of domestic and international law on the right of reply.
{"title":"The right of reply under the European Convention on Human Rights: an analysis of Eker v Turkey App no 24016/05 (ECtHR, 24 October 2017)","authors":"Felix Hempel","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2018.1458403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2018.1458403","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article analyses the latest judgment of the European Court of Human Rights dealing with the right of reply. The court held that the compulsion for a publisher to print a reply to an editorial he had written and published in his newspaper did not violate his fundamental rights. Exploring the key findings, this analysis sets out the decision’s wider implications for freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial, and the right to private life. Particularly, the case comes to significant conclusions that might result in the widening of the admissible content of a reply and an extension of the scope of the remedy. By reinterpreting the normative foundations of the right of reply, it also combines disparate approaches from previous case law. Thus, this article highlights both the ruling’s practical implications and potential repercussions for future application of domestic and international law on the right of reply.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2018.1458403","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48575479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2018.1464536
D. Acheson
ABSTRACT This paper examines whether corporations could claim a right to reputation under the European Convention on Human Rights. The existence of such a right could have significant implications for English defamation law as it relates to corporate claimants. The analysis in this paper focuses on Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1, because the European Court of Human Rights has left open the applicability of each of these Articles to the corporate interest in reputation. While the Court’s case law in both of these areas is unclear, the argument advanced here is that there is no good justification for extending a right to reputation to corporations under either Article. However, given the often-haphazard approach the Court takes to developing its interpretation of Convention rights, there is a risk that it will uncritically extend a Convention right to reputation to companies in the future.
{"title":"Corporate reputation under the European Convention on Human Rights","authors":"D. Acheson","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2018.1464536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2018.1464536","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines whether corporations could claim a right to reputation under the European Convention on Human Rights. The existence of such a right could have significant implications for English defamation law as it relates to corporate claimants. The analysis in this paper focuses on Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1, because the European Court of Human Rights has left open the applicability of each of these Articles to the corporate interest in reputation. While the Court’s case law in both of these areas is unclear, the argument advanced here is that there is no good justification for extending a right to reputation to corporations under either Article. However, given the often-haphazard approach the Court takes to developing its interpretation of Convention rights, there is a risk that it will uncritically extend a Convention right to reputation to companies in the future.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2018.1464536","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46341062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403
Thomas D C Bennett
ABSTRACT In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that s 1 Defamation Act 2013 was intended to “raise the bar” for defamation claims above the standard previously demanded at common law. However, despite finding that this was Parliament’s intention in enacting s 1, the Court held that this intention had not been successfully implemented by the wording of the Act. The notion that libel is a tort that is actionable per se is one that has a lengthy heritage at common law. However, an examination of case law between 2005 and 2013 reveals that libel had ceased to be actionable per se long before the new s 1 appeared on the statute books. The Court of Appeal thus based its ruling on a misunderstanding of the pre-Act common law position, resulting in a failure to interpret the Act in a manner consistent with the Parliamentary intention that the Court identified, thereby frustrating that very intention.
{"title":"Why so serious? Lachaux and the threshold of ‘serious harm’ in section 1 Defamation Act 2013","authors":"Thomas D C Bennett","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that s 1 Defamation Act 2013 was intended to “raise the bar” for defamation claims above the standard previously demanded at common law. However, despite finding that this was Parliament’s intention in enacting s 1, the Court held that this intention had not been successfully implemented by the wording of the Act. The notion that libel is a tort that is actionable per se is one that has a lengthy heritage at common law. However, an examination of case law between 2005 and 2013 reveals that libel had ceased to be actionable per se long before the new s 1 appeared on the statute books. The Court of Appeal thus based its ruling on a misunderstanding of the pre-Act common law position, resulting in a failure to interpret the Act in a manner consistent with the Parliamentary intention that the Court identified, thereby frustrating that very intention.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49552671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2018.1467597
B. Morris, Máire Messenger Davies
ABSTRACT In recent years, a number of high-profile privacy cases involving children have come before the English courts. This article draws on developments from ‘PJS v News group, Weller v Associated Newspapers’ and ‘Murray vExpress Newspaper’. In these cases, the courts considered concepts of welfare and well-being when balancing a child’s article 8 right to privacy with the article 10 right to freedom of expression for the media to reporton matters involving or affecting children. The article argues that by contrast, press regulation and its enforcement sometimes lag behind legal developments. The article draws on comparative research of fifty-seven press codes from press regulators around the world to identify patterns and gaps in ethical press standards regarding the representation of children. The article recommends ways to enhance the relevance and robustness of press regulation to better protect and promote the rights and interests of children.
{"title":"Can children’s privacy rights be adequately protected through press regulation? What press regulation can learn from the courts","authors":"B. Morris, Máire Messenger Davies","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2018.1467597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2018.1467597","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In recent years, a number of high-profile privacy cases involving children have come before the English courts. This article draws on developments from ‘PJS v News group, Weller v Associated Newspapers’ and ‘Murray vExpress Newspaper’. In these cases, the courts considered concepts of welfare and well-being when balancing a child’s article 8 right to privacy with the article 10 right to freedom of expression for the media to reporton matters involving or affecting children. The article argues that by contrast, press regulation and its enforcement sometimes lag behind legal developments. The article draws on comparative research of fifty-seven press codes from press regulators around the world to identify patterns and gaps in ethical press standards regarding the representation of children. The article recommends ways to enhance the relevance and robustness of press regulation to better protect and promote the rights and interests of children.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2018.1467597","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47993282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2018.1463674
M. Richardson, Julian Thomas
ABSTRACT How did the nineteenth-century trade marks registration system with its preference for distinctive trade marks accommodate Britain’s newspapers and reading publics, who seemed able to distinguish between newspapers despite their common descriptive names? In this article, it is argued that the situation presents another example of intellectual property law’s ‘negative spaces’, of creativity and innovation thriving in the absence of significant formal protection from intellectual property law. Moreover, it shows, yet again, the place of informal control in what is in other respects a formalised media industry sector. The historical analysis helps to explain the recent decision of an Irish judge that The Times and The Irish Times should continue to ‘co-exist peacefully’ in Ireland, with The Times permitted to launch a digital Times (Irish Edition) over the objection of the similarly named Irish Times, its nineteenth-century counterpart.
{"title":"Trade marks, newspapers and reading publics","authors":"M. Richardson, Julian Thomas","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2018.1463674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2018.1463674","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How did the nineteenth-century trade marks registration system with its preference for distinctive trade marks accommodate Britain’s newspapers and reading publics, who seemed able to distinguish between newspapers despite their common descriptive names? In this article, it is argued that the situation presents another example of intellectual property law’s ‘negative spaces’, of creativity and innovation thriving in the absence of significant formal protection from intellectual property law. Moreover, it shows, yet again, the place of informal control in what is in other respects a formalised media industry sector. The historical analysis helps to explain the recent decision of an Irish judge that The Times and The Irish Times should continue to ‘co-exist peacefully’ in Ireland, with The Times permitted to launch a digital Times (Irish Edition) over the objection of the similarly named Irish Times, its nineteenth-century counterpart.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2018.1463674","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46434852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/10948008309488476
Daniel L. Brenner, W. Rivers, Kenneth S. Devol, D. Dickerson, Peter W. House
{"title":"Media Regulation","authors":"Daniel L. Brenner, W. Rivers, Kenneth S. Devol, D. Dickerson, Peter W. House","doi":"10.1080/10948008309488476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10948008309488476","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90208105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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