Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.004
Pablo Barberá
A popular argument that is commonly put forth as an explanation linking digital technologies to political polarization is related to their ability to foster the emergence of echo chambers where extremist ideas are amplified. Sunstein (2018), a leading proponent of this view, argues that the main characteristic of social networking sites is that they allow politically like-minded individuals to find one another. In this environment, citizens are only exposed to information that reinforces their political views and remain isolated from other individuals with opposing views, in part due to the filtering effects of ranking algorithms that generate filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) and create incentives for publishers to share clickbait and hyperpartisan content (Benkler et al, 2018). The outcome of this process is a society that is increasingly segregated along partisan lines, and where compromise becomes unlikely due to rising mistrust on public officials, media outlets, and ordinary citizens on the other side of the ideological spectrum.
{"title":"Social Media, Echo Chambers, and Political Polarization","authors":"Pablo Barberá","doi":"10.1017/9781108890960.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108890960.004","url":null,"abstract":"A popular argument that is commonly put forth as an explanation linking digital technologies to political polarization is related to their ability to foster the emergence of echo chambers where extremist ideas are amplified. Sunstein (2018), a leading proponent of this view, argues that the main characteristic of social networking sites is that they allow politically like-minded individuals to find one another. In this environment, citizens are only exposed to information that reinforces their political views and remain isolated from other individuals with opposing views, in part due to the filtering effects of ranking algorithms that generate filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) and create incentives for publishers to share clickbait and hyperpartisan content (Benkler et al, 2018). The outcome of this process is a society that is increasingly segregated along partisan lines, and where compromise becomes unlikely due to rising mistrust on public officials, media outlets, and ordinary citizens on the other side of the ideological spectrum.","PeriodicalId":378598,"journal":{"name":"Social Media and Democracy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132290241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.006
S. Woolley
Public awareness surrounding the threat of political bots, of international fears about armies of automated accounts taking over civic conversations on social media, reached a peak in the spring of 2017. OnMay 8 of that year, former Acting US Attorney General Sally Yates and former US Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. sat before Congress to testify on what they called “the Russian toolbox” used in online efforts to manipulate the 2016 US election (Washington Post Staff 2017). In response to their testimony and a larger US intelligence community (IC) report on the subject Senator Sheldon Whitehouse said, “I went through the list [of tools used by the Russians] . . . it looked like propaganda, fake news, trolls, and bots. We can all agree from the IC report that those were in fact used in the 2016 election” (Washington Post Staff 2017). Yates and Clapper argued that the Russian government and its commercial proxy – the Internet Research Agency (IRA) – made substantive use of bots to spread disinformation and inflame polarization during the 2016 US presidential election. These comments mirrored concurrent allegations made by other public officials, but also by academic researchers and investigative journalists, around the globe. Eight months earlier, during a speech before her country’s parliament German Chancellor Angela Merkel raised concerns that bots would affect the outcome of their upcoming election (Copley 2016). Shortly thereafter, the New York Times described the rise of “a battle among political bots” on Twitter. Around the same time, research from the University of Southern California’s Information Sciences Institute concretized the ways that social media bots were being used to manipulate public opinion:
公众对政治机器人威胁的意识，以及国际社会对大量自动账户接管社交媒体上公民对话的担忧，在2017年春天达到了顶峰。当年5月8日，美国前代理司法部长萨利·耶茨和美国前国家情报总监詹姆斯·克拉珀在国会就他们所谓的“俄罗斯工具箱”在网络上操纵2016年美国大选作证。参议员谢尔登·怀特豪斯(Sheldon Whitehouse)在回应他们的证词和一份更大的美国情报界(IC)关于该主题的报告时说:“我仔细研究了(俄罗斯人使用的)工具清单……它看起来像是宣传、假新闻、喷子和机器人。我们都可以从IC的报告中同意，这些实际上是在2016年选举中使用的。”(华盛顿邮报职员2017)耶茨和克拉珀认为，俄罗斯政府及其商业代理——互联网研究机构(IRA)——在2016年美国总统大选期间大量利用机器人传播虚假信息，煽动两极分化。这些言论反映了全球其他政府官员以及学术研究人员和调查记者同时提出的指控。八个月前，德国总理安格拉·默克尔在她的国家议会发表演讲时表示担心机器人会影响即将到来的选举结果(Copley 2016)。此后不久，《纽约时报》在推特上描述了“政治机器人之间的战斗”的兴起。大约在同一时间，南加州大学信息科学研究所(University of Southern California’s Information Sciences Institute)的研究具体化了社交媒体机器人被用来操纵公众舆论的方式:
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Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.010
F. Fukuyama, Andrew J. Grotto
In current debates over the Internet’s impact on global democracy, the prospect of state regulation of social media has been proffered as a solution to problems like fake news, hate speech, conspiracy-mongering, and similar ills. For example, US Senator Mark Warner has proposed a bill that would enhance privacy protections required of internet platforms, create rules for labeling bot accounts, and change the legal terms of the platforms’ legal relationship with their users. In Europe, regulation has already been enacted in the form of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and new laws like the Network Enforcement Law (NetzDG). This chapter will survey this rapidly developing field, putting current efforts of liberal democracies to regulate internet content in the broader perspective of legacy media regulation. As we will see, there are very different national approaches to this issue among contemporary liberal democracies, and in many respects the new internet regulations, actual and proposed, are extensions of existing practices. We conclude that, in the US case, content regulation will be very difficult to achieve politically and that antitrust should be considered as an alternative. Media regulation is a sensitive and controversial topic in all liberal democracies. The US Constitution’s First Amendment protects freedom of speech, while media freedom is guaranteed in various legal instruments governing the European Union and the Council of Europe, as well as in the European Convention on Human Rights. Freedom of speech is normatively regarded as critical to the proper functioning of a liberal democracy, and the
{"title":"Comparative Media Regulation in the United States and Europe","authors":"F. Fukuyama, Andrew J. Grotto","doi":"10.1017/9781108890960.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108890960.010","url":null,"abstract":"In current debates over the Internet’s impact on global democracy, the prospect of state regulation of social media has been proffered as a solution to problems like fake news, hate speech, conspiracy-mongering, and similar ills. For example, US Senator Mark Warner has proposed a bill that would enhance privacy protections required of internet platforms, create rules for labeling bot accounts, and change the legal terms of the platforms’ legal relationship with their users. In Europe, regulation has already been enacted in the form of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and new laws like the Network Enforcement Law (NetzDG). This chapter will survey this rapidly developing field, putting current efforts of liberal democracies to regulate internet content in the broader perspective of legacy media regulation. As we will see, there are very different national approaches to this issue among contemporary liberal democracies, and in many respects the new internet regulations, actual and proposed, are extensions of existing practices. We conclude that, in the US case, content regulation will be very difficult to achieve politically and that antitrust should be considered as an alternative. Media regulation is a sensitive and controversial topic in all liberal democracies. The US Constitution’s First Amendment protects freedom of speech, while media freedom is guaranteed in various legal instruments governing the European Union and the Council of Europe, as well as in the European Convention on Human Rights. Freedom of speech is normatively regarded as critical to the proper functioning of a liberal democracy, and the","PeriodicalId":378598,"journal":{"name":"Social Media and Democracy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126299674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.012
Tim Hwang
=3067552 Pasquale, F., & Bracha, O. (2007). Federal Search Commission? Access, fairness and accountability in the law of search. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=1002453 Paul, C., & Courtney, W. (2016). Russian propaganda is pervasive, and America is behind the power curve in countering it. Rand Corporation (blog), September 12. www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/russian-propaganda-is-pervasive-and-americais-behind.html Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2017). Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2958246 Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. (2017). Assessing the effect of “disputed” warnings and source salience on perceptions of fake news accuracy. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn .com/abstract=3035384 Amendment of Section 230 283 Published online by Cambridge University Press Prior, M. (2013). Media and political polarization. Annual Review of Political Science,
=3067552 Pasquale, F， & Bracha, O.(2007)。联邦搜索委员会?搜索法中的获取、公平和问责。SSRN。https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=1002453 Paul, C， & Courtney, W.(2016)。俄罗斯的宣传无处不在，而美国在反击方面落后于实力曲线。兰德公司(博客)9月12日。www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/russian-propaganda-is-pervasive-and-americais-behind.html Pennycook, G.， Cannon, T. D.， and Rand, D. G.(2017)。先前的曝光增加了假新闻的感知准确性。SSRN。https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2958246 Pennycook, G.， and Rand, D.(2017)。评估“有争议的”警告和消息来源显著性对假新闻准确性认知的影响。SSRN。《第230条283修正案》剑桥大学出版社，Prior, M.(2013)。媒体和政治两极分化。政治学年度评论，
{"title":"Dealing with Disinformation: Evaluating the Case for Amendment of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act","authors":"Tim Hwang","doi":"10.1017/9781108890960.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108890960.012","url":null,"abstract":"=3067552 Pasquale, F., & Bracha, O. (2007). Federal Search Commission? Access, fairness and accountability in the law of search. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=1002453 Paul, C., & Courtney, W. (2016). Russian propaganda is pervasive, and America is behind the power curve in countering it. Rand Corporation (blog), September 12. www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/russian-propaganda-is-pervasive-and-americais-behind.html Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2017). Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2958246 Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. (2017). Assessing the effect of “disputed” warnings and source salience on perceptions of fake news accuracy. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn .com/abstract=3035384 Amendment of Section 230 283 Published online by Cambridge University Press Prior, M. (2013). Media and political polarization. Annual Review of Political Science,","PeriodicalId":378598,"journal":{"name":"Social Media and Democracy","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116381270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.005
A. Siegel
Online Hate Speech ist ein virulentes, gesamtgesellschaftliches Problem: User*innen von sozialen Netzwerken und Online-Medien sind zunehmend davon betroffen. Auch der Rechtsstaat und Organisationen müssen neue Umgangsstrategien finden. Die Autor*innen dieses Sammelbandes betrachten Online Hate Speech aus interdisziplinären Perspektiven der Rechts-, Politik-, Medien- und Sozialwissenschaften und aus der Praxis. Sie bieten Einblicke in neueste rechtliche Entwicklungen, in die mediale bzw. zivilgesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung, die Betroffenheit von Personen(-Gruppen) und in die Strafrechtstheorie und -praxis. Praktische Handlungsempfehlungen für Politik, Medien, Zivilgesellschaft und Einzelne für den Umgang mit Online Hate Speech runden die Publikation ab. Die Inhalte des Sammelbandes entstammen dem Projekt „NoHate@WebStyria“ der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, der FH JOANNEUM und der Antidiskriminierungsstelle Steiermark - gefördert durch den Zukunftsfonds Steiermark. Creative Commons Licence Terms: Namensnennung – Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International ( CC BY-SA 4.0 ) Sie dürfen: Teilen — das Material in jedwedem Format oder Medium vervielfältigen und weiterverbreiten und zwar für beliebige Zwecke, sogar kommerziell. Unter folgenden Bedingungen: 1. Namensnennung — Sie müssen angemessene Urheber- und Rechteangaben machen, einen Link zur Lizenz beifügen und angeben, ob Änderungen vorgenommen wurden. 2. Keine weiteren Einschränkungen — Sie dürfen keine zusätzlichen Klauseln oder technische Verfahren einsetzen, die anderen rechtlich irgendetwas untersagen, was die Lizenz erlaubt. Die vollständigen Creative Commons Lizenzbestimmungen finden Sie unter: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de Die Rechte an den einzelnen Textbeiträgen und die Verantwortung für deren Inhalt liegen bei den Autor*innen. Trotz sorgfältigster Bearbeitung erfolgen alle Angaben ohne Gewähr. Eine Haftung des Verlages, der Herausgeber*innen und der Autor*innen ist ausgeschlossen.
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Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.015
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Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.003
A. Guess, Benjamin A. Lyons
Not long ago, the rise of social media inspired great optimism about its potential for flattening access to economic and political opportunity, enabling collective action, and facilitating new forms of expression. Its increasingly widespread use ushered in a wave of commentary and scholarship seeking to meld wellestablished bodies of knowledge on mass media, economics, and social movements with the affordances of this new communication technology. Several political upheavals and an election later, the outlook in both the popular press and scholarly discussions is decidedly less optimistic. Facebook and Twitter are more likely to be discussed as incubators of “fake news” and propaganda than as tools for empowerment and social change. The resulting research focus has changed, too, with scholars looking to earlier literatures on misperceptions and persuasion for insight into the challenges of the present. The terms “misinformation,” “disinformation,” and “propaganda” are sometimes used interchangeably, with shifting and overlapping definitions. All three concern false or misleading messages spread under the guise of informative content, whether in the form of elite communication, online messages, advertising, or published articles. For the purposes of this chapter, we define misinformation as constituting a claim that contradicts or distorts common understandings of verifiable facts. This is distinct conceptually from rumors or conspiracy theories, whose definitions do not hinge on the truth value of the claims being made. Instead, rumors are understood as claims whose power arises from social transmission itself (Berinsky 2015). Conspiracy theories have specific characteristics, such as the belief that a hidden group of powerful individuals exerts control over some aspect of society (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009).
{"title":"Misinformation, Disinformation, and Online Propaganda","authors":"A. Guess, Benjamin A. Lyons","doi":"10.1017/9781108890960.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108890960.003","url":null,"abstract":"Not long ago, the rise of social media inspired great optimism about its potential for flattening access to economic and political opportunity, enabling collective action, and facilitating new forms of expression. Its increasingly widespread use ushered in a wave of commentary and scholarship seeking to meld wellestablished bodies of knowledge on mass media, economics, and social movements with the affordances of this new communication technology. Several political upheavals and an election later, the outlook in both the popular press and scholarly discussions is decidedly less optimistic. Facebook and Twitter are more likely to be discussed as incubators of “fake news” and propaganda than as tools for empowerment and social change. The resulting research focus has changed, too, with scholars looking to earlier literatures on misperceptions and persuasion for insight into the challenges of the present. The terms “misinformation,” “disinformation,” and “propaganda” are sometimes used interchangeably, with shifting and overlapping definitions. All three concern false or misleading messages spread under the guise of informative content, whether in the form of elite communication, online messages, advertising, or published articles. For the purposes of this chapter, we define misinformation as constituting a claim that contradicts or distorts common understandings of verifiable facts. This is distinct conceptually from rumors or conspiracy theories, whose definitions do not hinge on the truth value of the claims being made. Instead, rumors are understood as claims whose power arises from social transmission itself (Berinsky 2015). Conspiracy theories have specific characteristics, such as the belief that a hidden group of powerful individuals exerts control over some aspect of society (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009).","PeriodicalId":378598,"journal":{"name":"Social Media and Democracy","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125221252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.008
R. Nielsen, R. Fletcher
The move to a more digital, more mobile, and more platform-dominated media environment represents a change to the institutions and infrastructures of free expression and a form of “democratic creative destruction” that challenges incumbent institutions, creates new ones, and in many ways empower individual citizens, even as this change also leaves both individuals and institutions increasingly dependent on a few large US-based technology companies and subjects many historically disadvantaged groups to more abuse and harassment online. That is the argument we advance in this chapter, where we will aim to step away from assessing the democratic implications of the Internet on the basis of individual cases, countries, or outcomes to focus on how structural changes in the media are intertwined with changes in democratic politics. We will set aside considerations of (important) individual phenomena like the Arab Spring, the indignados movement, and #MeToo, or (important) individual outcomes like the 2014 Indian general elections, the UK (Brexit) referendum on EU membership, or the 2016 US presidential elections, and instead identify a few key changes at the institutional level and the individual level that are part and parcel of the rise of digital media and discuss how this rise is in turn changing the institutions and infrastructures that enable free expression. Inspired by James Webster (2014) and his work on structuration, we examine structural change by considering the interplay between institutional change on the supply side and aggregate individual-level behavior on the demand side. We will do so through the lens of news, first the news media as an institution and second news as part of how individual citizens engage with public life. We focus on news as one of several key aspects of democratic politics, key to how we imagine it in its ideal forms and key to how we realize it imperfectly in practice. The structural changes we analyze are not dictated by technology but
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Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.007
E. Fowler, Michael M. Franz, Travis N. Ridout
Digital political advertising comes inmany forms, appears in amyriad of places, and can be targeted in many more ways than traditional television advertising. At its most basic, digital political advertising is interactive content placed for a fee. It includes display advertising (images, audio, or video) and search advertising (based on keyword search behavior); the goal may be to build supporter distribution lists, to fundraise for a candidate, party, or specific political cause, to persuade, or to increase name recognition and distribute information. Paid political ads can appear as banners (across the top of the page), as page takeovers, on the side of a webpage or news feed, in mobile apps, or in social media feeds where viewers can interact, like, or share them, further disseminating paid content organically. Some online ads feature call-to-action buttons and some auto-play as pre-roll advertising, appearing before consumers can continue their online activity. Some can be skipped and others will not allow further action until the ad finishes playing. According to Borrell Associates, digital advertising made up a small fraction (less than 1 percent, $71million) of political ad spending in the United States in 2014 but was projected to comprise a fifth of spending (20.1 percent, $1.8 billion) in 2018 (Borrell Associates 2018). Although digital advertising in campaigns has been around for a while and has been a growth market for several cycles now, it has long been overlooked by scholars, especially in comparison to traditional television advertising, for which there is a long and robust literature (see Fowler, Franz, and Ridout 2016), and even organic social media content, for which there is burgeoning research (Borah 2016; Bode et al. 2016). The lack of research on paid online advertising stems, in large part, from the difficulty in tracking the placement of and spending on online ads on websites, in apps, and on social media. Unlike television, where commercial tracking data has been available for two decades, systematic commercial tracking of digital advertising is very new, and until the aftermath of the 2016
数字政治广告有多种形式，出现在无数的地方，比传统的电视广告有更多的针对性。最基本的是，数字政治广告是付费投放的互动内容。它包括展示广告(图像、音频或视频)和搜索广告(基于关键字搜索行为);目标可能是建立支持者分布名单，为候选人、政党或特定的政治事业筹集资金，说服或提高知名度和传播信息。付费政治广告可以以横幅(在页面顶部)的形式出现，也可以作为页面接管，出现在网页或新闻动态的侧面，出现在移动应用程序中，或者出现在社交媒体动态中，浏览者可以与之互动、点赞或分享，从而进一步有机地传播付费内容。一些在线广告以号召按钮和一些自动播放的广告为特色，在消费者继续他们的在线活动之前出现。有些可以跳过，有些则不允许进一步操作，直到广告播放完毕。根据博雷尔协会的数据，2014年，数字广告占美国政治广告支出的一小部分(不到1%，7100万美元)，但预计到2018年将占支出的五分之一(20.1%，18亿美元)(博雷尔协会2018年)。尽管竞选活动中的数字广告已经存在了一段时间，并且现在已经成为几个周期的增长市场，但长期以来一直被学者们所忽视，特别是与传统电视广告相比，传统电视广告有悠久而强大的文献(见Fowler, Franz, and Ridout 2016)，甚至有机社交媒体内容，也有新兴的研究(Borah 2016;Bode et al. 2016)。在很大程度上，缺乏对付费在线广告的研究，是因为很难追踪在线广告在网站、应用程序和社交媒体上的投放和支出。在电视上，商业跟踪数据已经存在了20年，而数字广告的系统商业跟踪是非常新的，直到2016年大选之后
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Pub Date : 2019-12-16DOI: 10.1017/9781108890960.011
Daphne Keller, P. Leerssen
Reliable information about platforms’ content removal systems was, for many years, hard to come by. But data and disclosures are steadily emerging as researchers focus on the topic and platforms ramp up their transparency measures, including both self-regulatory efforts as well as disclosures required by law. This essay reviews the current and likely future sources of information. First, we discuss disclosures from platforms and other participants in content moderation, such as users and governments. Second, we discuss independent research from third parties such as academics and journalists, including data analysis, interviews and surveys. Finally, before concluding the essay, we list specific questions and areas for future empirical research.
{"title":"Facts and Where to Find Them: Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and Content Moderation","authors":"Daphne Keller, P. Leerssen","doi":"10.1017/9781108890960.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108890960.011","url":null,"abstract":"Reliable information about platforms’ content removal systems was, for many years, hard to come by. But data and disclosures are steadily emerging as researchers focus on the topic and platforms ramp up their transparency measures, including both self-regulatory efforts as well as disclosures required by law. This essay reviews the current and likely future sources of information. First, we discuss disclosures from platforms and other participants in content moderation, such as users and governments. Second, we discuss independent research from third parties such as academics and journalists, including data analysis, interviews and surveys. Finally, before concluding the essay, we list specific questions and areas for future empirical research.","PeriodicalId":378598,"journal":{"name":"Social Media and Democracy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125003857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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