Pub Date : 2011-01-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100611422045
Norman R Augustine
The very subject of giftedness is fraught with contradiction and controversy. On the one hand, we often encounter misunderstanding, envy, and perceived elitism—and on the other, admiration, dependency, and respect. Little wonder that our K–12 education system has not yet determined how best to nurture extraordinary individuals so that they can become extraordinary contributors to society—and feel rewarded in doing so. Unfortunately, it is not simply the gifted who are underserved by most of our nation’s 14,000 public school systems; that group is just more acutely neglected, along with the economically less fortunate, than the nation’s student population as a whole.
{"title":"Educating the Gifted.","authors":"Norman R Augustine","doi":"10.1177/1529100611422045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100611422045","url":null,"abstract":"The very subject of giftedness is fraught with contradiction and controversy. On the one hand, we often encounter misunderstanding, envy, and perceived elitism—and on the other, admiration, dependency, and respect. Little wonder that our K–12 education system has not yet determined how best to nurture extraordinary individuals so that they can become extraordinary contributors to society—and feel rewarded in doing so. Unfortunately, it is not simply the gifted who are underserved by most of our nation’s 14,000 public school systems; that group is just more acutely neglected, along with the economically less fortunate, than the nation’s student population as a whole.","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"12 1","pages":"1-2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100611422045","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33899781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-01-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100611418056
Rena F Subotnik, Paula Olszewski-Kubilius, Frank C Worrell
For nearly a century, scholars have sought to understand, measure, and explain giftedness. Succeeding theories and empirical investigations have often built on earlier work, complementing or sometimes clashing over conceptions of talent or contesting the mechanisms of talent development. Some have even suggested that giftedness itself is a misnomer, mistaken for the results of endless practice or social advantage. In surveying the landscape of current knowledge about giftedness and gifted education, this monograph will advance a set of interrelated arguments: The abilities of individuals do matter, particularly their abilities in specific talent domains; different talent domains have different developmental trajectories that vary as to when they start, peak, and end; and opportunities provided by society are crucial at every point in the talent-development process. We argue that society must strive to promote these opportunities but that individuals with talent also have some responsibility for their own growth and development. Furthermore, the research knowledge base indicates that psychosocial variables are determining influences in the successful development of talent. Finally, outstanding achievement or eminence ought to be the chief goal of gifted education. We assert that aspiring to fulfill one's talents and abilities in the form of transcendent creative contributions will lead to high levels of personal satisfaction and self-actualization as well as produce yet unimaginable scientific, aesthetic, and practical benefits to society. To frame our discussion, we propose a definition of giftedness that we intend to be comprehensive. Giftedness is the manifestation of performance that is clearly at the upper end of the distribution in a talent domain even relative to other high-functioning individuals in that domain. Further, giftedness can be viewed as developmental in that in the beginning stages, potential is the key variable; in later stages, achievement is the measure of giftedness; and in fully developed talents, eminence is the basis on which this label is granted. Psychosocial variables play an essential role in the manifestation of giftedness at every developmental stage. Both cognitive and psychosocial variables are malleable and need to be deliberately cultivated. Our goal here is to provide a definition that is useful across all domains of endeavor and acknowledges several perspectives about giftedness on which there is a fairly broad scientific consensus. Giftedness (a) reflects the values of society; (b) is typically manifested in actual outcomes, especially in adulthood; (c) is specific to domains of endeavor; (d) is the result of the coalescing of biological, pedagogical, psychological, and psychosocial factors; and (e) is relative not just to the ordinary (e.g., a child with exceptional art ability compared to peers) but to the extraordinary (e.g., an artist who revolutionizes a field of art). In this monograph, our goal
{"title":"Rethinking Giftedness and Gifted Education: A Proposed Direction Forward Based on Psychological Science.","authors":"Rena F Subotnik, Paula Olszewski-Kubilius, Frank C Worrell","doi":"10.1177/1529100611418056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100611418056","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>For nearly a century, scholars have sought to understand, measure, and explain giftedness. Succeeding theories and empirical investigations have often built on earlier work, complementing or sometimes clashing over conceptions of talent or contesting the mechanisms of talent development. Some have even suggested that giftedness itself is a misnomer, mistaken for the results of endless practice or social advantage. In surveying the landscape of current knowledge about giftedness and gifted education, this monograph will advance a set of interrelated arguments: The abilities of individuals do matter, particularly their abilities in specific talent domains; different talent domains have different developmental trajectories that vary as to when they start, peak, and end; and opportunities provided by society are crucial at every point in the talent-development process. We argue that society must strive to promote these opportunities but that individuals with talent also have some responsibility for their own growth and development. Furthermore, the research knowledge base indicates that psychosocial variables are determining influences in the successful development of talent. Finally, outstanding achievement or eminence ought to be the chief goal of gifted education. We assert that aspiring to fulfill one's talents and abilities in the form of transcendent creative contributions will lead to high levels of personal satisfaction and self-actualization as well as produce yet unimaginable scientific, aesthetic, and practical benefits to society. To frame our discussion, we propose a definition of giftedness that we intend to be comprehensive. Giftedness is the manifestation of performance that is clearly at the upper end of the distribution in a talent domain even relative to other high-functioning individuals in that domain. Further, giftedness can be viewed as developmental in that in the beginning stages, potential is the key variable; in later stages, achievement is the measure of giftedness; and in fully developed talents, eminence is the basis on which this label is granted. Psychosocial variables play an essential role in the manifestation of giftedness at every developmental stage. Both cognitive and psychosocial variables are malleable and need to be deliberately cultivated. Our goal here is to provide a definition that is useful across all domains of endeavor and acknowledges several perspectives about giftedness on which there is a fairly broad scientific consensus. Giftedness (a) reflects the values of society; (b) is typically manifested in actual outcomes, especially in adulthood; (c) is specific to domains of endeavor; (d) is the result of the coalescing of biological, pedagogical, psychological, and psychosocial factors; and (e) is relative not just to the ordinary (e.g., a child with exceptional art ability compared to peers) but to the extraordinary (e.g., an artist who revolutionizes a field of art). In this monograph, our goal ","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"12 1","pages":"3-54"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100611418056","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33899782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100610390861
Aldert Vrij, Pär Anders Granhag, Stephen Porter
The question of whether discernible differences exist between liars and truth tellers has interested professional lie detectors and laypersons for centuries. In this article we discuss whether people can detect lies when observing someone’s nonverbal behavior or analyzing someone’s speech. An article about detecting lies by observing nonverbal and verbal cues is overdue. Scientific journals regularly publish overviews of research articles regarding nonverbal and verbal cues to deception, but they offer no explicit guidance about what lie detectors should do and should avoid doing to catch liars. We will present such guidance in the present article.
{"title":"Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie Detection.","authors":"Aldert Vrij, Pär Anders Granhag, Stephen Porter","doi":"10.1177/1529100610390861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610390861","url":null,"abstract":"The question of whether discernible differences exist between liars and truth tellers has interested professional lie detectors and laypersons for centuries. In this article we discuss whether people can detect lies when observing someone’s nonverbal behavior or analyzing someone’s speech. An article about detecting lies by observing nonverbal and verbal cues is overdue. Scientific journals regularly publish overviews of research articles regarding nonverbal and verbal cues to deception, but they offer no explicit guidance about what lie detectors should do and should avoid doing to catch liars. We will present such guidance in the present article.","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"11 3","pages":"89-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100610390861","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33899780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100610390863
Elizabeth F Loftus
While trying to think of an interesting way to introduce this major review of the field of lie detection, I did what lots of people do these days. I typed ‘‘catching liars’’ into the Google search bar and up came 305,000 results in .17 seconds. The first page was ‘‘10 ways to catch a liar’’ from WebMD. The essay featured J.J. Newberry, a trained federal agent purported to be skilled at detecting deception in people he interviewed. One of his success stories was the lie he spotted when a witness to a shooting tried to tell him that she heard gunshots and, without looking, just ran away. Newberry was suspicious: For him, this was inconsistent with how people respond to situations like this. And to prove his point, he banged on the table and the witness instantly looked right at him. This story helped motivate the tip at the top of the list for catching liars. The number-1 tip, Newberry said, is to look for inconsistencies in what witnesses are saying. Number 2: Ask the unexpected. Newberry’s professional experience and notions about liars would find some support in the following Psychological Science in the Public Interest article on lie detection. But I expect that he would also find out some new things that might surprise him. The focus of the article is on behaviors, both nonverbal and speech behaviors, that can be used by someone who wants to try to detect deception in another person. Basically, we’re not particularly good at detecting deception, for a number of reasons. First, we often don’t want to catch lies: We’d rather be happily in the dark about some matters. Second, detecting lies is not that easy to do. We make mistakes because we rely on behaviors that aren’t helpful and that can even lead us astray. We expect liars to behave in certain ways, but they don’t. We think that liars look away (gaze aversion) and that they fidget (grooming gestures). These popular cues that people use to detect lies are not reliable cues. How do we know this? Researchers on lie detection have devised some very clever ways of trying to figure out what liars actually do. For years, experimental subjects have been instructed to lie or to tell the truth about some matter. For example, they lie about a film they recently saw or about whether they had a particular object in their pocket. Or, more complexly, they go to a restaurant to have lunch (the truth) or they commit a mock crime and pretend they were at the restaurant having lunch (the lie). Or they are passengers at an airport who either tell the truth about an upcoming trip or tell a lie. Liars don’t look away, and they don’t fidget more than truth tellers do. Using gaze aversion to decide that someone is lying can be dangerous for that someone’s health and happiness. And— what was news to me—some cultural or ethnic groups are more likely to show gaze aversion. For example, Blacks are particularly likely to show gaze aversion. So imagine now the problem that might arise when a White police officer intervie
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Pub Date : 2010-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100610388753
James R Flynn
Congratulations to Deary, Weiss, and Batty (2010, this issue) for an encyclopedic and judicious survey of the literature and for their sensible recommendations as to how medical practitioners must tailor prescriptions to the personality and cognitive ability of patients they address. The suggestions for future research are state of the art in terms of analysis of the kind of data psychologists are likely to collect. However, I suggest that we approach sociologists with hypotheses that might motivate them to supplement our knowledge. The curse of any model is that it is underidentified and encourages us to think that we know what human behavior lies behind the numbers it generates. I will comment on what etiology might lie behind the correlation between low IQ and hospitalization for violence-inflicted injury. Others with broader knowledge will I hope make similar contributions. I was reared in a gang-organized area where gangs were staffed by ethnicity: Blacks versus an alliance of non-Black Catholics (Irish, Italian, Puerto Rican, Filipino). The culture was one of defense of honor and territory by fighting. Teenagers challenged other teenagers to fight: The path between IQ and injury was not a matter of being too unintelligent to have mediation or coping skills. If challenged, any resort to such was proof of cowardice, and the sanctions for that were to be outcast and bullied. If you won, you might have the high status of the best street fighter in your group; if you lost honorably, you were a member of the group in good standing. Gangs challenged each other: Failure to fight and risk injury meant having no place to ‘‘play’’ and low group esteem. Pub culture was a major leisure-time amusement and going to a pub was likely to lead to challenges. Football (gridiron) was a leisure sport that led to challenges. In sum, fighting for honor and territory was not a behavioral manifestation of low IQ. Yet as a group we undoubtedly had a lower mean IQ than Washington, D.C., as a whole. But it was our culture, not low-IQ, that was the active factor. It might seem that allowing for lower socioeconomic status (SES) would capture this etiology. Not entirely: Jewish boys in our neighborhood simply did not go out on the street after school; they socialized through the Synagogue. They would avoid risk because their self-esteem did not include honor as the rest of us defined it. We thought they were cowards, but they did not care. I doubt Swedish data would pick up any of this, and I am impressed that it shows a correlation between IQ and violence-inflicted injury after SES is allowed for. I suspect that functional or dysfunctional cognition is the answer. I suspect that U.S. data would show a stronger correlation, particularly before SES is allowed for. But it would be wrong to conclude that the extra is necessarily due to cognitive rather than ethnic or cultural factors. Therefore, let us have some investigation of behavior on the ground if we want a full under
{"title":"Commentary on \"Intelligence and Personality as Predictors of Illness and Death\" by Deary, Weiss, and Batty.","authors":"James R Flynn","doi":"10.1177/1529100610388753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610388753","url":null,"abstract":"Congratulations to Deary, Weiss, and Batty (2010, this issue) for an encyclopedic and judicious survey of the literature and for their sensible recommendations as to how medical practitioners must tailor prescriptions to the personality and cognitive ability of patients they address. The suggestions for future research are state of the art in terms of analysis of the kind of data psychologists are likely to collect. However, I suggest that we approach sociologists with hypotheses that might motivate them to supplement our knowledge. The curse of any model is that it is underidentified and encourages us to think that we know what human behavior lies behind the numbers it generates. I will comment on what etiology might lie behind the correlation between low IQ and hospitalization for violence-inflicted injury. Others with broader knowledge will I hope make similar contributions. I was reared in a gang-organized area where gangs were staffed by ethnicity: Blacks versus an alliance of non-Black Catholics (Irish, Italian, Puerto Rican, Filipino). The culture was one of defense of honor and territory by fighting. Teenagers challenged other teenagers to fight: The path between IQ and injury was not a matter of being too unintelligent to have mediation or coping skills. If challenged, any resort to such was proof of cowardice, and the sanctions for that were to be outcast and bullied. If you won, you might have the high status of the best street fighter in your group; if you lost honorably, you were a member of the group in good standing. Gangs challenged each other: Failure to fight and risk injury meant having no place to ‘‘play’’ and low group esteem. Pub culture was a major leisure-time amusement and going to a pub was likely to lead to challenges. Football (gridiron) was a leisure sport that led to challenges. In sum, fighting for honor and territory was not a behavioral manifestation of low IQ. Yet as a group we undoubtedly had a lower mean IQ than Washington, D.C., as a whole. But it was our culture, not low-IQ, that was the active factor. It might seem that allowing for lower socioeconomic status (SES) would capture this etiology. Not entirely: Jewish boys in our neighborhood simply did not go out on the street after school; they socialized through the Synagogue. They would avoid risk because their self-esteem did not include honor as the rest of us defined it. We thought they were cowards, but they did not care. I doubt Swedish data would pick up any of this, and I am impressed that it shows a correlation between IQ and violence-inflicted injury after SES is allowed for. I suspect that functional or dysfunctional cognition is the answer. I suspect that U.S. data would show a stronger correlation, particularly before SES is allowed for. But it would be wrong to conclude that the extra is necessarily due to cognitive rather than ethnic or cultural factors. Therefore, let us have some investigation of behavior on the ground if we want a full under","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"11 2","pages":"80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100610388753","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33899778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100610387081
Ian J Deary, Alexander Weiss, G David Batty
This monograph describes research findings linking intelligence and personality traits with health outcomes, including health behaviors, morbidity, and mortality. The field of study of intelligence and health outcomes, is called cognitive epidemiology, and the field of study of personality traits and health outcomes is known as personological epidemiology. Intelligence and personality traits are the principal research topics studied by differential psychologists, so the combined field could be called differential epidemiology. This research is important for the following reasons: The findings overviewed are relatively new, and many researchers and practitioners are unaware of them; the effect sizes are on par with better-known, traditional risk factors for illness and death; mechanisms of the associations are largely unknown, so they must be explored further; and the findings have yet to be applied, so we write this to encourage diverse interested parties to consider how applications might be achieved. To make this research accessible to as many relevant researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and laypersons as possible, we first provide an overview of the basic discoveries regarding intelligence and personality. We describe the nature and structure of the measured phenotypes (i.e., the observable characteristics of an individual) in both fields. Although both areas of study are well established, we recognize that this may not be common knowledge outside of experts in the field. Human intelligence differences are described by a hierarchy that includes general intelligence (g) at the pinnacle, strongly correlated broad domains of cognitive functioning at a lower level, and specific abilities at the foot. The major human differences in personality are described by five personality factors that are widely agreed on with respect to their number and nature: neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. As a foundation for health-related findings, we provide a summary of research showing that intelligence and personality differences can be measured reliably and validly and are stable across many years (even decades), substantially heritable, and related to important life outcomes. Cognitive and personality traits are fundamental aspects of a person, and they have relevance to life chances and outcomes, including health outcomes. We provide an overview of major and recent research on the associations between intelligence and personality traits and health outcomes. These outcomes include mortality from all causes, specific causes of death, specific illnesses, and others, such as health-related behaviors. Intelligence and personality traits are significantly and substantially (by comparison with traditional risk factors) related to all of these outcomes. The studies we describe are unusual in psychology: They have large sample sizes (typically thousands of subjects, sometimes ~1 million), the samples are more representative
{"title":"Intelligence and Personality as Predictors of Illness and Death: How Researchers in Differential Psychology and Chronic Disease Epidemiology Are Collaborating to Understand and Address Health Inequalities.","authors":"Ian J Deary, Alexander Weiss, G David Batty","doi":"10.1177/1529100610387081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610387081","url":null,"abstract":"This monograph describes research findings linking intelligence and personality traits with health outcomes, including health behaviors, morbidity, and mortality. The field of study of intelligence and health outcomes, is called cognitive epidemiology, and the field of study of personality traits and health outcomes is known as personological epidemiology. Intelligence and personality traits are the principal research topics studied by differential psychologists, so the combined field could be called differential epidemiology. This research is important for the following reasons: The findings overviewed are relatively new, and many researchers and practitioners are unaware of them; the effect sizes are on par with better-known, traditional risk factors for illness and death; mechanisms of the associations are largely unknown, so they must be explored further; and the findings have yet to be applied, so we write this to encourage diverse interested parties to consider how applications might be achieved. To make this research accessible to as many relevant researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and laypersons as possible, we first provide an overview of the basic discoveries regarding intelligence and personality. We describe the nature and structure of the measured phenotypes (i.e., the observable characteristics of an individual) in both fields. Although both areas of study are well established, we recognize that this may not be common knowledge outside of experts in the field. Human intelligence differences are described by a hierarchy that includes general intelligence (g) at the pinnacle, strongly correlated broad domains of cognitive functioning at a lower level, and specific abilities at the foot. The major human differences in personality are described by five personality factors that are widely agreed on with respect to their number and nature: neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. As a foundation for health-related findings, we provide a summary of research showing that intelligence and personality differences can be measured reliably and validly and are stable across many years (even decades), substantially heritable, and related to important life outcomes. Cognitive and personality traits are fundamental aspects of a person, and they have relevance to life chances and outcomes, including health outcomes. We provide an overview of major and recent research on the associations between intelligence and personality traits and health outcomes. These outcomes include mortality from all causes, specific causes of death, specific illnesses, and others, such as health-related behaviors. Intelligence and personality traits are significantly and substantially (by comparison with traditional risk factors) related to all of these outcomes. The studies we describe are unusual in psychology: They have large sample sizes (typically thousands of subjects, sometimes ~1 million), the samples are more representative ","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"11 2","pages":"53-79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100610387081","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33899777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100610389558
Susan Nolen-Hoeksema
Bonanno, Brewin, Kaniasty, and LaGreca (2010, this issue) provide a comprehensive and authoritative review of research on risk and resilience following disaster, including the authors’ own ground-breaking work in this area. This review seems particularly timely given the apparent excess of natural and human-made disasters in the news in recent years. Images of hurricane victims in New Orleans, tsunami victims in Southeast Asia, earthquake victims in Haiti, and flood victims in Pakistan, as well as those who lost their livelihoods due to the Deep Horizon oil spill in the Gulf Coast, haunt us, moving us to want to do something. Bonanno et al. caution that some well-motivated attempts to prevent psychological harm in disaster victims may backfire, undermining the natural coping and healing processes that characterize the majority of victims. The authors persuasively demonstrate that the strong majority of victims are resilient, showing little evidence of long-term psychological harm. Still, there is a minority of individuals who suffer long-term distress—manifested in many ways in addition to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—who could benefit from empirically informed interventions such as cognitive-behavioral therapy. Sadly, few of these individuals will have access to such interventions, particularly when their whole community has been ravaged by a disaster. The aspect of the review by Bonanno et al. that is probably most novel to many psychologists is their discussion of the impact of disasters on families and communities. We are accustomed to thinking about both risk factors and interventions at the level of the individual. The authors make clear, however, that some of the most potent risk factors for postdisaster psychological distress may be at the family and community level, such as decreased instrumental and emotional support. Further, some of the most potent (and safe) interventions may be to restore community and family resources and cohesion as soon as possible after the disaster. This suggests that psychologists should work with sociologists, political scientists, and economists, among other professionals, to study communityand family-level factors that most strongly impact individuals’ well-being after a disaster and to design new interventions to restore factors promoting resilience.
{"title":"Learning New Ways to Do Good.","authors":"Susan Nolen-Hoeksema","doi":"10.1177/1529100610389558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610389558","url":null,"abstract":"Bonanno, Brewin, Kaniasty, and LaGreca (2010, this issue) provide a comprehensive and authoritative review of research on risk and resilience following disaster, including the authors’ own ground-breaking work in this area. This review seems particularly timely given the apparent excess of natural and human-made disasters in the news in recent years. Images of hurricane victims in New Orleans, tsunami victims in Southeast Asia, earthquake victims in Haiti, and flood victims in Pakistan, as well as those who lost their livelihoods due to the Deep Horizon oil spill in the Gulf Coast, haunt us, moving us to want to do something. Bonanno et al. caution that some well-motivated attempts to prevent psychological harm in disaster victims may backfire, undermining the natural coping and healing processes that characterize the majority of victims. The authors persuasively demonstrate that the strong majority of victims are resilient, showing little evidence of long-term psychological harm. Still, there is a minority of individuals who suffer long-term distress—manifested in many ways in addition to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—who could benefit from empirically informed interventions such as cognitive-behavioral therapy. Sadly, few of these individuals will have access to such interventions, particularly when their whole community has been ravaged by a disaster. The aspect of the review by Bonanno et al. that is probably most novel to many psychologists is their discussion of the impact of disasters on families and communities. We are accustomed to thinking about both risk factors and interventions at the level of the individual. The authors make clear, however, that some of the most potent risk factors for postdisaster psychological distress may be at the family and community level, such as decreased instrumental and emotional support. Further, some of the most potent (and safe) interventions may be to restore community and family resources and cohesion as soon as possible after the disaster. This suggests that psychologists should work with sociologists, political scientists, and economists, among other professionals, to study communityand family-level factors that most strongly impact individuals’ well-being after a disaster and to design new interventions to restore factors promoting resilience.","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"11 1","pages":"i"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100610389558","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33899776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100610387086
George A Bonanno, Chris R Brewin, Krzysztof Kaniasty, Annette M La Greca
Disasters typically strike quickly and cause great harm. Unfortunately, because of the spontaneous and chaotic nature of disasters, the psychological consequences have proved exceedingly difficult to assess. Published reports have often overestimated a disaster's psychological cost to survivors, suggesting, for example, that many if not most survivors will develop posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); at the same time, these reports have underestimated the scope of the disaster's broader impact in other domains. We argue that such ambiguities can be attributed to methodological limitations. When we focus on only the most scientifically sound research--studies that use prospective designs or include multivariate analyses of predictor and outcome measures--relatively clear conclusions about the psychological parameters of disasters emerge. We summarize the major aspects of these conclusions in five key points and close with a brief review of possible implications these points suggest for disaster intervention. 1. Disasters cause serious psychological harm in a minority of exposed individuals. People exposed to disaster show myriad psychological problems, including PTSD, grief, depression, anxiety, stress-related health costs, substance abuse, and suicidal ideation. However, severe levels of these problems are typically observed only in a relatively small minority of exposed individuals. In adults, the proportion rarely exceeds 30% of most samples, and in the vast majority of methodologically sound studies, the level is usually considerably lower. Among youth, elevated symptoms are common in the first few months following a high-impact disaster, but again, chronic symptom elevations rarely exceed 30% of the youth sampled. 2. Disasters produce multiple patterns of outcome, including psychological resilience. In addition to chronic dysfunction, other patterns of disaster outcome are typically observed. Some survivors recover their psychological equilibrium within a period ranging from several months to 1 or 2 years. A sizeable proportion, often more than half of those exposed, experience only transient distress and maintain a stable trajectory of healthy functioning or resilience. Resilient outcomes have been evidenced across different methodologies, including recent studies that identified patterns of outcome using relatively sophisticated data analytic approaches, such as latent growth mixture modeling. 3. Disaster outcome depends on a combination of risk and resilience factors. As is true for most highly aversive events, individual differences in disaster outcomes are informed by a number of unique risk and resilience factors, including variables related to the context in which the disaster occurs, variables related to proximal exposure during the disaster, and variables related to distal exposure in the disaster's aftermath. Multivariate studies indicate that there is no one single dominant predictor of disaster outcomes. Rather, as with traumatic
{"title":"Weighing the Costs of Disaster: Consequences, Risks, and Resilience in Individuals, Families, and Communities.","authors":"George A Bonanno, Chris R Brewin, Krzysztof Kaniasty, Annette M La Greca","doi":"10.1177/1529100610387086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610387086","url":null,"abstract":"Disasters typically strike quickly and cause great harm. Unfortunately, because of the spontaneous and chaotic nature of disasters, the psychological consequences have proved exceedingly difficult to assess. Published reports have often overestimated a disaster's psychological cost to survivors, suggesting, for example, that many if not most survivors will develop posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); at the same time, these reports have underestimated the scope of the disaster's broader impact in other domains. We argue that such ambiguities can be attributed to methodological limitations. When we focus on only the most scientifically sound research--studies that use prospective designs or include multivariate analyses of predictor and outcome measures--relatively clear conclusions about the psychological parameters of disasters emerge. We summarize the major aspects of these conclusions in five key points and close with a brief review of possible implications these points suggest for disaster intervention. 1. Disasters cause serious psychological harm in a minority of exposed individuals. People exposed to disaster show myriad psychological problems, including PTSD, grief, depression, anxiety, stress-related health costs, substance abuse, and suicidal ideation. However, severe levels of these problems are typically observed only in a relatively small minority of exposed individuals. In adults, the proportion rarely exceeds 30% of most samples, and in the vast majority of methodologically sound studies, the level is usually considerably lower. Among youth, elevated symptoms are common in the first few months following a high-impact disaster, but again, chronic symptom elevations rarely exceed 30% of the youth sampled. 2. Disasters produce multiple patterns of outcome, including psychological resilience. In addition to chronic dysfunction, other patterns of disaster outcome are typically observed. Some survivors recover their psychological equilibrium within a period ranging from several months to 1 or 2 years. A sizeable proportion, often more than half of those exposed, experience only transient distress and maintain a stable trajectory of healthy functioning or resilience. Resilient outcomes have been evidenced across different methodologies, including recent studies that identified patterns of outcome using relatively sophisticated data analytic approaches, such as latent growth mixture modeling. 3. Disaster outcome depends on a combination of risk and resilience factors. As is true for most highly aversive events, individual differences in disaster outcomes are informed by a number of unique risk and resilience factors, including variables related to the context in which the disaster occurs, variables related to proximal exposure during the disaster, and variables related to distal exposure in the disaster's aftermath. Multivariate studies indicate that there is no one single dominant predictor of disaster outcomes. Rather, as with traumatic","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"11 1","pages":"1-49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100610387086","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33899774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100610389314
Judith F Kroll
Until recently, research on language processing and its cognitive basis assumed that monolingual speakers were the model subjects of study and that English provided an adequate basis on which universal principles might be generalized. In this view, bilinguals were considered a special group of language users, much like brain-damaged patients, children with language disorders, or deaf individuals who use a signed language to communicate. Each of these special groups held genuine interest for the field, but their performance was not taken to provide primary evidence for the purpose of adjudicating the classic debates about the representation of language in the mind and brain. In the past two decades, this situation has changed with the realization that bilingualism is not an exceptional feature of a small group of language users but a common state of affairs in many places in the world. The rapid increase in research on bilingualism has spawned all of the usual academic conferences and professional journals. But more critically, it has enabled the insight that bilinguals provide a unique lens for cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and clinicians who seek to understand the trajectory of cognitive and language development, its basis in the brain, and the nature of disorders that may be manifest when more than a single language is engaged. The article by Bialystok, Craik, Green, and Gollan that appears in this issue of Psychological Science in the Public Interest provides an outstanding summary of these recent developments on bilingualism and its consequences. Bialystok et al. demonstrate that, contrary to the earlier view that bilingualism is a special case, the acquisition and use of multiple languages reveal new discoveries about the mind and the brain that would not be possible from studies focused only on monolingual use of the native language. What lessons can we take from Bialystok et al.’s review of this emerging area of research? The message that is perhaps most relevant to the goal of placing psychological science in the public domain is that bilingualism is a good thing. Contrary to the view that young children will be confused by exposure to more than one language and harmed by delays in development, the research to date demonstrates that exposure to two languages from birth enables children to recognize and distinguish speech in both languages. The course of development for bilingual-learning children may differ in subtle ways from that of monolingual children, but bilingual children are not harmed by the multiple exposure. To the contrary, the past 20 years of research suggests that by the time bilingual children are 3 or 4 years old, not only have they acquired the ability to recognize speech in two languages but their cognitive development is also advantaged relative to their monolingual counterparts. Bialystok herself has been a pioneer in demonstrating that bilingualism confers positive consequences to young children in the domai
{"title":"The Consequences of Bilingualism for the Mind and the Brain.","authors":"Judith F Kroll","doi":"10.1177/1529100610389314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610389314","url":null,"abstract":"Until recently, research on language processing and its cognitive basis assumed that monolingual speakers were the model subjects of study and that English provided an adequate basis on which universal principles might be generalized. In this view, bilinguals were considered a special group of language users, much like brain-damaged patients, children with language disorders, or deaf individuals who use a signed language to communicate. Each of these special groups held genuine interest for the field, but their performance was not taken to provide primary evidence for the purpose of adjudicating the classic debates about the representation of language in the mind and brain. In the past two decades, this situation has changed with the realization that bilingualism is not an exceptional feature of a small group of language users but a common state of affairs in many places in the world. The rapid increase in research on bilingualism has spawned all of the usual academic conferences and professional journals. But more critically, it has enabled the insight that bilinguals provide a unique lens for cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and clinicians who seek to understand the trajectory of cognitive and language development, its basis in the brain, and the nature of disorders that may be manifest when more than a single language is engaged. The article by Bialystok, Craik, Green, and Gollan that appears in this issue of Psychological Science in the Public Interest provides an outstanding summary of these recent developments on bilingualism and its consequences. Bialystok et al. demonstrate that, contrary to the earlier view that bilingualism is a special case, the acquisition and use of multiple languages reveal new discoveries about the mind and the brain that would not be possible from studies focused only on monolingual use of the native language. What lessons can we take from Bialystok et al.’s review of this emerging area of research? The message that is perhaps most relevant to the goal of placing psychological science in the public domain is that bilingualism is a good thing. Contrary to the view that young children will be confused by exposure to more than one language and harmed by delays in development, the research to date demonstrates that exposure to two languages from birth enables children to recognize and distinguish speech in both languages. The course of development for bilingual-learning children may differ in subtle ways from that of monolingual children, but bilingual children are not harmed by the multiple exposure. To the contrary, the past 20 years of research suggests that by the time bilingual children are 3 or 4 years old, not only have they acquired the ability to recognize speech in two languages but their cognitive development is also advantaged relative to their monolingual counterparts. Bialystok herself has been a pioneer in demonstrating that bilingualism confers positive consequences to young children in the domai","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"10 3","pages":"i-ii"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100610389314","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"34284184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-01DOI: 10.1177/1529100610387084
Ellen Bialystok, Fergus I M Craik, David W Green, Tamar H Gollan
The regular use of two languages by bilingual individuals has been shown to have a broad impact on language and cognitive functioning. In this monograph, we consider four aspects of this influence. In the first section, we examine differences between monolinguals and bilinguals in children’s acquisition of language and adults’ linguistic processing, particularly in terms of lexical retrieval. Children learning two languages from birth follow the same milestones for language acquisition as monolinguals do (first words, first use of grammar) but may use different strategies for language acquisition, and they generally have a smaller vocabulary in each language than do monolingual children learning only a single language. Adult bilinguals typically take longer to retrieve individual words than monolinguals do, and they generate fewer words when asked to satisfy a constraint such as category membership or initial letter. In the second section, we consider the impact of bilingualism on nonverbal cognitive processing in both children and adults. The primary effect in this case is the enhancement of executive control functions in bilinguals. On tasks that require inhibition of distracting information, switching between tasks, or holding information in mind while performing a task, bilinguals of all ages outperform comparable monolinguals. A plausible reason is that bilinguals recruit control processes to manage their ongoing linguistic performance and that these control processes become enhanced for other unrelated aspects of cognitive processing. Preliminary evidence also suggests that the executive control advantage may even mitigate cognitive decline in older age and contribute to cognitive reserve, which in turn may postpone Alzheimer’s disease. In the third section, we describe the brain networks that are responsible for language processing in bilinguals and demonstrate their involvement in nonverbal executive control for bilinguals. We begin by reviewing neuroimaging research that identifies the networks used for various nonverbal executive control tasks in the literature. These networks are used as a reference point to interpret the way in which bilinguals perform both verbal and nonverbal control tasks. The results show that bilinguals manage attention to their two language systems using the same networks that are used by monolinguals performing nonverbal tasks. In the fourth section, we discuss the special circumstances that surround the referral of bilingual children (e.g., language delays) and adults (e.g., stroke) for clinical intervention. These referrals are typically based on standardized assessments that use normative data from monolingual populations, such as vocabulary size and lexical retrieval. As we have seen, however, these measures are often different for bilinguals, both for children and adults. We discuss the implications of these linguistic differences for standardized test performance and clinical approaches. We conclude by co
{"title":"Bilingual Minds.","authors":"Ellen Bialystok, Fergus I M Craik, David W Green, Tamar H Gollan","doi":"10.1177/1529100610387084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610387084","url":null,"abstract":"The regular use of two languages by bilingual individuals has been shown to have a broad impact on language and cognitive functioning. In this monograph, we consider four aspects of this influence. In the first section, we examine differences between monolinguals and bilinguals in children’s acquisition of language and adults’ linguistic processing, particularly in terms of lexical retrieval. Children learning two languages from birth follow the same milestones for language acquisition as monolinguals do (first words, first use of grammar) but may use different strategies for language acquisition, and they generally have a smaller vocabulary in each language than do monolingual children learning only a single language. Adult bilinguals typically take longer to retrieve individual words than monolinguals do, and they generate fewer words when asked to satisfy a constraint such as category membership or initial letter. In the second section, we consider the impact of bilingualism on nonverbal cognitive processing in both children and adults. The primary effect in this case is the enhancement of executive control functions in bilinguals. On tasks that require inhibition of distracting information, switching between tasks, or holding information in mind while performing a task, bilinguals of all ages outperform comparable monolinguals. A plausible reason is that bilinguals recruit control processes to manage their ongoing linguistic performance and that these control processes become enhanced for other unrelated aspects of cognitive processing. Preliminary evidence also suggests that the executive control advantage may even mitigate cognitive decline in older age and contribute to cognitive reserve, which in turn may postpone Alzheimer’s disease. In the third section, we describe the brain networks that are responsible for language processing in bilinguals and demonstrate their involvement in nonverbal executive control for bilinguals. We begin by reviewing neuroimaging research that identifies the networks used for various nonverbal executive control tasks in the literature. These networks are used as a reference point to interpret the way in which bilinguals perform both verbal and nonverbal control tasks. The results show that bilinguals manage attention to their two language systems using the same networks that are used by monolinguals performing nonverbal tasks. In the fourth section, we discuss the special circumstances that surround the referral of bilingual children (e.g., language delays) and adults (e.g., stroke) for clinical intervention. These referrals are typically based on standardized assessments that use normative data from monolingual populations, such as vocabulary size and lexical retrieval. As we have seen, however, these measures are often different for bilinguals, both for children and adults. We discuss the implications of these linguistic differences for standardized test performance and clinical approaches. We conclude by co","PeriodicalId":37882,"journal":{"name":"Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society","volume":"10 3","pages":"89-129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1529100610387084","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"34284183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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