This article presents and scrutinizes the Privatizations Law of the Republic of Cyprus, in the context of sustainable development. Cyprus was another victim of the Eurozone crisis. A bailout agreement was reached between Cyprus and its creditors. This bailout agreement was accompanied by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on specific Economic Policy Conditionality requiring certain reforms. The Cyprus MoU required, among others, privatizations of certain State-owned enterprises. In 2014, Cyprus adopt ed the Privatizations Law stipulating the details of the privatization process. This article presents and discusses the most important aspects of this Law. A critical overview of the legal framework of privatizations is provided in the context of sustainable development. The contribution of this privatization procedure to sustainable development is examined. More specifically, the absence of sustainable development from the Privatizations Law is criticized. This article sheds light on the relationship between the privatized enterprises and sustainable development. Certain proposals in the light of the golden shares case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) are made. It is argued that sustainable development could be pursued through golden shares in privatized enterprises. Proposals for the inclusion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in privatized enterprises are brought forward. This article also considers various challenges to the privatization programme of Cyprus.
{"title":"Building the Legal Framework of Privatizations in Cyprus: The Missing Link with Sustainable Development","authors":"Thomas Papadopoulos","doi":"10.54648/eulr2018039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2018039","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents and scrutinizes the Privatizations Law of the Republic of Cyprus, in the context of sustainable development. Cyprus was another victim of the Eurozone crisis. A bailout agreement was reached between Cyprus and its creditors. This bailout agreement was accompanied by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on specific Economic Policy Conditionality requiring certain reforms. The Cyprus MoU required, among others, privatizations of certain State-owned enterprises. In 2014, Cyprus adopt ed the Privatizations Law stipulating the details of the privatization process. This article presents and discusses the most important aspects of this Law. A critical overview of the legal framework of privatizations is provided in the context of sustainable development. The contribution of this privatization procedure to sustainable development is examined. More specifically, the absence of sustainable development from the Privatizations Law is criticized. This article sheds light on the relationship between the privatized enterprises and sustainable development. Certain proposals in the light of the golden shares case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) are made. It is argued that sustainable development could be pursued through golden shares in privatized enterprises. Proposals for the inclusion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in privatized enterprises are brought forward. This article also considers various challenges to the privatization programme of Cyprus.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127336973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the case of workers’ buyout, which has emerged with increasing evidence in Italy over the last ten years, in order to reflect on sustainable alternatives to the capitalist mode of production. Worker-recuperated bankrupted companies, generally defined as recovered factories, have been linked to the Argentinean movement of empresas recuperadas, which produced in the early 2000s a strong social upheaval and a proliferation of companies occupied and restarted for production by the workers themselves. Italian and European recovered factories are, however, mostly the result of a workers’ buyout, an institutional process which allows the employees of a company in crisis to acquire the same by converting their own mobility allowances in share capital. The thesis that we intend to support here is that workers’ buyout provides an excellent example of the resilient capacity of individuals to react to crisis, partly counteracting the decline in employment levels and preserving their livelihoods, as well as a prospective alternative to the capitalist mode of production.
{"title":"Cooperation against Capitalism’s Biases. Workers-Recuperated Enterprises in Italy during the Great Recession","authors":"L. Antonazzo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3270326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3270326","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the case of workers’ buyout, which has emerged with increasing evidence in Italy over the last ten years, in order to reflect on sustainable alternatives to the capitalist mode of production. Worker-recuperated bankrupted companies, generally defined as recovered factories, have been linked to the Argentinean movement of empresas recuperadas, which produced in the early 2000s a strong social upheaval and a proliferation of companies occupied and restarted for production by the workers themselves. Italian and European recovered factories are, however, mostly the result of a workers’ buyout, an institutional process which allows the employees of a company in crisis to acquire the same by converting their own mobility allowances in share capital. The thesis that we intend to support here is that workers’ buyout provides an excellent example of the resilient capacity of individuals to react to crisis, partly counteracting the decline in employment levels and preserving their livelihoods, as well as a prospective alternative to the capitalist mode of production.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121475363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We exploit one of the largest data leaks to date to study whether and how firms use secret offshore vehicles. From the leaked data, we identify 338 listed firms as users of secret offshore vehicles and document that these vehicles are used to finance corruption, avoid taxes, and expropriate shareholders. Overall, the leak erased $174 billion in market capitalization among implicated firms. Following the increased transparency brought about by the leak, implicated firms experience lower sales from perceptively corrupt countries and avoid less tax. We estimate conservatively that one in seven firms have offshore secrets.
{"title":"The Value of Offshore Secrets – Evidence from the Panama Papers","authors":"J. O'Donovan, Hannes F. Wagner, Stefan Zeume","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2771095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2771095","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit one of the largest data leaks to date to study whether and how firms use secret offshore vehicles. From the leaked data, we identify 338 listed firms as users of secret offshore vehicles and document that these vehicles are used to finance corruption, avoid taxes, and expropriate shareholders. Overall, the leak erased $174 billion in market capitalization among implicated firms. Following the increased transparency brought about by the leak, implicated firms experience lower sales from perceptively corrupt countries and avoid less tax. We estimate conservatively that one in seven firms have offshore secrets.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132640547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sylvain Carr'e, P. Collin-Dufresne, Franck Gabriel
We consider a one-period Kyle (1985) framework where the insider can be subject to a penalty if she trades. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for virtually any penalty function when noise is uniform. In equilibrium, the demand of the insider and the price functions are in general non-linear and remain analytically tractable because the expected price function is linear. We use this result to investigate the trade off between price efficiency and "fairness": we consider a regulator that wants to minimise post-trade standard deviation for a given level of uninformed traders' losses. The minimisation is over the function space of penalties; for each possible penalty, our existence and uniqueness theorem allows to define unambiguously the post-trade standard deviation and the uninformed traders' losses that prevail in equilibrium. Optimal penalties are characterized in closed-form. They must increase quickly with the magnitude of the insider's order for small orders and become flat for large orders: in cases where the fundamental realizes at very high or very low values, the insider finds it optimal to trade despite the high penalty. Although such trades-if they occur-are costly for liquidity traders, they signal extreme events and therefore incorporate a lot of information into prices. We generalize this result in two directions by imposing a budget constraint on the regulator and considering the cases of either non-pecuniary or pecuniary penalties. In the first case, we establish that optimal penalties are a subset of the previously optimal penalties: the patterns of equilibrium trade volumes and prices is unchanged. In the second case, we also fully characterize the constrained efficient points and penalties and show that new patterns emerge in the demand schedules of the insider trader and the associated price functions.
{"title":"Insider Trading with Penalties","authors":"Sylvain Carr'e, P. Collin-Dufresne, Franck Gabriel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3475445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475445","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a one-period Kyle (1985) framework where the insider can be subject to a penalty if she trades. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for virtually any penalty function when noise is uniform. In equilibrium, the demand of the insider and the price functions are in general non-linear and remain analytically tractable because the expected price function is linear. We use this result to investigate the trade off between price efficiency and \"fairness\": we consider a regulator that wants to minimise post-trade standard deviation for a given level of uninformed traders' losses. The minimisation is over the function space of penalties; for each possible penalty, our existence and uniqueness theorem allows to define unambiguously the post-trade standard deviation and the uninformed traders' losses that prevail in equilibrium. Optimal penalties are characterized in closed-form. They must increase quickly with the magnitude of the insider's order for small orders and become flat for large orders: in cases where the fundamental realizes at very high or very low values, the insider finds it optimal to trade despite the high penalty. Although such trades-if they occur-are costly for liquidity traders, they signal extreme events and therefore incorporate a lot of information into prices. We generalize this result in two directions by imposing a budget constraint on the regulator and considering the cases of either non-pecuniary or pecuniary penalties. In the first case, we establish that optimal penalties are a subset of the previously optimal penalties: the patterns of equilibrium trade volumes and prices is unchanged. In the second case, we also fully characterize the constrained efficient points and penalties and show that new patterns emerge in the demand schedules of the insider trader and the associated price functions.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125016982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We adopt a comparative institutional approach to examine the most efficient way of dealing with market failure. We develop a typology of market failures based on the extent of externalities and information asymmetries and define the distinct transaction costs associated with each type. We then consider the relative efficacy of alternate governance forms in dealing with these costs, arguing that enforcement costs are lowest under the state, assurance costs under collectives, and fiduciary costs under non-profits. Further, we argue that for-profits can help address problems of market failure that require either co-specialized business capabilities or the development of new solutions. These arguments combine to produce a mapping between different market failure situations and the optimal arrangement to deal with them, including various hybrid arrangements. Our study thus contributes to work in both public economics and business strategy by developing a holistic theory of how public-private interactions are best governed.
{"title":"Private Action in Public Interest: The Comparative Governance of Social Issues","authors":"Jiao Luo, A. Kaul","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2769368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2769368","url":null,"abstract":"We adopt a comparative institutional approach to examine the most efficient way of dealing with market failure. We develop a typology of market failures based on the extent of externalities and information asymmetries and define the distinct transaction costs associated with each type. We then consider the relative efficacy of alternate governance forms in dealing with these costs, arguing that enforcement costs are lowest under the state, assurance costs under collectives, and fiduciary costs under non-profits. Further, we argue that for-profits can help address problems of market failure that require either co-specialized business capabilities or the development of new solutions. These arguments combine to produce a mapping between different market failure situations and the optimal arrangement to deal with them, including various hybrid arrangements. Our study thus contributes to work in both public economics and business strategy by developing a holistic theory of how public-private interactions are best governed.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115811686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This comment makes recommendations for how the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) could improve its data collection methods, how to use those data to enhance retrospective review of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations, and how to align its procedural provisions for implementing NEPA with regulatory best practices such as benefit-cost analysis. The George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center improves regulatory policy through research, education, and outreach. As part of its mission, the Center conducts careful and independent analyses to assess rulemaking proposals from the perspective of the public interest. This comment on CEQ's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) for updating the regulations for implementing the procedures of NEPA does not represent the views of any particular affected party or special interest, but is designed to evaluate the effect of CEQ’s proposal on overall consumer welfare. This comment reflects the views of the author and does not represent an official position of the GW Regulatory Studies Center or the George Washington University.
{"title":"Public Interest Comment on the Council on Environmental Quality’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Update to the Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act","authors":"Mark Febrizio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3235482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235482","url":null,"abstract":"This comment makes recommendations for how the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) could improve its data collection methods, how to use those data to enhance retrospective review of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations, and how to align its procedural provisions for implementing NEPA with regulatory best practices such as benefit-cost analysis. The George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center improves regulatory policy through research, education, and outreach. As part of its mission, the Center conducts careful and independent analyses to assess rulemaking proposals from the perspective of the public interest. This comment on CEQ's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) for updating the regulations for implementing the procedures of NEPA does not represent the views of any particular affected party or special interest, but is designed to evaluate the effect of CEQ’s proposal on overall consumer welfare. This comment reflects the views of the author and does not represent an official position of the GW Regulatory Studies Center or the George Washington University.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130911159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines?aspects of heterogeneous multi-product firms that are seldom studied in the?empirical literature, specifically the effects of skewness in export sales towards the best-performing products (core products) on the creation of new commercial product-country links. Additionally, this paper examines the factors that affect the differences in the trading of core products compared to fringe products.?The results?reveal that if the distance to the core increases by one standard deviation, then the probability of creating a new product-country link decreases by 3.5 percent. Distance to the core is negatively correlated with the ratio of the importing-country?s demand at the product-level.
{"title":"Distance to Core and Selection of Export Products-Destinations","authors":"Carlos-Enrique Cardoso-Vargas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3232400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3232400","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines?aspects of heterogeneous multi-product firms that are seldom studied in the?empirical literature, specifically the effects of skewness in export sales towards the best-performing products (core products) on the creation of new commercial product-country links. Additionally, this paper examines the factors that affect the differences in the trading of core products compared to fringe products.?The results?reveal that if the distance to the core increases by one standard deviation, then the probability of creating a new product-country link decreases by 3.5 percent. Distance to the core is negatively correlated with the ratio of the importing-country?s demand at the product-level.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116615075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Automatic payments are increasingly common. The psychologies of the prominent of number, defaults and inattention combine to create an unexpected side effect of automatic payments. We see that credit card holders set a default automatic payment to match their modal repayment behavior. For those often paying in full, an automatic full repayment almost completely eliminates late fees caused when people forget to pay their bill. For those often paying only the minimum, an automatic minimum repayment locks in their modal minimum payment behavior. But it was their amodal behavior — occasionally making larger repayments at prominent amounts (e.g., £100, £200, £500) — that was reducing their balance. Without the need to address their bill each month, card holders make these additional repayments less often, and as a result incur 2–3 times more in interest charges than the late payment fees that they avoid by automating their payments. We estimate that the reduction in prominent amount repayments as people switch to automatic minimum repayment is responsible for 12% of all of the interest ever paid on credit cards.
{"title":"When Setting a Default Payment Harms Credit Card Holders","authors":"Hiroaki Sakaguchi, Neil Stewart, John Gathergood","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3221299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3221299","url":null,"abstract":"Automatic payments are increasingly common. The psychologies of the prominent of number, defaults and inattention combine to create an unexpected side effect of automatic payments. We see that credit card holders set a default automatic payment to match their modal repayment behavior. For those often paying in full, an automatic full repayment almost completely eliminates late fees caused when people forget to pay their bill. For those often paying only the minimum, an automatic minimum repayment locks in their modal minimum payment behavior. But it was their amodal behavior — occasionally making larger repayments at prominent amounts (e.g., £100, £200, £500) — that was reducing their balance. Without the need to address their bill each month, card holders make these additional repayments less often, and as a result incur 2–3 times more in interest charges than the late payment fees that they avoid by automating their payments. We estimate that the reduction in prominent amount repayments as people switch to automatic minimum repayment is responsible for 12% of all of the interest ever paid on credit cards.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120918065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the U.S. regulates auditing and seeks to promote its quality, a difficult-to-define concept. To understand how agents involved in private companies think of audit quality, we interview their CFOs, auditors, bankers, board members, bonding agencies, and some private equity investors. We find that a variety of agents demand an audit while retaining their scepticism and seeking independent corroboration of what they learn from the audited financial statements. Management selects the auditor. Audit Quality is assessed based on the degree to which the audit plan (inputs and risk assessment processes) aligns with the views of management and directors. In addition, output measures such as number of errors and the time when they are adjusted, tax advice, controls/governance advice and auditor candor are used to assess audit quality. As judged by users, quality depends on a combination of inputs, processes and outcomes of audits.
美国上市公司会计监督委员会(Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, PCAOB)负责监管审计，并寻求提高审计质量，这是一个难以定义的概念。为了了解私营公司的代理人是如何看待审计质量的，我们采访了他们的首席财务官、审计师、银行家、董事会成员、担保机构和一些私募股权投资者。我们发现，各种代理人要求进行审计，同时保留他们的怀疑态度，并寻求对他们从经审计的财务报表中学到的东西的独立佐证。管理层选择审计师。审计质量是根据审计计划(投入和风险评估过程)与管理层和董事意见的一致程度来评估的。此外，还使用诸如错误数量和调整错误的时间、税务建议、控制/治理建议和审计师的坦率等输出度量来评估审计质量。根据使用者的判断，质量取决于审计的投入、过程和结果的组合。
{"title":"Demand for and Assessment of Audit Quality in Private Companies","authors":"Adam M. Esplin, K. Jamal, S. Sunder","doi":"10.1111/abac.12138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12138","url":null,"abstract":"The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the U.S. regulates auditing and seeks to promote its quality, a difficult-to-define concept. To understand how agents involved in private companies think of audit quality, we interview their CFOs, auditors, bankers, board members, bonding agencies, and some private equity investors. We find that a variety of agents demand an audit while retaining their scepticism and seeking independent corroboration of what they learn from the audited financial statements. Management selects the auditor. Audit Quality is assessed based on the degree to which the audit plan (inputs and risk assessment processes) aligns with the views of management and directors. In addition, output measures such as number of errors and the time when they are adjusted, tax advice, controls/governance advice and auditor candor are used to assess audit quality. As judged by users, quality depends on a combination of inputs, processes and outcomes of audits.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115768844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the effect of shareholdings on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit in Japan. It focuses on cross- and stable shareholdings, which are well-known features of Japanese corporate governance, as a private information sharing system. The relationship between cross- and stable shareholdings, accounting quality, and trade credit is tested. The results reveal that trade credit of customers without either cross- or stable shareholdings increases with accounting quality and that such shareholdings weaken the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit. The findings suggest that a close tie to cross- and stable shareholders results in reducing the importance of accounting information through sharing private information.
{"title":"The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Relationship between Accounting Quality and Trade Credit: Evidence from Japan","authors":"M. Enomoto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3171338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171338","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the effect of shareholdings on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit in Japan. It focuses on cross- and stable shareholdings, which are well-known features of Japanese corporate governance, as a private information sharing system. The relationship between cross- and stable shareholdings, accounting quality, and trade credit is tested. The results reveal that trade credit of customers without either cross- or stable shareholdings increases with accounting quality and that such shareholdings weaken the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit. The findings suggest that a close tie to cross- and stable shareholders results in reducing the importance of accounting information through sharing private information.","PeriodicalId":388011,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132680098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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