In this article I survey Foucault’s remarks on norms and normalisation from across his oeuvre, with a view to reconstructing his genealogy of norms, leaning at points – following Foucault himself – on Georges Canguilhem’s seminal work on the topic. I also survey in tandem the existing secondary scholarship on this question, maintaining – pace other scholars – that Foucault’s position has not been adequately explicated despite sophisticated attempts. I argue that Foucault’s idiosyncratic conception of the norm, overlooked or misunderstood by other readers, is consistently of an ideal model guiding human action in any particular sphere. This concept is a relatively modern one that may be contrasted to the older form of restricting human behaviour according to binary discriminations that may be called ‘laws’ or ‘rules’. Foucault traces the form of the norm specifically to medieval processes for dealing with the plague, which later become highly generalised and diffused to produce a normalising society. I conclude with a more speculative discussion of how this society of the norm continues to utilise binarising rules, arguing that norms are typically used in order to ground binarising condemnations of abnormal cases, but that the nebulousness of norms ultimately allows any particular case to be condemned by such standards.
{"title":"What’s In a Norm? Foucault’s Conceptualisation and Genealogy of the Norm","authors":"M. Kelly","doi":"10.22439/fs.v27i27.5889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v27i27.5889","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I survey Foucault’s remarks on norms and normalisation from across his oeuvre, with a view to reconstructing his genealogy of norms, leaning at points – following Foucault himself – on Georges Canguilhem’s seminal work on the topic. I also survey in tandem the existing secondary scholarship on this question, maintaining – pace other scholars – that Foucault’s position has not been adequately explicated despite sophisticated attempts. I argue that Foucault’s idiosyncratic conception of the norm, overlooked or misunderstood by other readers, is consistently of an ideal model guiding human action in any particular sphere. This concept is a relatively modern one that may be contrasted to the older form of restricting human behaviour according to binary discriminations that may be called ‘laws’ or ‘rules’. Foucault traces the form of the norm specifically to medieval processes for dealing with the plague, which later become highly generalised and diffused to produce a normalising society. I conclude with a more speculative discussion of how this society of the norm continues to utilise binarising rules, arguing that norms are typically used in order to ground binarising condemnations of abnormal cases, but that the nebulousness of norms ultimately allows any particular case to be condemned by such standards.","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45730241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we attempt to synthesize the findings of the branch of behavioral economics known as “picoeconomics” (developed by George Ainslie) with insights from Foucauldian thought in order to demonstrate that a richer and more nuanced understanding of strategies for self-managing human irrationality can be achieved when both approaches are mobilized. Picoeconomic games can be modeled as an intrapsychic exercise of the disciplinary power thereby suggesting an important contributing factor to the formation of effective Ainslean will. On the other hand, picoenomic descriptions of the functioning of mind do not only align with Foucault’s concept of the “techniques of the self” but also point to the possibility of the transformation of disciplinary practices into modes of subjectivation once the former are fully internalized. On the basis of these findings, we propose an empirically testable hypothesis about the biographical correlates of strong Ainslean will and a prospective area of subjectivity research in the vein of Foucauldian studies.
{"title":"Sirens in the Panopticon: Intersections Between Ainslean Picoeconomics and Foucault`s Discipline Theory","authors":"Yevhenii Osiievskyi, M. Yakovlyev","doi":"10.22439/fs.v27i27.5894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v27i27.5894","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we attempt to synthesize the findings of the branch of behavioral economics known as “picoeconomics” (developed by George Ainslie) with insights from Foucauldian thought in order to demonstrate that a richer and more nuanced understanding of strategies for self-managing human irrationality can be achieved when both approaches are mobilized. Picoeconomic games can be modeled as an intrapsychic exercise of the disciplinary power thereby suggesting an important contributing factor to the formation of effective Ainslean will. On the other hand, picoenomic descriptions of the functioning of mind do not only align with Foucault’s concept of the “techniques of the self” but also point to the possibility of the transformation of disciplinary practices into modes of subjectivation once the former are fully internalized. On the basis of these findings, we propose an empirically testable hypothesis about the biographical correlates of strong Ainslean will and a prospective area of subjectivity research in the vein of Foucauldian studies.","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43976800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how Foucault and Deleuze understand each other’s work, arguing that they are united in their common endeavour to make it possible to think again. Focusing on Foucault’s ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ and Deleuze’s Foucault, it shows how each of Foucault and Deleuze considers the other as someone who opens anew the possibility of thinking. The first section examines Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault’s work. It demonstrates that, despite sounding as if he is elucidating his own philosophy, Deleuze is correct in saying that Foucault re-thinks thought by positing the disjunction between the articulable and the visible, among other things. Turning to Foucault’s review of Deleuze’s works, the second section explains why Foucault deems Deleuze’s notion of thought as a disjunctive affirmation. By underscoring the disjunctive role ‘and’ plays in the disjunctive affirmation of ‘the event and the phantasm’ and/or of thought itself and its object, Foucault considers Deleuze as someone who re-thinks thought not by conceptualising it but by thinking difference. The paper concludes that, while each endeavours to consider thought in a new light, both Foucault and Deleuze believe that the other makes it possible to think again.
{"title":"Re-thinking Thought: Foucault, Deleuze, and the Possibility of Thinking","authors":"Wendyl Luna","doi":"10.22439/fs.v27i27.5891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v27i27.5891","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how Foucault and Deleuze understand each other’s work, arguing that they are united in their common endeavour to make it possible to think again. Focusing on Foucault’s ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ and Deleuze’s Foucault, it shows how each of Foucault and Deleuze considers the other as someone who opens anew the possibility of thinking. The first section examines Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault’s work. It demonstrates that, despite sounding as if he is elucidating his own philosophy, Deleuze is correct in saying that Foucault re-thinks thought by positing the disjunction between the articulable and the visible, among other things. Turning to Foucault’s review of Deleuze’s works, the second section explains why Foucault deems Deleuze’s notion of thought as a disjunctive affirmation. By underscoring the disjunctive role ‘and’ plays in the disjunctive affirmation of ‘the event and the phantasm’ and/or of thought itself and its object, Foucault considers Deleuze as someone who re-thinks thought not by conceptualising it but by thinking difference. The paper concludes that, while each endeavours to consider thought in a new light, both Foucault and Deleuze believe that the other makes it possible to think again.","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46006806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Colin Koopman: \"How We Became Our Data: A Genealogy of the Informational Person\"","authors":"L. D’Cruz","doi":"10.22439/fs.v27i27.5896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v27i27.5896","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41901676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the concept of ethical invention in both Jean-Paul Sartre’s and Michel Foucault’s later lectures and interviews, showing that a courageous disposition to invent or transform plays a key role in both thinkers’ visions of ethics. Three of Sartre’s post-Critique of Dialectical Reason lectures on ethics are examined: Morality and History, The Rome Lecture, and A Plea for Intellectuals. It is shown that ethical invention for Sartre requires the use of our freedom to transcend our current circumstances, a willingness to break away from harmful ideologies, and directing our free praxis towards the goal of universal humanism. Examining several of Foucault’s interviews alongside his lecture series The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth, it is shown that ethical invention for Foucault requires a rejection of necessities or inevitabilities in our current landscape, a willingness to reshape our current beliefs, and a philosophical way of life that results in an alteration of the relationship to self and others. For both thinkers, ethical invention should be preceded by a critical reflection on ourselves in our historical moment. Both argue that ethical invention requires a rejection of the inherent value of our world and realization that the conditions of possibility for being subjects are malleable. Last, it is shown that both philosophers specifically call philosophers or intellectuals to invent.
{"title":"Ethical Invention in Sartre and Foucault: Courage, Freedom, Transformation","authors":"Kimberly S. Engels","doi":"10.22439/fs.v27i27.5893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v27i27.5893","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the concept of ethical invention in both Jean-Paul Sartre’s and Michel Foucault’s later lectures and interviews, showing that a courageous disposition to invent or transform plays a key role in both thinkers’ visions of ethics. Three of Sartre’s post-Critique of Dialectical Reason lectures on ethics are examined: Morality and History, The Rome Lecture, and A Plea for Intellectuals. It is shown that ethical invention for Sartre requires the use of our freedom to transcend our current circumstances, a willingness to break away from harmful ideologies, and directing our free praxis towards the goal of universal humanism. Examining several of Foucault’s interviews alongside his lecture series The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth, it is shown that ethical invention for Foucault requires a rejection of necessities or inevitabilities in our current landscape, a willingness to reshape our current beliefs, and a philosophical way of life that results in an alteration of the relationship to self and others. For both thinkers, ethical invention should be preceded by a critical reflection on ourselves in our historical moment. Both argue that ethical invention requires a rejection of the inherent value of our world and realization that the conditions of possibility for being subjects are malleable. Last, it is shown that both philosophers specifically call philosophers or intellectuals to invent.","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48726517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tom Boland: \"The Spectacle of Critique: from Philosophy to Cacophony\"","authors":"Stéphanie B. Martens","doi":"10.22439/fs.v27i27.5897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v27i27.5897","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43096606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper further realises Foucault’s genealogy of ethics to grasp genealogy as the totality of three axes – power, truth, and ethics – driven by the ethical axis. The paper demonstrates that Foucault’s discussion of antiquity is genealogical. The main focus is Foucault’s late work and, in particular, his final lectures on The Courage of Truth. The paper highlights the genealogical function of the distinction between ‘Laches’ and ‘Alcibiades’. ‘Laches’ provides a heuristic source for self-care in the present in the form of practices of living tied to the ‘Laches’ parrhesia. But, it is also a critique of the present applied to democratic theories that have used the neo-platonic line of the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia – of which Foucault disapproves – as their source in creating traceable technologies of the self tied to structures of domination. Such technologies freeze games of power and governmentalise the problematisation of how to govern the self. Hence, the genealogical discussion of antiquity in connection with an understanding of genealogy as problematisation should be perceived as a heuristic source of self-creation with critical implications for evaluating power regimes in the present. The paper introduces the link between the ancient past and the present with respect to Foucault vis-à-vis certain democratic theories. The central aim is to consider on what grounds placing the problematisation of the self at the centre of a new politics can be also linked to governmentality. In this context, the paper also clarifies the wider implication of its core premise for Foucauldian studies and the emerging discussion of parrhesia.
{"title":"Foucault as an Ethical Philosopher: The Genealogical Discussion of Antiquity and the Present","authors":"Dimitrios Lais","doi":"10.22439/fs.v27i27.5892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v27i27.5892","url":null,"abstract":"The paper further realises Foucault’s genealogy of ethics to grasp genealogy as the totality of three axes – power, truth, and ethics – driven by the ethical axis. The paper demonstrates that Foucault’s discussion of antiquity is genealogical. The main focus is Foucault’s late work and, in particular, his final lectures on The Courage of Truth. The paper highlights the genealogical function of the distinction between ‘Laches’ and ‘Alcibiades’. ‘Laches’ provides a heuristic source for self-care in the present in the form of practices of living tied to the ‘Laches’ parrhesia. But, it is also a critique of the present applied to democratic theories that have used the neo-platonic line of the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia – of which Foucault disapproves – as their source in creating traceable technologies of the self tied to structures of domination. Such technologies freeze games of power and governmentalise the problematisation of how to govern the self. Hence, the genealogical discussion of antiquity in connection with an understanding of genealogy as problematisation should be perceived as a heuristic source of self-creation with critical implications for evaluating power regimes in the present. The paper introduces the link between the ancient past and the present with respect to Foucault vis-à-vis certain democratic theories. The central aim is to consider on what grounds placing the problematisation of the self at the centre of a new politics can be also linked to governmentality. In this context, the paper also clarifies the wider implication of its core premise for Foucauldian studies and the emerging discussion of parrhesia.","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48623380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rosi Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova: \"Posthuman Glossary\"","authors":"Asker Bryld Staunæs, M. Thomsen","doi":"10.22439/fs.v27i27.5898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v27i27.5898","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47457505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his late lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault underpins the pre-eminence of art as the modern site of parrhesia. He omits, however, the aesthetic question: how does parrhesia work through art? A compelling question, firstly, because “truth-telling” seems to be at odds with art as an imaginative process. Secondly, because parrhesia implies a transformation in the listener, while Foucault’s limited notion of discourse precludes transformation beyond discourse. This essay hypothesizes that parrhesiastic art effects a transformation in the imagination, without dismissing this transformation as unreal. As Foucault’s utterances about the imagination are restricted to his earliest publications, this essay features a combined reading of Foucault’s early and late discussions of art. To further analyze the elusive role of the imagination in the late discussions, the essay employs the Deleuzian notion of “dramatization”, an epistemological method that draws on the imagination to escape representational thought. The essay thus aims to demonstrate that parrhesia mirrors the artwork in its intuitive and dynamic relation to truth. Subsequently, it argues that Foucault and Deleuze, respectively proceeding from a limited and an unlimited mode of thinking, come infinitely close in their thinking of art.
福柯在法国美术馆（Collège de France）的后期演讲中，强调了艺术作为现代艺术场所的卓越地位。然而，他忽略了美学问题：假牙是如何通过艺术发挥作用的？首先，这是一个令人信服的问题，因为“讲真话”似乎与艺术作为一个富有想象力的过程不一致。其次，因为假语意味着听者的转换，而福柯有限的话语概念排除了话语之外的转换。本文假设假造艺术在想象中产生了一种转变，但并不认为这种转变是不真实的。由于福柯关于想象力的论述仅限于他最早的出版物，本文结合阅读了福柯早期和晚期的艺术讨论。为了进一步分析想象力在晚期讨论中难以捉摸的作用，本文采用了德勒兹的“戏剧化”概念，一种利用想象来逃避具象思维的认识论方法。因此，本文旨在证明假语反映了艺术作品与真理的直观和动态关系。随后，福柯和德勒兹分别从一种有限的思维方式和一种无限的思维方式出发，认为他们的艺术思维是无限接近的。
{"title":"How Parrhesia Works through Art The Elusive Role of the Imagination in Truth-Telling","authors":"M. Paijmans","doi":"10.22439/FS.V0I26.5750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/FS.V0I26.5750","url":null,"abstract":"In his late lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault underpins the pre-eminence of art as the modern site of parrhesia. He omits, however, the aesthetic question: how does parrhesia work through art? A compelling question, firstly, because “truth-telling” seems to be at odds with art as an imaginative process. Secondly, because parrhesia implies a transformation in the listener, while Foucault’s limited notion of discourse precludes transformation beyond discourse. This essay hypothesizes that parrhesiastic art effects a transformation in the imagination, without dismissing this transformation as unreal. As Foucault’s utterances about the imagination are restricted to his earliest publications, this essay features a combined reading of Foucault’s early and late discussions of art. To further analyze the elusive role of the imagination in the late discussions, the essay employs the Deleuzian notion of “dramatization”, an epistemological method that draws on the imagination to escape representational thought. The essay thus aims to demonstrate that parrhesia mirrors the artwork in its intuitive and dynamic relation to truth. Subsequently, it argues that Foucault and Deleuze, respectively proceeding from a limited and an unlimited mode of thinking, come infinitely close in their thinking of art.","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42006853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michel Foucault’s Punitive Society lectures make clear that, for him, punishment presents a critical problem. On the one hand, Foucault struggles to develop a conceptual vocabulary adequate to punishment, and particularly to the prison-form as a penal development. On the other hand, the Punitive Society lectures clearly indicate the stakes of punishment. How, Foucault asks, might punishment focalize relations of power? How might it serve as a field of struggle? What does a punitive technology of power look like, if it exists? Indeed, across numerous works from the 1970s and 1980s, Foucault traces the varying place of penalties within penal and punitive tactics, showing how punishment reciprocates historical relations of power and problems of power. Yet it remains necessary to develop Foucault’s account of punishment, which is never formalized. In this paper, I develop punishment as a polyvalent technology. Foucauldian punishment may be an analytic, a technology, and—in the allegorical “punitive city” from Discipline and Punish—a diagram of power. I argue that Foucauldian punitive power seizes the body in the name of an authority or a reified power to subordinate individuals to that authority, and with an objective to correct the individual’s relation to a multiplicity. It operates “above,” at the level of, and in “fragments” of embodied individuals. Further, with Foucault’s account of the “punitive city,” we find a theoretical model in whichpunishment becomes the ordering force of the social, and therein a diagram of punitive power exerted in extensive form across the social field.
{"title":"“Each Punishment Should Be a Fable”: Punitive Analytics, The Punitive-City Diagram, and Punishment as Technology of Power in Foucault’s Works of the 1970s and 1980s","authors":"M. Bruzzone","doi":"10.22439/FS.V0I26.5755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/FS.V0I26.5755","url":null,"abstract":"Michel Foucault’s Punitive Society lectures make clear that, for him, punishment presents a critical problem. On the one hand, Foucault struggles to develop a conceptual vocabulary adequate to punishment, and particularly to the prison-form as a penal development. On the other hand, the Punitive Society lectures clearly indicate the stakes of punishment. How, Foucault asks, might punishment focalize relations of power? How might it serve as a field of struggle? What does a punitive technology of power look like, if it exists? Indeed, across numerous works from the 1970s and 1980s, Foucault traces the varying place of penalties within penal and punitive tactics, showing how punishment reciprocates historical relations of power and problems of power. Yet it remains necessary to develop Foucault’s account of punishment, which is never formalized. In this paper, I develop punishment as a polyvalent technology. Foucauldian punishment may be an analytic, a technology, and—in the allegorical “punitive city” from Discipline and Punish—a diagram of power. I argue that Foucauldian punitive power seizes the body in the name of an authority or a reified power to subordinate individuals to that authority, and with an objective to correct the individual’s relation to a multiplicity. It operates “above,” at the level of, and in “fragments” of embodied individuals. Further, with Foucault’s account of the “punitive city,” we find a theoretical model in whichpunishment becomes the ordering force of the social, and therein a diagram of punitive power exerted in extensive form across the social field.","PeriodicalId":38873,"journal":{"name":"Foucault Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45969341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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