Pub Date : 2019-08-05DOI: 10.1146/ANNUREV-LAWSOCSCI-101518-042658
Dan Simon
This review examines the workings of jurors deciding criminal cases. It seeks not to commend or condemn jury decision making but rather to offer an empathic exploration of the task that jurors face in exercising their fact-finding duty. Reconstructing criminal events in the courtroom amounts to a difficult feat under the best of circumstances. The task becomes especially complicated under the taxing conditions of criminal adjudication: the often substandard evidence presented in court; the paucity of the investigative record; types of evidence that are difficult to decipher; the unruly decision-making environment of the courtroom; and mental gymnastics required to meet the normative demands of criminal adjudication. The critical spotlight is directed not at the jurors but at the conditions under which we expect them to fulfill their duty and at the unverified reverence in which their verdicts are held. The article concludes with a set of recommendations designed to assist our fact-finders in meeting the societal expectations of this solemn task.
{"title":"On Juror Decision Making: An Empathic Inquiry","authors":"Dan Simon","doi":"10.1146/ANNUREV-LAWSOCSCI-101518-042658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV-LAWSOCSCI-101518-042658","url":null,"abstract":"This review examines the workings of jurors deciding criminal cases. It seeks not to commend or condemn jury decision making but rather to offer an empathic exploration of the task that jurors face in exercising their fact-finding duty. Reconstructing criminal events in the courtroom amounts to a difficult feat under the best of circumstances. The task becomes especially complicated under the taxing conditions of criminal adjudication: the often substandard evidence presented in court; the paucity of the investigative record; types of evidence that are difficult to decipher; the unruly decision-making environment of the courtroom; and mental gymnastics required to meet the normative demands of criminal adjudication. The critical spotlight is directed not at the jurors but at the conditions under which we expect them to fulfill their duty and at the unverified reverence in which their verdicts are held. The article concludes with a set of recommendations designed to assist our fact-finders in meeting the societal expectations of this solemn task.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131154082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amidst the severe crisis the WTO’s crown jewel is facing these days, the WTO tribunals are confronted with another perplexed matter – adjudication of the security exception. In a number of the ongoing disputes the parties invoked national security to justify their trade-restrictive measures. The interpretation of the security exception raises a number of vexed questions. Before delving into the discussion of the interpretative intricacies, it is prudent to inquire whether the WTO tribunals have jurisdiction over the security clause and if it is justiciable.
{"title":"Adjudication of the GATT Security Clause: To Be or Not to Be, This is the Question","authors":"I. Bogdanova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3359187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3359187","url":null,"abstract":"Amidst the severe crisis the WTO’s crown jewel is facing these days, the WTO tribunals are confronted with another perplexed matter – adjudication of the security exception. In a number of the ongoing disputes the parties invoked national security to justify their trade-restrictive measures. The interpretation of the security exception raises a number of vexed questions. Before delving into the discussion of the interpretative intricacies, it is prudent to inquire whether the WTO tribunals have jurisdiction over the security clause and if it is justiciable.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126815940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates whether labor unions use proposals opportunistically to influence contract negotiations. Our empirical strategy relies on the observation that proposals have higher bargaining-chip value in contract expiration years, when a new contract must be negotiated. We find that in contract expiration years compared with nonexpiration years, unions increase their proposal rate by one-fifth, particularly proposals concerning executive compensation. Union proposals made during expiration years are less likely to be supported by other shareholders or a leading proxy advisor; the market reacts negatively to union proposals in expiration years; and withdrawn union proposals are accompanied by higher wage settlements. Received March 14, 2017; editorial decision July 19, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
{"title":"Opportunistic Proposals by Union Shareholders","authors":"J. Matsusaka, O. Ozbas, Irene Yi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2666064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2666064","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper investigates whether labor unions use proposals opportunistically to influence contract negotiations. Our empirical strategy relies on the observation that proposals have higher bargaining-chip value in contract expiration years, when a new contract must be negotiated. We find that in contract expiration years compared with nonexpiration years, unions increase their proposal rate by one-fifth, particularly proposals concerning executive compensation. Union proposals made during expiration years are less likely to be supported by other shareholders or a leading proxy advisor; the market reacts negatively to union proposals in expiration years; and withdrawn union proposals are accompanied by higher wage settlements.\u0000 Received March 14, 2017; editorial decision July 19, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131649604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we evaluate the relationship between political control and bureaucratic performance using information requested by researchers via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and congress via congressional committee requests. The information requested was the same, and the timing of requests was similar. We find modest evidence of a relationship between agency politicization and a lack of responsiveness to requests for information from the public and Congress. Politicized agencies are slower to respond to requests even when controlling for agency size and workload. There is little evidence, however, that these agencies are more likely to respond poorly when they do respond. The difficulties in responding appear to be due to poor performance of the FOIA offices, either because political actors focus more on other agency activities or because of poorer management agency-wide. We conclude that efforts to make agencies responsive to elected officials may hurt management performance.
{"title":"Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization","authors":"A. Wood, D. Lewis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1884392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1884392","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we evaluate the relationship between political control and bureaucratic performance using information requested by researchers via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and congress via congressional committee requests. The information requested was the same, and the timing of requests was similar. We find modest evidence of a relationship between agency politicization and a lack of responsiveness to requests for information from the public and Congress. Politicized agencies are slower to respond to requests even when controlling for agency size and workload. There is little evidence, however, that these agencies are more likely to respond poorly when they do respond. The difficulties in responding appear to be due to poor performance of the FOIA offices, either because political actors focus more on other agency activities or because of poorer management agency-wide. We conclude that efforts to make agencies responsive to elected officials may hurt management performance.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123364156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Globalization, trade and other free market policies increase wealth. But the gains from trade are not being evenly spread among all citizens. People and politicians rage against foreigners. But it is the United States tax system, not trade, that ought to change, and wealthy Americans, not workers world-wide, who should be sharing the wealth. And it is the form of tax, not just its rate structure, that must reform, so that capital at last bears a meaningful share of the burden.
{"title":"It's Tax Not Trade (Stupid)","authors":"Edward J. McCaffery","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2811723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2811723","url":null,"abstract":"Globalization, trade and other free market policies increase wealth. But the gains from trade are not being evenly spread among all citizens. People and politicians rage against foreigners. But it is the United States tax system, not trade, that ought to change, and wealthy Americans, not workers world-wide, who should be sharing the wealth. And it is the form of tax, not just its rate structure, that must reform, so that capital at last bears a meaningful share of the burden.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114053376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In their 1984 article, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,” Priest and Klein famously hypothesized a “tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories” among litigated cases. Nevertheless, many scholars doubt the validity of their conclusions, because the model they relied upon does not meet modern standards of rigor. This article updates the Priest-Klein model by considering three modifications. First, we raise a novel critique of the Priest-Klein model — that it is non-Bayesian — and show that most of the results of Priest and Klein (1984) pertaining to limits nevertheless remain valid under a modified model in which parties use Bayes’ rule to refine their estimates of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing. Second, we show that even when an incentive-compatible mechanism is imposed, many of the results remain valid for symmetric Nash equilibria. Finally, we show how the Priest-Klein model can be modified to analyze asymmetric information, show that most results are false under this modification, and compare the modified Priest-Klein model to standard asymmetric information models.
在1984年的文章《诉讼纠纷的选择》(The Selection of Disputes for Litigation)中，普里斯特和克莱因提出了一个著名的假设，即在诉讼案件中“原告胜诉的趋势为50%”。然而，许多学者怀疑他们结论的有效性，因为他们所依赖的模型不符合现代严谨的标准。本文通过考虑三个修改来更新priestst - klein模型。首先，我们对普里斯特-克莱因模型提出了一种新颖的批评——它是非贝叶斯的——并表明，普里斯特和克莱因(1984)关于限制的大多数结果在一个修改后的模型下仍然有效，在这个模型中，当事人使用贝叶斯规则来改进他们对原告胜诉概率的估计。其次，我们表明，即使施加了激励相容机制，许多结果仍然对对称纳什均衡有效。最后，我们展示了如何修改priest克莱因模型来分析不对称信息，表明在这种修改下大多数结果都是错误的，并将修改后的priest克莱因模型与标准的不对称信息模型进行了比较。
{"title":"Updating Priest and Klein","authors":"Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Daniel Klerman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2619856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2619856","url":null,"abstract":"In their 1984 article, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,” Priest and Klein famously hypothesized a “tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories” among litigated cases. Nevertheless, many scholars doubt the validity of their conclusions, because the model they relied upon does not meet modern standards of rigor. This article updates the Priest-Klein model by considering three modifications. First, we raise a novel critique of the Priest-Klein model — that it is non-Bayesian — and show that most of the results of Priest and Klein (1984) pertaining to limits nevertheless remain valid under a modified model in which parties use Bayes’ rule to refine their estimates of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing. Second, we show that even when an incentive-compatible mechanism is imposed, many of the results remain valid for symmetric Nash equilibria. Finally, we show how the Priest-Klein model can be modified to analyze asymmetric information, show that most results are false under this modification, and compare the modified Priest-Klein model to standard asymmetric information models.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128408212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper tests theories of representation by studying laws that were challenged by referendum. For these laws, we can compare legislator roll call votes and citizen votes on the same law. In a sample of 3,242 roll call votes on 25 laws in nine states, I find that legislators voted congruent with majority opinion in their district 67 percent of the time, so representation generally “worked.” However, when legislator preferences differed from district opinion on an issue, legislators voted congruent with district opinion only 28 percent of the time. Electoral pressure measured by vote margin, proximity of next election, and term limits had at most a modest connection with congruence. The evidence is broadly consistent with the assumption of the citizen-candidate (or trustee) theory that legislators vote their own preferences.
{"title":"When Do Legislators Follow Constituent Opinion? Evidence from Matched Roll Call and Referendum Votes","authors":"J. Matsusaka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2612342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2612342","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tests theories of representation by studying laws that were challenged by referendum. For these laws, we can compare legislator roll call votes and citizen votes on the same law. In a sample of 3,242 roll call votes on 25 laws in nine states, I find that legislators voted congruent with majority opinion in their district 67 percent of the time, so representation generally “worked.” However, when legislator preferences differed from district opinion on an issue, legislators voted congruent with district opinion only 28 percent of the time. Electoral pressure measured by vote margin, proximity of next election, and term limits had at most a modest connection with congruence. The evidence is broadly consistent with the assumption of the citizen-candidate (or trustee) theory that legislators vote their own preferences.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128680149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
English Abstract: As legal, especially the right of the surviving spouse on furniture and household objects that were affected common use can be qualified as a legal right of inheritance.Romanian Abstract: Ca natură juridică, dreptul special al soţului supravieţuitor asupra mobilierului si obiectelor de uz casnic care au fost afectate folosinţei comune poate fi calificat ca un drept de mostenire legal.
{"title":"Special Right Surviving Spouse on Furniture and Household Items (Dreptul Special Al Soţului Supravieţuitor Asupra Mobilierului Şi a Obiectelor De Uz Casnic)","authors":"Titu Ionascu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2658586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2658586","url":null,"abstract":"English Abstract: As legal, especially the right of the surviving spouse on furniture and household objects that were affected common use can be qualified as a legal right of inheritance.Romanian Abstract: Ca natură juridică, dreptul special al soţului supravieţuitor asupra mobilierului si obiectelor de uz casnic care au fost afectate folosinţei comune poate fi calificat ca un drept de mostenire legal.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121297252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contained in the GATT, are provisions whose applications contradict each other. Article XXIV, which empowers WTO members to form regional trade agreements (RTAs), otherwise referred to as competitive liberalization, is contrary to the idea of the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) principle set out article I. Indeed article XXIV is an exception to article I, however the conflict caused by these provisions, has led to a situation where the two will not co-exist for long, and one will eventually phase-out the other. While under article I, countries are prevented from discriminating between their trading partners, and any benefit granted to one member of the WTO must be extended to all WTO members; article XXIV gives countries the option of circumventing article I, to offer preferential trade benefits to only the select few with which they choose to trade through the formation of RTAs. Thus, conclusion of RTAs is a practice that is contrary to the interest of the World Trade Organization. Rules of origin present in most RTAs have a negative impact on competitive liberalization, a key goal of the WTO in combatting protectionism, as RTAs grant special treatment to members regardless of their inability to produce commodities more competitively than non-members due to the reciprocal benefits of RTAs. This seeks to frustrate the aims of the WTO in attempting to effectively regulate international trade, because while RTAs facilitate trade amongst its members; it hinders trade for non-member with which it has no trade desires. Regrettably, however, the WTO has faced increasing difficulty in the regulation of RTAs, in their manifold shapes and sizes.
{"title":"Taking Stock of GATT’s Conflicting Provisions: Competitive Liberalization and the Demise of the WTO","authors":"A. Hippolyte","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2373569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2373569","url":null,"abstract":"Contained in the GATT, are provisions whose applications contradict each other. Article XXIV, which empowers WTO members to form regional trade agreements (RTAs), otherwise referred to as competitive liberalization, is contrary to the idea of the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) principle set out article I. Indeed article XXIV is an exception to article I, however the conflict caused by these provisions, has led to a situation where the two will not co-exist for long, and one will eventually phase-out the other. While under article I, countries are prevented from discriminating between their trading partners, and any benefit granted to one member of the WTO must be extended to all WTO members; article XXIV gives countries the option of circumventing article I, to offer preferential trade benefits to only the select few with which they choose to trade through the formation of RTAs. Thus, conclusion of RTAs is a practice that is contrary to the interest of the World Trade Organization. Rules of origin present in most RTAs have a negative impact on competitive liberalization, a key goal of the WTO in combatting protectionism, as RTAs grant special treatment to members regardless of their inability to produce commodities more competitively than non-members due to the reciprocal benefits of RTAs. This seeks to frustrate the aims of the WTO in attempting to effectively regulate international trade, because while RTAs facilitate trade amongst its members; it hinders trade for non-member with which it has no trade desires. Regrettably, however, the WTO has faced increasing difficulty in the regulation of RTAs, in their manifold shapes and sizes.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126012165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The research aimed to cover a 360 degrees angle of the lobbying activities in Romania and as a consequence the surveys were aimed to reach all its three dimensions: the population affected directly or indirectly by lobbying activities (vox populi), the initiatiors (lobbyists) and decision makers (politicians). The results allow thus for the first time a realistic picture of Romanian lobbying activities and can be used as reference in the strategy of any lobbying organisation, but also by political decision makers for a better assessment of this activity. Following the fact that together with GfK Romania we realised a national survey on representative samples of urban population over 15 years old, we could integrate in the present study an analysis of the public perception concerning the Romanian lobbying activities, essential element both for lobbyist and for politicians.
{"title":"Lobbying in Romania","authors":"L. Mihaileanu, D. Oancea, Aurelian Horja","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2062175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2062175","url":null,"abstract":"The research aimed to cover a 360 degrees angle of the lobbying activities in Romania and as a consequence the surveys were aimed to reach all its three dimensions: the population affected directly or indirectly by lobbying activities (vox populi), the initiatiors (lobbyists) and decision makers (politicians). The results allow thus for the first time a realistic picture of Romanian lobbying activities and can be used as reference in the strategy of any lobbying organisation, but also by political decision makers for a better assessment of this activity. Following the fact that together with GfK Romania we realised a national survey on representative samples of urban population over 15 years old, we could integrate in the present study an analysis of the public perception concerning the Romanian lobbying activities, essential element both for lobbyist and for politicians.","PeriodicalId":390004,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125728666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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