This study investigates into the consequences of earnings management by classification shifting via examining its effect on corporate investment efficiency. The underlying expectation is that the way of reporting different items of profit within the income statement should induce information asymmetry between managers and the capital providers about the level of core, and so more likely repeatable, firm performance, and therefore associate with efficiency in firm-level investment. We find that classification shifting strongly and positively associates with both over- and under-investment. Our results are more pronounced when other factors that should favor efficient investing are weaker, namely for firms facing greater financial constraints, firms with greater information asymmetry and lower auditor quality, and also when opportunistic special items, levels of unexpected investment, and investment opacity are higher. Our study provides evidence on the adverse consequences of classification shifting, representing a form of earnings management typically considered as relatively innocuous and without any bottom-line performance reversing effects, with reference to a very important firm-level outcome, as is efficiency in investment.
{"title":"Classification Shifting and Efficiency of Corporate Investment","authors":"Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou, Kamran Malikov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3801959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3801959","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates into the consequences of earnings management by classification shifting via examining its effect on corporate investment efficiency. The underlying expectation is that the way of reporting different items of profit within the income statement should induce information asymmetry between managers and the capital providers about the level of core, and so more likely repeatable, firm performance, and therefore associate with efficiency in firm-level investment. We find that classification shifting strongly and positively associates with both over- and under-investment. Our results are more pronounced when other factors that should favor efficient investing are weaker, namely for firms facing greater financial constraints, firms with greater information asymmetry and lower auditor quality, and also when opportunistic special items, levels of unexpected investment, and investment opacity are higher. Our study provides evidence on the adverse consequences of classification shifting, representing a form of earnings management typically considered as relatively innocuous and without any bottom-line performance reversing effects, with reference to a very important firm-level outcome, as is efficiency in investment.","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122531402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We find that business cycles drive productive economic churn. During recessions, firms with high previous abnormal investment scale back while firms with low abnormal investment scale up. These findings are consistent with an improvement in investment efficiency over the business cycle. Our estimates suggest that an average firm cuts inefficient investment during recessions by at least 7%, or roughly $145M. Valuation ratios converge similarly with inefficient firms showing relative improvement. Our results are stronger for less entrenched firms and firms with more shareholder filings (13D/G), which point to shareholder monitoring as an economic channel. Overall, investment efficiency appears to improve in recessions and decline in expansions, supporting Schumpeter's notion of creative destruction.
{"title":"Creative Destruction and the Bright Side of Economic Downturns","authors":"Shahram Amini, Andrew D. MacKinlay, J. Weston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3624454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3624454","url":null,"abstract":"We find that business cycles drive productive economic churn. During recessions, firms with high previous abnormal investment scale back while firms with low abnormal investment scale up. These findings are consistent with an improvement in investment efficiency over the business cycle. Our estimates suggest that an average firm cuts inefficient investment during recessions by at least 7%, or roughly $145M. Valuation ratios converge similarly with inefficient firms showing relative improvement. Our results are stronger for less entrenched firms and firms with more shareholder filings (13D/G), which point to shareholder monitoring as an economic channel. Overall, investment efficiency appears to improve in recessions and decline in expansions, supporting Schumpeter's notion of creative destruction.","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"263 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114750613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Spanish Abstract: Las inversiones extranjeras están siendo objeto de una aproximación más cautelosa y crítica en los últimos años en gran número de países. Una posición que se refleja en su régimen jurídico y se manifiesta, entre otros extremos, en el diseño de mecanismos de control previo con base en su eventual contrariedad con la seguridad nacional del país receptor. La pandemia del COVID-19 no ha hecho sino acentuar esta tendencia. La posición mantenida por la UE al respecto, y la suspensión de la libre circulación de inversiones decidida por el Gobierno español son manifestaciones de ello que, todo apunta, han venido para perdurar.
English Abstract: In recent years, foreign investment is subject to a more cautious and critical approach in many countries. This attitude is reflected in its regulation and in the growing design of screening mechanisms on national security grounds. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend. The position adopted by the EU and the suspension of the free circulation of investments approved by the Spanish Government reflect also this attitude. The issue now is to know whether they are transitory or will remain once the pandemic is over.
{"title":"COVID-19 y libre circulación de inversiones: un (muy) difícil matrimonio (COVID-19 and Free Movement of Investment: A (Very) Difficult Marriage)","authors":"C. Esplugues","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3634461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3634461","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Spanish Abstract:</b> Las inversiones extranjeras están siendo objeto de una aproximación más cautelosa y crítica en los últimos años en gran número de países. Una posición que se refleja en su régimen jurídico y se manifiesta, entre otros extremos, en el diseño de mecanismos de control previo con base en su eventual contrariedad con la seguridad nacional del país receptor. La pandemia del COVID-19 no ha hecho sino acentuar esta tendencia. La posición mantenida por la UE al respecto, y la suspensión de la libre circulación de inversiones decidida por el Gobierno español son manifestaciones de ello que, todo apunta, han venido para perdurar. <br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> In recent years, foreign investment is subject to a more cautious and critical approach in many countries. This attitude is reflected in its regulation and in the growing design of screening mechanisms on national security grounds. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend. The position adopted by the EU and the suspension of the free circulation of investments approved by the Spanish Government reflect also this attitude. The issue now is to know whether they are transitory or will remain once the pandemic is over.","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129505966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the effect of mandatory disclosure requirements for private firms on their decision to go public. Using detailed project-level data for biopharmaceutical firms, we explore the effects of a legal reform---the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA)---which exogenously required that firms publicly disclose information regarding clinical trials. Exploiting cross-sectional heterogeneity in firms' exposure to the regulation based on their internal development portfolios, we find that affected firms are significantly more likely to transition to public equity markets following the reform. We also find that firms that go public due to the increased disclosure requirements subsequently reduce the size of their project portfolios while shifting to safer investments acquired externally. The results suggest that private firms' general information environment and disclosure requirements influence the propensity of going public, and the nature of their subsequent project decisions.
{"title":"Do Mandatory Disclosure Requirements for Private Firms Increase the Propensity of Going Public?","authors":"Cyrus Aghamolla, Richard T. Thakor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3428780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3428780","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the effect of mandatory disclosure requirements for private firms on their decision to go public. Using detailed project-level data for biopharmaceutical firms, we explore the effects of a legal reform---the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA)---which exogenously required that firms publicly disclose information regarding clinical trials. Exploiting cross-sectional heterogeneity in firms' exposure to the regulation based on their internal development portfolios, we find that affected firms are significantly more likely to transition to public equity markets following the reform. We also find that firms that go public due to the increased disclosure requirements subsequently reduce the size of their project portfolios while shifting to safer investments acquired externally. The results suggest that private firms' general information environment and disclosure requirements influence the propensity of going public, and the nature of their subsequent project decisions.","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123381767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Capital markets are catalysts for economic growth and wealth creation for both investors and investees. Vibrancy of capital markets comes in when demand and supply of capital is high. That is, investors’ returns are attractive and the investees’ objectives of accessing cheaper capital are met. The free-market economy principles should therefore be basis of capital markets to dictate both and equity and debt instruments.
Malawi’s capital market is still at an infancy stage despite being operational for about twenty five years. Critical evaluation reveals that this could be attributed to the fact that it is wholly owned by government and the central bank continues to roll out policies which might not be in line with the demand and supply tenets.
The results of this study indicate that equity instruments market is not ideal for indigenous citizens in view of the low dividend payouts, meager capital gains and weak laws to protect insignificant numerous minority shareholders. On the other hand, the debt instruments market despite being inactive with weak secondary market, provides meaningful returns to investors and could be a good source for long-term cheap capital for companies and government agencies such as state owned entities, local authorities and other quasi bodies. There is need provide civic education to indigenous people to invest in municipal bonds for capital projects such as roads, schools, hospitals rather than borrow from development partners and other lenders.
{"title":"Apathy of Malawian Indigenous Citizens on Capital Markets","authors":"B. Kampanje","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3307808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3307808","url":null,"abstract":"Capital markets are catalysts for economic growth and wealth creation for both investors and investees. Vibrancy of capital markets comes in when demand and supply of capital is high. That is, investors’ returns are attractive and the investees’ objectives of accessing cheaper capital are met. The free-market economy principles should therefore be basis of capital markets to dictate both and equity and debt instruments. <br><br>Malawi’s capital market is still at an infancy stage despite being operational for about twenty five years. Critical evaluation reveals that this could be attributed to the fact that it is wholly owned by government and the central bank continues to roll out policies which might not be in line with the demand and supply tenets.<br><br>The results of this study indicate that equity instruments market is not ideal for indigenous citizens in view of the low dividend payouts, meager capital gains and weak laws to protect insignificant numerous minority shareholders. On the other hand, the debt instruments market despite being inactive with weak secondary market, provides meaningful returns to investors and could be a good source for long-term cheap capital for companies and government agencies such as state owned entities, local authorities and other quasi bodies. There is need provide civic education to indigenous people to invest in municipal bonds for capital projects such as roads, schools, hospitals rather than borrow from development partners and other lenders. <br>","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125862678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze a global equity return model driven by mutually exciting jump-diffusions with asymmetric excitation to account for the fact that crashes in the US get reflected quickly in other economies but much less the other way round. We solve in closed-form the associated portfolio optimization problem and find that the optimal portfolio is biased towards the US compared to classic models. By calibrating the model to historical returns on the US, Japanese, and European equity indices, we show that the over-exposure to the US equity predicted by our model is consistent with the cross-border equity portfolios observed in reality.
{"title":"Asymmetric Excitation and the US Bias in Portfolio Choice","authors":"Zhenzhen Fan, R. Laeven, Rob van den Goorbergh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3485356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485356","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a global equity return model driven by mutually exciting jump-diffusions with asymmetric excitation to account for the fact that crashes in the US get reflected quickly in other economies but much less the other way round. We solve in closed-form the associated portfolio optimization problem and find that the optimal portfolio is biased towards the US compared to classic models. By calibrating the model to historical returns on the US, Japanese, and European equity indices, we show that the over-exposure to the US equity predicted by our model is consistent with the cross-border equity portfolios observed in reality.","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129943793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how management forecasts, the cost of equity capital and corporate governance are related, using Japanese data. As management forecasts, capital investment forecasts as well as earnings forecasts are comprehensively available in Japan. They reveal the following: First, better corporate governance systems enhance the quality of earnings forecasts, but do not improve that of capital investment forecasts. Second, firms with more precise earnings forecasts can enjoy lower cost of equity capital. Meanwhile, the precision of capital investment forecasts has no relation with the cost of equity capital. Finally, the precision of capital investment forecasts has a negative influence on the cost of capital as long as corporate governance is poorly built. These findings suggest that capital investment forecasts provide informativeness that is totally different from that in earnings forecasts to investors’ valuation. The precision of earnings forecasts is a substitute for the quality of corporate governance and that of capital investment forecasts plays a complementary role, making up for the information shortcomings arising out of the low quality of corporate governance.
{"title":"Management Forecasts of Capital Investment and Earnings, the Cost of Equity Capital and Corporate Governance in Japan","authors":"Yoshinori Shimada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3023946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3023946","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how management forecasts, the cost of equity capital and corporate governance are related, using Japanese data. As management forecasts, capital investment forecasts as well as earnings forecasts are comprehensively available in Japan. They reveal the following: First, better corporate governance systems enhance the quality of earnings forecasts, but do not improve that of capital investment forecasts. Second, firms with more precise earnings forecasts can enjoy lower cost of equity capital. Meanwhile, the precision of capital investment forecasts has no relation with the cost of equity capital. Finally, the precision of capital investment forecasts has a negative influence on the cost of capital as long as corporate governance is poorly built. These findings suggest that capital investment forecasts provide informativeness that is totally different from that in earnings forecasts to investors’ valuation. The precision of earnings forecasts is a substitute for the quality of corporate governance and that of capital investment forecasts plays a complementary role, making up for the information shortcomings arising out of the low quality of corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115289827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study proposes an effective governance model for project adjudication and funding that draws from several industries, including financial services and higher education. The goal is to provide senior executives with a proven blueprint for investing in projects that align with strategy, thereby bolstering return on investment (ROI).
{"title":"Governing Project Investments","authors":"W. Khan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2769229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2769229","url":null,"abstract":"This study proposes an effective governance model for project adjudication and funding that draws from several industries, including financial services and higher education. The goal is to provide senior executives with a proven blueprint for investing in projects that align with strategy, thereby bolstering return on investment (ROI).","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127081515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT: This paper examines how the external information environment in which foreign subsidiaries operate affects the investment decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs). We hypothesize and find that the investment decisions of foreign subsidiaries in country-industries with more transparent information environments are more responsive to local growth opportunities than are those of foreign subsidiaries in country-industries with less transparent information environments. Further, this effect is larger when (1) there are greater cross-border frictions between the parent and subsidiary, and (2) the parents are relatively more involved in their subsidiaries' investment decision-making process. Our results suggest that the external information environment helps mitigate the agency problems that arise when firms expand their operations across borders. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the external information environment helps MNCs mitigate information frictions within the firm...
{"title":"Information Environment and the Investment Decisions of Multinational Corporations","authors":"Nemit Shroff, Rodrigo S. Verdi, Gwen Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1939494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1939494","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: This paper examines how the external information environment in which foreign subsidiaries operate affects the investment decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs). We hypothesize and find that the investment decisions of foreign subsidiaries in country-industries with more transparent information environments are more responsive to local growth opportunities than are those of foreign subsidiaries in country-industries with less transparent information environments. Further, this effect is larger when (1) there are greater cross-border frictions between the parent and subsidiary, and (2) the parents are relatively more involved in their subsidiaries' investment decision-making process. Our results suggest that the external information environment helps mitigate the agency problems that arise when firms expand their operations across borders. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the external information environment helps MNCs mitigate information frictions within the firm...","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122683431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article deals with the proper procedure for calculating Tax Shields (TS). The calculation includes cases where Losses Carried Forward are allowed and there is financial Other Income (OI). The procedure takes into account the magnitude of Adjusted Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBITAdj) —that is, EBIT + OI – OE excluding Financial— compared with Financial Expenses (FE). This comparison defines three intervals and results for TS. If EBITAdj. 0 and less than FE, TS is T × EBITAdj.; finally if EBITAdj. > FE, TS is T × FE. When firm possesses OI, TS are not equivalent to the difference in taxes and an adjustment is needed. Proper calculation of TS is important because their value might represent a substantial part of firm value. ***** Este articulo define el procedimiento adecuado para calcular los ahorros en impuestos (AI). Incluye el caso en que se permiten perdidas amortizadas y hay otros ingresos financieros. El procedimiento compara la utilidad antes de intereses e impuestos ajustada (UAIIAj) —eso es UAII+OI–OE excl. Financieros— en comparacion con los gastos financieros (GF). Esto define tres intervalos y resultados para AI. Si UAIIAj 0 y menor que GF, AI es T x UAIIAj, por ultimo, si UAIIAj > GF, AI es T x GF. Cuando existen otros ingresos financieros, los AI no son la diferencia en los impuestos y se necesita un ajuste. Calcular adecuadamente los AI es relevante debido a que su valor podria ser una parte importante del valor de la empresa.
本文讨论计算税盾(TS)的适当程序。该计算包括允许结转亏损和存在财务其他收入(OI)的情况。该程序考虑了调整后的息税前收益(EBITAdj)的大小，即EBIT + OI - OE(不包括财务)与财务费用(FE)的比较。这种比较定义了TS的三个区间和结果。0且小于FE，则TS = T × EBITAdj;最后，如果EBITAdj。> FE, TS等于T × FE。当企业拥有OI时，TS不等于税收差额，需要进行调整。正确计算TS是很重要的，因为它们的价值可能代表了公司价值的很大一部分。***** Este articulo define el procedimiento adecuado para calcular los ahorros en impustos (AI)。包括其他公司和金融机构允许的分期付款。比较公用事业和利益的程序是指投资者调整的利益，包括投资者调整的利益和利益，包括投资者调整的利益和利益，包括投资者调整的利益和利益。通过结果来定义树的间隔。4 . i = T = GF, i = T = GF, i = T = GF, i = T = GF。宽裕存在着对金融机构、金融机构、金融机构、金融机构的不同要求。计算能力的丧失是一项重要的债务，因为它是一项重要的债务，它是一项重要的债务。
{"title":"Tax Shields, Financial Expenses and Losses Carried Forward","authors":"Ignacio Vélez-Pareja","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1604082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1604082","url":null,"abstract":"This article deals with the proper procedure for calculating Tax Shields (TS). The calculation includes cases where Losses Carried Forward are allowed and there is financial Other Income (OI). The procedure takes into account the magnitude of Adjusted Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBITAdj) —that is, EBIT + OI – OE excluding Financial— compared with Financial Expenses (FE). This comparison defines three intervals and results for TS. If EBITAdj. 0 and less than FE, TS is T × EBITAdj.; finally if EBITAdj. > FE, TS is T × FE. When firm possesses OI, TS are not equivalent to the difference in taxes and an adjustment is needed. Proper calculation of TS is important because their value might represent a substantial part of firm value. ***** Este articulo define el procedimiento adecuado para calcular los ahorros en impuestos (AI). Incluye el caso en que se permiten perdidas amortizadas y hay otros ingresos financieros. El procedimiento compara la utilidad antes de intereses e impuestos ajustada (UAIIAj) —eso es UAII+OI–OE excl. Financieros— en comparacion con los gastos financieros (GF). Esto define tres intervalos y resultados para AI. Si UAIIAj 0 y menor que GF, AI es T x UAIIAj, por ultimo, si UAIIAj > GF, AI es T x GF. Cuando existen otros ingresos financieros, los AI no son la diferencia en los impuestos y se necesita un ajuste. Calcular adecuadamente los AI es relevante debido a que su valor podria ser una parte importante del valor de la empresa.","PeriodicalId":397102,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Capital Investment (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117137077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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