Defenders of The Pure View – “Purists”, as I shall call them – maintain that perception is pure presentation. That is, a perceptual experience has no commitments that exceed what is given or presented in the experience. I argue The Pure View seems unable to offer a convincing account of amodal completion. I distinguish three Purist strategies for addressing amodal completion, and suggest that none is very promising.
{"title":"Amodal Completion and the Impurity of Perception","authors":"S. Overgaard","doi":"10.17454/pam-2210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2210","url":null,"abstract":"Defenders of The Pure View – “Purists”, as I shall call them – maintain that perception is pure presentation. That is, a perceptual experience has no commitments that exceed what is given or presented in the experience. I argue The Pure View seems unable to offer a convincing account of amodal completion. I distinguish three Purist strategies for addressing amodal completion, and suggest that none is very promising.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128518724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Individuals suffering from depression consistently report experiencing a lack of connectedness with others. David Karp (2017), in his memoir and study of depression, has gone so far to describe depression as “an illness of isolation, a disease of disconnectedness” (p. 73). It has become common, in phenomenological circles, to attribute this social impairment to the depressed individual experiencing their body as corporealized , acting as a barrier between them and the world around them (Fuchs, 2005, 2016). In this paper, I offer an alternative view of the experience of social disconnectedness in depression, suggesting that rather than necessarily experiencing their body as object-like, the depressed individual’s bodily is saturated with experiences of lethargy, tiredness, heaviness, sadness, hopelessness and so on, to the exclusion of being able to bodily connect to others. I suggest that depression does not involve a complete social impairment but a specific impairment of affective forms of interpersonal experience.
{"title":"Bodily saturation and social disconnectedness in depression","authors":"Lucy Osler","doi":"10.17454/pam-2104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2104","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals suffering from depression consistently report experiencing a lack of connectedness with others. David Karp (2017), in his memoir and study of depression, has gone so far to describe depression as “an illness of isolation, a disease of disconnectedness” (p. 73). It has become common, in phenomenological circles, to attribute this social impairment to the depressed individual experiencing their body as corporealized , acting as a barrier between them and the world around them (Fuchs, 2005, 2016). In this paper, I offer an alternative view of the experience of social disconnectedness in depression, suggesting that rather than necessarily experiencing their body as object-like, the depressed individual’s bodily is saturated with experiences of lethargy, tiredness, heaviness, sadness, hopelessness and so on, to the exclusion of being able to bodily connect to others. I suggest that depression does not involve a complete social impairment but a specific impairment of affective forms of interpersonal experience.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127736808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because of this, the many property problem isn’t on its own a good reason for rejecting Adverbialism; and nor is it a puzzle that will decide amongst the other leading theories.
{"title":"The Significance of the Many Property Problem","authors":"T. Crane, Alex Grzankowski","doi":"10.17454/pam-2214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2214","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because of this, the many property problem isn’t on its own a good reason for rejecting Adverbialism; and nor is it a puzzle that will decide amongst the other leading theories.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130656385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The debate about mental content is not well framed as internalists versus externalists, because there is both internal and external mental content. There is also a question about how best to draw the line between them, and this paper argues that this line is not usually drawn in the right place. It proposes a new alignment: the expression ‘internal content’ is to be taken to denote actually occurring, concrete, immediately phenomenologically given content. Absolutely everything else that can be said to be the content of experience is to be classified as external content. It turns out, under this new alignment, that internal content can be external content; this is the case when I think about your pain, or indeed my own pain. But this is as it should be.
{"title":"Internal and External Content: A New Alignment","authors":"G. Strawson","doi":"10.17454/pam-2202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2202","url":null,"abstract":"The debate about mental content is not well framed as internalists versus externalists, because there is both internal and external mental content. There is also a question about how best to draw the line between them, and this paper argues that this line is not usually drawn in the right place. It proposes a new alignment: the expression ‘internal content’ is to be taken to denote actually occurring, concrete, immediately phenomenologically given content. Absolutely everything else that can be said to be the content of experience is to be classified as external content. It turns out, under this new alignment, that internal content can be external content; this is the case when I think about your pain, or indeed my own pain. But this is as it should be.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125234297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The three main approaches to the metaphysics of intentionality can arguably be subjected to analysis in terms of grammatical point of view: the approach of the (internalist) phenomenal intentionality programme (plus productivism about linguistic content) may be regarded as first-personal; interpretationism, perhaps, as second-personal; and (reductive externalist) causal information theories (including teleosemantics) as third-personal. After making this plausible, the current paper focusses on the role of the interpreter (if any) in interpretationism. It argues that, despite some considerations from the publicity of meaning potentially suggesting the contrary, radical interpretation is not subject to epistemic constraint; nor should the interpretationist appeal to the idiosyncratic interests of actual interpreters, thereby rendering the approach irremediably relativistic. Instead, an appeal to the pure form of interestedness is all that is involved; this supports a methodologically non-reductive outlook on intentionality.
{"title":"Intentionality, Point of View, and the Role of the Interpreter","authors":"B. Ball","doi":"10.17454/pam-2207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2207","url":null,"abstract":"The three main approaches to the metaphysics of intentionality can arguably be subjected to analysis in terms of grammatical point of view: the approach of the (internalist) phenomenal intentionality programme (plus productivism about linguistic content) may be regarded as first-personal; interpretationism, perhaps, as second-personal; and (reductive externalist) causal information theories (including teleosemantics) as third-personal. After making this plausible, the current paper focusses on the role of the interpreter (if any) in interpretationism. It argues that, despite some considerations from the publicity of meaning potentially suggesting the contrary, radical interpretation is not subject to epistemic constraint; nor should the interpretationist appeal to the idiosyncratic interests of actual interpreters, thereby rendering the approach irremediably relativistic. Instead, an appeal to the pure form of interestedness is all that is involved; this supports a methodologically non-reductive outlook on intentionality.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"143 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114640987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crossing the Lines: Manipulation, Social Impairment, and a Challenging Emotional Life","authors":"Philipp Schmidt","doi":"10.17454/pam-2105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2105","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121464628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Finding (and losing) one’s way: autism, social impairments, and the politics of space","authors":"Joel Krueger","doi":"10.17454/pam-2102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2102","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132083142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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