{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.21","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130222086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic warfare shaped the First World War, but neither its execution nor its effect have been studied thoroughly. Economic warfare usually is seen just as a matter of warships; in fact, it stemmed from and was waged through a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, law, and seapower. The Royal Navy might have exercised blockade simply through strength, but Britannia did not wish to rule the waves by force alone. Britain cared about being, and seeming to be, lawful in action, which also eased the diplomacy of economic warfare. Intelligence, especially intercepted cables, wireless and, above all, the international post, unified seapower and sea law. Seapower enabled diplomacy, intelligence and law. They executed seapower. In particular, only overwhelming seapower could make every neutral at once tolerate British interception of their seamail, which was inconvenient and, neutrals thought, illegal. In turn, the postal censorship, Britain’s most feminised department of state, matched the most manly of arms as a tool of seapower.
{"title":"Postal Censorship and the Alchemy of Victory at Sea during the First World War","authors":"J. Ferris","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.15","url":null,"abstract":"Economic warfare shaped the First World War, but neither its execution nor its effect have been studied thoroughly. Economic warfare usually is seen just as a matter of warships; in fact, it stemmed from and was waged through a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, law, and seapower. The Royal Navy might have exercised blockade simply through strength, but Britannia did not wish to rule the waves by force alone. Britain cared about being, and seeming to be, lawful in action, which also eased the diplomacy of economic warfare. Intelligence, especially intercepted cables, wireless and, above all, the international post, unified seapower and sea law. Seapower enabled diplomacy, intelligence and law. They executed seapower. In particular, only overwhelming seapower could make every neutral at once tolerate British interception of their seamail, which was inconvenient and, neutrals thought, illegal. In turn, the postal censorship, Britain’s most feminised department of state, matched the most manly of arms as a tool of seapower.","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"PP 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126441792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epilogue:","authors":"D. Moran","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129947329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter argues for the central importance of the development of the principle of neutrality in explaining the contours of the nineteenth-century age of industrial globalisation and the waging of economic warfare between 1815 and 1914. It highlights how nineteenth-century imperial expansion and industrial growth were dependent on the ability of industrial states to sustain easy access to the open seas, even in time of war. It describes how the naval powers co-ordinated and negotiated the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents in international law in such a way as to maximise the financial, industrial and imperial advantages from doing so. It also explains how the principles of war avoidance and neutrality maintenance helped to underwrite the global power of Great Britain and the contours of the Pax Britannica.
{"title":"Protecting Neutrality at Sea in a Global Age, 1815–1914","authors":"Maartje Abbenhuis","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.14","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues for the central importance of the development of the principle of neutrality in explaining the contours of the nineteenth-century age of industrial globalisation and the waging of economic warfare between 1815 and 1914. It highlights how nineteenth-century imperial expansion and industrial growth were dependent on the ability of industrial states to sustain easy access to the open seas, even in time of war. It describes how the naval powers co-ordinated and negotiated the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents in international law in such a way as to maximise the financial, industrial and imperial advantages from doing so. It also explains how the principles of war avoidance and neutrality maintenance helped to underwrite the global power of Great Britain and the contours of the Pax Britannica.\u0000","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132533769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under the leadership of Alfred von Tirpitz, the German navy concentrated on building a battle fleet based in the North Sea rather than cruisers designed for operations in distant waters. This has led many historians to assume that commerce warfare (Handelskrieg) played no real part in German preparations for war against Britain before 1914. This chapter disputes this analysis. It shows that Germany’s naval planners in the Admiralstab believed that by converting merchant ships into auxiliary cruisers and using them to attack British commerce on the high seas the German navy would be able to cause considerable damage to British shipping and so force the Royal Navy to divert forces from the main theatre of war to distant oceans. It goes on to examine the reality of this plan during the First World War.
{"title":"Britain and Economic Warfare in German Naval Thinking in the Era of the Great War","authors":"M. Seligmann","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.16","url":null,"abstract":"Under the leadership of Alfred von Tirpitz, the German navy concentrated on building a battle fleet based in the North Sea rather than cruisers designed for operations in distant waters. This has led many historians to assume that commerce warfare (Handelskrieg) played no real part in German preparations for war against Britain before 1914. This chapter disputes this analysis. It shows that Germany’s naval planners in the Admiralstab believed that by converting merchant ships into auxiliary cruisers and using them to attack British commerce on the high seas the German navy would be able to cause considerable damage to British shipping and so force the Royal Navy to divert forces from the main theatre of war to distant oceans. It goes on to examine the reality of this plan during the First World War.","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117114705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economics, Warfare, and the Sea, c. 1650–1945","authors":"S. Conway","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115267479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter provides an overview of recent scholarship on the Royal Navy’s economic blockade of the United States between 1812 and 1815. The article shows how the combination of British naval forces and privateers slowly strangled the American economy and nearly immobilized the U.S. Navy. Despite the Royal Navy’s very successful application of economic warfare, it was not decisive. Due to financial exhaustion following the Napoleonic wars, Parliament would not support the naval and military funding necessary to impose the harsh peace terms for which economic warfare had laid the foundation.
{"title":"The Royal Navy and Economic Warfare against the United States during the War of 1812","authors":"J. Hattendorf","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.13","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides an overview of recent scholarship on the Royal Navy’s economic blockade of the United States between 1812 and 1815. The article shows how the combination of British naval forces and privateers slowly strangled the American economy and nearly immobilized the U.S. Navy. Despite the Royal Navy’s very successful application of economic warfare, it was not decisive. Due to financial exhaustion following the Napoleonic wars, Parliament would not support the naval and military funding necessary to impose the harsh peace terms for which economic warfare had laid the foundation.","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127921193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Select Bibliography","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.20","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128254380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sea Power and Neutrality:","authors":"S. Marzagalli","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123480414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Convoys and Companies:","authors":"E. Odegard","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"726 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123096906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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