{"title":"List of Tables","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117219854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neither a Silver Bullet Nor a Distraction:","authors":"Bleddyn E. Bowen","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131032853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The combination of British blockade and convoys has been seen as comfortably defeating Napoleon’s economic warfare strategy, principally his Continental System after 1807. Trade and military convoys were maintained and increased from 1803 and 1815, but this success came at a cost. Winter storms and ice were responsible for more warship and merchant ship losses than by enemy action. Shortages of skilled seamen caused considerable anxiety at the Admiralty. The greatest difficulties were the Danish attacks on convoys between 1809 and 1810 and those from America in 1812 and 1813, dangers which, fortunately for Britain, did not arrive simultaneously. The British naval and mercantile effort survived, but towards the end of the war it was a close-run thing.
{"title":"The Achievement and Cost of the British Convoy System, 1803–1815","authors":"R. Knight","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.12","url":null,"abstract":"The combination of British blockade and convoys has been seen as comfortably defeating Napoleon’s economic warfare strategy, principally his Continental System after 1807. Trade and military convoys were maintained and increased from 1803 and 1815, but this success came at a cost. Winter storms and ice were responsible for more warship and merchant ship losses than by enemy action. Shortages of skilled seamen caused considerable anxiety at the Admiralty. The greatest difficulties were the Danish attacks on convoys between 1809 and 1810 and those from America in 1812 and 1813, dangers which, fortunately for Britain, did not arrive simultaneously. The British naval and mercantile effort survived, but towards the end of the war it was a close-run thing.","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129012582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction:","authors":"David Morgan-Owen, Louis Halewood","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131162590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Merchants of Fortune:","authors":"A. Brinkman","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114173676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter analyses the operational capability and strategic planning of the Royal Navy, United States Navy, and Imperial Japanese Navy in the period between the outbreak of war in China in July 1937 to the beginning of the general Pacific war on December 7, 1941. It outlines the lack of ability of the Western Powers to use naval power effectively to deter Japan in conjunction with Economic Warfare at sea. It also highlights the inability of the Anglo-Americans to prevent an escalation in tensions during the implementation of economic warfare measures due to a lack of credible maritime power to support that deterrence strategy.
{"title":"Maritime Power and Economic Warfare in the Far East, 1937–1941","authors":"G. Kennedy","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvz0h9dx.17","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyses the operational capability and strategic planning of the Royal Navy, United States Navy, and Imperial Japanese Navy in the period between the outbreak of war in China in July 1937 to the beginning of the general Pacific war on December 7, 1941. It outlines the lack of ability of the Western Powers to use naval power effectively to deter Japan in conjunction with Economic Warfare at sea. It also highlights the inability of the Anglo-Americans to prevent an escalation in tensions during the implementation of economic warfare measures due to a lack of credible maritime power to support that deterrence strategy.","PeriodicalId":405806,"journal":{"name":"Economic Warfare and the Sea","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125194087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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