Pub Date : 2019-03-01DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00164-6
Yves Sprumont
{"title":"Nash welfarism and the distributive implications of informational constraints","authors":"Yves Sprumont","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00164-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00164-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"49 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00164-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-09DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7
H. Moulin, A. Seth, B. Taub
{"title":"Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment","authors":"H. Moulin, A. Seth, B. Taub","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"1 - 11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-31DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1
Yu Chen
{"title":"Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types","authors":"Yu Chen","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"277 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2
G. Gerasimou
{"title":"Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences","authors":"G. Gerasimou","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"165 - 171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-24DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0158-3
R. Dubey, Minwook Kang
{"title":"Transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium","authors":"R. Dubey, Minwook Kang","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-0158-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0158-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"259 - 269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-0158-3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44016674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The transfer paradox describes the situation in which transfers of initial endowments within competitive market make the donor better off and (or) the recipient worse off. Advantageous redistribution, strong transfer paradox, and Chichilnisky paradox are the three cases of the transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium, wherein each case produces a different welfare outcome. This paper shows that the three paradoxes are concretely related by applying Kaldor welfare measure.
{"title":"Transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium","authors":"R. Dubey, Minwook Kang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3144038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3144038","url":null,"abstract":"The transfer paradox describes the situation in which transfers of initial endowments within competitive market make the donor better off and (or) the recipient worse off. Advantageous redistribution, strong transfer paradox, and Chichilnisky paradox are the three cases of the transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium, wherein each case produces a different welfare outcome. This paper shows that the three paradoxes are concretely related by applying Kaldor welfare measure.","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"259-269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46588547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-31DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0153-8
José F. Tudón M.
{"title":"Perception, utility, and evolution","authors":"José F. Tudón M.","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-0153-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0153-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"191 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-0153-8","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I consider a moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties, limited liability, and an informed principal. The contractible outcome is correlated to both the principal’s private information and the agent’s hidden action. In contrast to a model without a privately informed principal or without limited liability, I show that the first-best payoff cannot be implemented by any equilibrium mechanism.
{"title":"Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability","authors":"Teddy Mekonnen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3083159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3083159","url":null,"abstract":"I consider a moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties, limited liability, and an informed principal. The contractible outcome is correlated to both the principal’s private information and the agent’s hidden action. In contrast to a model without a privately informed principal or without limited liability, I show that the first-best payoff cannot be implemented by any equilibrium mechanism.","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"9 1","pages":"119-142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.3083159","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49077929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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