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Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions 对共同价值拍卖中竞争性投标收敛定理的修正
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-08-20 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00234-2
S. Lee, Jeong‐Yoo Kim
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引用次数: 0
Local stability constraints 局部稳定性约束
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-07-30 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00232-4
E. Peralta
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引用次数: 0
Is it reasonable to legalize tea money? 把茶钱合法化合理吗?
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-07-28 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00231-5
Hideki Sato
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引用次数: 0
More ambiguity aversion or more risk aversion? 更多的模糊厌恶还是更多的风险厌恶？
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00227-1
Jiankang Zhang
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引用次数: 0
The minimal Hilbert basis of the Hammond order cone 哈蒙德阶锥的极小希尔伯特基
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-07-11 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00226-2
R. Abul Naga
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引用次数: 0
The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements 具有同构乘积的Bertrand对偶是具有完全补码的Cournot
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-05-21 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00225-3
P. Bertoletti
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引用次数: 0
Optimal licensing contracts with a downstream oligopoly: insider versus outsider innovation 下游寡头垄断的最优许可合同:内部人与外部创新
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-05-19 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00224-4
Tsung-Sheng Tsai, Cheng-Tai Wu

In the literature that deals with cost-reduction technology licensing in an oligopolistic downstream market, the paper by Sen and Tauman (Games Econ Behav 59:163–186, 2007) has been a milestone in that it thoroughly characterizes the optimal licensing contracts for both cases of insider and outsider innovation under complete information. However, when determining the licensee’s fee payment to obtain the license through an auction, their treatments for different numbers of licensees are inconsistent. We instead use a consistent approach that can be applied to all numbers of licensees, in which a firm’s reservation payoff is determined by its Cournot profit if it rejects the contract. We find that the optimal contract is for both the insider and outsider innovator to sell the license to all downstream firms. We also show that an insider innovator sets a (weakly) higher royalty rate and generates a (weakly) lower social welfare than an outsider innovator.

在研究下游寡头垄断市场中降低成本的技术许可的文献中，Sen和Tauman的论文(游戏经济行为59:163-186,2007)具有里程碑式的意义，因为它详尽地描述了完全信息下内部人创新和外部创新两种情况下的最优许可合同。然而，在确定通过拍卖获得许可证的被许可人的费用支付时，他们对不同数量的被许可人的处理是不一致的。相反，我们采用了一种适用于所有被许可方的一致方法，即如果拒绝合同，公司的保留收益由其古诺利润决定。我们发现，最优契约是内部创新者和外部创新者都将许可证出售给所有下游企业。我们还表明，与外部创新者相比，内部创新者设定了(弱)更高的版税税率，并产生了(弱)更低的社会福利。
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引用次数: 1
Auctions with resale and risk aversion 具有转售和规避风险的拍卖
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-04-29 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00221-7
Sanyyam Khurana
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引用次数: 0
Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences 具有非有序和不连续偏好的经济体中阿尔法核心配置的存在
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-04-26 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00223-5
V. Scalzo
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引用次数: 2
The fractional multidimensional knapsack problem: solution and uniqueness 分数维背包问题的解与唯一性
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2022-03-29 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00217-3
John Y. Zhu
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引用次数: 0
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