Abstract Instruments of direct democracy can be – and are – used to further and strengthen illiberal democracy by restricting minority rights (1). The legal design of these instruments can make this easier or less likely (2).
{"title":"Illiberal Direct Democracy","authors":"Frank J. Merli","doi":"10.1515/icl-2020-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2020-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Instruments of direct democracy can be – and are – used to further and strengthen illiberal democracy by restricting minority rights (1). The legal design of these instruments can make this easier or less likely (2).","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"20 1","pages":"199 - 210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72756934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-01DOI: 10.1515/icl-2020-frontmatter2
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/icl-2020-frontmatter2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2020-frontmatter2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78520279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The article analyses the impact that the diminutive size of the four continental Europe micro states has upon their constitutional arrangements and their approach toward continental integration mechanisms. Generally speaking, the international commitment toward integration mechanisms is one of the distinguishing traits of micro states. It may seem a paradox, but actually the international dimension is much more strategic for micro than for macro states. However, being micro territorial enclaves demanded certain ability from the part of European micro states when managing foreign relations in order not to be swallowed by their macro neighbours. Therefore, they carried out for centuries a cautious policy of ‘guarded openness’, trying to strike a balance between the maintenance of their traditional institutions and the need to interact on a continental scale. Constitutional systems that at a first glance are unusual may be an obstacle to integration and thus have to be reformed. However, not too much, because otherwise the whole system may implode if deprived of its original constitutional balance. The protection of national tradition and identity is conservative, in the sense that it arises from the necessity of self-preservation, rather than from ideology. The article claims that the ambivalent approach of continental Europe micro states have when interacting with macro states within the Council of Europe and the EU directly derives from their diminutive size. Furthermore, the relevant role played by the diminutive size is proved by the fact that recently the EU adopted a specific micro states approach. Hence, the article also aims at investigating how they try to strike a balance between the commitment toward self-preservation – ie their constitutional identity – and the commitment toward continental integration mechanisms.
{"title":"The Constitutional Identity of European Micro States and the Continental Integration Mechanisms. The Influence of the Diminutive Size","authors":"E. Bertolini","doi":"10.1515/icl-2019-0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2019-0055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article analyses the impact that the diminutive size of the four continental Europe micro states has upon their constitutional arrangements and their approach toward continental integration mechanisms. Generally speaking, the international commitment toward integration mechanisms is one of the distinguishing traits of micro states. It may seem a paradox, but actually the international dimension is much more strategic for micro than for macro states. However, being micro territorial enclaves demanded certain ability from the part of European micro states when managing foreign relations in order not to be swallowed by their macro neighbours. Therefore, they carried out for centuries a cautious policy of ‘guarded openness’, trying to strike a balance between the maintenance of their traditional institutions and the need to interact on a continental scale. Constitutional systems that at a first glance are unusual may be an obstacle to integration and thus have to be reformed. However, not too much, because otherwise the whole system may implode if deprived of its original constitutional balance. The protection of national tradition and identity is conservative, in the sense that it arises from the necessity of self-preservation, rather than from ideology. The article claims that the ambivalent approach of continental Europe micro states have when interacting with macro states within the Council of Europe and the EU directly derives from their diminutive size. Furthermore, the relevant role played by the diminutive size is proved by the fact that recently the EU adopted a specific micro states approach. Hence, the article also aims at investigating how they try to strike a balance between the commitment toward self-preservation – ie their constitutional identity – and the commitment toward continental integration mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"3 1","pages":"133 - 165"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85407411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article deals with one of the perennial questions of legal and political philosophy, ie, how the state should relate to religion? It makes a distinction between five models: (i) the atheist state, (ii) the theocratic state, (iii) the model of an official state church, (iv) the multiculturalist state, and (v) the agnostic state (or secular state). The authors reflect on the legitimacy of each of these models. Some states reclaim their right to adopt an official religion as their state religion or as the religious Leitkultur of their country (model iii). Others favor the support of religion as long as this is premised on the equal rights of all religions (model iv). And others think that the state can only support equal citizenship if the state does not support any religion whatsoever (model v).
{"title":"The Five Models for State and Religion: Atheism, Theocracy, State Church, Multiculturalism, and Secularism","authors":"P. Cliteur, A. Ellian","doi":"10.1515/icl-2018-0056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2018-0056","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article deals with one of the perennial questions of legal and political philosophy, ie, how the state should relate to religion? It makes a distinction between five models: (i) the atheist state, (ii) the theocratic state, (iii) the model of an official state church, (iv) the multiculturalist state, and (v) the agnostic state (or secular state). The authors reflect on the legitimacy of each of these models. Some states reclaim their right to adopt an official religion as their state religion or as the religious Leitkultur of their country (model iii). Others favor the support of religion as long as this is premised on the equal rights of all religions (model iv). And others think that the state can only support equal citizenship if the state does not support any religion whatsoever (model v).","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"68 1","pages":"103 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76597464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The present article maps the explicit references to the rule of law in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR by examining the judgments of the Grand Chamber and the Plenary Court. On the basis of the structured analysis it seeks to identify the constitutive elements of the Court’s rule of law concept and contrast it with the author’s working definition and the position of other Council of Europe organs. The review of the case-law indicates that the Court primarily associates the rule of law with access to court, judicial safeguards, legality and democracy, and it follows a moderately thick definition of the concept including formal, procedural and some substantive elements. The rule of law references are predominantly ancillary arguments giving weight to other Convention-based considerations and it is not applied as a self-standing standard.
{"title":"In Search of a Standard: References to the Rule of Law in the Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights","authors":"Eszter Polgári","doi":"10.1515/icl-2019-0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2019-0040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The present article maps the explicit references to the rule of law in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR by examining the judgments of the Grand Chamber and the Plenary Court. On the basis of the structured analysis it seeks to identify the constitutive elements of the Court’s rule of law concept and contrast it with the author’s working definition and the position of other Council of Europe organs. The review of the case-law indicates that the Court primarily associates the rule of law with access to court, judicial safeguards, legality and democracy, and it follows a moderately thick definition of the concept including formal, procedural and some substantive elements. The rule of law references are predominantly ancillary arguments giving weight to other Convention-based considerations and it is not applied as a self-standing standard.","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"3 1","pages":"43 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91233485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Proponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza’s solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.
{"title":"Judicial Review (Departmentalism) vs Supremacy: The Connection to a 17th Century Debate and a Dilemma for Today","authors":"Boleslaw Z. Kabala","doi":"10.1515/icl-2019-0052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2019-0052","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Proponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza’s solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"18 1","pages":"71 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86040364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-01DOI: 10.1515/icl-2020-frontmatter1
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/icl-2020-frontmatter1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2020-frontmatter1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"136 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77465036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The idea of human dignity, found in almost all legal and political cultures, now plays a very significant role in political and legal discourse. The concept occupies a prominent place in many national constitutions and international human rights conventions. Some constitutional and conventional laws in fact claim that the pursuit of dignity is (or should be) the central organizing principle of every government. Yet, it is not always clear what this seemingly central concept means or entails. Its popularity seems inversely related to its clarity. Dignity is often invoked in support of opposing positions on the same issue. Using an approach that the article refers to as dignity pragmatism, the author advances the argument that careful examination of the use of dignity in national constitutions and international human rights documents and their elaboration by the relevant tribunals shows that the idea of human dignity is often used in the context of defending the integrity of the person. Here integrity is defined as the condition of wholeness or completeness. The article details what the conditions for integrity are and how human dignity is invoked in its defense. On this account, dignity is an existential value. It is about personhood in its various dimensions – physical, psychological and social. When integrity as wholeness is threatened, existence itself is threatened. Viewed this way, indignity is the effacement of personhood.
{"title":"Dignity, Integrity, and the Concept of a Person","authors":"Adeno Addis","doi":"10.1515/icl-2019-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2019-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The idea of human dignity, found in almost all legal and political cultures, now plays a very significant role in political and legal discourse. The concept occupies a prominent place in many national constitutions and international human rights conventions. Some constitutional and conventional laws in fact claim that the pursuit of dignity is (or should be) the central organizing principle of every government. Yet, it is not always clear what this seemingly central concept means or entails. Its popularity seems inversely related to its clarity. Dignity is often invoked in support of opposing positions on the same issue. Using an approach that the article refers to as dignity pragmatism, the author advances the argument that careful examination of the use of dignity in national constitutions and international human rights documents and their elaboration by the relevant tribunals shows that the idea of human dignity is often used in the context of defending the integrity of the person. Here integrity is defined as the condition of wholeness or completeness. The article details what the conditions for integrity are and how human dignity is invoked in its defense. On this account, dignity is an existential value. It is about personhood in its various dimensions – physical, psychological and social. When integrity as wholeness is threatened, existence itself is threatened. Viewed this way, indignity is the effacement of personhood.","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"2 1","pages":"323 - 372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81230631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-01DOI: 10.1515/icl-2019-frontmatter4
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/icl-2019-frontmatter4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2019-frontmatter4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91176266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Depending on how we define a peace regime, we can determine whether we have reached a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, or what and how we have to pursue to reach a peace regime. A new definition of a regime should not be too broad to admit the current balance of powers based on hegemonies and states’ patterns of behaviors, or too restrictive and formal to codify as a multi-national treaty; a simple peace treaty cannot cover everything a peace regime needs to have and reflect the complicated process of peace building, cooperation and tension-reduction. In this paper, I will attempt to find the most-realistic definition for a peace regime to provide an ultimate peace on the Korean peninsula. Further, I will think about how to reach the newly defined peace regime on the Korean peninsula and the obstacles to overcome to reach this peace regime, including: (1) Denuclearization; and (2) How a peace regime can be transnationally supported and peacefully digested and incorporated into the domestic level processes and norms, especially considering that reaching a regime reflecting national interests is a daunting task. Lastly, I will conclude with recommendations for states surrounding the Korean peninsula.
{"title":"Establishment of a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: Definition, Process, and Cooperation","authors":"Jootaek Lee","doi":"10.1515/icl-2019-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/icl-2019-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Depending on how we define a peace regime, we can determine whether we have reached a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, or what and how we have to pursue to reach a peace regime. A new definition of a regime should not be too broad to admit the current balance of powers based on hegemonies and states’ patterns of behaviors, or too restrictive and formal to codify as a multi-national treaty; a simple peace treaty cannot cover everything a peace regime needs to have and reflect the complicated process of peace building, cooperation and tension-reduction. In this paper, I will attempt to find the most-realistic definition for a peace regime to provide an ultimate peace on the Korean peninsula. Further, I will think about how to reach the newly defined peace regime on the Korean peninsula and the obstacles to overcome to reach this peace regime, including: (1) Denuclearization; and (2) How a peace regime can be transnationally supported and peacefully digested and incorporated into the domestic level processes and norms, especially considering that reaching a regime reflecting national interests is a daunting task. Lastly, I will conclude with recommendations for states surrounding the Korean peninsula.","PeriodicalId":41321,"journal":{"name":"ICL Journal-Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law","volume":"13 1","pages":"307 - 321"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88299199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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