Abstract The article argues that the contours of the ‘business judgment rule’ (hereinafter, ‘the rule’ or ‘the doctrine’) have not been properly delineated and add avoidable transaction costs in terms of business decision-making. On the premise of ‘influence’ existing between Board Directors and countervailing requirements of legal compliance, it becomes imperative to study both components. In the absence of any clear legalese on the latter component incentivizes Directors in two ways – by inhibiting judgment or by incentivizing abuse for a perceived higher probability of economic gain.
{"title":"Law-and-Economics of Business Judgment Rule in India","authors":"Rahul Singh, Pratyay Amrit","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0045","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article argues that the contours of the ‘business judgment rule’ (hereinafter, ‘the rule’ or ‘the doctrine’) have not been properly delineated and add avoidable transaction costs in terms of business decision-making. On the premise of ‘influence’ existing between Board Directors and countervailing requirements of legal compliance, it becomes imperative to study both components. In the absence of any clear legalese on the latter component incentivizes Directors in two ways – by inhibiting judgment or by incentivizing abuse for a perceived higher probability of economic gain.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"41 39","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139442315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper aims to carry out empirical analysis of the viability of large language models (LLMs), specifically ChatGPT, in simulating the common law system and facilitating its evolutionary processes. Drawing on the Theory of Rules Evolution, it is understood that common law generates efficient rules by natural selection through constant litigation. Nonetheless, this evolutionary mechanism faces several hindrances. The process of change is typically slow and incremental. Courts often have to wait for a case that’s deemed ‘appropriate’ before they can change the law, leading to extended delays. Additionally, courts frequently struggle to make efficient decisions due to limited information. Other factors that decelerate the creation of efficient rules include judicial bias, unequal distribution of resources among litigating parties, and the diminishing presence of a competitive legal order. This study first assesses ChatGPT’s capability to embrace the essence of the common law system, namely the doctrine of stare decisis. We then assess its potential to overcome the hindrances in common law development and promote efficient rules. Through a series of meticulously designed hypothetical cases set in a virtual jurisdiction called the “Matrix Kingdom,” we observed that ChatGPT mimic the functions of a common law court by citing, following, and distinguishing its own precedents, but it accomplishes this with significantly fewer resources and in less time. This implies that humans can introduce hypothetical legal situations, enabling LLMs to replicate the natural selection process observed in the common law system but with a significantly accelerated pace. Given that LLMs are trained with diverse information sources, not just the factual contexts of cases, they could potentially lower the informational constraints in decision-making. As such, LLMs might significantly contribute to the evolutionary processes of common law development. However, it is important to remain cautious of certain limitations, such as the potential for AI Hallucination and inherent biases in LLMs, which require careful consideration and management.
{"title":"Catalyst for Common Law Evolution: Experiment with ChatGPT and a Hypothetical Common Law Jurisdiction","authors":"Kwansai Iu, Ziyue Zhou","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0114","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper aims to carry out empirical analysis of the viability of large language models (LLMs), specifically ChatGPT, in simulating the common law system and facilitating its evolutionary processes. Drawing on the Theory of Rules Evolution, it is understood that common law generates efficient rules by natural selection through constant litigation. Nonetheless, this evolutionary mechanism faces several hindrances. The process of change is typically slow and incremental. Courts often have to wait for a case that’s deemed ‘appropriate’ before they can change the law, leading to extended delays. Additionally, courts frequently struggle to make efficient decisions due to limited information. Other factors that decelerate the creation of efficient rules include judicial bias, unequal distribution of resources among litigating parties, and the diminishing presence of a competitive legal order. This study first assesses ChatGPT’s capability to embrace the essence of the common law system, namely the doctrine of stare decisis. We then assess its potential to overcome the hindrances in common law development and promote efficient rules. Through a series of meticulously designed hypothetical cases set in a virtual jurisdiction called the “Matrix Kingdom,” we observed that ChatGPT mimic the functions of a common law court by citing, following, and distinguishing its own precedents, but it accomplishes this with significantly fewer resources and in less time. This implies that humans can introduce hypothetical legal situations, enabling LLMs to replicate the natural selection process observed in the common law system but with a significantly accelerated pace. Given that LLMs are trained with diverse information sources, not just the factual contexts of cases, they could potentially lower the informational constraints in decision-making. As such, LLMs might significantly contribute to the evolutionary processes of common law development. However, it is important to remain cautious of certain limitations, such as the potential for AI Hallucination and inherent biases in LLMs, which require careful consideration and management.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"46 51","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139382247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"46 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le
Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.
{"title":"Estimating the International Cocaine Market: A Novel Combination of Excess Compensation and Stochastic Frontier Analysis","authors":"Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"45 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le
Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.
{"title":"Estimating the International Cocaine Market: A Novel Combination of Excess Compensation and Stochastic Frontier Analysis","authors":"Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"45 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"46 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"46 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le
Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.
{"title":"Estimating the International Cocaine Market: A Novel Combination of Excess Compensation and Stochastic Frontier Analysis","authors":"Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"45 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le
Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.
{"title":"Estimating the International Cocaine Market: A Novel Combination of Excess Compensation and Stochastic Frontier Analysis","authors":"Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"45 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139114248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"46 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139114711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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