Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le
Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.
{"title":"Estimating the International Cocaine Market: A Novel Combination of Excess Compensation and Stochastic Frontier Analysis","authors":"Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139118036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139118735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139122565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le
Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.
{"title":"Estimating the International Cocaine Market: A Novel Combination of Excess Compensation and Stochastic Frontier Analysis","authors":"Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139122970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139123864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le
Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.
{"title":"Estimating the International Cocaine Market: A Novel Combination of Excess Compensation and Stochastic Frontier Analysis","authors":"Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le
Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.
{"title":"Estimating the International Cocaine Market: A Novel Combination of Excess Compensation and Stochastic Frontier Analysis","authors":"Ba Tam Le, Xuan Thi Thanh Mai, T. Ngo, Tu D. Q. Le","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although there are different ways to estimate the value of the illicit drug markets, the main issue remains that one cannot estimate the unseized or floating value of drugs at the country- and international-level markets. This study applies a novel estimation method that combines excess compensation estimation (from the financial field) and stochastic frontier analysis (from the operations research field) to estimate the value of the international cocaine market in 2019. Our estimations show that in 2019, the unseized market accounted for 32.16 % of the total market of cocaine and was smaller than the ratio of 48 % in 2007, indicating that the effectiveness of countries in disrupting the illicit cocaine market has improved. More importantly, we show that improvement in dealing with money laundering risks could also help reduce the illicit market of cocaine since illicit cocaine/drug proceeds must be laundered before they can be used by criminal organisations.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.
{"title":"Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers","authors":"Alice Guerra, Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the traditional rent-seeking model to consider contests in which the effects of the contestants’ efforts are externally unproductive (i.e., redistributive) but internally productive (i.e., with positive spillover effects on other contestants). Our results show that when players act sequentially, the presence of positive spillovers on other contestants may reduce, or even reverse, the first-mover’s advantage. A second-mover advantage is very likely to arise. Notably, in contests with multiple players, the second-mover advantage does not unravel into a last-mover advantage. Players want to be second, but not last. The comparative statics analysis shows how the strength of positive spillovers affects contestants’ equilibrium expenditures and payoffs, and aggregate rent dissipation.","PeriodicalId":41431,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139113579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：