Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532728
F. Porrúa, G. B. Schuch, L. Barroso, Alexandre Street, M. Junqueira, S. Granville
The objective of this paper is to provide a methodology for pricing, under a generation company (Genco) point of view, long-term energy contracts signed across different price zones in a zonal pricing hydro-based power system where classical financial transmission rights (FTRs) are not available. The main result is the establishment of the overprice that a Genco must include in the contract signed in a neighbor zone (where the Genco faces the congestion risk) when compared to the same contract offered in its own zone (with no congestion risk). All relevant risks (hydrological risk, congestion risk, etc) are captured for the long-term through the use of scenarios. Based on these scenarios and on the risk profile of the agent modeled by utility functions (UFs), the pricing of cross-zones contracts are determined. The approach is illustrated with practical examples deriving from the Brazilian electricity market, which is hydro-based, has a zonal-pricing scheme and does not offer instruments to hedge against congestion risks, such as FTRs
{"title":"Assessment of transmission congestion price risk and hedging in the Brazilian electricity market","authors":"F. Porrúa, G. B. Schuch, L. Barroso, Alexandre Street, M. Junqueira, S. Granville","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532728","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this paper is to provide a methodology for pricing, under a generation company (Genco) point of view, long-term energy contracts signed across different price zones in a zonal pricing hydro-based power system where classical financial transmission rights (FTRs) are not available. The main result is the establishment of the overprice that a Genco must include in the contract signed in a neighbor zone (where the Genco faces the congestion risk) when compared to the same contract offered in its own zone (with no congestion risk). All relevant risks (hydrological risk, congestion risk, etc) are captured for the long-term through the use of scenarios. Based on these scenarios and on the risk profile of the agent modeled by utility functions (UFs), the pricing of cross-zones contracts are determined. The approach is illustrated with practical examples deriving from the Brazilian electricity market, which is hydro-based, has a zonal-pricing scheme and does not offer instruments to hedge against congestion risks, such as FTRs","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127130609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532767
P. Tsamasfyrou, F. Verrier, P. B. Eriksen
Transmission constraints can isolate markets and enhance market power. The allocation of transmission capacity is therefore a big issue in Europe and there is a growing interest among the continental European countries about market coupling, which may allocate optimally the transmission capacities. However, the allocation scheme of these transmission capacities may have an impact on market power that should be studied beforehand. Energinet.dk and RTE developed a common simulation tool, ARES, that is intended to bring a first answer to these questions. ARES, which is based on ELTRA's MARS model, is a supply function equilibrium model that simulates an integrated market of several zones with different prices interconnected by lines whose flows are restricted. In this paper, we show the formulation of the basic problem, then include transmission rights in the problem and eventually study the impact of these rights, under different allocation patterns, on the market power of participants, using a test network schematising the European network, and show the consistency with the theoretical models
{"title":"Assessing the impact of transmission rights on market power using the simulation model ares","authors":"P. Tsamasfyrou, F. Verrier, P. B. Eriksen","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532767","url":null,"abstract":"Transmission constraints can isolate markets and enhance market power. The allocation of transmission capacity is therefore a big issue in Europe and there is a growing interest among the continental European countries about market coupling, which may allocate optimally the transmission capacities. However, the allocation scheme of these transmission capacities may have an impact on market power that should be studied beforehand. Energinet.dk and RTE developed a common simulation tool, ARES, that is intended to bring a first answer to these questions. ARES, which is based on ELTRA's MARS model, is a supply function equilibrium model that simulates an integrated market of several zones with different prices interconnected by lines whose flows are restricted. In this paper, we show the formulation of the basic problem, then include transmission rights in the problem and eventually study the impact of these rights, under different allocation patterns, on the market power of participants, using a test network schematising the European network, and show the consistency with the theoretical models","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126053303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532747
J. Valentin, J. Coulondre, J. Pérez, D. Chaniotis
With the opening of the electricity markets in Europe through the EU96/92 Directive enforced on the 19 February 1999, the European market integration could not result into a copper plate. The variety of generation mixes among the fifteen member countries, and the state of interconnection ties between them, has resulted into regional markets interfaced by bottlenecks, rather than into a single market with a unique price. European Authorities have quickly understood this situation and defined a new European Regulation enforced since 1 July 2004, which promotes market based congestion management mechanisms, able to provide efficient use of the interconnection as well as appropriate market signals giving the right incentives for transmission or generation investments. The focus of this paper is the cross-border congestion management as practiced today by the French transmission system operator (RTE). In particular, the paper depicts the challenges of integration facing this part of the European electricity market, as well as the current methodologies in place to handle cross-border congestion. It also introduces the first projects, which have been completed or launched in cooperation with other transmission system operators and power exchanges
{"title":"Managing cross-border congestion in a european market environment: The French case","authors":"J. Valentin, J. Coulondre, J. Pérez, D. Chaniotis","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532747","url":null,"abstract":"With the opening of the electricity markets in Europe through the EU96/92 Directive enforced on the 19 February 1999, the European market integration could not result into a copper plate. The variety of generation mixes among the fifteen member countries, and the state of interconnection ties between them, has resulted into regional markets interfaced by bottlenecks, rather than into a single market with a unique price. European Authorities have quickly understood this situation and defined a new European Regulation enforced since 1 July 2004, which promotes market based congestion management mechanisms, able to provide efficient use of the interconnection as well as appropriate market signals giving the right incentives for transmission or generation investments. The focus of this paper is the cross-border congestion management as practiced today by the French transmission system operator (RTE). In particular, the paper depicts the challenges of integration facing this part of the European electricity market, as well as the current methodologies in place to handle cross-border congestion. It also introduces the first projects, which have been completed or launched in cooperation with other transmission system operators and power exchanges","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128581163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532754
T. Kostic, N. Čukalevski
Based on a questionnaire on data exchange issues related to control centres, prepared on the behalf of Cigre WG C2.01, we have analysed answers of 26 respondents from all over the world. In this paper, we present the most interesting findings of that analysis
根据代表Cigre WG C2.01编写的关于控制中心相关数据交换问题的问卷，我们分析了来自世界各地的26名受访者的答案。在本文中，我们将介绍该分析中最有趣的发现
{"title":"Data exchange issues within the power system operation and control environment","authors":"T. Kostic, N. Čukalevski","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532754","url":null,"abstract":"Based on a questionnaire on data exchange issues related to control centres, prepared on the behalf of Cigre WG C2.01, we have analysed answers of 26 respondents from all over the world. In this paper, we present the most interesting findings of that analysis","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130451462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532729
J.Y. Da Silva, G. Matas, J. Bermúdez, A.C. Neira, A. Ferreira, J. Pérez
This paper has as main objective to present a methodology to determine the costs associated to power transmission and its adequate remuneration, under a criterion of efficiency, for the Venezuelan electric power system. A proposed model establishes incomes by the daily sales of energy, bilateral contracts and congestion, and it was evaluated for a six node test system and the Venezuelan national interconnected system. The suggested methodology, a schema of tariff rates in two parts in a neighborhood where coexist the spot market and long-term contracts with transmission rights of type FTR, seems to give consistent results, adjusted to the requirements of income of the transmission company. The suggested methodology is simple and represents an easy implementation with the adequate tools. In spite of the proposed model, which complies with the suggested guidelines and fits the requirements of the Venezuelan law for the electrical service, efforts in results with this methodology for Venezuelan NES must keep being carried out, using better quality information. This must be performed in order to have greater certainty, or not, of its good functioning, since, the power wholesale market in Venezuela have not been given many advances and the application of LOSE is frozen, there is not a point of comparison nowadays
{"title":"Selection and application of the methodology of cost allocation of electric power transmission in the Venezuelan interconnected system","authors":"J.Y. Da Silva, G. Matas, J. Bermúdez, A.C. Neira, A. Ferreira, J. Pérez","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532729","url":null,"abstract":"This paper has as main objective to present a methodology to determine the costs associated to power transmission and its adequate remuneration, under a criterion of efficiency, for the Venezuelan electric power system. A proposed model establishes incomes by the daily sales of energy, bilateral contracts and congestion, and it was evaluated for a six node test system and the Venezuelan national interconnected system. The suggested methodology, a schema of tariff rates in two parts in a neighborhood where coexist the spot market and long-term contracts with transmission rights of type FTR, seems to give consistent results, adjusted to the requirements of income of the transmission company. The suggested methodology is simple and represents an easy implementation with the adequate tools. In spite of the proposed model, which complies with the suggested guidelines and fits the requirements of the Venezuelan law for the electrical service, efforts in results with this methodology for Venezuelan NES must keep being carried out, using better quality information. This must be performed in order to have greater certainty, or not, of its good functioning, since, the power wholesale market in Venezuela have not been given many advances and the application of LOSE is frozen, there is not a point of comparison nowadays","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"226 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130745452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532730
J. Constantinescu
The paper attempts to bring a contribution to both the transmission service pricing and the congestion management solutions, for a multi-TSO power interconnection. It must first be noted that the proposed methodology owed much to the significance of the grid services; it ensures a fair allocation of sustainable grid cost on the grid customers, too. Revenues and corresponding rates components are identified for each service the grid is selling. There is an access to grid/market service as a complement to the loss compensation and congestion compensation services. The grid services are supplied in the grid nodes and can be straightforwardly integrated into the energy wholesale market. The access to grid/market fee, or otherwise speaking, the opportunity fee, is basically compliant with the market principles notwithstanding it may contradict some paradigms of the current transmission pricing: full predictability and non-transaction dependence of the grid rates, confidentiality of the market energy prices. It must be admitted that these paradigms do not have much in common with the market efficiency and the grid sustainability. The loss compensation and the congestion compensation services are sold at regulated fees featuring significant locational signals for the efficient operation and development of both the grid and the grid users facilities. However, the rate-based congestion compensation service implies a certain harmonization of the multi-TSO grid regulation while avoiding much controversy on the cross-border congestion management issue
{"title":"Transmission fees in a multi - service / multi - TSO interconnection","authors":"J. Constantinescu","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532730","url":null,"abstract":"The paper attempts to bring a contribution to both the transmission service pricing and the congestion management solutions, for a multi-TSO power interconnection. It must first be noted that the proposed methodology owed much to the significance of the grid services; it ensures a fair allocation of sustainable grid cost on the grid customers, too. Revenues and corresponding rates components are identified for each service the grid is selling. There is an access to grid/market service as a complement to the loss compensation and congestion compensation services. The grid services are supplied in the grid nodes and can be straightforwardly integrated into the energy wholesale market. The access to grid/market fee, or otherwise speaking, the opportunity fee, is basically compliant with the market principles notwithstanding it may contradict some paradigms of the current transmission pricing: full predictability and non-transaction dependence of the grid rates, confidentiality of the market energy prices. It must be admitted that these paradigms do not have much in common with the market efficiency and the grid sustainability. The loss compensation and the congestion compensation services are sold at regulated fees featuring significant locational signals for the efficient operation and development of both the grid and the grid users facilities. However, the rate-based congestion compensation service implies a certain harmonization of the multi-TSO grid regulation while avoiding much controversy on the cross-border congestion management issue","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"17 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134090193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532744
G. Thorpe
The paper presents a market-oriented review of the arrangements within the Australian national electricity market (NEM) for management of transmission network congestion. It asserts that as result of the combination of governance and market design the arrangements work satisfactorily, but not perfectly, in the short term, but less so in the longer-term. The reasons for this are described and an overview of work in hand to further refine the arrangements is presented. A brief summary of the key elements of the Australian market is provided as background. The paper notes that the NEM benefits from being a single unified market covering all parts of the interconnected network and thus does not suffer from "seams" issues or need to accommodate "through flows" from other pools. As a result it has been possible to give significant attention to a wide range of behavioural incentives to enhance efficiency. Where problems exist the most common cause identified is the lack of alignment between regulatory and competitive elements of the NEM and to a lesser extent between different authorities
{"title":"Congestion management within the Australian National Electricity Market","authors":"G. Thorpe","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532744","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents a market-oriented review of the arrangements within the Australian national electricity market (NEM) for management of transmission network congestion. It asserts that as result of the combination of governance and market design the arrangements work satisfactorily, but not perfectly, in the short term, but less so in the longer-term. The reasons for this are described and an overview of work in hand to further refine the arrangements is presented. A brief summary of the key elements of the Australian market is provided as background. The paper notes that the NEM benefits from being a single unified market covering all parts of the interconnected network and thus does not suffer from \"seams\" issues or need to accommodate \"through flows\" from other pools. As a result it has been possible to give significant attention to a wide range of behavioural incentives to enhance efficiency. Where problems exist the most common cause identified is the lack of alignment between regulatory and competitive elements of the NEM and to a lesser extent between different authorities","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125469946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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