Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532760
O. Gjerde, Klas Karlsson, U. Moller, F. Pedersen, J. Uusitalo
The purpose of the paper is to describe the common Nordic congestion management scheme, and the evaluations done in a Nordel project: "rules for congestion management, evaluation of capacity and possibilities for increase counter-trade". The paper describes shortly the different methods for congestion management. These can be grouped into methods for capacity allocation and capacity alleviation. In Europe explicit and implicit auctions are the favoured methods for congestion management. The present methods for congestion management in the Nordic countries are presented. Currently congestions are managed mainly by using two methods in combination, market splitting and counter-trade
{"title":"Congestion management in the nordic countries, present solutions and evaluation of possible developments","authors":"O. Gjerde, Klas Karlsson, U. Moller, F. Pedersen, J. Uusitalo","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532760","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the paper is to describe the common Nordic congestion management scheme, and the evaluations done in a Nordel project: \"rules for congestion management, evaluation of capacity and possibilities for increase counter-trade\". The paper describes shortly the different methods for congestion management. These can be grouped into methods for capacity allocation and capacity alleviation. In Europe explicit and implicit auctions are the favoured methods for congestion management. The present methods for congestion management in the Nordic countries are presented. Currently congestions are managed mainly by using two methods in combination, market splitting and counter-trade","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122037781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532747
J. Valentin, J. Coulondre, J. Pérez, D. Chaniotis
With the opening of the electricity markets in Europe through the EU96/92 Directive enforced on the 19 February 1999, the European market integration could not result into a copper plate. The variety of generation mixes among the fifteen member countries, and the state of interconnection ties between them, has resulted into regional markets interfaced by bottlenecks, rather than into a single market with a unique price. European Authorities have quickly understood this situation and defined a new European Regulation enforced since 1 July 2004, which promotes market based congestion management mechanisms, able to provide efficient use of the interconnection as well as appropriate market signals giving the right incentives for transmission or generation investments. The focus of this paper is the cross-border congestion management as practiced today by the French transmission system operator (RTE). In particular, the paper depicts the challenges of integration facing this part of the European electricity market, as well as the current methodologies in place to handle cross-border congestion. It also introduces the first projects, which have been completed or launched in cooperation with other transmission system operators and power exchanges
{"title":"Managing cross-border congestion in a european market environment: The French case","authors":"J. Valentin, J. Coulondre, J. Pérez, D. Chaniotis","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532747","url":null,"abstract":"With the opening of the electricity markets in Europe through the EU96/92 Directive enforced on the 19 February 1999, the European market integration could not result into a copper plate. The variety of generation mixes among the fifteen member countries, and the state of interconnection ties between them, has resulted into regional markets interfaced by bottlenecks, rather than into a single market with a unique price. European Authorities have quickly understood this situation and defined a new European Regulation enforced since 1 July 2004, which promotes market based congestion management mechanisms, able to provide efficient use of the interconnection as well as appropriate market signals giving the right incentives for transmission or generation investments. The focus of this paper is the cross-border congestion management as practiced today by the French transmission system operator (RTE). In particular, the paper depicts the challenges of integration facing this part of the European electricity market, as well as the current methodologies in place to handle cross-border congestion. It also introduces the first projects, which have been completed or launched in cooperation with other transmission system operators and power exchanges","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128581163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532731
C. Yuen, Qianjin Liu, Jiuping Pan
This paper aims at evaluating the financial benefits brought about by congestion relief measures under deregulated environment. Two representative congestion mechanisms is investigated: one taking into account transmission constraints and one not. The first mechanism presented is a typical example of market settlement mechanism taking fully into account power transmission constraints, locational marginal pricing (LMP), which is widely adopted by various regional markets in the USA and some other countries in the world. The second mechanism presented, is a contrasting pricing mechanism that employs a "congestion uplift" which is an additional premium that all consumers should pay on top of the system marginal price. This pricing mechanism is widely used in some European countries, e.g. England and Spain. These two pricing mechanisms result in different quantity of congestion charges
{"title":"Financial impacts of congestion relief measures under different congestion management schemes","authors":"C. Yuen, Qianjin Liu, Jiuping Pan","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532731","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims at evaluating the financial benefits brought about by congestion relief measures under deregulated environment. Two representative congestion mechanisms is investigated: one taking into account transmission constraints and one not. The first mechanism presented is a typical example of market settlement mechanism taking fully into account power transmission constraints, locational marginal pricing (LMP), which is widely adopted by various regional markets in the USA and some other countries in the world. The second mechanism presented, is a contrasting pricing mechanism that employs a \"congestion uplift\" which is an additional premium that all consumers should pay on top of the system marginal price. This pricing mechanism is widely used in some European countries, e.g. England and Spain. These two pricing mechanisms result in different quantity of congestion charges","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115937753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532728
F. Porrúa, G. B. Schuch, L. Barroso, Alexandre Street, M. Junqueira, S. Granville
The objective of this paper is to provide a methodology for pricing, under a generation company (Genco) point of view, long-term energy contracts signed across different price zones in a zonal pricing hydro-based power system where classical financial transmission rights (FTRs) are not available. The main result is the establishment of the overprice that a Genco must include in the contract signed in a neighbor zone (where the Genco faces the congestion risk) when compared to the same contract offered in its own zone (with no congestion risk). All relevant risks (hydrological risk, congestion risk, etc) are captured for the long-term through the use of scenarios. Based on these scenarios and on the risk profile of the agent modeled by utility functions (UFs), the pricing of cross-zones contracts are determined. The approach is illustrated with practical examples deriving from the Brazilian electricity market, which is hydro-based, has a zonal-pricing scheme and does not offer instruments to hedge against congestion risks, such as FTRs
{"title":"Assessment of transmission congestion price risk and hedging in the Brazilian electricity market","authors":"F. Porrúa, G. B. Schuch, L. Barroso, Alexandre Street, M. Junqueira, S. Granville","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532728","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this paper is to provide a methodology for pricing, under a generation company (Genco) point of view, long-term energy contracts signed across different price zones in a zonal pricing hydro-based power system where classical financial transmission rights (FTRs) are not available. The main result is the establishment of the overprice that a Genco must include in the contract signed in a neighbor zone (where the Genco faces the congestion risk) when compared to the same contract offered in its own zone (with no congestion risk). All relevant risks (hydrological risk, congestion risk, etc) are captured for the long-term through the use of scenarios. Based on these scenarios and on the risk profile of the agent modeled by utility functions (UFs), the pricing of cross-zones contracts are determined. The approach is illustrated with practical examples deriving from the Brazilian electricity market, which is hydro-based, has a zonal-pricing scheme and does not offer instruments to hedge against congestion risks, such as FTRs","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127130609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532767
P. Tsamasfyrou, F. Verrier, P. B. Eriksen
Transmission constraints can isolate markets and enhance market power. The allocation of transmission capacity is therefore a big issue in Europe and there is a growing interest among the continental European countries about market coupling, which may allocate optimally the transmission capacities. However, the allocation scheme of these transmission capacities may have an impact on market power that should be studied beforehand. Energinet.dk and RTE developed a common simulation tool, ARES, that is intended to bring a first answer to these questions. ARES, which is based on ELTRA's MARS model, is a supply function equilibrium model that simulates an integrated market of several zones with different prices interconnected by lines whose flows are restricted. In this paper, we show the formulation of the basic problem, then include transmission rights in the problem and eventually study the impact of these rights, under different allocation patterns, on the market power of participants, using a test network schematising the European network, and show the consistency with the theoretical models
{"title":"Assessing the impact of transmission rights on market power using the simulation model ares","authors":"P. Tsamasfyrou, F. Verrier, P. B. Eriksen","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532767","url":null,"abstract":"Transmission constraints can isolate markets and enhance market power. The allocation of transmission capacity is therefore a big issue in Europe and there is a growing interest among the continental European countries about market coupling, which may allocate optimally the transmission capacities. However, the allocation scheme of these transmission capacities may have an impact on market power that should be studied beforehand. Energinet.dk and RTE developed a common simulation tool, ARES, that is intended to bring a first answer to these questions. ARES, which is based on ELTRA's MARS model, is a supply function equilibrium model that simulates an integrated market of several zones with different prices interconnected by lines whose flows are restricted. In this paper, we show the formulation of the basic problem, then include transmission rights in the problem and eventually study the impact of these rights, under different allocation patterns, on the market power of participants, using a test network schematising the European network, and show the consistency with the theoretical models","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126053303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-11-21DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532730
J. Constantinescu
The paper attempts to bring a contribution to both the transmission service pricing and the congestion management solutions, for a multi-TSO power interconnection. It must first be noted that the proposed methodology owed much to the significance of the grid services; it ensures a fair allocation of sustainable grid cost on the grid customers, too. Revenues and corresponding rates components are identified for each service the grid is selling. There is an access to grid/market service as a complement to the loss compensation and congestion compensation services. The grid services are supplied in the grid nodes and can be straightforwardly integrated into the energy wholesale market. The access to grid/market fee, or otherwise speaking, the opportunity fee, is basically compliant with the market principles notwithstanding it may contradict some paradigms of the current transmission pricing: full predictability and non-transaction dependence of the grid rates, confidentiality of the market energy prices. It must be admitted that these paradigms do not have much in common with the market efficiency and the grid sustainability. The loss compensation and the congestion compensation services are sold at regulated fees featuring significant locational signals for the efficient operation and development of both the grid and the grid users facilities. However, the rate-based congestion compensation service implies a certain harmonization of the multi-TSO grid regulation while avoiding much controversy on the cross-border congestion management issue
{"title":"Transmission fees in a multi - service / multi - TSO interconnection","authors":"J. Constantinescu","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532730","url":null,"abstract":"The paper attempts to bring a contribution to both the transmission service pricing and the congestion management solutions, for a multi-TSO power interconnection. It must first be noted that the proposed methodology owed much to the significance of the grid services; it ensures a fair allocation of sustainable grid cost on the grid customers, too. Revenues and corresponding rates components are identified for each service the grid is selling. There is an access to grid/market service as a complement to the loss compensation and congestion compensation services. The grid services are supplied in the grid nodes and can be straightforwardly integrated into the energy wholesale market. The access to grid/market fee, or otherwise speaking, the opportunity fee, is basically compliant with the market principles notwithstanding it may contradict some paradigms of the current transmission pricing: full predictability and non-transaction dependence of the grid rates, confidentiality of the market energy prices. It must be admitted that these paradigms do not have much in common with the market efficiency and the grid sustainability. The loss compensation and the congestion compensation services are sold at regulated fees featuring significant locational signals for the efficient operation and development of both the grid and the grid users facilities. However, the rate-based congestion compensation service implies a certain harmonization of the multi-TSO grid regulation while avoiding much controversy on the cross-border congestion management issue","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"17 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134090193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532744
G. Thorpe
The paper presents a market-oriented review of the arrangements within the Australian national electricity market (NEM) for management of transmission network congestion. It asserts that as result of the combination of governance and market design the arrangements work satisfactorily, but not perfectly, in the short term, but less so in the longer-term. The reasons for this are described and an overview of work in hand to further refine the arrangements is presented. A brief summary of the key elements of the Australian market is provided as background. The paper notes that the NEM benefits from being a single unified market covering all parts of the interconnected network and thus does not suffer from "seams" issues or need to accommodate "through flows" from other pools. As a result it has been possible to give significant attention to a wide range of behavioural incentives to enhance efficiency. Where problems exist the most common cause identified is the lack of alignment between regulatory and competitive elements of the NEM and to a lesser extent between different authorities
{"title":"Congestion management within the Australian National Electricity Market","authors":"G. Thorpe","doi":"10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CIGRE.2005.1532744","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents a market-oriented review of the arrangements within the Australian national electricity market (NEM) for management of transmission network congestion. It asserts that as result of the combination of governance and market design the arrangements work satisfactorily, but not perfectly, in the short term, but less so in the longer-term. The reasons for this are described and an overview of work in hand to further refine the arrangements is presented. A brief summary of the key elements of the Australian market is provided as background. The paper notes that the NEM benefits from being a single unified market covering all parts of the interconnected network and thus does not suffer from \"seams\" issues or need to accommodate \"through flows\" from other pools. As a result it has been possible to give significant attention to a wide range of behavioural incentives to enhance efficiency. Where problems exist the most common cause identified is the lack of alignment between regulatory and competitive elements of the NEM and to a lesser extent between different authorities","PeriodicalId":414346,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium CIGRE/IEEE PES, 2005.","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125469946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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