Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0017
J. Dokic
A central issue in the study of sensory substitution devices is whether and to what extent the original source of knowledge about the world that they seem to enable substitutes for ordinary perception. I argue that this issue divides into two sub-issues, which concern respectively the sensory and the affective aspects of the phenomenology of perception. The sensory aspect determines the representational contents of experience, while the affective aspect is constituted by noetic feelings such as familiarity and presence. A pessimistic view may be formulated according to which neither familiarity nor presence can be reproduced in sensory substitution. There are important phenomenological differences between ordinary perception and sensory substitution due to the massively parallel architecture of the former. However, drawing on a discussion of Capgras syndrome and derealization disorder, I show that we also enjoy higher-level, post-perceptual feelings of familiarity and presence. In the last part of the essay, I draw on the psychological literature on metacognition and sketch a fluency-based account of both these feelings, which leads to a more optimistic view about whether they can be enjoyed by trained users of sensory substitution devices.
{"title":"The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution","authors":"J. Dokic","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0017","url":null,"abstract":"A central issue in the study of sensory substitution devices is whether and to what extent the original source of knowledge about the world that they seem to enable substitutes for ordinary perception. I argue that this issue divides into two sub-issues, which concern respectively the sensory and the affective aspects of the phenomenology of perception. The sensory aspect determines the representational contents of experience, while the affective aspect is constituted by noetic feelings such as familiarity and presence. A pessimistic view may be formulated according to which neither familiarity nor presence can be reproduced in sensory substitution. There are important phenomenological differences between ordinary perception and sensory substitution due to the massively parallel architecture of the former. However, drawing on a discussion of Capgras syndrome and derealization disorder, I show that we also enjoy higher-level, post-perceptual feelings of familiarity and presence. In the last part of the essay, I draw on the psychological literature on metacognition and sketch a fluency-based account of both these feelings, which leads to a more optimistic view about whether they can be enjoyed by trained users of sensory substitution devices.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"192 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115246811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0011
R. Briscoe
According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception, active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. Given all of the endogenous and exogenous evidence available to those systems, what is the most probable source of stimulation in the substituting modality? From this perspective, active control over the camera’s movements matters for rather different reasons. Most importantly, it generates proprioceptive and efference-copy based information about the camera’s body-relative position necessary to make use of the spatial cues present in the stimulation that the subject receives for purposes of egocentric object localization.
{"title":"Bodily Action and Distal Attribution in Sensory Substitution","authors":"R. Briscoe","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception, active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. Given all of the endogenous and exogenous evidence available to those systems, what is the most probable source of stimulation in the substituting modality? From this perspective, active control over the camera’s movements matters for rather different reasons. Most importantly, it generates proprioceptive and efference-copy based information about the camera’s body-relative position necessary to make use of the spatial cues present in the stimulation that the subject receives for purposes of egocentric object localization.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"30 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122881417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0015
C. Spence
Many of the most attention-grabbing claims concerning the uptake of sensory substitution devices in the last 50 years have, noticeably, not come to pass. I highlight a number of the fundamental limitations (some acknowledged, others not) that may have prevented the development and uptake of these devices amongst individuals suffering from sensory loss. First and foremost, it may simply be impossible to fully substitute for the loss of vision (the sense most substituted for) given the imbalance in neural cortical resources given to processing information in the various senses. Second, the inability to substitute for the hedonic attributes of a given modality constitutes an important, if currently under-acknowledged, problem. Most researchers tend to focus their efforts on the substitution of the sensory-discriminative (primarily spatial) aspects of stimulation instead. Third, I highlight the technological limitations associated with providing useful substitution devices for those who have lost their sense of taste or smell, senses which, theoretically, should be far easier to substitute for. Another factor that may have limited the uptake of these devices—aesthetic concerns about the appearance of users wearing them—is, I believe, likely to disappear, as a range of other augmented-perception technologies become more widely accepted.
{"title":"Sensory Substitution: Unfulfilled Promises and Fundamental Limitations","authors":"C. Spence","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Many of the most attention-grabbing claims concerning the uptake of sensory substitution devices in the last 50 years have, noticeably, not come to pass. I highlight a number of the fundamental limitations (some acknowledged, others not) that may have prevented the development and uptake of these devices amongst individuals suffering from sensory loss. First and foremost, it may simply be impossible to fully substitute for the loss of vision (the sense most substituted for) given the imbalance in neural cortical resources given to processing information in the various senses. Second, the inability to substitute for the hedonic attributes of a given modality constitutes an important, if currently under-acknowledged, problem. Most researchers tend to focus their efforts on the substitution of the sensory-discriminative (primarily spatial) aspects of stimulation instead. Third, I highlight the technological limitations associated with providing useful substitution devices for those who have lost their sense of taste or smell, senses which, theoretically, should be far easier to substitute for. Another factor that may have limited the uptake of these devices—aesthetic concerns about the appearance of users wearing them—is, I believe, likely to disappear, as a range of other augmented-perception technologies become more widely accepted.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131162822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0008
M. Ptito, Katrine Iversen, M. Auvray, Ophelia Deroy, R. Kupers
The tongue display unit (TDU) is a sensory substitution device that translates visual images into electrotactile stimulation that is transmitted to the tongue and leads to new perceptual skills following training. Trained users, including blind individuals, become capable of orientation discrimination, motion detection, shape recognition and they can also successfully use the TDU to navigate in an environment, locate objects and avoid obstacles. Many studies and discussions have focused on the effects of training at the behavioural level, and assumed that the effects shown in training blindfolded sighted individuals are similar to those observed in blind people. In doing so, we argue that behavioural research on sensory substitution shows a functionalist bias. Functionalism claims that mental processes can be individuated by their characteristic inputs and outputs, and that the physical realization of a given function introduces no relevant difference, as long as the function is the same. We emphasize here why this assumption biases the interpretation of sensory substitution devices.
{"title":"Limits of the Classical Functionalist Perspective on Sensory Substitution","authors":"M. Ptito, Katrine Iversen, M. Auvray, Ophelia Deroy, R. Kupers","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The tongue display unit (TDU) is a sensory substitution device that translates visual images into electrotactile stimulation that is transmitted to the tongue and leads to new perceptual skills following training. Trained users, including blind individuals, become capable of orientation discrimination, motion detection, shape recognition and they can also successfully use the TDU to navigate in an environment, locate objects and avoid obstacles. Many studies and discussions have focused on the effects of training at the behavioural level, and assumed that the effects shown in training blindfolded sighted individuals are similar to those observed in blind people. In doing so, we argue that behavioural research on sensory substitution shows a functionalist bias. Functionalism claims that mental processes can be individuated by their characteristic inputs and outputs, and that the physical realization of a given function introduces no relevant difference, as long as the function is the same. We emphasize here why this assumption biases the interpretation of sensory substitution devices.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114180977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0010
K. O’regan
Cortical plasticity is often invoked to explain changes in the quality or location of experience observed in rewired animals, in sensory substitution, in extension of the body through tool use, and in the rubber hand illusion. However this appeal to cortical plasticity may be misleading, because it suggests that the cortical areas that are plastic are themselves the loci of generation of experience. This would be an error, I claim, since cortical areas do not generate experience. Cortical areas participate in enabling the interaction of an agent with its environment, and the quality of this interaction constitutes the quality of experience. Thus it is not plasticity in itself, but the change in modes of interaction which plasticity allows, which gives rise to the change of experience observed in these studies.
{"title":"Rewired Animals and Sensory Substitution: The Cause Is Not Cortical Plasticity","authors":"K. O’regan","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Cortical plasticity is often invoked to explain changes in the quality or location of experience observed in rewired animals, in sensory substitution, in extension of the body through tool use, and in the rubber hand illusion. However this appeal to cortical plasticity may be misleading, because it suggests that the cortical areas that are plastic are themselves the loci of generation of experience. This would be an error, I claim, since cortical areas do not generate experience. Cortical areas participate in enabling the interaction of an agent with its environment, and the quality of this interaction constitutes the quality of experience. Thus it is not plasticity in itself, but the change in modes of interaction which plasticity allows, which gives rise to the change of experience observed in these studies.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115216567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0003
B. Smith
Sensory substitution devices make use of information in one sensory modality to deliver information usually provided by another. But when information usually presented visually is presented to a subject in an auditory or haptic way, is the resulting experience in any sense visual? Or does sensory substitution show that dimensions of experience—about the spatial layout of objects and properties in the environment—that were previously taken to be essentially visual can be experienced in other modalities too? I will consider this question by looking at whether a property such as the transparency of visual experience can be transferred to, and enhance, experience in other modalities.
{"title":"Sensory Substitution and the Transparency of Visual Experience","authors":"B. Smith","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Sensory substitution devices make use of information in one sensory modality to deliver information usually provided by another. But when information usually presented visually is presented to a subject in an auditory or haptic way, is the resulting experience in any sense visual? Or does sensory substitution show that dimensions of experience—about the spatial layout of objects and properties in the environment—that were previously taken to be essentially visual can be experienced in other modalities too? I will consider this question by looking at whether a property such as the transparency of visual experience can be transferred to, and enhance, experience in other modalities.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"53 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132090008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0006
Sarah F. Hillenbrand, D. Raveh, A. Amedi
We discuss how sensory substitution devices (SSDs) can be used to study the organization of the brain. To do so we look at the use of SSDs in the blind and how SSDs can be used to identify sensory-dependent and sensory-independent brain function. Cross-modal interactions may represent new patterns of connectivity or the unmasking of pre-existing associations. We show how the blind brain can be a window into cross-modal plasticity and can dissociate intrinsic and experience-dependent brain functions. We argue that the brain is a sensory-independent task machine and explain the implications for the rehabilitation of blind people.
{"title":"What Can Sensory Substitution Tell Us about the Organization of the Brain?","authors":"Sarah F. Hillenbrand, D. Raveh, A. Amedi","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss how sensory substitution devices (SSDs) can be used to study the organization of the brain. To do so we look at the use of SSDs in the blind and how SSDs can be used to identify sensory-dependent and sensory-independent brain function. Cross-modal interactions may represent new patterns of connectivity or the unmasking of pre-existing associations. We show how the blind brain can be a window into cross-modal plasticity and can dissociate intrinsic and experience-dependent brain functions. We argue that the brain is a sensory-independent task machine and explain the implications for the rehabilitation of blind people.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117134747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0012
Thomas D. Wright, J. Ward
There has been considerable effort devoted towards understanding sensory substitution devices in terms of their relationship to canonical sensory modalities. The approach taken in this essay is rather different, although complementary, in that we seek to define a broad conceptual space of ‘sensory tools’ in which sensory substitution devices can be situated. Such devices range from telescopes, to cochlear implants, to attempts to create a magnetic sense. One feature of these devices is that they operate at the level of ‘raw’ sensory information. As such, systems such as Braille which operate at a symbolic/conceptual level do not count as a sensory tool (or a sensory substitution device) and nor would a device such as CCTV which, although capturing raw sensory information, would not meet a conventional definition of a tool. With this approach, we hope to avoid the circularity inherent in previous attempts at defining sensory substitution and provide a better starting point to explore the effects of sensory tools, more generally, on the functioning of the nervous system.
{"title":"Sensory Substitution Devices as Advanced Sensory Tools","authors":"Thomas D. Wright, J. Ward","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"There has been considerable effort devoted towards understanding sensory substitution devices in terms of their relationship to canonical sensory modalities. The approach taken in this essay is rather different, although complementary, in that we seek to define a broad conceptual space of ‘sensory tools’ in which sensory substitution devices can be situated. Such devices range from telescopes, to cochlear implants, to attempts to create a magnetic sense. One feature of these devices is that they operate at the level of ‘raw’ sensory information. As such, systems such as Braille which operate at a symbolic/conceptual level do not count as a sensory tool (or a sensory substitution device) and nor would a device such as CCTV which, although capturing raw sensory information, would not meet a conventional definition of a tool. With this approach, we hope to avoid the circularity inherent in previous attempts at defining sensory substitution and provide a better starting point to explore the effects of sensory tools, more generally, on the functioning of the nervous system.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127433767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0009
M. Proulx, David J. Brown, Achille Pasqualotto
Vision is the default sensory modality for normal spatial navigation in humans. Touch is restricted to providing information about peripersonal space, whereas detecting and avoiding obstacles in extrapersonal space is key for efficient navigation. Hearing is restricted to the detection of objects that emit noise, yet many obstacles such as walls are silent. Sensory substitution devices provide a means of translating distal visual information into a form that visually impaired individuals can process through either touch or hearing. Here we will review findings from various sensory substitution systems for the processing of visual information that can be classified as what (object recognition), where (localization), and how (perception for action) processing. Different forms of sensory substitution excel at some tasks more than others. Spatial navigation brings together these different forms of information and provides a useful model for comparing sensory substitution systems, with important implications for rehabilitation, neuroanatomy, and theories of cognition.
{"title":"The Processing of What, Where, and How","authors":"M. Proulx, David J. Brown, Achille Pasqualotto","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Vision is the default sensory modality for normal spatial navigation in humans. Touch is restricted to providing information about peripersonal space, whereas detecting and avoiding obstacles in extrapersonal space is key for efficient navigation. Hearing is restricted to the detection of objects that emit noise, yet many obstacles such as walls are silent. Sensory substitution devices provide a means of translating distal visual information into a form that visually impaired individuals can process through either touch or hearing. Here we will review findings from various sensory substitution systems for the processing of visual information that can be classified as what (object recognition), where (localization), and how (perception for action) processing. Different forms of sensory substitution excel at some tasks more than others. Spatial navigation brings together these different forms of information and provides a useful model for comparing sensory substitution systems, with important implications for rehabilitation, neuroanatomy, and theories of cognition.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117182012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-13DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0013
Jonathan B. Cohen
Designers of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) typically aim to capture a wide representational scope by requiring their devices to present in the substituting modality the full range of basic energy available to the substituted modality, and then using this information to code up any further representations needed. On this view, if we could build a device that represents to touch (say) the distal distribution of light intensity—the basic form of energy to which visual receptors are normally responsive—our device could, in principle, represent everything available to vision: colour, shape, form, motion, and so on. Unfortunately, I will argue, this simple idea fails. For perceptual modalities represent ‘emergent’ features —i.e. features whose exemplification is not fixed by the representation of the distribution of basic energy. Hence, an SSD whose basic representational vocabulary is limited to the distribution of such basic energy will leave things out. None of this shows that SSDs will inevitably fail to represent what sensory modalities normally represent. It does suggest, however, that if we want them to represent what sensory modalities normally represent, we will have to do more than preserve the representation of basic energy to which the substituted modalities are sensitive.
{"title":"Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Emergence","authors":"Jonathan B. Cohen","doi":"10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266441.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Designers of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) typically aim to capture a wide representational scope by requiring their devices to present in the substituting modality the full range of basic energy available to the substituted modality, and then using this information to code up any further representations needed. On this view, if we could build a device that represents to touch (say) the distal distribution of light intensity—the basic form of energy to which visual receptors are normally responsive—our device could, in principle, represent everything available to vision: colour, shape, form, motion, and so on. Unfortunately, I will argue, this simple idea fails. For perceptual modalities represent ‘emergent’ features —i.e. features whose exemplification is not fixed by the representation of the distribution of basic energy. Hence, an SSD whose basic representational vocabulary is limited to the distribution of such basic energy will leave things out. None of this shows that SSDs will inevitably fail to represent what sensory modalities normally represent. It does suggest, however, that if we want them to represent what sensory modalities normally represent, we will have to do more than preserve the representation of basic energy to which the substituted modalities are sensitive.","PeriodicalId":415104,"journal":{"name":"Sensory Substitution and Augmentation","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126488518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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