A. Rai, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Jorge Lemus, Erik N. Hovenkamp
The America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”) created a robust administrative system—the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”)—for challenging the validity of granted patents. Congress determined that administrative correction of errors made in initial patent grants could be cheaper and more scientifically accurate than district court litigation over patent validity. In terms of private economic value per patent, few areas of technology can match the biopharmaceutical industry. Particularly for small molecule drugs, a billion-dollar drug monopoly may be protected from competition by a relatively small number of patents. Accordingly, the social cost of invalid patents—and, by extension, the potential benefit of PTAB review—is particularly acute in the biopharmaceutical industry. Conversely, to the extent that PTAB is overly assertive and improperly targets high-quality patents, the decrease in innovation incentives may be quite problematic. To investigate the issue empirically, our paper uses several novel datasets (made publicly available via the posting of this article) to study the respective roles of the PTAB and the district courts. Our empirical findings indicate that the PTAB’s role in adjudicating small molecule patents has been quite modest, substantially more modest than its role for other types of patents. Moreover, we do not find any evidence that the PTAB targets categories of small molecule patents that are generally considered high quality. To the contrary, the PTAB does not appear to differentially target even categories of small molecule patents that are generally considered to exhibit lower quality. We also find no evidence that the PTAB is targeting small molecule patents held by small entities. We conclude by discussing paths policymakers could take if they were interested in a more active role for the PTAB in policing the validity of small molecule drug patents.
{"title":"Post-Grant Adjudication of Drug Patents: Agency and/or Court","authors":"A. Rai, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Jorge Lemus, Erik N. Hovenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3865804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3865804","url":null,"abstract":"The America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”) created a robust administrative system—the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”)—for challenging the validity of granted patents. Congress determined that administrative correction of errors made in initial patent grants could be cheaper and more scientifically accurate than district court litigation over patent validity. In terms of private economic value per patent, few areas of technology can match the biopharmaceutical industry. Particularly for small molecule drugs, a billion-dollar drug monopoly may be protected from competition by a relatively small number of patents. Accordingly, the social cost of invalid patents—and, by extension, the potential benefit of PTAB review—is particularly acute in the biopharmaceutical industry. Conversely, to the extent that PTAB is overly assertive and improperly targets high-quality patents, the decrease in innovation incentives may be quite problematic. To investigate the issue empirically, our paper uses several novel datasets (made publicly available via the posting of this article) to study the respective roles of the PTAB and the district courts. Our empirical findings indicate that the PTAB’s role in adjudicating small molecule patents has been quite modest, substantially more modest than its role for other types of patents. Moreover, we do not find any evidence that the PTAB targets categories of small molecule patents that are generally considered high quality. To the contrary, the PTAB does not appear to differentially target even categories of small molecule patents that are generally considered to exhibit lower quality. We also find no evidence that the PTAB is targeting small molecule patents held by small entities. We conclude by discussing paths policymakers could take if they were interested in a more active role for the PTAB in policing the validity of small molecule drug patents.","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116397600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent proposals from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D NY) to raise the top marginal tax rates under the income tax, and from Senator Elizabeth Warren (D Mass), to add a stand-alone wealth tax to the existing mix of taxes, are promising beginnings. They have burst forth from a veritable desert of progressive tax alternatives in the public political discussion. But both sets of ideas suffer from an allegiance to the status quo; both operate within the existing paradigm of nominally attempting to tax “income” and “wealth” – wealth transfers, in the case of the status quo, wealth itself, in the case of Warren’s proposal. This Article examines that status quo to show that the “income” tax is dead, replaced by a universal wage tax in which payroll taxes add on to a wage/income tax to highly, and inescapably, burden labor while wealth is left off the hook of taxation altogether. This Article traces the century-long movement of our tax system from an income tax to a wage tax, culminating, to date, in President Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Liberals and progressives must change the way they think about tax in order to get non-taxpaying billionaires, such as the President and his son-in-law, to pay anything at all.
{"title":"The Death of the Income Tax (or, the Rise of America's Universal Wage Tax)","authors":"Edward J. McCaffery","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3242314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3242314","url":null,"abstract":"Recent proposals from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D NY) to raise the top marginal tax rates under the income tax, and from Senator Elizabeth Warren (D Mass), to add a stand-alone wealth tax to the existing mix of taxes, are promising beginnings. They have burst forth from a veritable desert of progressive tax alternatives in the public political discussion. But both sets of ideas suffer from an allegiance to the status quo; both operate within the existing paradigm of nominally attempting to tax “income” and “wealth” – wealth transfers, in the case of the status quo, wealth itself, in the case of Warren’s proposal. This Article examines that status quo to show that the “income” tax is dead, replaced by a universal wage tax in which payroll taxes add on to a wage/income tax to highly, and inescapably, burden labor while wealth is left off the hook of taxation altogether. This Article traces the century-long movement of our tax system from an income tax to a wage tax, culminating, to date, in President Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Liberals and progressives must change the way they think about tax in order to get non-taxpaying billionaires, such as the President and his son-in-law, to pay anything at all.","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130750380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Disagreement between knowledgeable scientific experts and median political views often do not suggest political bias on the part of scientists, but rather an effort by think tanks, media organizations, interest groups and politicians to inappropriately politicize scientific issues. For example, the causes and consequences of Climate Change are scientific issues. The likely economic harm from such changes, and the costs of preventing or mitigating them, are also scientific issues. So are the adverse health consequences from air and water pollution or the health effects of smoking. So is the question of whether tax cuts can generate enough economic growth to reduce the Debt-to-GDP ratio. While scientific questions can have political and policy implications, scientific inquiry should not be politicized. The best evidence should be analyzed with the best methods, and the implications and degree of uncertainty honestly conveyed to policymakers and the public. But according to scientific experts, many scientific issues have been inappropriately politicized when scientific evidence threatened private sector profits or government budgets. These issues include the causes and effects of climate change, the health risks of pollution, and the dangers of tobacco use. According to a Pew survey, nearly 80 percent of scientists believe that previous administrations suppressed government scientists’ findings for political reasons. Many scientists worry that suppression of scientific findings for political reasons is becoming more common. Note that the Pew sample consists overwhelmingly of natural or “hard” scientists in fields such as medical sciences, chemistry, physics and geosciences. Pew’s sample included those who work in private industry as well as those who work in government and universities. Recently, there have been systematic efforts by some members of Congress to weaken the role of science in informing agency rule-making and increase the role of political actors. Some politicians have also sought to prevent government agencies from collecting basic data about demographics, the environment, health and safety, and the economy, even if de-identified to protect individual privacy. Today, threats to academic freedom can come from powerful donors, political leaders, and outside pressure groups who sometimes seek to subtly (or not so subtly) influence ostensibly neutral and unbiased academic research to further their own business interests or other political preferences. The best way to protect universities from undue influence may be to secure and expand revenue sources that are indifferent to or cannot sway the conclusions of academic research. This is analogous to the approach we take to try to protect the independence of members of the federal judiciary or the Federal Reserve.
{"title":"'The State of Intellectual Freedom in America' (Written Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice)","authors":"M. Simkovic","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3256465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3256465","url":null,"abstract":"Disagreement between knowledgeable scientific experts and median political views often do not suggest political bias on the part of scientists, but rather an effort by think tanks, media organizations, interest groups and politicians to inappropriately politicize scientific issues. \u0000For example, the causes and consequences of Climate Change are scientific issues. The likely economic harm from such changes, and the costs of preventing or mitigating them, are also scientific issues. So are the adverse health consequences from air and water pollution or the health effects of smoking. So is the question of whether tax cuts can generate enough economic growth to reduce the Debt-to-GDP ratio. \u0000While scientific questions can have political and policy implications, scientific inquiry should not be politicized. The best evidence should be analyzed with the best methods, and the implications and degree of uncertainty honestly conveyed to policymakers and the public. \u0000But according to scientific experts, many scientific issues have been inappropriately politicized when scientific evidence threatened private sector profits or government budgets. These issues include the causes and effects of climate change, the health risks of pollution, and the dangers of tobacco use. \u0000According to a Pew survey, nearly 80 percent of scientists believe that previous administrations suppressed government scientists’ findings for political reasons. Many scientists worry that suppression of scientific findings for political reasons is becoming more common. \u0000Note that the Pew sample consists overwhelmingly of natural or “hard” scientists in fields such as medical sciences, chemistry, physics and geosciences. Pew’s sample included those who work in private industry as well as those who work in government and universities. \u0000Recently, there have been systematic efforts by some members of Congress to weaken the role of science in informing agency rule-making and increase the role of political actors. Some politicians have also sought to prevent government agencies from collecting basic data about demographics, the environment, health and safety, and the economy, even if de-identified to protect individual privacy. \u0000Today, threats to academic freedom can come from powerful donors, political leaders, and outside pressure groups who sometimes seek to subtly (or not so subtly) influence ostensibly neutral and unbiased academic research to further their own business interests or other political preferences. \u0000The best way to protect universities from undue influence may be to secure and expand revenue sources that are indifferent to or cannot sway the conclusions of academic research. This is analogous to the approach we take to try to protect the independence of members of the federal judiciary or the Federal Reserve.","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126811276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper asserts that the discourse of religious accommodation has stopped making sense, and that the reason it has stopped making sense is because our terminology (including such terms as "religion," "accommodation," and "secularism") is inherited from tradition of political theological discourse that has been forgotten: the theology of divine accommodation. The paper reconstructs the content of that tradition of political theology in broad strokes, arguing that the birthplace of secularism and the birthplace of liberalism both lie here and that, once we recognize that, a number of doctrinal and conceptual puzzles can be solved, including how to define religion, whether to characterize secular humanism as a religion, and whether to accept the broad (virtually boundless) conception of a right to religious accommodation now being promoted by religious conservatives. The answers proposed are that (a) religion, from the standpoint of this tradition of political theology, refers to beliefs about the content and source of the moral law, and is not contingent on continued belief in a deity; (b) secular humanism is a religion in this sense, and is indeed the religion promoted by accommodationist political theology; (c) the broad conception of a right to religious accommodation must be rejected for the same reasons that the "religion" of secular humanism must be accepted. The paper further argues, as a matter of political theory/history of political thought, that locating the origins of liberalism and secularism in the tradition of divine accommodation reveals conservative political theology and liberal political theory to be one and the same. Finally, it underscores the centrality of law to the humanist tradition and the centrality of humanism to law.
{"title":"From Eternity to Here: Divine Accommodation and the Lost Language of Law","authors":"N. Stolzenberg","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3255018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3255018","url":null,"abstract":"This paper asserts that the discourse of religious accommodation has stopped making sense, and that the reason it has stopped making sense is because our terminology (including such terms as \"religion,\" \"accommodation,\" and \"secularism\") is inherited from tradition of political theological discourse that has been forgotten: the theology of divine accommodation. The paper reconstructs the content of that tradition of political theology in broad strokes, arguing that the birthplace of secularism and the birthplace of liberalism both lie here and that, once we recognize that, a number of doctrinal and conceptual puzzles can be solved, including how to define religion, whether to characterize secular humanism as a religion, and whether to accept the broad (virtually boundless) conception of a right to religious accommodation now being promoted by religious conservatives. The answers proposed are that (a) religion, from the standpoint of this tradition of political theology, refers to beliefs about the content and source of the moral law, and is not contingent on continued belief in a deity; (b) secular humanism is a religion in this sense, and is indeed the religion promoted by accommodationist political theology; (c) the broad conception of a right to religious accommodation must be rejected for the same reasons that the \"religion\" of secular humanism must be accepted. The paper further argues, as a matter of political theory/history of political thought, that locating the origins of liberalism and secularism in the tradition of divine accommodation reveals conservative political theology and liberal political theory to be one and the same. Finally, it underscores the centrality of law to the humanist tradition and the centrality of humanism to law.","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128843632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The social and political problems of wealth inequality in America are severe and getting worse. A surprise is that the U.S. tax system, as is, is a significant cause of these problems, not a cure for them. The tax-law doctrines that allow those who already have financial wealth to live, luxuriously and tax-free, or to pass on their wealth tax-free to heirs, are simple. The applicable legal doctrines have been in place for nearly a century under the income tax, the primary social tool for addressing matters of economic inequality. The analytic pathways to reform are easy to see once the law is properly understood. Yet our political systems show no serious interest in taxing wealth seriously. We are letting capital off the hook, and ratcheting up taxes on labor, at precisely a time when deep-seated and long-running economic forces suggest that this is precisely the wrong thing to do. It is time -- past time -- for a change. This Article canvasses a century of tax policy in the United States to show that we have never been serious about taxing wealth seriously, and to lay out pathways towards reform.
{"title":"Taxing Wealth Seriously","authors":"Edward J. McCaffery","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2738848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2738848","url":null,"abstract":"The social and political problems of wealth inequality in America are severe and getting worse. A surprise is that the U.S. tax system, as is, is a significant cause of these problems, not a cure for them. The tax-law doctrines that allow those who already have financial wealth to live, luxuriously and tax-free, or to pass on their wealth tax-free to heirs, are simple. The applicable legal doctrines have been in place for nearly a century under the income tax, the primary social tool for addressing matters of economic inequality. The analytic pathways to reform are easy to see once the law is properly understood. Yet our political systems show no serious interest in taxing wealth seriously. We are letting capital off the hook, and ratcheting up taxes on labor, at precisely a time when deep-seated and long-running economic forces suggest that this is precisely the wrong thing to do. It is time -- past time -- for a change. This Article canvasses a century of tax policy in the United States to show that we have never been serious about taxing wealth seriously, and to lay out pathways towards reform.","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123722668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Almost all theorizing about law begins with government. In a series of papers we challenge this orthodoxy. Our “what-is-law” approach places private enforcement at the center of a theory of law. The critical public component that distinguishes legal from social order is not public enforcement but rather a public, common knowledge, and stewarded normative classification institution that designates what is and what is not acceptable conduct in a community. Law emerges, we argue, to better coordinate and incentivize decentralized collective punishment (that is, private ordering: sanctions imposed by individuals not in an official capacity.) Our work to date shows that the social order produced by a centralized classification institution supported exclusively by decentralized enforcement is characterized by several normatively attractive features. We call these features legal attributes. They include features routinely understood in the legal philosophical literature as characteristic of the rule of law: generality, published, clear, prospective, and stable. Importantly, the legal attributes we identify do not arise from normative claims about law. Rather, they arise from our positive analysis sustaining an equilibrium based on centralized classification when enforcement requires the voluntary participation of ordinary citizens. These legal attributes are necessary to secure coordination and incentive compatibility in a regime of fully decentralized enforcement. Without them, the effort to sustain an equilibrium based on centralized classification fails. A regime characterized by rule of law is only an equilibrium, we argue, when enforcement of public classifications includes an important component of private enforcement. Without the discipline imposed by the need to incentivize and coordinate private enforcers, a government cannot succeed in sustaining law.
{"title":"Is Rule of Law an Equilibrium Without Private Ordering?","authors":"Gillian K. Hadfield, Barry R. Weingast","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2785017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2785017","url":null,"abstract":"Almost all theorizing about law begins with government. In a series of papers we challenge this orthodoxy. Our “what-is-law” approach places private enforcement at the center of a theory of law. The critical public component that distinguishes legal from social order is not public enforcement but rather a public, common knowledge, and stewarded normative classification institution that designates what is and what is not acceptable conduct in a community. Law emerges, we argue, to better coordinate and incentivize decentralized collective punishment (that is, private ordering: sanctions imposed by individuals not in an official capacity.) Our work to date shows that the social order produced by a centralized classification institution supported exclusively by decentralized enforcement is characterized by several normatively attractive features. We call these features legal attributes. They include features routinely understood in the legal philosophical literature as characteristic of the rule of law: generality, published, clear, prospective, and stable. Importantly, the legal attributes we identify do not arise from normative claims about law. Rather, they arise from our positive analysis sustaining an equilibrium based on centralized classification when enforcement requires the voluntary participation of ordinary citizens. These legal attributes are necessary to secure coordination and incentive compatibility in a regime of fully decentralized enforcement. Without them, the effort to sustain an equilibrium based on centralized classification fails. A regime characterized by rule of law is only an equilibrium, we argue, when enforcement of public classifications includes an important component of private enforcement. Without the discipline imposed by the need to incentivize and coordinate private enforcers, a government cannot succeed in sustaining law.","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121709699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that an early 20th century central banker, had he been alive at the turn of the 21st century, would have predicted the 2007-08 crisis and its severity. This paper is Part II of a series which contends that early 20th century banking theory is a valuable framework for understanding the relationship between banks, financial markets, and the central bank. This paper builds on Part I which explained that because a social norm supports the circulation of bank deposits as money, deposits are a network good and this makes possible monetary finance, or the expansion of the money supply as a source of funds for banks to lend.This paper first analyses the British model of monetary finance, the structured interaction of banks, the money market, and the central bank that formed its core, and the means by which this structure made possible the origination of safe, privately-issued assets. Then, the analysis turns to the macroeconomic implications of monetary finance: in order to protect the monetary social norm, both financial instability and inflation must be avoided. The real bills principle addressed the former by proscribing monetary finance of long-term assets and the latter by requiring careful monitoring and control of the growth of money market instruments that were not real bills.Thus, the modern integration of money and capital markets is seen through traditional banking theory to be a recipe for financial instability, because it undermines the ability of banks and the money market to be joined together in the production of safe privately-issued assets. This theory indicates that restabilizing the financial system will require structural reform and that only after such reform has been implemented can we expect macro-prudential regulation to succeed.
{"title":"The Bank-Centered View of the Money Market Part II: Re-Evaluating the Real Bills Approach to Macro-Prudential Regulation","authors":"Carolyn Sissoko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2578408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2578408","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that an early 20th century central banker, had he been alive at the turn of the 21st century, would have predicted the 2007-08 crisis and its severity. This paper is Part II of a series which contends that early 20th century banking theory is a valuable framework for understanding the relationship between banks, financial markets, and the central bank. This paper builds on Part I which explained that because a social norm supports the circulation of bank deposits as money, deposits are a network good and this makes possible monetary finance, or the expansion of the money supply as a source of funds for banks to lend.This paper first analyses the British model of monetary finance, the structured interaction of banks, the money market, and the central bank that formed its core, and the means by which this structure made possible the origination of safe, privately-issued assets. Then, the analysis turns to the macroeconomic implications of monetary finance: in order to protect the monetary social norm, both financial instability and inflation must be avoided. The real bills principle addressed the former by proscribing monetary finance of long-term assets and the latter by requiring careful monitoring and control of the growth of money market instruments that were not real bills.Thus, the modern integration of money and capital markets is seen through traditional banking theory to be a recipe for financial instability, because it undermines the ability of banks and the money market to be joined together in the production of safe privately-issued assets. This theory indicates that restabilizing the financial system will require structural reform and that only after such reform has been implemented can we expect macro-prudential regulation to succeed.","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"148 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123267849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a study that follows in Macaulay’s (1963) footsteps, we asked businesses what role formal contract law plays in managing their external relationships. We heard similar answers to the ones Macaulay obtained fifty years ago from companies who described important but non-innovation-oriented external relationships. But we also uncovered an important phenomenon: companies that described innovationoriented external relationships reported making extensive use of formal contracts to plan and manage these relationships. They do not, however, generate these formal contracts in order to secure the benefits of a credible threat of formal contract enforcement; instead, like Macaulay’s original respondents, they largely relied on relational tools
{"title":"Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation","authors":"I. Božović, Gillian K. Hadfield","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1984915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1984915","url":null,"abstract":"In a study that follows in Macaulay’s (1963) footsteps, we asked businesses what role formal contract law plays in managing their external relationships. We heard similar answers to the ones Macaulay obtained fifty years ago from companies who described important but non-innovation-oriented external relationships. But we also uncovered an important phenomenon: companies that described innovationoriented external relationships reported making extensive use of formal contracts to plan and manage these relationships. They do not, however, generate these formal contracts in order to secure the benefits of a credible threat of formal contract enforcement; instead, like Macaulay’s original respondents, they largely relied on relational tools","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121527576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Virtual music scores are produced from highly manipulable instructions about the location and other attributes of digitally rendered musical symbols and sounds. These instructions, compiled in one of the hundreds of codes developed for the graphical representation of music, direct the arrangement of pixels into a sequence of characters of symbolic music notation. They typically also comprise MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) instructions that enable sound producing machinery to recreate cfonsistently, across audio platforms, an audible rendition of the visual score. Over seventy percent of professional quality music scores are now produced using virtual score technology yet very few of these are distributed in any format other than printed scores. This is regrettable because virtual scores offer musicians remarkable new creative freedoms and efficiencies. They are also, however, more susceptible to unauthorized copying than are hardcopy scores; hence publishers are reluctant to distribute their scores in this format. Publishers of editions of public domain musical works - that comprise most of the Classical music canon - are particularly chary of distribution of virtual scores. This is because their copyright interest in these editions tends to be attenuated, extending only to original information that editors may have added, but not to the considerable “sweat of the brow” they may have invested in producing scores that reflect the original author’s intentions. This article suggests that to ensure a future for music scores publishers of public domain and copyrightable music scores alike might find that the best means to capitalize upon their publications - while also promoting more widespread adoption of virtual score technology - are contractual restrictions and access and copy controls managed by aggregators of virtual music scores.
{"title":"Virtual Music Scores, Copyright and the Promotion of a Marginalized Technology","authors":"Charles Cronin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2457442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2457442","url":null,"abstract":"Virtual music scores are produced from highly manipulable instructions about the location and other attributes of digitally rendered musical symbols and sounds. These instructions, compiled in one of the hundreds of codes developed for the graphical representation of music, direct the arrangement of pixels into a sequence of characters of symbolic music notation. They typically also comprise MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) instructions that enable sound producing machinery to recreate cfonsistently, across audio platforms, an audible rendition of the visual score. Over seventy percent of professional quality music scores are now produced using virtual score technology yet very few of these are distributed in any format other than printed scores. This is regrettable because virtual scores offer musicians remarkable new creative freedoms and efficiencies. They are also, however, more susceptible to unauthorized copying than are hardcopy scores; hence publishers are reluctant to distribute their scores in this format. Publishers of editions of public domain musical works - that comprise most of the Classical music canon - are particularly chary of distribution of virtual scores. This is because their copyright interest in these editions tends to be attenuated, extending only to original information that editors may have added, but not to the considerable “sweat of the brow” they may have invested in producing scores that reflect the original author’s intentions. This article suggests that to ensure a future for music scores publishers of public domain and copyrightable music scores alike might find that the best means to capitalize upon their publications - while also promoting more widespread adoption of virtual score technology - are contractual restrictions and access and copy controls managed by aggregators of virtual music scores.","PeriodicalId":415853,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132176144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anthony M. Bertelli, D. Mason, J. Connolly, David A. Gastwirth
Public management researchers are interested in many characteristics of organizations that cannot be directly captured, making aggregated attitudes from surveys an attractive proxy. Yet difficulties in measuring meaningful attributes over time and across organizations have frequently limited statistical designs to a single organization or time. We offer a method for creating such statistical measures across agencies and time using item response theory. Focusing our attention on U.S. federal administrative agencies, we marshal a variety of questions from surveys commissioned by the Office of Personnel Management and Merit Systems Protection Board and employ statistical models to measure three important attributes — autonomy, job satisfaction, and intrinsic motivation — for 71 agencies between 1998-2010. Our study provides a wealth of data for quantitative public management research designs as well as an adaptable framework for measuring a wide range of concepts.
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