{"title":"Bertrand Russell’s Visit to China: Selected Texts on the Centenary of Intercultural Dialogues in Logic and Epistemology","authors":"B. Linsky","doi":"10.4312/9789610604594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4312/9789610604594","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49568876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.15173/russell.v41i1.4809
T. Simpson
{"title":"On A Logician’s Mantelpiece: Frege","authors":"T. Simpson","doi":"10.15173/russell.v41i1.4809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v41i1.4809","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41893654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ermes (Mercury in Roman usage) was the god of writers, boundarycrossers, and thieves. Biographers might thank Hermes when they “borrow” another’s life for a short while, crossing psychological and logistical boundaries to write that life. Hermes may provide the inspiration, but his adepts must do the composing, travelling, and ... thieving. Ruth Derham’s biography of Frank Russell is within the hermetic tradition, bar the larceny. She gives an integrated picture of Frank, filling in the blanks left by his autobiography, My Life and Adventures (). That autobiography is a study in discontinuity, pages in chapters. He salts his commentary on the folly of humankind with shorter discussions on the follies of Frank Russell. Frank’s education had been planned by his parents, John and Kate Amberley, on radically liberal lines. There was to be no religious practice or instruction. Even as a small boy, Frank (and Bertie) would have freedom and the right to learn from experience. Frank was given a tutor who agreed on these essentials. Frank quickly acquired a taste for personal liberty. This happy circumstance would not last. Frank’s (and Bertie’s) mother, Kate (née Stanley) (b. ) and sister Rachel (b. ), died in . “Johnny,” the children’s father (b. ), died in . Frank was eight years old when his mother and sister died, ten years old at his father’s death. Bertie
{"title":"Frank Russell: A Whole From The Parts","authors":"William A. Bruneau","doi":"10.1353/rss.2021.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rss.2021.0004","url":null,"abstract":"ermes (Mercury in Roman usage) was the god of writers, boundarycrossers, and thieves. Biographers might thank Hermes when they “borrow” another’s life for a short while, crossing psychological and logistical boundaries to write that life. Hermes may provide the inspiration, but his adepts must do the composing, travelling, and ... thieving. Ruth Derham’s biography of Frank Russell is within the hermetic tradition, bar the larceny. She gives an integrated picture of Frank, filling in the blanks left by his autobiography, My Life and Adventures (). That autobiography is a study in discontinuity, pages in chapters. He salts his commentary on the folly of humankind with shorter discussions on the follies of Frank Russell. Frank’s education had been planned by his parents, John and Kate Amberley, on radically liberal lines. There was to be no religious practice or instruction. Even as a small boy, Frank (and Bertie) would have freedom and the right to learn from experience. Frank was given a tutor who agreed on these essentials. Frank quickly acquired a taste for personal liberty. This happy circumstance would not last. Frank’s (and Bertie’s) mother, Kate (née Stanley) (b. ) and sister Rachel (b. ), died in . “Johnny,” the children’s father (b. ), died in . Frank was eight years old when his mother and sister died, ten years old at his father’s death. Bertie","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46302423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Jean Nicod, born in 1893, died far too young in 1924. He is remembered today as one of the foreign disciples (among them Ludwig Wittgenstein and Norbert Wiener) attracted to Cambridge by Russell after the publication of the Principia. We publish here a translation of “Les tendances philosophiques de M. Bertrand Russell”, which appeared in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale in 1922. The article is testimony not only to Nicod’s philosophical talents, but also of how Russell’s philosophy could be received in France at the beginning of the twentieth century.
摘要：让·尼科德，1893年出生，1924年英年早逝。今天，他被人们铭记为《原理》出版后罗素吸引到剑桥的外国弟子之一（其中包括路德维希·维特根斯坦和诺伯特·维纳）。我们在这里出版了“M.Bertrand Russell的哲学倾向”的译本，该译本于1922年发表在《Métaphysicue et de Morale评论》上。这篇文章不仅证明了尼科德的哲学才能，也证明了罗素的哲学思想在二十世纪初的法国是如何被接受的。
{"title":"The Philosophical Tendencies of Mr. Bertrand Russell","authors":"J.‐C. Nicod, Roseline Adzogble, S. Gandon","doi":"10.1353/rss.2021.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rss.2021.0000","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Jean Nicod, born in 1893, died far too young in 1924. He is remembered today as one of the foreign disciples (among them Ludwig Wittgenstein and Norbert Wiener) attracted to Cambridge by Russell after the publication of the Principia. We publish here a translation of “Les tendances philosophiques de M. Bertrand Russell”, which appeared in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale in 1922. The article is testimony not only to Nicod’s philosophical talents, but also of how Russell’s philosophy could be received in France at the beginning of the twentieth century.","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41567970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.15173/russell.v41i1.4806
Ruth Derham
Abstract:Frank Russell, 2nd Earl Russell (1865–1931), was a man of rational thought and social conscience who, released from his early imbroglios, embarked on a controversial career, throwing his name and political weight behind a range of desperate but often successful causes. This bibliographical guide acknowledges his labours, illustrates his diversity and demonstrates why Frank Russell deserves to be taken seriously.
{"title":"Frank Russell’s Diverse Writing and Speaking Career: A Bibliographical Guide","authors":"Ruth Derham","doi":"10.15173/russell.v41i1.4806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v41i1.4806","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Frank Russell, 2nd Earl Russell (1865–1931), was a man of rational thought and social conscience who, released from his early imbroglios, embarked on a controversial career, throwing his name and political weight behind a range of desperate but often successful causes. This bibliographical guide acknowledges his labours, illustrates his diversity and demonstrates why Frank Russell deserves to be taken seriously.","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47130497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.15173/russell.v41i1.4810
K. Blackwell
Abstract:The text of The Problems of Philosophy is unsound. It was published first with minor typographical errors. Revision in 1913 resulted in serious errors. Resetting the type in 1946 corrected some but omitted a line and introduced other errors. Resetting the type in 1967—for the final time in Russell’s life—repeated this history while he agreed to a substantive change. I distinguish alterations of sense and recommend seven restorations to build a sounder text, along with an historical register of variants.
{"title":"A Truer Text of The Problems of Philosophy","authors":"K. Blackwell","doi":"10.15173/russell.v41i1.4810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v41i1.4810","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The text of The Problems of Philosophy is unsound. It was published first with minor typographical errors. Revision in 1913 resulted in serious errors. Resetting the type in 1946 corrected some but omitted a line and introduced other errors. Resetting the type in 1967—for the final time in Russell’s life—repeated this history while he agreed to a substantive change. I distinguish alterations of sense and recommend seven restorations to build a sounder text, along with an historical register of variants.","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42354447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.15173/russell.v41i1.4802
G. Ratti
Abstract:Regarding his views on ethics, Russell is typically saddled with charges of (mainly pragmatic) inconsistency for holding that ultimate ethical valuations are subjective, while, at the same time, expressing emphatic opinions on ethical questions. In this paper, I re-examine some of the ways out of these accusations Russell himself proposed, mainly by pointing to the weaknesses of objectivism (among which its failure in reaching Occamist rigour is paramount). I also put forward some other possible replies that he did not explicitly explore. In particular, I stress that the object-language/metalanguage distinction, which has its historical roots in Russell’s theory of types, can be used to hold that there is no possible contradiction in maintaining a subjectivist metaethics and defending substantive ethical claims. Along these lines, I argue that Russell should have not been concerned with the charges of inconsistency of any kind, for second-order claims about the nature of moral judgments are not conceptually apt to ground first-order substantive moral views.
{"title":"Bertrand Russell and the Paradox of the Committed Emotivist","authors":"G. Ratti","doi":"10.15173/russell.v41i1.4802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v41i1.4802","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Regarding his views on ethics, Russell is typically saddled with charges of (mainly pragmatic) inconsistency for holding that ultimate ethical valuations are subjective, while, at the same time, expressing emphatic opinions on ethical questions. In this paper, I re-examine some of the ways out of these accusations Russell himself proposed, mainly by pointing to the weaknesses of objectivism (among which its failure in reaching Occamist rigour is paramount). I also put forward some other possible replies that he did not explicitly explore. In particular, I stress that the object-language/metalanguage distinction, which has its historical roots in Russell’s theory of types, can be used to hold that there is no possible contradiction in maintaining a subjectivist metaethics and defending substantive ethical claims. Along these lines, I argue that Russell should have not been concerned with the charges of inconsistency of any kind, for second-order claims about the nature of moral judgments are not conceptually apt to ground first-order substantive moral views.","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47407331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.15173/russell.v41i1.4816
S. Andersson
Abstract:Bertrand Russell’s speech “Why I Am Not a Christian” (1927) triggered many theologians to defend Christian beliefs. Aside from his rational criticism of the so-called “proofs” of God’s existence, it is his humorous irony as a rhetorical weapon that made many abandon their faith in Christianity and become atheists or at least agnostics. In this article I examine two British theologians’ unsuccessful attempts to counterattack Russell’s devastating analysis of some central Christian dogmas.
{"title":"Two Theologians and “Why I Am Not A Christian”","authors":"S. Andersson","doi":"10.15173/russell.v41i1.4816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v41i1.4816","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Bertrand Russell’s speech “Why I Am Not a Christian” (1927) triggered many theologians to defend Christian beliefs. Aside from his rational criticism of the so-called “proofs” of God’s existence, it is his humorous irony as a rhetorical weapon that made many abandon their faith in Christianity and become atheists or at least agnostics. In this article I examine two British theologians’ unsuccessful attempts to counterattack Russell’s devastating analysis of some central Christian dogmas.","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44484918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
, lectures those who a better under-standing of the interaction between Russell and ideas
对罗素与思想之间的相互作用有了更好理解的人，将在这里接受讲座
{"title":"100 Years of Logical Atomism","authors":"Graham P. Stevens","doi":"10.1353/rss.2021.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/rss.2021.0008","url":null,"abstract":", lectures those who a better under-standing of the interaction between Russell and ideas","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43651450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-10DOI: 10.15173/russell.v40i2.4574
Peter Baumann
Desires are contentful mental states. But what determines the content of a desire? Two different classic answers were proposed by Russell and by Wittgenstein, starting in the 1910s. Russell proposed a behaviourist account according to which the content of the desire is fixed by the type of state that puts an end to the relevant kind of behaviour which was triggered by some initial discomfort. The desire’s content consists in its “satisfaction conditions”. Wittgenstein criticized such an account for neglecting the crucial point that the relation between a desire and its content is a conceptual, internal one, not an external contingent one. Desires specify their own contents, their “fulfillment conditions”. Even though there is a lot to say in favour of Wittgenstein’s criticism, this paper argues that Russell pointed at an important aspect of desires which plays a crucial role for accounts of self-knowledge of one’s own desires. It turns out fulfillment conditions and satisfaction conditions are tied together in rational self-knowledge of one’s own desires. In this sense, the views of Russell and Wittgenstein can be combined in a fruitful way.
{"title":"Ludwig’s Punch and Bertie’s Comeback","authors":"Peter Baumann","doi":"10.15173/russell.v40i2.4574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v40i2.4574","url":null,"abstract":"Desires are contentful mental states. But what determines the content of a desire? Two different classic answers were proposed by Russell and by Wittgenstein, starting in the 1910s. Russell proposed a behaviourist account according to which the content of the desire is fixed by the type of state that puts an end to the relevant kind of behaviour which was triggered by some initial discomfort. The desire’s content consists in its “satisfaction conditions”. Wittgenstein criticized such an account for neglecting the crucial point that the relation between a desire and its content is a conceptual, internal one, not an external contingent one. Desires specify their own contents, their “fulfillment conditions”. Even though there is a lot to say in favour of Wittgenstein’s criticism, this paper argues that Russell pointed at an important aspect of desires which plays a crucial role for accounts of self-knowledge of one’s own desires. It turns out fulfillment conditions and satisfaction conditions are tied together in rational self-knowledge of one’s own desires. In this sense, the views of Russell and Wittgenstein can be combined in a fruitful way.","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42900576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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