This paper provides newer insights on governance – performance relationship using recent data (2007 to 2015) on anti-takeover provisions' incidence in the sample firms. Looking beyond the equally weighted methodology employed in related literature for constructing G-Index, E-Index, and Gov-Score, we present an alternate unequally weighted "new Governance (nG) Index" as governance proxy. We show that our proposed nG-Index traces governance – performance relationship more persistently than the equal-weighted measure. Firms with better governance structures are found to show higher firm values and superior operating performances in our sample period. Our analysis further reveals that a zero-investment hedge going long on poor governance stock portfolio and shorting the good governance one would have generated an abnormal return of over 1.33% per month or about 16% per year. This hedge is completely opposite to the long good governance – short poor governance strategy suggested in prior literature. We posit that such hedge reversal is an indication that, in recent years, investors seek compensation for high riskiness associated with poorly governed firms.
{"title":"The Corporate Governance - Performance Puzzle: New Insights","authors":"A. Dumitrescu, Mohammed Zakriya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2901933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2901933","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides newer insights on governance – performance relationship using recent data (2007 to 2015) on anti-takeover provisions' incidence in the sample firms. Looking beyond the equally weighted methodology employed in related literature for constructing G-Index, E-Index, and Gov-Score, we present an alternate unequally weighted \"new Governance (nG) Index\" as governance proxy. We show that our proposed nG-Index traces governance – performance relationship more persistently than the equal-weighted measure. Firms with better governance structures are found to show higher firm values and superior operating performances in our sample period. Our analysis further reveals that a zero-investment hedge going long on poor governance stock portfolio and shorting the good governance one would have generated an abnormal return of over 1.33% per month or about 16% per year. This hedge is completely opposite to the long good governance – short poor governance strategy suggested in prior literature. We posit that such hedge reversal is an indication that, in recent years, investors seek compensation for high riskiness associated with poorly governed firms.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124287159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-15DOI: 10.4337/9781785364181.00022
Nina Gorovaia
This chapter reviews and synthesizes the major research findings on knowledge transfer in franchising organizations. It discusses what is transferred and why, addresses the when and how question, and also who transfers and where. The discussion of these broad issues is facilitated by reviewing state-of-the-art research that use knowledge-based view of the firm, information richness theory, the value co-creation concept, organizational life-cycle theory, resource-based theory and organizational capabilities perspective. The study argues that the resource-based theory and organizational capabilities perspective could make an important contribution to franchising research by highlighting how franchise companies create and capture value from knowledge transfer and knowledge management.
{"title":"Knowledge Transfer in Franchising","authors":"Nina Gorovaia","doi":"10.4337/9781785364181.00022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785364181.00022","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews and synthesizes the major research findings on knowledge transfer in franchising organizations. It discusses what is transferred and why, addresses the when and how question, and also who transfers and where. The discussion of these broad issues is facilitated by reviewing state-of-the-art research that use knowledge-based view of the firm, information richness theory, the value co-creation concept, organizational life-cycle theory, resource-based theory and organizational capabilities perspective. The study argues that the resource-based theory and organizational capabilities perspective could make an important contribution to franchising research by highlighting how franchise companies create and capture value from knowledge transfer and knowledge management.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133833695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper deals with the general concept of (good) governance in sports organizations, explaining its required particularities through a look at its principles, existing challenges and issues that have yet to be resolved. It will also give an overview of which obstacles need to be taken into account for the implementation of good governance. Furthermore, it lays out some potential ideas for enhanced good governance through the example of mega-events such as the Olympic Games.
{"title":"Governance in Sports Organizations","authors":"W. Maennig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3025498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025498","url":null,"abstract":"The paper deals with the general concept of (good) governance in sports organizations, explaining its required particularities through a look at its principles, existing challenges and issues that have yet to be resolved. It will also give an overview of which obstacles need to be taken into account for the implementation of good governance. Furthermore, it lays out some potential ideas for enhanced good governance through the example of mega-events such as the Olympic Games.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126045584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A large empirical literature analyzes determinants of the make-or-buy decision. Transaction cost economics highlights the role of asset specificity, the property rights theory focuses on the relative marginal contributions to joint surplus creation, and some evidence suggests that making transactions more contractible facilitates outsourcing. We use a unique transaction-level dataset of outsourced automotive components to predict carmakers’ choices between four distinct ways of organizing sourcing relationships. We derive conditional predictions for three characteristics: (i) the complexity or contractibility of a transaction, (ii) how objectively codifiable performance is, and (iii) the supplier’s capabilities. For example, while dominant buyer investments might predict vertical integration, as in the property rights theory, other characteristics might convince a buyer to simply re-organize the collaboration with the supplier in a more suitable way. Our results suggest that “buy” relationships differ systematically and that the predictive power of our variables extend from the make-or-buy decision to how-to-buy.
{"title":"Governing Supply Relationships: Evidence from the Automotive Industry","authors":"A. Schmitt, Johannes Van Biesebroeck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3052235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3052235","url":null,"abstract":"A large empirical literature analyzes determinants of the make-or-buy decision. Transaction cost economics highlights the role of asset specificity, the property rights theory focuses on the relative marginal contributions to joint surplus creation, and some evidence suggests that making transactions more contractible facilitates outsourcing. We use a unique transaction-level dataset of outsourced automotive components to predict carmakers’ choices between four distinct ways of organizing sourcing relationships. We derive conditional predictions for three characteristics: (i) the complexity or contractibility of a transaction, (ii) how objectively codifiable performance is, and (iii) the supplier’s capabilities. For example, while dominant buyer investments might predict vertical integration, as in the property rights theory, other characteristics might convince a buyer to simply re-organize the collaboration with the supplier in a more suitable way. Our results suggest that “buy” relationships differ systematically and that the predictive power of our variables extend from the make-or-buy decision to how-to-buy.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123347711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore how various aspects of corporate governance influence the likelihood of a public corporation surviving as a separate public entity, after addressing potential endogeneity that arises from competing corporate exit outcomes: acquisitions, going†private transactions, and bankruptcies. We find that some corporate governance features are more important determinants of the form of a firm's exit than many economic factors that have figured prominently in prior research. We also find evidence that outsider†dominated boards and lower restrictions on internal governance play major roles in the way firms exit public markets, particularly when a firm's industry suffers a negative shock. Overall, our results suggest that failure to recognize competing risks produces biased estimates, resulting in faulty inferences.
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Firm Survival","authors":"M. S. Goktan, R. Kieschnick, R. Moussawi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.881608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.881608","url":null,"abstract":"We explore how various aspects of corporate governance influence the likelihood of a public corporation surviving as a separate public entity, after addressing potential endogeneity that arises from competing corporate exit outcomes: acquisitions, going†private transactions, and bankruptcies. We find that some corporate governance features are more important determinants of the form of a firm's exit than many economic factors that have figured prominently in prior research. We also find evidence that outsider†dominated boards and lower restrictions on internal governance play major roles in the way firms exit public markets, particularly when a firm's industry suffers a negative shock. Overall, our results suggest that failure to recognize competing risks produces biased estimates, resulting in faulty inferences.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115596563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Utilizing approximately 51,000 sample firms from developed markets over 1995-2014, we document a stark heterogeneity in global integration at the firm-level and study its implications for diversification. Specifically, the adjusted R-square, our integration measure, is widely distributed across firms, within and across sample markets. A firm’s integration is significantly affected by its style, country, and industry attributes. Systematically identifying and holding “local stocks” that are minimally driven by the common global factors, investors can significantly benefit from diversification within developed markets. Thus, the diversification gains solely inferred from the market indices much understate the potential benefits that world markets can provide.
{"title":"Global Diversification with Local Stocks: A Road Less Traveled","authors":"Cheol S. Eun, Soohun Kim, Fengrong Wei, Tim Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2997231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997231","url":null,"abstract":"Utilizing approximately 51,000 sample firms from developed markets over 1995-2014, we document a stark heterogeneity in global integration at the firm-level and study its implications for diversification. Specifically, the adjusted R-square, our integration measure, is widely distributed across firms, within and across sample markets. A firm’s integration is significantly affected by its style, country, and industry attributes. Systematically identifying and holding “local stocks” that are minimally driven by the common global factors, investors can significantly benefit from diversification within developed markets. Thus, the diversification gains solely inferred from the market indices much understate the potential benefits that world markets can provide.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116308321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows that the cost of enforcing contracts governing non-financial relationships between firms affects a firm’s financing structure. We analyze the interaction between a firm’s capital structure and the type of contracts it uses to deal with its suppliers. We first develop a theoretical model where a downstream party needs an intermediate good from an upstream party, and this intermediate good can be of high or low quality. Court-enforceable contracts can be used to enforce high quality, but their use is costly. If these costs are too high, relational contracts - self-enforcing informal arrangements that can be sustained in long-term relationships - are needed. Relational contracts, though, can only be sustained if debt is not too high. The reason is that a firm’s commitment in relational contracts is determined by its future profits in the cooperative relationship, and the need to repay debt reduces future profits. We therefore derive the prediction that, on average, higher costs of enforcing formal contracts should be associated with firms having less leverage. We test this prediction with the help of two datasets. First, the Microdatabase Directinvestment (MiDi) provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, which records balance-sheet information on the universe of German investments abroad, including detailed information on external debt and equity capital. Second, the World Bank’s Doing Business Database, which provides information on the average cost of enforcing (formal) contracts between a firm and a supplier of an intermediate good. Using a panel data model for fractional response variables, we can show that an increase in the cost of enforcing contracts in a country makes firms use substantially more equity financing.
{"title":"Relational Contracts, the Cost of Enforcing Formal Contracts, and Capital Structure Choice - Theory and Evidence","authors":"Matthias Fahn, V. Merlo, G. Wamser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3014728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3014728","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that the cost of enforcing contracts governing non-financial relationships between firms affects a firm’s financing structure. We analyze the interaction between a firm’s capital structure and the type of contracts it uses to deal with its suppliers. We first develop a theoretical model where a downstream party needs an intermediate good from an upstream party, and this intermediate good can be of high or low quality. Court-enforceable contracts can be used to enforce high quality, but their use is costly. If these costs are too high, relational contracts - self-enforcing informal arrangements that can be sustained in long-term relationships - are needed. Relational contracts, though, can only be sustained if debt is not too high. The reason is that a firm’s commitment in relational contracts is determined by its future profits in the cooperative relationship, and the need to repay debt reduces future profits. We therefore derive the prediction that, on average, higher costs of enforcing formal contracts should be associated with firms having less leverage. We test this prediction with the help of two datasets. First, the Microdatabase Directinvestment (MiDi) provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, which records balance-sheet information on the universe of German investments abroad, including detailed information on external debt and equity capital. Second, the World Bank’s Doing Business Database, which provides information on the average cost of enforcing (formal) contracts between a firm and a supplier of an intermediate good. Using a panel data model for fractional response variables, we can show that an increase in the cost of enforcing contracts in a country makes firms use substantially more equity financing.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116088952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide the first general empirical test of tax invariance (TIV). When a 25 percent tax remitted by manufacturers was eliminated in Washington state and the retail cannabis excise tax was simultaneously increased from 25 to 37 percent—a shift intended to be revenue-neutral—TIV did not hold. Manufacturers kept two-thirds of their tax savings instead of passing all their savings through to retail firms via lower prices as predicted by TIV. One-third of the retail tax increase was passed on to consumers via higher retail prices – TIV would have predicted constant or even declining tax-inclusive retail prices.
{"title":"Getting Into the Weeds of Tax Invariance","authors":"Benjamin C. Hansen, Keaton S. Miller, C. Weber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3006807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3006807","url":null,"abstract":"We provide the first general empirical test of tax invariance (TIV). When a 25 percent tax remitted by manufacturers was eliminated in Washington state and the retail cannabis excise tax was simultaneously increased from 25 to 37 percent—a shift intended to be revenue-neutral—TIV did not hold. Manufacturers kept two-thirds of their tax savings instead of passing all their savings through to retail firms via lower prices as predicted by TIV. One-third of the retail tax increase was passed on to consumers via higher retail prices – TIV would have predicted constant or even declining tax-inclusive retail prices.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122328973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is the Online Appendix to accompany the paper "Human Capital Relatedness and Mergers and Acquisitions". This appendix contains additional results that are referred to but not contained in the paper. Original paper available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996878
{"title":"Online Appendix for Human Capital Relatedness and Mergers and Acquisitions","authors":"Kyeong Hun Lee, D. Mauer, Emma Q. Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2996865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2996865","url":null,"abstract":"This is the Online Appendix to accompany the paper \"Human Capital Relatedness and Mergers and Acquisitions\". This appendix contains additional results that are referred to but not contained in the paper. \u0000Original paper available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996878","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122103959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Johannes Beyenbach, M. S. Rapp, C. Strenger, Michael Wolff
English Abstract: The Code Compliance Study 2017 examines the acceptance level of the current version of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) within DAX and MDAX firms. The study analyses overall compliance, as well as the firms’ compliance behavior on the level of chapters, items and even single GCGC recommendations. In addition, the study examines the firms' governance quality based on four specially constructed governance indices that represent the the key areas of governance (transparency, monitoring/control, incentives and diversity). Moreover, compliance behavior with respect to GCGC's suggestions as well as the relationship between firm characteristics and compliance levels is analyzed. Overall, the study presents a broad and comprehensive view on code compliance behavior of German listed firms. German Abstract: Die Studie analysiert und bewertet systematisch und umfassend die Akzeptanz der aktuellen, dreizehnten Fassung des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (DCGK) durch DAX-und MDAX-Gesellschaften anhand der durch §161 AktG vorgeschriebenen Entsprechenserklarungen. Analysiert wird das grundsatzliche Niveau der Kodexakzeptanz, aber auch das Entsprechensverhalten der Gesellschaften auf Kapitel- und Ziffernebene, bis hin zur Analyse einzelner Empfehlungen. Daruber hinaus untersucht die Studie die Governance Qualitat der Gesellschaften basierend auf vier eigens hierfur konstruierten Governance Indizes, welche die Kernbereiche Transparenz, Kontrolle/Uberwachung, Anreizsysteme und Vielfalt abbilden. Erganzt wird dies um Analysen hinsichtlich des Verhaltens bezuglich Kodexanregungen, des Zusammenhangs zwischen Complianceverhalten und Unternehmensgrose bzw. Eigentumerstruktur und einer Analyse der im Rahmen der Entsprechenserklarungen gegebenen Erlauterungen. Im Rahmen der Studie werden die bis 31. Marz 2017 veroffentlichten Entsprechenserklarungen (gemas §161 AktG) der in DAX und MDAX notierten Gesellschaften analysiert. Die untersuchten Unternehmen reprasentieren zu Ende 2016 etwa 88 Prozent der Marktkapitalisierung des Prime Standard der Deutschen Borse, sodass die Studie einen umfassenden und gleichzeitig individuell- differenzierten Blick auf die marktrelevante Akzeptanz des DCGK in den grosten deutschen Aktiengesellschaften vermittelt.
摘要:2017年准则合规研究调查了DAX和MDAX公司对当前版本的德国公司治理准则(GCGC)的接受程度。该研究分析了总体合规情况，以及各公司在章节、项目甚至单个GCGC建议层面的合规行为。此外，该研究基于四个特别构建的治理指数来检验公司的治理质量，这些指数代表了治理的关键领域(透明度、监督/控制、激励和多样性)。此外，本文还分析了企业对ggc建议的合规行为，以及企业特征与合规水平之间的关系。总体而言，本研究对德国上市公司的合规行为提供了一个广泛而全面的视角。摘要:Die stude analyert und bewertet systematisch and unfassend Die Akzeptanz der aktuellen, dreizehnten Fassung des Deutschen公司治理Kodex (DCGK) durch dax and MDAX-Gesellschaften and hand der durch§161 AktG vorgeschriebenen Entsprechenserklarungen。“分析”的意思是:“分析”的意思是:“分析”的意思是:“分析”的意思是:“分析”的意思是“分析”。中国治理质量的研究:治理质量的研究:治理质量的研究:治理质量的研究:治理质量的研究:治理质量的研究:透明的研究:治理质量的研究:治理质量的研究德国风力分析与德国风力分析:德国风力分析与德国风力分析:德国风力分析与德国风力分析:德国风力分析:德国风力分析:德国风力分析:德国风力分析本征结构与结构分析:以拉赫曼为例。我叫拉赫曼·德·斯考迪，今年31岁。2017.03 veroffentlichten Entsprechenserklarungen (gemas§161 AktG) der in DAX and MDAX notierten Gesellschaften analyert。2016年2月8日，德国证券交易所(deutsche securities securities)发布了《德国证券交易所市场资本主义研究报告》(Prozent der market capital isierung des Prime Standard of Deutschen Borse)、《德国证券交易所市场资本主义研究报告》和《德国证券交易所市场资本主义研究报告》(gleichzetitig)。
{"title":"Code Compliance Study 2017 - Analysis of the Declarations of Conformity with the German Corporate Governance Code (Version May 2015)","authors":"Johannes Beyenbach, M. S. Rapp, C. Strenger, Michael Wolff","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2993262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2993262","url":null,"abstract":"English Abstract: The Code Compliance Study 2017 examines the acceptance level of the current version of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) within DAX and MDAX firms. The study analyses overall compliance, as well as the firms’ compliance behavior on the level of chapters, items and even single GCGC recommendations. \u0000In addition, the study examines the firms' governance quality based on four specially constructed governance indices that represent the the key areas of governance (transparency, monitoring/control, incentives and diversity). Moreover, compliance behavior with respect to GCGC's suggestions as well as the relationship between firm characteristics and compliance levels is analyzed. Overall, the study presents a broad and comprehensive view on code compliance behavior of German listed firms. \u0000German Abstract: Die Studie analysiert und bewertet systematisch und umfassend die Akzeptanz der aktuellen, dreizehnten Fassung des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (DCGK) durch DAX-und MDAX-Gesellschaften anhand der durch §161 AktG vorgeschriebenen Entsprechenserklarungen. Analysiert wird das grundsatzliche Niveau der Kodexakzeptanz, aber auch das Entsprechensverhalten der Gesellschaften auf Kapitel- und Ziffernebene, bis hin zur Analyse einzelner Empfehlungen. Daruber hinaus untersucht die Studie die Governance Qualitat der Gesellschaften basierend auf vier eigens hierfur konstruierten Governance Indizes, welche die Kernbereiche Transparenz, Kontrolle/Uberwachung, Anreizsysteme und Vielfalt abbilden. Erganzt wird dies um Analysen hinsichtlich des Verhaltens bezuglich Kodexanregungen, des Zusammenhangs zwischen Complianceverhalten und Unternehmensgrose bzw. Eigentumerstruktur und einer Analyse der im Rahmen der Entsprechenserklarungen gegebenen Erlauterungen. \u0000Im Rahmen der Studie werden die bis 31. Marz 2017 veroffentlichten Entsprechenserklarungen (gemas §161 AktG) der in DAX und MDAX notierten Gesellschaften analysiert. Die untersuchten Unternehmen reprasentieren zu Ende 2016 etwa 88 Prozent der Marktkapitalisierung des Prime Standard der Deutschen Borse, sodass die Studie einen umfassenden und gleichzeitig individuell- differenzierten Blick auf die marktrelevante Akzeptanz des DCGK in den grosten deutschen Aktiengesellschaften vermittelt.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131405372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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