Nigeria’s Niger Delta is plagued by serious environmental problems. These environmental problems include oil spillage, pollution, deforestation, biodiversity destruction, and so forth. Many of the environmental problems in the Niger Delta arise from the anthropogenic activities of multinational oil companies. While these environmental problems, which have caused widespread environmental degradation, are well discussed in light of environmental justice, the reality—that these problems are also precipitated by environmental racist attitudes and practices—is not receiving just attention. This article argues that the environmental problems in the Niger Delta should be seen from the perspective of environmental racism. Through critical hermeneutics and analytic methods, the article shows that what is taking place in the Niger Delta can be called environmental racism. The Niger Delta peoples and cultures have disproportionately suffered from the burden and effects of oil exploration and exploitation activities. Many practices taking place in the Niger Delta, such as gas flaring, use of obsolete oil equipment, and so forth, will not be tolerated in Western countries where the headquarters of multinational oil companies are located. The article finds that unacceptable levels of environmental racism are taking place in the Niger Delta. The article concludes that there is a need to promote environmental justice and mitigate the environmental problems in the Niger Delta.
{"title":"Environmental Racism in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An Ethical Appraisal","authors":"M. O. Ikeke","doi":"10.25159/2413-3086/7271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25159/2413-3086/7271","url":null,"abstract":"Nigeria’s Niger Delta is plagued by serious environmental problems. These environmental problems include oil spillage, pollution, deforestation, biodiversity destruction, and so forth. Many of the environmental problems in the Niger Delta arise from the anthropogenic activities of multinational oil companies. While these environmental problems, which have caused widespread environmental degradation, are well discussed in light of environmental justice, the reality—that these problems are also precipitated by environmental racist attitudes and practices—is not receiving just attention. This article argues that the environmental problems in the Niger Delta should be seen from the perspective of environmental racism. Through critical hermeneutics and analytic methods, the article shows that what is taking place in the Niger Delta can be called environmental racism. The Niger Delta peoples and cultures have disproportionately suffered from the burden and effects of oil exploration and exploitation activities. Many practices taking place in the Niger Delta, such as gas flaring, use of obsolete oil equipment, and so forth, will not be tolerated in Western countries where the headquarters of multinational oil companies are located. The article finds that unacceptable levels of environmental racism are taking place in the Niger Delta. The article concludes that there is a need to promote environmental justice and mitigate the environmental problems in the Niger Delta.","PeriodicalId":42048,"journal":{"name":"Phronimon","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140744532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-23DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/14898
Ntokozo Dladla
‘Traditional Cultural Expressions’ and ‘Expressions of folklore’ (TCEs/folklore) have received very little critical attention within intellectual property (IP) jurisprudence. Where TCEs/folklore have been treated, it has only been to the extent that international IP does not offer sufficient protection over them as an analogous class of IP or to the extent that TCEs/folklore themselves are philosophically incompatible with IP, and accordingly fail to adequately capture the cultural expressions of indigenous peoples. This article offers a different argument regarding TCEs/folklore which neither seeks their further protection nor their legislative and policy development. Instead, this article traces the genealogy of TCEs/folklore within the imperialist foundations of international law, arguing that TCEs/folklore are the function of an already existing discursive arrangement of power that is consistent with colonial valuations of knowledge and culture.
{"title":"Copyright Law and the Ruse of Culture: ‘Traditional Cultural Expressions and Expressions of Folklore’ as a Conception of Racial Difference","authors":"Ntokozo Dladla","doi":"10.25159/2413-3086/14898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25159/2413-3086/14898","url":null,"abstract":"‘Traditional Cultural Expressions’ and ‘Expressions of folklore’ (TCEs/folklore) have received very little critical attention within intellectual property (IP) jurisprudence. Where TCEs/folklore have been treated, it has only been to the extent that international IP does not offer sufficient protection over them as an analogous class of IP or to the extent that TCEs/folklore themselves are philosophically incompatible with IP, and accordingly fail to adequately capture the cultural expressions of indigenous peoples. This article offers a different argument regarding TCEs/folklore which neither seeks their further protection nor their legislative and policy development. Instead, this article traces the genealogy of TCEs/folklore within the imperialist foundations of international law, arguing that TCEs/folklore are the function of an already existing discursive arrangement of power that is consistent with colonial valuations of knowledge and culture.\u0000","PeriodicalId":42048,"journal":{"name":"Phronimon","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140435608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-23DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/14906
Ilana Le Roux
Discussions on the use, regulation, and development of assisted reproductive and reprogenetic technologies are dominated by rights discourse, primarily paying attention to how these technologies can give effect to or violate individual or group rights within the current liberal human rights framework. South Africa has played a prominent role as Africa’s representative in this global discussion pertaining to the ethics of genetic and reproductive technologies; undoubtedly attributable to it having what is described by many as “one of the most progressive constitutions in the world.” One popular perspective presupposing the legitimacy of the 1996 constitution and prevailing human rights norms, argues for the relaxation of restrictions on these technologies to allow for the effective exercise and realisation of constitutionally protected rights. In this article I explore the use of these technologies from a constitutional abolitionist perspective espoused by the Azanian Philosophical Tradition. By understanding the 1996 constitution as the constitutionalisation of conquest, I contemplate the ways in which these technologies function in service of (global) white supremacy and settler domination in conqueror South Africa. The article argues that in a world ordered by bio-logic, these technologies effectively (re)produce the society envisioned by the conqueror; begging the question as to whether these technologies can indeed be used in service of a post-conquest South Africa.
{"title":"Reproducing the Conqueror’s South Africa: An Azanian Critique of the Constitutionalist Endorsement of Assisted Reproductive and Reprogenetic Technologies","authors":"Ilana Le Roux","doi":"10.25159/2413-3086/14906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25159/2413-3086/14906","url":null,"abstract":"Discussions on the use, regulation, and development of assisted reproductive and reprogenetic technologies are dominated by rights discourse, primarily paying attention to how these technologies can give effect to or violate individual or group rights within the current liberal human rights framework. South Africa has played a prominent role as Africa’s representative in this global discussion pertaining to the ethics of genetic and reproductive technologies; undoubtedly attributable to it having what is described by many as “one of the most progressive constitutions in the world.” One popular perspective presupposing the legitimacy of the 1996 constitution and prevailing human rights norms, argues for the relaxation of restrictions on these technologies to allow for the effective exercise and realisation of constitutionally protected rights. In this article I explore the use of these technologies from a constitutional abolitionist perspective espoused by the Azanian Philosophical Tradition. By understanding the 1996 constitution as the constitutionalisation of conquest, I contemplate the ways in which these technologies function in service of (global) white supremacy and settler domination in conqueror South Africa. The article argues that in a world ordered by bio-logic, these technologies effectively (re)produce the society envisioned by the conqueror; begging the question as to whether these technologies can indeed be used in service of a post-conquest South Africa.","PeriodicalId":42048,"journal":{"name":"Phronimon","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140438063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-20DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/14922
M. Ramose
Diphetogo tseo di tlisitsego boipuso mafatsheng a Afrika gase tsa fetola nyenyefatso ya bothopja le bokgoba bjo bo gapeleditsweng ke mafatshe a Bodikela bja mose wa mawatle. Sebakwa ke sona se taodisong ye. Re ema ka la gore magoro kamoka a bophelo a tshwanetse go mothofatswa, botho ebe bjona motheo wa phedisano magereng ga batho kamoka “Afrika-borwa” le lefatsheng ka bophara. Moono wo o tshwanetse go ba karolo ya mananego kamoka a thuto go tloga thutong ya motheo go fihlela thutong tje phagamego. The ethically unjustified violence of Western colonisation continues in the economic and epistemic spheres in Africa, despite the reluctant concession by the Western coloniser to political independence. The constitutional histories of politically independent Africa are mainly the reaffirmation of the imposed domestication of the legal paradigm of the Western colonial conqueror. This is constitutionalism. With particular reference to conqueror South Africa, I take the “Union of South Africa” as the commencement of constitutionalism. General Smuts, later Prime Minister, was among three Afrikaner Generals engaged in the founding and the development of the “Union of South Africa.” He is selected here for his claim that the White colonial conquerors from Western Europe are endowed with superior intelligence. This can be used to continue the subjugation of indigenous conquered peoples into an indefinitely long future. This article challenges this claim because it is ethically untenable and fundamentally at odds with constitution-ness underlying the ubu-ntu legal paradigm. Given the evolution of constitutionalism in conqueror South Africa until the constitution of 1996, was Smuts right in his claim? In addition to the ethical indefensibility of this claim, it is argued further that the “epistemic decolonial turn” overlooks “decolonisation” as argued by Africans, and disregards humanisation—mothofatso—as the fundamental counter to the dehumanisation project of colonialism.
Diphetogo tseo di tlisitsego boipuso mafatsheng a Afrika gase tsa fetola nyenyefatso ya bothopja le bokgoba bjo bo gapeleditsweng ke mafatshe a Bodikela bja mose wa mawatle.Sebakwa ke sona se taodisong ye.Re ema ka la gore magoro kamoka a bophelo a tshwanetse go mothofatswa, botho ebe bjona motheo wa phedisano magereng ga batho kamoka "Afrika-borwa" le lefatsheng ka bophara.Moono wo o tshwanetse go ba karolo ya mananego kamoka a thuto go tloga thutong ya motheo go fihlela thutong tje phagamego.政治独立的非洲的宪政史主要是对西方殖民征服者强加的法律范式的国内化的重申。这就是立宪主义。具体到征服者南非，我认为 "南非联邦 "是宪政的开端。斯穆特将军，后来的总理，是参与创建和发展 "南非联盟 "的三位阿非利加将军之一。他之所以被选中，是因为他声称来自西欧的白人殖民征服者拥有超群的智慧。这可以用来在无限长的未来继续征服被征服的原住民。本文对这一主张提出质疑，因为它在伦理上站不住脚，而且从根本上违背了乌布恩图法律范式所依据的宪政性。鉴于征服者南非直到 1996 年宪法之前的宪政演变，斯穆特的主张是否正确？除了在伦理上站不住脚之外，本文还进一步论证了 "认识论上的非殖民化转向 "忽视了非洲人所主张的 "非殖民化"，无视人性化--Mothofatso--作为对殖民主义非人性化项目的根本性反击。
{"title":"The Evolution of Constitutionalism in Conqueror South Africa. Was Jan Smuts Right? An Ubu-ntu Response","authors":"M. Ramose","doi":"10.25159/2413-3086/14922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25159/2413-3086/14922","url":null,"abstract":"Diphetogo tseo di tlisitsego boipuso mafatsheng a Afrika gase tsa fetola nyenyefatso ya bothopja le bokgoba bjo bo gapeleditsweng ke mafatshe a Bodikela bja mose wa mawatle. Sebakwa ke sona se taodisong ye. Re ema ka la gore magoro kamoka a bophelo a tshwanetse go mothofatswa, botho ebe bjona motheo wa phedisano magereng ga batho kamoka “Afrika-borwa” le lefatsheng ka bophara. Moono wo o tshwanetse go ba karolo ya mananego kamoka a thuto go tloga thutong ya motheo go fihlela thutong tje phagamego.\u0000The ethically unjustified violence of Western colonisation continues in the economic and epistemic spheres in Africa, despite the reluctant concession by the Western coloniser to political independence. The constitutional histories of politically independent Africa are mainly the reaffirmation of the imposed domestication of the legal paradigm of the Western colonial conqueror. This is constitutionalism. With particular reference to conqueror South Africa, I take the “Union of South Africa” as the commencement of constitutionalism. General Smuts, later Prime Minister, was among three Afrikaner Generals engaged in the founding and the development of the “Union of South Africa.” He is selected here for his claim that the White colonial conquerors from Western Europe are endowed with superior intelligence. This can be used to continue the subjugation of indigenous conquered peoples into an indefinitely long future. This article challenges this claim because it is ethically untenable and fundamentally at odds with constitution-ness underlying the ubu-ntu legal paradigm. Given the evolution of constitutionalism in conqueror South Africa until the constitution of 1996, was Smuts right in his claim? In addition to the ethical indefensibility of this claim, it is argued further that the “epistemic decolonial turn” overlooks “decolonisation” as argued by Africans, and disregards humanisation—mothofatso—as the fundamental counter to the dehumanisation project of colonialism.","PeriodicalId":42048,"journal":{"name":"Phronimon","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140445719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-16DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/13880
M. E. Baloyi
The quest for decolonisation and Africanisation of higher education in South African higher educational institutions has reached an uncompromising stage, since colonial divisions between the natives and the colonisers are still evident in the education system. This was also demonstrated by the “#FeesMustFall” campaign, which closed the majority of South African universities in 2015. Since then, decolonisation has kept scholars, academics and researchers busy in search of appropriate responses to the quest, but decolonial projects seem to be very slow. One of the reasons is that those in the leadership of the projects may be using delaying tactics for their colonial benefits. This article questions who should lead in the projects of Africanisation and decolonisation. The author is convinced that this question cannot be avoided if Africanisation and decolonisation must take speed. Reversal of colonial inequalities (including in educational spheres) is of paramount importance for the life of the colonised in general. It is an important demand that the correct or capable and informed leaders are identified and equipped to take the lead with the project. To this effect, this article makes a few practical theological suggestions. This research is interdisciplinary in nature since it starts with decolonisation, and continues with theology—particularly practical theology. These two disciplines are engaging the current problem of the contemporary people within their immediate situation.
{"title":"Who Must Lead Decoloniality: A Practical Theological Interrogation on the Possible Qualification to Lead Decolonisation: A South African Study","authors":"M. E. Baloyi","doi":"10.25159/2413-3086/13880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25159/2413-3086/13880","url":null,"abstract":"The quest for decolonisation and Africanisation of higher education in South African higher educational institutions has reached an uncompromising stage, since colonial divisions between the natives and the colonisers are still evident in the education system. This was also demonstrated by the “#FeesMustFall” campaign, which closed the majority of South African universities in 2015. Since then, decolonisation has kept scholars, academics and researchers busy in search of appropriate responses to the quest, but decolonial projects seem to be very slow. One of the reasons is that those in the leadership of the projects may be using delaying tactics for their colonial benefits. This article questions who should lead in the projects of Africanisation and decolonisation. The author is convinced that this question cannot be avoided if Africanisation and decolonisation must take speed. Reversal of colonial inequalities (including in educational spheres) is of paramount importance for the life of the colonised in general. It is an important demand that the correct or capable and informed leaders are identified and equipped to take the lead with the project. To this effect, this article makes a few practical theological suggestions. This research is interdisciplinary in nature since it starts with decolonisation, and continues with theology—particularly practical theology. These two disciplines are engaging the current problem of the contemporary people within their immediate situation.","PeriodicalId":42048,"journal":{"name":"Phronimon","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140453685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-13DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/14813
Pieter Craffert
On an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience confronts us with claims about our essential nature as human beings. These vary from you are your brain to you have no free will. Despite the prevalence of these claims in the neurosciences on the big questions about ourselves, contemporary neuroscience of consciousness does not speak with a unified voice. Although mainstream neuroscience of consciousness claims that you are your brain, a minority tradition argues you are not your brain but that you have a brain. The substance of these two traditions is presented in this article. An evaluation of the impact of the neurosciences on the big questions of being humans should as a first step appreciate the significance that the neurosciences do not automatically provide a solution to these age-old questions about human beings but display a spectrum of views.
{"title":"You Are (Not) Your Brain: Incompatible Images of Human Beings in The Neurosciences","authors":"Pieter Craffert","doi":"10.25159/2413-3086/14813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25159/2413-3086/14813","url":null,"abstract":"On an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience confronts us with claims about our essential nature as human beings. These vary from you are your brain to you have no free will. Despite the prevalence of these claims in the neurosciences on the big questions about ourselves, contemporary neuroscience of consciousness does not speak with a unified voice. Although mainstream neuroscience of consciousness claims that you are your brain, a minority tradition argues you are not your brain but that you have a brain. The substance of these two traditions is presented in this article. An evaluation of the impact of the neurosciences on the big questions of being humans should as a first step appreciate the significance that the neurosciences do not automatically provide a solution to these age-old questions about human beings but display a spectrum of views.","PeriodicalId":42048,"journal":{"name":"Phronimon","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139964440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-09DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/15283
Bert Olivier
The work that I wish to concentrate on here, Perpetual Peace, is situated at least in the converging fields of (international and constitutional) law and politics. Given its date of publication (1795), Kant’s preceding works may all safely be said to have prepared his thinking for the progressive ideas expressed there, but to disclose the specific threads that connect each of these 12 preceding works with Perpetual Peace would require far more than a mere article. For this reason, I have confined myself largely to drawing such connections between the latter work and Kant’s seminal (and famous) essay, What is Enlightenment? (1784) before elaborating on Perpetual Peace and its implications for the current global situation, which will, therefore, also have to be reconstructed, unavoidably, from my own perspective. This article, therefore, addresses the question of “lasting” world peace through the lens of Kant’s essay on the conditions for “perpetual peace.” This is done by listing each of the six “Preliminary Articles” and three “Definitive Articles” stated by Kant, in turn, and comparing their respective requirements to current events in the extant world, specifically those surrounding the Russia-Ukraine/NATO conflict. It is demonstrated that, although Kant admitted that the principles he listed comprised an “ideal”, the present era marks a set of conditions further removed from lasting peace than ever before.
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Pub Date : 2024-02-09DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/15283
Bert Olivier
The work that I wish to concentrate on here, Perpetual Peace, is situated at least in the converging fields of (international and constitutional) law and politics. Given its date of publication (1795), Kant’s preceding works may all safely be said to have prepared his thinking for the progressive ideas expressed there, but to disclose the specific threads that connect each of these 12 preceding works with Perpetual Peace would require far more than a mere article. For this reason, I have confined myself largely to drawing such connections between the latter work and Kant’s seminal (and famous) essay, What is Enlightenment? (1784) before elaborating on Perpetual Peace and its implications for the current global situation, which will, therefore, also have to be reconstructed, unavoidably, from my own perspective. This article, therefore, addresses the question of “lasting” world peace through the lens of Kant’s essay on the conditions for “perpetual peace.” This is done by listing each of the six “Preliminary Articles” and three “Definitive Articles” stated by Kant, in turn, and comparing their respective requirements to current events in the extant world, specifically those surrounding the Russia-Ukraine/NATO conflict. It is demonstrated that, although Kant admitted that the principles he listed comprised an “ideal”, the present era marks a set of conditions further removed from lasting peace than ever before.
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Pub Date : 2023-10-20DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/12556
Tosin Adeate
Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is considered a defence of individual rights and the equal worth of rights and duties in Afro-communitarianism. It concerns the primary status of rights and duties in modern African thought. However, moderate communitarianism has been received with strong reactions, one of which is the supposed serious consideration it gives to duties and community in the final analysis of its argument regarding the conception of personhood and the relationship between the self and its community. Criticism of moderate communitarianism is about its inability to capture the rights of individuals that is bold in its demand for primary status in the Afro-communitarian political thought dominated by the supremacy of communal duties—a stance that triggered its emergence. Nonetheless, I argue that a reading of moderate communitarianism demonstrates that its criticism is mainly due to some unclarity in Gyekye’s analysis and that, contrary to existing defence, moderate communitarianism, as an account of moderate persons and moderate communities, is not a description of what exists in Afro-communitarianism but a designed framework for modern Afro-communitarianism in a way that redefines the communitarian nature of African thought. Interpreting moderate communitarianism as suggesting a direction for Afro-communitarianism would be essential for a meaningful engagement with it.
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Pub Date : 2023-09-21DOI: 10.25159/2413-3086/13232
Casper Lötter
This is a study of how Finland, a Western democracy which has considerably reduced its rate of recidivism, could help South Africa achieve more effective crime control, despite vested interests (such as the prison-industrial-complex, which profits from the perpetuation of crime). This contribution also considers Braithwaite’s seminal distinction between stigmatising and integrative shaming cultures and how Finland, even though it has a stigmatising shaming culture, has achieved a recidivism rate of around 31% (with deincarceration at 53/100 000). This is much better than South Africa’s unacceptably high 86–94% (259/100 000). By using a conflict transformation theoretical lens, it is argued that this great accomplishment in Finland manifests as a result of a meaningful acknowledgement of offenders’ and ex-offenders’ basic human needs, thereby removing this primary source of human conflict. In conclusion, Finland’s criminal justice system is a good blueprint that South Africa’s Department of Correctional Services should seriously consider emulating.
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